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Abstract 
 
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, large dealer banks exercised strong influence over 
the regulation of OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives in the United States and the European 
Union. Has there been any change in their influence over policy outcomes in the regulation 
of OTC derivatives in these two jurisdictions since the global financial crisis of 2008? If so, 
why? If not, why not? This thesis addresses these questions by analyzing the post-crisis 
introduction of mandatory margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. 
 
It argues that this regulatory innovation reveals a significant decrease in dealer bank 
influence. Shifting from a position of dominance before the crisis, the dealer banks’ 
influence over this regulatory reform process was significantly reduced.  
 
To explain this change, the thesis argues that the influence of dealer bank preferences over 
regulatory outcomes in this sector is moderated by a number of variables. Based on a 
survey of literature in international political economy (IPE), it identifies six moderators 
whose effect individually and jointly shapes the degree of bank influence over policy 
outcomes: business unity, public issue salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state 
of the transnational policy community, inter-state power relations, and the domestic 
institutional environment. Prior to the crisis, all six moderators individually and jointly 
operated to the banks’ advantage. The crisis, however, caused an exogenous shock to the 
system, resulting in a fundamental reconfiguration, and corresponding reduction in 
influence. 
 
Theoretically, this dissertation speaks to the literature analyzing private financial sector 
influence over financial regulation. Specifically, it contributes to the literature that 
conceives of ‘influence over policy outcomes’ as a moderated condition by exploring the 
role of the six variables in moderating the influence of dealer bank preferences over 
regulatory outcomes in this sector. Empirically, it provides the first detailed analysis of some 
important elements of the margin reform, which, despite the enormous significance of 
derivatives to the global economy, has received little scholarly attention. The margin reform 
represents a sea change in terms of the governance of the uncleared market, but it has not 
been accompanied by broader change reaching beyond the efforts of addressing ‘systemic 
risk’.  
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CHAPTER I - Introduction 
 
1. The argument and overview of the study 
 
During the years leading up to the global financial crisis of 2008, the preferences of large 
dealer banks exercised strong influence over the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). Has there been any 
change in their influence over policy outcomes in the regulation of OTC derivatives in these 
two jurisdictions since the global financial crisis of 2008? If so, why? If not, why not? This 
thesis addresses these questions, focusing on the post-crisis introduction of mandatory 
margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. I argue that this regulatory 
change reveals a significant decrease in dealer bank influence. Shifting from a position of 
dominance before the crisis, the dealer banks’ influence over this regulatory reform process 
has been more limited. In many specific episodes surrounding the introduction of 
mandatory margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives, their preferences did 
not align with the regulatory outcome; that is, they experienced a direct ‘loss’. In other 
cases, there was closer alignment, but their influence over those outcomes was either non-
existent – that is, they benefited from ‘congruence’, but had no influence – or only limited 
and indirect. 
 
To explain this change, I argue that the influence of dealer bank preferences over regulatory 
outcomes in this sector is moderated by a number of variables. Drawing on literature in 
international political economy (IPE), I identify six moderators whose effect individually and 
jointly shapes the degree of bank influence over policy outcomes. The six conditions are 
business unity, public issue salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the 
transnational policy community, inter-state power relations, and the domestic institutional 
environment. I argue we should study not only the individual effect of each moderator on 
the level of dealer bank influence, as most of the currently existing research does, but also 
their joint, interactive, and dynamic effects. By ‘dynamic’ effects, I mean that the particular 
effect of a moderator on its own can sometimes have little impact on the level of dealer 
bank influence, but that in other cases, it can set in motion a domino effect, changing the 
effect of other moderators, with the joint effect leading to a particular level of influence. 
Such an integrative approach appears particularly promising for cases in which the needle of 
the influence barometer fluctuates along the spectrum over the course of the policy 
process, before settling on its final level once the final policy outcome has been produced. 
 
The results of this study reveal that prior to the crisis, all of the six moderators individually 
and jointly operated to the banks’ advantage. The crisis, however, caused an exogenous 
shock to the system, resulting in a fundamental reconfiguration. Every moderator at times 
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had a detrimental effect on the banks’ respective level of influence. Depending on the 
specific constellation of the moderators, this resulted in (limited) indirect influence, 
congruence, or loss. There was not a single case in which the banks returned to the pinnacle 
of pre-crisis influence. The empirical evidence suggests that there is no ‘super moderator’ 
allowing us to predict ex ante which level of dealer bank influence will prevail, suggesting 
that dealer bank influence cannot be reduced to one particular condition. 
 
At the same time, the cross-case analysis reveals that three moderators behaved in a very 
interesting way in that their effect was positive in those cases in which the banks exercised 
influence, whereas their effect was negative when the dealers experienced a loss. The 
moderators in question are policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the transnational 
policy community, and the domestic institutional environment. Often considered only as a 
‘second’ thought by the literature which tends to privilege instrumental and structural 
power variables, these conditions appear to be of particular relevance to dealer bank 
influence and their relevance should be further explored. 
 
This thesis makes several contributions to the existing academic literature. First, it makes a 
theoretical contribution to the literature analyzing private financial sector influence over 
financial regulation. While the dissertation cannot provide a definite answer the classical 
question of ‘what causes bank influence?’ I propose to study dealer bank influence in a 
particular way that might improve our understanding of the concept. Specifically, I 
contribute to the literature that conceives of ‘influence over policy outcomes’ as a 
moderated condition by exploring the role of the six variables in moderating the influence 
of dealer bank preferences over regulatory outcomes in this sector. Overall, the analysis 
suggests that the relationship between dealer bank influence and policy-making is much 
more complex than simplistic notions of ‘regulatory capture’ tend to assume. Given that the 
post-crisis period was punctuated by important, unequivocal losses for the banks, I 
conclude that scholars interested in understanding post-crisis financial regulation should 
widen their analytical lens beyond interest group-based analyses to also consider other 
approaches, including those related to the variables identified as moderators in this thesis.  
 
Second, the dissertation makes several empirical contributions. Most importantly, it 
provides the first detailed analysis of some important elements of the margin reform, 
which, despite the enormous significance of derivatives to the global economy, has received 
little scholarly attention. In addition, it responds to calls from the literature to examine how 
the pre-crisis role of the banks as central figures in the policy-making process has evolved 
after the crisis, and the impact this has had on the public-private relationship in the global 
political economy of finance. I argue that because of the reconfiguration of the moderator 
constellation that used to provide ample opportunity for dealer bank influence, the banks 
have lost their central position in the policy-making process and have failed to restore their 
pre-crisis levels of dominance, resulting in a move of the weight in the public-private 
partnership towards the public side. 
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Finally, this thesis also speaks to the wider literature on the extent to which the 2008 crisis 
has led to ‘change’. While President Obama set the bar very high in 2009 by announcing the 
beginning of ‘a new era of economic engagement’,1 most observers are sceptical of the 
extent to which more far-reaching change has been achieved. Contributing to this debate, I 
argue that the margin reform has resulted in a sea change in the ways in which the 
uncleared market is governed, but that policy-makers did not use the momentum this 
change provided them in order to engage in a debate about how the governance of the OTC 
derivatives market could be aligned with the broader ‘global public interest’ defined not 
exclusively from a ‘systemic risk’ perspective. However, I show that recent announcements 
by the Republican-led CFTC, in conjunction with the current discussions on Brexit might lead 
to a reversal of the change that has been achieved. 
 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 of this chapter provides some background 
information on ‘derivatives’, ‘margin’, and ‘central clearing’. It also discusses the centrality 
of the dealer banks in the uncleared market, and covers the ways in which the under-
collateralization of the uncleared market prior to 2008 contributed to the global financial 
crisis. Section 3 situates the thesis within existing IPE literature, both theoretical and 
empirical.  
 
Chapter II develops the analytical framework of the thesis. I first explain the theoretical 
framework. (II-2). I begin by discussing the difficulties of identifying interest group influence 
(II-2.1). Next, I address the ways in which dealer banks can articulate their preferences. This 
thesis focuses on two methods of articulation: the provision of information and the 
projection of structural and structuring power (II-2.2). In the following section, I introduce 
the six conditions I have identified in the IPE literature as moderators of interest group 
influence. I discuss the individual effect of each condition as explained and tested by the 
literature (II-2.3). Section II-3 presents the individual cases of the thesis which correspond to 
different aspects of pre and post-crisis regulatory outcomes. While I focus on the pre-crisis 
deregulation of the OTC market as one case, the other cases cover selected aspects of the 
post-crisis margin rules. Section II-4 covers the methodological approach of the study. 
Section II-5 addresses the limitations of the thesis, an important one of which pertains to 
the comparatively weaker data basis for the EU cases. 
 
Chapter III explores dealer bank influence over pre-crisis deregulation. In chapter IV, I 
discuss several aspects that transcend the discussion of the individual post-crisis margin 
rules. These include the initial persistence of the deregulation consensus in 2008 (IV-2), the 
exponential rise of public issue salience (IV-3), the emergence of the ideational 
clearing/margining consensus (IV-4), and the marginalization of the banks during the policy-
making process (IV-5). I subsequently discuss the individual margin cases. Chapter V covers 
the mandatory use of initial margin (IM) over which the banks failed to exercise influence, 
having to accept their first major loss. Chapter VI covers some specific design elements of 
                                                        
1
 Obama (2009:2) 
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the IM mandate including the 2-way exchange requirement, the segregation requirement, 
and the rehypothecation ban, each of which equally resulted in a loss for the banks. 
 
Chapter VII focuses on the treatment of non-financial end-users, which was the only case in 
which the banks successfully exercised influence, even though it was only indirect, and 
more limited in the EU than the US. Chapter VIII addresses the IM and variation margin 
(VM) rules for foreign exchange (FX) swaps and FX forwards. While the banks probably 
benefited from congruence regarding the lack of an IM collateralization requirement, they 
also lost the VM case. Each case study chapter begins, where necessary, with some 
background information to introduce the specific rule element(s). I then cover the 
preferences of dealer banks as well as those of other interest groups, followed by policy-
makers’ responses, and the ways in which the moderators affected the particular level of 
influence. In each case, I first provide a brief overview of the policy-making process, before 
describing it through the lens of the analytical model. The reader will notice the significant 
length of the end-user case which provides for the longest most encompassing case study 
chapter. The reason is that, compared to the other rule elements, this part of the 
framework kept policy-makers on their toes for many years, with the policy-process taking 
many turns, particularly in the US. 
 
Chapter IX concludes. Section IX-1 pulls the individual results together in light of the overall 
argument and discusses the theoretical implications of the findings. Section IX-2 covers the 
empirical contributions, with section IX-3 focusing more specifically on the extent to which 
the margin reform has led to broader change in the post-crisis derivatives markets. 
 
2. Background: Derivatives, margin, the dealer banks, and 
central clearing  
 
2.1 Derivatives and the centrality of dealer banks 
 
Derivatives represent a form of financial contract whose value is derived from the price of 
an underlying asset, such as a security, an index, a currency, an interest rate, or, in principle, 
any other market variable, including the weather.2  Entered into for the purpose of 
speculation (meaning the investor intends to earn a profit from the difference between the 
price of the derivative and the underlying asset, which often involves a directional bet) or 
with the aim of hedging (through which the investor intends to protect herself against 
adverse changes of the underlying asset through the offsetting effect of the derivative),3 
                                                        
2
 Waldman (1994:1026f.) 
3
 Chui (2012:4) 
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they ‘transfer the consequence of a price change’ for the investor.4 In practice, the line 
between hedging and speculation often blurs. 
 
Derivatives embody a kind of debt in that they ‘involve a promise to make some payment or 
to deliver some financial asset in the future’.5 The obligations differ in function of the type 
of derivative in question. The most common forms include forwards, futures, options, and 
swaps. Through a forward, an investor enters the obligation to buy or sell a particular asset 
for a pre-specified price determined when the contract is signed. A futures contract is based 
on the same idea, the only difference being that the contract is standardized and traded on 
an exchange. An option is more flexible in that it conveys the option to buy or sell the 
underlying asset, without any formal obligation to actually do so. Options can also be traded 
on an exchange. Swaps involve a two-way exchange of cash flows, based on the assets the 
two counterparties own, at specific dates defined in the contract.6 
 
Derivatives can be traded on an exchange, or over-the-counter (OTC). Leo Melamed, 
chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) in 2009 explained that ‘OTC derivatives 
and exchange traded financial futures are galaxies different’.7 OTC and exchange-traded 
derivatives do indeed differ across several dimensions. For example, the terms of contract 
(such as size) of exchange-traded contracts are standardized, whereas they are bespoke for 
OTC trades, although up until the crisis, many counterparties also traded a portion of their 
standardized deals OTC, given the ease of conducting business in a deregulated 
environment. Exchange-traded contracts also have a relatively short maturity (i.e. the time 
until the instrument ceases to exist is short). It rarely exceeds several months, whereas the 
maturity of OTC contracts can be many years, if not decades. Short maturities also explain 
why the liquidity of exchange-traded contracts is high, while it can be limited for OTC 
contracts, given their high level of bespokeness and long maturity. As well, the volume of 
exchange-traded derivatives is usually comparatively small in relation to the overall market 
size, meaning an individual trade would rarely make the market ‘move’. By contrast, OTC 
trades can be of relatively large size, with a bid or an offer potentially having a significant 
effect on the direction in which the market moves. Finally, the credit risk (i.e. the risk that 
the counterparty fails to make a contractually stipulated payment) pertaining to exchange-
traded contracts is assumed by a central counterparty (CCP) that interposes itself between 
buyer and seller, whereas it rests at the bilateral level for OTC contract.8  
 
While derivatives have been known since 2000 BC,9 most of their modern-day use dates 
back to the end of the Bretton Woods regime. Susan Strange has described the rise of the 
uncleared market as the result of a ‘coincidence of escalating growth and escalating risk’, 
with firms and investors relying on OTC derivatives to respond to the increasing risks 
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 Turbeville (2013) 
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 Murphy (2013:9), see also Awrey (2018:11) 
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associated with accelerating trade and production from the 1970s onwards. 10  With 
economic globalization taking off in the early 1990s, derivatives soon followed. By the mid-
1990s, the OTC market had outgrown the exchange-traded market, given the greater 
flexibility OTC deals offered vis-à-vis exchange-traded ones. Post-crisis, the exchange-traded 
market remains at a fraction of the OTC market.11 Figure 1 illustrates the market value of 
the OTC market broken down across various types of contracts and two different metrics. 
 
Figure 1: The market value of OTC derivatives 
 
Source: Author, based on BIS derivatives statistics (‘OTC derivatives outstanding’, USD bn). Notional volumes 
represent the total asset value of the respective underlying positions. 
 
As figure 1 illustrates, the largest segment of the OTC market is captured by interest rate 
derivatives, followed by FX and credit derivatives. The market grew spectacularly up until 
the global financial crisis of 2008, when the notional volume of outstanding trades was USD 
684tn. After the crisis, growth continued, but at a slower pace. In recent years, market 
volume has decreased. There are several explanations. Some of them relate to investors’ 
specific perception of market risk, for example with respect to interest rates, the strength of 
key currencies etc. Others are informed by the post-crisis regulatory agenda. For example, 
with the advent of mandatory central clearing, the requirements for which began to be 
phased-in in 2013 (US) and 2014 (EU), market actors had an interest in pursuing portfolio 
compression. This means ‘tearing up’ trades that cancel each other out in order to avoid any 
                                                        
10
 Strange (1998:30f.) 
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 See the BIS’ ‘exchange-traded derivatives statistics’, available at 
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 7 
double-counting under the new rules. Compression was particularly pronounced with 
respect to interest rate derivatives.12 Reduced volumes, therefore, do not necessarily reflect 
reduced risk to the economy. 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the OTC market in function of counterparty type. 
 
Figure 2: The OTC derivatives market by counterparty type 
 
Source: Author, based on BIS derivatives statistics (‘OTC derivatives outstanding’); notional volumes in USD bn. 
 
Up until the 2008 crisis, the dealer banks used to be among the most active group of market 
participants.13 As market makers, the dealers quote bids and offers for their clients. In 
addition, they often trade in the market for their own account. The dealer market tends to 
be very concentrated, with a handful of firms (see figure 3 below) capturing the bulk of its 
share. In terms of terminology, I use the expressions ‘(large) dealer bank’ and ‘(large) bank’ 
synonymously with ‘the industry’. 
 
On the other side of the trade can be found the ‘buy-side’. Key actors of the buy-side are 
‘other financial institutions’ including hedge funds, investment funds, insurance firms, 
smaller non-dealer banks, and institutional investors. In addition, there are ‘non-financial 
institutions’. They capture a rather small share, even though over 90% of globally active 
non-financial firms are part of this segment.14 The entities referred to as ‘other financial 
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 8 
institutions’ are also known as financial end-users. In this thesis, the term ‘end-user’ is 
reserved for ‘non-financial institutions’, unless otherwise specified. When speaking about 
the ‘buy-side’, I refer to ‘other financial institutions’.  
 
In the US, the top 25 dealer banks covered 99% of the annual market volume over the 
period 1998-2008.15  Within the group of the top 25, the market was even further 
concentrated. The top 14 dealers accounted for 95%,16 and within the top 14, the field was 
again heavily tilted towards the top 4. Figure 3 illustrates this by breaking down the notional 
amount of derivative contracts held by the top 10 US dealers for the year 2008. While the 
precise numbers varied from year to year in the lead-up to the crisis, the pattern of 
concentration towards the top was a consistent feature of the market. 
 
Figure 3: The leading US dealer banks in 2008 
 
Source: Author based on OCC (2009a:22 of the pdf, table 1, USD mn). Notional amount of derivative contracts, 
top commercial banks and trust companies in derivatives, as defined by the OCC, December 2008. 
 
In Europe, the key dealer banks up until the crisis included Deutsche Bank, Barclays, UBS, 
HSBC, BNP Paribas, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Credit Suisse.17 
 
The uncleared business represents a central pillar of the dealer banks’ revenue. Estimates 
suggest that in the late 1990s, OTC derivatives accounted for up to 40% of the banks’ 
profits.18 In 2009, the top 5 dealers in the US earned USD 52.83bn in revenue from trading 
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 9 
derivatives and cash securities (Goldman Sachs: USD 19.8bn; Bank of America: USD 10.64bn; 
JPMorgan: USD 9.34bn; Citigroup: USD 6.84bn; and Morgan Stanley: USD 6.21bn).19 
Pointing in a similar direction, The New York Times in 2010 reported that the OTC 
derivatives business tended to be by far the banks’ most lucrative source of income.20 
Financial analyst Christopher Whalen even stated that without this income, ‘the largest 
banks cannot survive’.21 The banks’ reliance on the income earned in this market segment 
explains their interest in pushing for deregulation and keeping intrusive public intervention 
at bay, both before and after the crisis. 
 
The dealers are organized through ISDA, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association which serves as the industry’s peak business association. Its origins date back to 
the 1980s, when a group of large banks decided it was necessary to streamline the process 
of negotiating contracts.22 In 1985, they founded the International Swap Dealers Association 
(ISDA’s predecessor), the aim being to facilitate this work and to ‘organize before any 
problems arise’23. Over time, ISDA became what Partnoy calls the ‘most powerful and 
effective lobbying force in the recent history of financial markets’.24 While it comprises over 
800 members from nearly 60 countries,25 the dealer banks have traditionally exercised a 
commanding influence over its decision-making process.26 In the years leading up to the 
crisis, only one of ISDA’s 19 board members was a non-dealer bank official (representing oil 
giant BP).27 
 
In recent years, the dealer banks have lost market share, not only because of their 
deleveraging efforts following the crisis, but also because of the rise of central clearing. The 
rise of central clearing, however, has not been even across all types of derivatives. As table 
1 reveals, it has been most pronounced with respect to interest rate and credit derivatives 
which, compared to other contract types, are more amenable to standardization. 
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 Katz/Schmidt (2010). The numbers cover the first 9 months of 2009. 
20
 Story (2010) 
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Table 1: Ratio of OTC derivatives submitted to CCPs 
 
Source: Author, based on BIS derivatives statistics (‘OTC derivatives outstanding’); percentages of notional 
volumes. 
 
2.2 The key mechanics of central clearing 
 
Central clearing means that the counterparties do not face each other directly, as in the 
uncleared market, but that a CCP interposes itself between them. The CCP ‘novates’ each 
trade through counterparty substitution. It thereby becomes the seller to every buyer and 
the buyer to every seller, and thus the ‘central’ counterparty to all trades.28 This structure 
allows the CCP to conduct ‘multilateral netting’, i.e. the cancellation (offset) of opposite and 
therefore redundant trades, which brings down notional exposure and enhances market 
liquidity.29  
 
The most important benefit of central clearing is that counterparties are not directly 
opposed to each other anymore. All their contracts are with the CCP, which itself keeps a 
flat book, i.e. it does not take a position in the market itself.30 The effects of counterparty 
default can thus be reduced, which decreases uncertainty, stabilizes the market and 
prevents fire sales, in case one counterparty experiences financial difficulties.31 By being 
counterparty to every trade, CCPs also make risks more easily identifiable and facilitate the 
gathering of trade information, which improves market transparency and allows for better 
risk management.32 CCPs lower interconnectedness among counterparties, which stops the 
dominos from falling, if one of them defaults.33 Overall, central clearing provides for a much 
more lucid and less complex market structure, compared to the impenetrable network of 
transactions characteristic of the universe of uncleared derivatives.34 
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 Peery (2012:102ff.) 
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 Cecchetti/Schoenholtz (2016), Gregory (2014:29)  
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 Lubben (2015:136), Podolyako (2010) 
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 Duffie (2010:14), Helleiner (2011a:136) 
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The principle of ‘clearing’ dates back to the 18th century Dojima rice market of Osaka, Japan. 
In the US, the Chicago Board of Trade instituted clearing with margin requirements in 1865. 
In 1882, a form of clearing including collateral requirements was introduced with the 
establishment of the Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en Marchandises in Le Havre, 
France.35 
 
Figure 4 offers a stylized comparison between the modern-day uncleared and the cleared 
markets 
 
 
Figure 4: The uncleared versus the cleared market for derivatives 
 
Source: CFTC (No Year.a: 8) 
 
As reflected by the right-hand side depiction of figure 4, CCPs operate on a ‘principal-to-
principal’ basis, meaning that the immediate buyers and sellers of contracts are both 
‘clearing members’ which have to meet certain financial, operational, and risk management 
standards. In addition, clearing members have customers of their own whose trades in 
terms of payment obligations they must guarantee.36  
 
One of the key features of modern-day central clearing is margining.37 Margin is collateral 
provided by counterparties. A ‘good faith deposit of money to assure performance’,38 it 
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 Norman (2011:ch.4, 5), Steigerwald (2014:17ff.), Gregory (2014:13) 
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reduces credit exposure, and counterparty risk.39 Margin is similar to capital in that both 
concepts lock in funds that otherwise would be available for investment or other purposes. 
The key difference becomes apparent once the counterparty defaults. Margin is ‘defaulter-
pay-oriented’, meaning the surviving counterparty uses the collateral the failing 
counterparty had provided. This feature renders margin ‘attractive from an economic 
perspective as ‘the polluter pays’’.40 By contrast, capital is ‘survivor-pay-oriented’, i.e. the 
surviving counterparty uses the assets it has set aside for itself in order to address potential 
losses.41 
 
There are two types of margin, variation margin (VM) and initial margin (IM), which 
respectively account for current and potential future exposure. VM is calculated on a daily 
basis in response to changes of market prices whose ‘variation’ it accounts for. Positions are 
marked-to-market, and counterparties must post collateral for a position that has 
decreased in value in order to make up for the loss (even if is not realized). For this reason, 
VM is also known as ‘maintenance’ margin. Valuations are conducted several times per day, 
and intra-day margin calls have started to become more and more common.42 The 
counterparty whose contract is ‘out of the money’, i.e. whose position is marked with a 
negative value has to post the necessary funds without delay, sometimes within two 
hours.43 If a counterparty is ‘in the money’, it receives VM. If the clearinghouse does not 
receive the required VM in time (a situation known as a ‘credit event’), it can promptly 
liquidate the position(s) in question, thus minimizing its losses.44  
 
IM needs to be posted to the CCP at the onset of the contract (hence the term ‘initial’ 
margin) in order to take account of potential future exposure and residual risk.45 It is 
calculated using risk-based models informed by historical data, as well as other 
parameters.46 IM provides extra protection in terms of a safety cushion the CCP can draw 
upon in case one of its members defaults and therefore cannot post any VM anymore.47 
During the time between the clearing member’s default and the close-out of its portfolio, 
known as the margin period of risk, the CCP holds a directional bet.48 It uses the IM in order 
to provide for the orderly liquidation of that member’s portfolio. The CCP can transfer the 
portfolio in question to another clearing member. It can also conduct a centralized auction 
process, potentially enhanced through further netting, which reduces the value of the 
overall position in need of replacement.49 While VM is usually limited to cash, IM can also 
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 Gregory (2014:75) 
40
 Wellink (2010:133) 
41
 ibid., also BCBS-IOSCO (2012:2) 
42
 Gregory (2014:150) 
43
 Murphy et al. (2016:2) 
44
 Markham (1991:64f.). In case of a profit, the customer receives the corresponding amount of VM in her 
account. 
45
 Chander/Costa (2010:10) 
46
 Murphy et al. (2016:2), Gregory (2015) 
47
 Duffie et al. (2010:7), Rosenberg (2010:142), Gregory (2014:86) 
48
 Gregory (2014:152) 
49
 Gregory (2014:6,30f., 140f., 152) 
 13 
take the form of other assets including, for example, high-quality sovereign bonds, gold, 
equity indices, and money market or mutual funds.50 
 
It is important to not confuse central clearing with exchange trading, which refers only to 
the venue of execution. Exchange trading involves centralized execution through a boards 
of trade mechanism. Most exchanges provide central clearing services, but central clearing 
is also possible without exchange trading, i.e. it can be pursued OTC.51 Prior to the crisis, 
however, central clearing was rather uncommon for those derivatives that were not traded 
on exchanges. 
 
 
2.3 The under-collateralization of the OTC derivatives market and the global 
financial crisis of 2008 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 did not have a single cause. A 2017 survey conducted 
among ‘leading’ American and European academic economists and cited by the Bank of 
England52 revealed the following ranking of contributing factors, as depicted in figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Causes of the global financial crisis of 2008 
 
Source: Aikman et al. (2018:5) 
 
Other professions might rank (some of) these factors differently, but the overall relevance 
of ‘inadequate regulation’, listed as the number one reason in the survey, would most likely 
remain unquestioned. 
 
While OTC derivatives were certainly not the sole cause of the crisis, some of this 
‘inadequate regulation’ extended to the bespoke market. Among other weaknesses, there 
were no specific legal collateralization requirements, given the deregulated nature of the 
market. IM and VM existed in the uncleared market, where they performed a very similar 
function as in the cleared marketplace,53  but counterparties were free to negotiate 
collateralization as they pleased.  
 
There is no precise data on the extent to which margin was used pre-2008, given that the 
sector was ‘the most private of markets’.54 Estimates, however, suggest that at the height of 
the crisis, the market was vastly undercollateralized. Regarding VM, the five largest US and 
EU dealer banks alone were burdened with USD 500bn and USD 600bn of 
undercollateralized risk respectively in 2007/2008.55 Regarding IM, the total volume of 
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collateral in the market in 2013 was about EUR 100bn, equalling 0.03% of gross notional 
exposure.56 
 
Indeed, the use of IM was ‘quite rare’.57 Dealers usually did not post IM to their clients, the 
justification being their high creditworthiness, as well as the fact that they were already 
subject to capital requirements.58 In general, inter-dealer trades were also not collateralized 
with IM.59 The buy-side was sometimes required to post IM.60 Given the perceived riskiness 
of their business, hedge funds, in particular, often had to collateralize their trades.61 
Decisions on IM were usually based on a credit analysis, but those results could be 
overshadowed by ‘market power and economics of trade between the two parties’.62 
 
VM was used somewhat more frequently, although the dealers usually did not post it to 
their clients either.63 End-users were generally exempt from all margin requirements, with 
OTC derivatives being considered part of the overall business, and in particular credit 
relationship with their banks.64 
 
Counterparties clarified their collateralization obligations when negotiating the details of 
the Credit Support Annex (CSA) of the Master Agreement.65 The Master Agreement is a 
contractual framework developed by ISDA, in which the counterparties define their rights 
and obligations.66 Prior to 2008, two common elements of CSAs were exposure thresholds 
beyond which and credit ratings below which counterparties needed to post (additional) 
collateral.67 If counterparties agreed to use VM, the idea was for it to be exchanged on a 
daily basis.68 In practice, however, the exchange often occurred much more infrequently, 
such as on a monthly basis, and the overall collateralization process often tended to be a 
secondary concern to many market actors.69  
 
Against this background, it might not be surprising that the dealer banks routinely did not 
‘segregate’ the IM they received (meaning they did not keep it aside from their proprietary 
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assets), and often ‘rehypothecated’ it (meaning they used it to finance their own 
investments).70 
 
A particular type of OTC derivatives, credit default swaps (CDS), played a prominent role 
during the crisis. A CDS represents ‘a privately negotiated contract where one party (the 
“protection seller”), in exchange for a fee, agrees to compensate another party (the 
“protection buyer”) if a specified "credit event" (such as bankruptcy or failure to pay) occurs 
with respect to a company (the "reference entity") or debt obligation (the "reference 
obligation")’.71 
 
While CDS offer a broad range of applicability, they were frequently used as a form of 
protection against the default of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), the market for which 
had massively expanded following the deregulation of lending standards.72 MBS were often 
bundled and sliced up in function of the riskiness of the underlying mortgages. The top, 
‘senior’ tranche was usually the largest slice, containing the relatively safest mortgages. The 
expected default rate of these mortgages was ‘only’ 20%, which was informed by the 
assumption that defaults were uncorrelated. 73  As a consequence of this optimistic 
assessment, the senior tranche was usually given a triple-A rating by credit rating agencies. 
The middle slice, known as the ‘mezzanine’ tranche, contained those mortgages with 
relatively elevated risk, while the ‘equity’ tranche was reserved for the relatively riskiest 
mortgages, which were often drawn from the ‘subprime’ market. The slicing and dicing was 
repeated in the construction process of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which were 
bonds backed by MBS. There were even third-order derivatives, known as ‘CDOs-Squared’.74 
 
As a result of the continuous slicing and dicing, it was often unknown which particular 
mortgages were part of which slice. In fact, it was perfectly possible for a senior CDO-
Squared tranche to contain MBS equity tranches. Nonetheless, the senior tranches of CDOs 
and CDOs-Squared were usually also rated triple-A. A top rating was usually a precondition 
for institutional investors to buy these products, given the strict limits set by their 
statutes.75 Banks, in turn, relied on these products as collateralization for their short-term 
funding.76 
 
Investors bought CDS in order to protect themselves against the risk of a default of their 
MBS/CDO/CDO-Squared tranche(s). 77  The possibility to acquire ‘naked’ CDS (without 
holding the underlying asset) allowed market actors to take out bets on other investors’ 
                                                        
70
 Gregory (2014:80), Atkins et al. (2012) 
71
 Sjostrum (2009:947f.) 
72
 Hull (2012:184ff.) 
73
 Golub (2015:662) 
74
 ibid., Blinder (2013:74ff.) 
75
 Blinder (2013:74ff.), Golub et al. (2015:660ff.), Morgan (2010:30), Spagna (2018:45) 
76
 FSA (2009a:16) 
77
 ibid. 
 17 
portfolios.78 CDS were also used in connection with other reference portfolios composed, 
for example, of loans or corporate bonds. 
 
The lack of mandatory collateralization requirements often kept the price of these products 
down, which further fuelled the market. Indeed, the appropriate collateralization of many 
of these deals, particularly those related to the mortgage market, was often not considered 
a pressing need. In the autumn of 2007, AIG’s CEO Martin Sullivan, for example, said ‘the 
probability that it [i.e. the firm’s derivative portfolio] will sustain an economic loss is close to 
zero’.79 Individual corporate officials who warned against the mounting levels of risk and 
exposure their respective firms had accumulated in the years leading up to the crisis were 
usually sidelined.80 
 
When the real estate bubble burst, the MBSs/CDOs/CDOs-Squared lost value, and the 
secondary concern regarding collateralization suddenly turned into a crucial, primary one. 
The loss in value catapulted many counterparties beyond the exposure thresholds in their 
CSAs, which led to (additional) margin calls, with further calls being made because of rating 
downgrades. Financial institutions soon began experiencing serious difficulty. The first ones 
were a number of hedge funds that collapsed in the late spring/early summer of 2007, 
followed by Northern Rock in the UK, which in the autumn of 2007 experienced a bank run. 
Next was Bear Stearns which in the spring of 2008 was bought by JP Morgan on the basis of 
a public financial purchase facilitation programme. In September 2008, the government-
sponsored mortgage lending agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were placed into 
conservatorship (where they remain to this day).81 The most prominent case was, of course, 
Lehman Brothers. In the immediate days preceding its default, it was USD 20bn in debt vis-
à-vis JP Morgan. As a consequence, JP Morgan froze USD 17bn of the Lehman assets it held, 
and called for an additional USD 5bn of collateral.82 
 
The US government’s decision to let Lehman fail fully catapulted the financial markets into 
turmoil. It soon turned out that the vast majority of CDS in the market had been sold by 
AIG. Taking advantage of its triple-A rating, AIG had accumulated an exposure of USD 500bn 
through the sale of CDS.83 Its overall derivatives portfolio had a total (notional) value of USD 
2.7tn,84 while its total equity at the height of the crisis was no more than USD 100bn.85 In 
July 2007, i.e. a couple of months prior to AIG CEO Sullivan’s confident remark about the 
safety of CDS, the firm had received a USD 1.8bn collateral call from Goldman Sachs. AIG 
disputed it for months, with Sullivan insisting he only became aware of the situation, and his 
firm’s overall exposure, much later. By September 2008, Goldman Sachs’ margin call had 
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grown nearly six-fold, reaching a level of USD 9bn.86 On 15 September 2018 AIG was 
downgraded by Moody’s and S&P. This led to additional margin calls in the range of USD 
20bn, in line with the arrangements the firm had agreed to in its CSAs. AIG was bailed out 
the following day.87 In addition, the US Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve 
implemented a series of large-scale public support measures, including record low interest 
rates, as well as vast amounts of liquidity injections through which they hoped to stabilize 
the crumbling financial markets. 
 
With many CDOs having been entered on a cross-border basis,88 the crisis soon spilled into 
other jurisdictions, and into other sectors of the financial markets. Further compounding 
factors were the lack of transparency about counterparties’ exposure (with top 
management of some counterparties often not fully aware even of their own exposure89) 
and the high level of financial interconnectedness the use of derivatives had fostered across 
all asset classes. As a result, the crisis extended to almost every part of the financial sector. 
Investors responded with fire sales, which led to the freezing of asset markets.90 Given the 
decreased availability of credit, the crisis spilled over into the trade and production sectors, 
which, in turn, had repercussions on commodity markets and remittances. The crisis soon 
became global in scope.91 
 
 
3. Situating the research within the literature 
 
This study situates itself at the nexus of three overlapping bodies of IPE literature: the 
literature on derivatives, the literature on interest group influence over post-crisis financial 
regulation, and the broader literature discussing changes to the politics of financial 
regulation after 2008.  
 
 
3.1 The IPE literature on derivatives 
 
Empirically, the thesis contributes to the IPE literature on derivatives by providing the first 
detailed study of the development of the new margin rules for uncleared derivatives. 
Despite the relevance of the derivatives sector to the global economy, these products have 
attracted scant scholarly interest, particularly when compared to the banking sector.92 This 
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section provides a first overview of the existing literature that will be expanded upon in the 
discussion of the theoretical framework. 
 
Recent research has approached the study of the IPE of pre-2008 derivatives from different 
angles, applying various theoretical or disciplinary lenses. Oldani has explored the 
implications of derivatives for monetary theory, monetary policy, and fiscal policy.93 Lagna 
has examined the derivatives-related financialization of the Italian state.94 Robertson has 
analyzed the global dominance of the community of derivatives practitioners trained in 
French schools and banks which are renowned for the quality of their education in this 
particular area.95 Spagna has covered the pre-crisis rise in importance of derivatives, which 
at the height of the crisis had become the world’s largest market.96 Bryan and Rafferty, as 
well as LiPuma and Lee have approached the dominance of OTC derivatives markets from a 
structuralist perspective.97 Riles has offered several ethnographically informed accounts on 
derivatives trading.98 
 
Post-crisis derivatives regulation has also received some attention: Helleiner and Mügge 
have each presented bird’s eye-view accounts of the broad contours and the significance of 
the reform developments after 2008.99 Pagliari has used the lens of public issue salience to 
trace the legislative debate on the post-crisis rules for derivatives in the US and the EU.100 
Clapp and Helleiner have focused on the US Congress’ debate on agricultural derivatives.101 
The cross-border dimension of the new rules has also attracted some scholarly interest. 
Pagliari and Gravelle, as well as Knaack have studied this aspect for the rules on central 
clearing and trade reporting.102 Lockwood has focused on CCPs, demonstrating that CCPs’ 
valuation methods remain heavily informed by VaR.103 Helleiner et al. have published a 
collection of essays on post-crisis derivatives reform which, among other developments, 
notes trends towards growing regulatory fragmentation across jurisdictions.104 
 
However, there are few accounts on the precise content of the new rules and the process of 
their generation. Helleiner, for example, has highlighted the need for ‘more detailed 
analyses of the content of [post-crisis] regulatory initiatives […].’105 Along similar lines, 
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Posner has called upon scholars to develop ‘[a] better grasp of how rules are made […]’.106 
In order to address this gap, Helleiner has already taken some steps by tracing the debate 
on position limits in the US and the EU. In a similar vein, Pagliari has examined some of the 
rules pertaining to clearing house membership and the de minimis threshold beyond which 
financial entities have to register as swap dealers with the CFTC.107 Newman and Posner 
have analyzed the relevance of international soft law for the alignment of post-crisis policy-
making in banking and central clearing regulation.108  
 
Margin requirements for uncleared derivatives, however, have barely attracted attention 
from the IPE community to this date. The recent collection of essays edited by Helleiner et 
al., which provides an overview of post-crisis derivatives regulation and to which several of 
the authors listed above have contributed, mentions the concept a few times, but does not 
expand on it.109 Neither do Newman and Posner who briefly touch on the topic in their 
comparison of post-crisis banking and central clearing regulation.110 Pagliari and Young have 
examined the end-user carve-out from the clearing requirement under Dodd-Frank, but 
their contribution studies exemptions from the rules, rather than the rules themselves.111 
 
The gap in research on margin is particularly significant for at least three reasons: First, the 
derivatives market is of great significance to the global financial system. At the height of the 
crisis, it was the ‘world’s largest market’.112 As we have seen, the lack of appropriate 
collateralization of derivatives is considered one of the reasons for the global financial crisis 
of 2008. Second, observers have emphasized the significance of the margin reform, 
describing it as ‘one of the bedrocks of global regulatory efforts to curb risk in the market 
[…]’113 and as a ‘part of the law [which] is among the most controversial’.114 Third, the 
reform represents one of the most important cases of post-crisis intervention in that it 
reaches beyond mere attempts at increasing transparency by imposing direct costs on 
market participants, particularly the dealer banks.  
 
The thesis begins to address this lacuna. It focuses on the actual content of some of the 
margin rules, as well as the process of their generation by applying the analytical lens of 
‘dealer bank influence’ over the respective policy outcomes. 
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3.2 The literature on interest group influence over post-crisis financial 
regulation 
 
The post-2008 literature on interest group influence over financial regulation can be 
grouped into two categories. One focuses on the theoretical conceptualization of 
‘influence’, the other on the empirical question concerning changes to the role of private 
financial groups in the policy-making process. 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical literature 
 
Theoretically, this study contributes to the growing literature on the role of private interest 
groups in financial regulation before and after 2008 which conceives of ‘influence’ as a 
moderated condition. Recent scholarship has noted that ‘numerous authors have debated 
how different resources, institutions and structural features of contemporary economies 
enable financial industry groups to influence the regulations to which they are subject’.115 
Most of these studies, however, focus on the individual effect of these variables, rather 
than attempting the development of a more integrative approach. 
 
A recent example of this literature is the work of James and Quaglia who explore the 
question why the banks have not been more successful in preventing, or at least 
attenuating Brexit. They identify three inhibitors, including ‘political statecraft’ (i.e. the May 
government’s decision to pursue a ‘hard line’ in light of electoral and internal party 
concerns), ‘institutional structures’ (i.e. the reorganization of decision-making authority 
regarding Brexit, which removed the banks’ traditional interlocutors from the drivers’ seat), 
and ‘business organization’ (i.e. the failure of the banks to mobilize wider corporate support 
against Brexit).116 A conceptually similar study has been presented by Bell and Hindmoor 
who argue that banks’ structural power in the UK over the design of capital rules before and 
after the crisis was shaped by three factors, i.e. policy-makers’ ideational interpretation of 
the banks’ threats of using the exit, the extent to which institutional arrangements fostered 
‘state capacity’ to act, and the level of ‘politicization’ of banking reform.117 Young has 
examined the ways in which private financial groups have changed their advocacy strategies 
after 2008 in response to two factors, i.e. ‘increased issue salience and a strained policy 
network’.118 His analysis of pre-crisis private sector influence over the formation of several 
policies under Basel II already revealed that interest group influence was sometimes 
fostered by the receptiveness of the financial policy network for the banks’ arguments, but 
often restrained by business conflict.119  
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I argue that, in addition to studying the individual effect of these moderators in isolation 
from each other, we should embrace a more integrative approach examining their joint, 
interactive and dynamic effects. In particular, I suggest that a specific focus on what is 
termed ‘institutions and structural features’120 in the quote at the beginning of this section 
can provide valuable insights improving our understanding of a concept as difficult to 
capture as ‘influence’. 
 
Drawing on the wider IPE literature, I propose a theoretical framework in which the 
strength of dealer bank influence is understood as being shaped by a collection of six 
conditions moderating the relationship between their policy preferences and reform 
outcomes. These variables are: business unity, public issue salience, policy-makers’ 
ideational outlook, the state of the transnational policy community, inter-state power 
relations, and the domestic institutional environment. Conceptually, these six factors could 
be subsumed under the three ‘dynamics’ Helleiner et al. have identified with respect to 
post-crisis derivatives regulation: transnational, domestic, inter-state.121 The state of the 
transnational policy community corresponds to Helleiner et al.’s ‘transnational dynamic’, 
while business unity, salience, and the domestic institutional environment align with the 
‘domestic dynamic’. Inter-state power is consistent with their ‘inter-state’ dynamic. 
Business unity could also be counted towards the ‘transnational’ level, if we were interested 
in transnational policy-making, which is not the primary focus of this thesis. Policy-makers’ 
ideational outlook spans both the ‘domestic’ and the ‘transnational’ categories. 
 
 
3.2.2 Empirical literature 
 
Scholars writing about post-crisis reform have called upon their colleagues to examine the 
evolution of ‘private actors, particularly financial firms, as key players in the policymaking 
process’.122 Young noted that the question of ‘how these groups adapt to and contribute to 
the process of financial regulatory change is not well understood’.123 More generally, he 
asked whether ‘financial industry influence [is] less consistent than in the past’.124 Along 
similar lines, Pagliari posed the question ‘Who Governs Finance?’ after the crisis, and invited 
further research on changes regarding ‘how the responsibility to regulate and oversee 
financial markets is divided between public regulatory agencies and private market 
actors’.125 Helleiner, in turn, has encouraged scholars to examine ‘the changing public-
private relationship in the global political economy’.126  
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Against this background, the verdict of the empirical literature having addressed these 
questions can be aligned along a spectrum. Several observers have identified a loss of 
financial sector dominance, but there are also sceptical voices pointing to its potential 
resurgence, if not continuing dominance. Johnson argues that even the worst crisis since 
the Great Depression has failed to effectively curtail the banks’ influence. He concludes that 
‘[b]ig banks, it seems, have only gained political strength since the crisis began’.127 
Kirshner’s assessment of the situation also points to continuous dominance. He speaks of 
‘stasis’, which he attributes to the persisting ‘power of the financial community and its 
enmeshment with political elites’. In his view, ‘the Wall Street-Washington axis endures’.128 
In a similar way, Chalmers identifies a return to ‘”business as usual”, with the lobbying 
efforts of banks effectively taking the teeth out of the new regulation’.129 Litan’s conclusion 
is of particular relevance to this research, since he considers the perseverance of dealer 
bank influence as one of ‘the main impediments to meaningful reform’.130 
 
A number of commentators have also pointed to ‘regulatory capture’131 as a contributing 
factor to the crisis, and a persistent feature in its aftermath. The term is informed by an 
understanding according to which ‘particularistic interests hijack[] public policy’.132 The 
former Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, for example, considered regulatory 
capture ‘one of the major problems leading up to the crisis’.133 The Warwick Commission on 
International Financial Reform, an expert body charged with providing recommendations on 
how to enhance global financial stability concluded that ‘[r]egulatory capture substantially 
contributed to the regulatory failure’.134 According to Baker, ‘regulatory capture was […] a 
principal political cause of the financial crisis of 2007-2009’, and he finds that ‘it has not 
been confronted directly or explicitly in current reform efforts’.135 Weng insists that the 
banks have captured the process leading to the adoption of Basel III.136 Along similar lines, 
Lall argues that the transition from Basel II to Basel III is a ‘history of […] failure after failure’, 
as a result of capture.137 
 
In the middle of the spectrum we might locate a number of scholars who have pointed to 
the banks’ increased reliance on the corporate sector to assist them in fending off public 
regulatory intervention, which we might interpret as a sign that, by themselves, the banks 
are often unable to halt reform. Keller, for example, notes the success of the bank/end-user 
                                                        
127
 Johnson (2009) 
128
 Kirshner (2014:101) 
129
 Chalmers (2017:108) 
130
 Litan (2010:3) 
131
 For analytical explorations of the concept, which can be traced back to Stigler (1971), see for example 
Mattli/Woods (2009) and the contributions in Pagliari (2012b). 
132
 Stellinga/Mügge (2017:415) 
133
 King quoted in Masters (2011). 
134
 Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform (2009:28), see also SOMO (2016). 
135
 Baker (2010:663) 
136
 Weng (2015) 
137
 Lall (2012:632). The overall assessment about the post-crisis situation is also shared by Underhill (2015:483) 
and Chalmers (2017). For Basel II, see also Underhill/Zhang (2008:546) and Helleiner/Porter (2009:14ff.) 
 24 
coalition in watering down post-crisis capital requirements in the EU.138 Kastner illustrates 
the coalition’s success in weakening the EU Commission’s proposal of a financial transaction 
tax. 139  As already mentioned, Pagliari and Young have examined the battle of the 
dealer/end-user coalition in favour of exemptions for non-financial firms from post-crisis 
derivatives rules.140 Helleiner argues that the banks now find themselves ‘under the heavy 
shadow of the state’,141 but that this has not entirely curtailed their ability to derail financial 
reform. He illustrates this with his research on the banks’ success at derailing the CFTC’s 
position limits rule by taking the agency to court over its interpretation of Dodd-Frank that 
had informed the proposed role.142 Still in the middle of the spectrum, we might also situate 
Tsingou who concludes that the transnational policy community in banking regulation is 
‘under stress but not broken’,143 and that financial groups still serve as regulators’ point of 
reference for the development of new rules.144 
 
Towards the other end of the spectrum, we might locate several authors who have 
identified even stronger signs of reduced dominance. Analyzing post-crisis banking 
regulation and derivatives regulation more generally, Young finds that private financial 
groups have lost their ability to kill regulatory proposals at the pre-agenda stages, and that 
they can no longer veto those proposals that do make it onto the agenda. Regarding the 
initial policy formulation stage, he notes banks’ ‘Relatively Passive Acceptance’ of the 
general parameters of the new rules and ‘Selective Involvement’ in the design of specific 
details. By contrast, he identifies an increased focus on the implementation stage, with the 
industry trying, often successfully, to ‘Seek to Delay Implementation’.145 Pagliari notes that 
the banks have often been held back by conflict with other financial sector groups, an 
example being the size of the capital threshold determining clearinghouse membership.146 
Porter points to the billions to trillions of USD the banks will have to raise in additional 
capital under Basel III, as well as to the stronger rules governing the work of CRAs. He 
concludes that ‘[w]hile there are a great many ways in which private financial actors have 
sought, often successfully, to block or reverse reform, these have not been enough to 
restore the levels of power […] that private sector actors enjoyed before the crisis’.147 Along 
similar lines, Posner observes that ‘governments are withdrawing support for self-regulation 
by market participants, taking more direct control over financial governance […]’.148 In a 
similar way, Germain suggests the role of private financial interest groups will cede to some 
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extent, while the state’s ‘centrality within the globalized structure of financial governance 
will grow’.149  
 
This study’s results on dealer bank influence over selected elements of the margin reform 
suggest a position towards the side of the spectrum indicating reduced dominance. In fact, 
the only reason we would not opt for a position closer to that end is the fact that the banks 
exercised (indirect) influence in the end-user case, relying on the heavy support of the 
corporate sector they helped to mobilize. The other cases, however, suggest that the 
margin reform has led to anything but ‘stasis’150 or a return to ‘business as usual’.151 While 
the banks also tried to delay the implementation of the margin reform (an aspect I do not 
cover in this thesis), they vehemently opposed any reform proposal that would have 
marked an end to the pre-crisis deregulation status quo. However, despite their fierce 
resistance, they lost in all but one case, in which they probably benefited from congruence 
(besides their indirect influence over the treatment of end-user deals).  
 
Although not at the height of or immediately after the crisis, policy-makers eventually 
performed a 180-degree turn away from self-regulation, thereby increasing the footprint of 
the state, and pulling the weight in the public-private relationship towards the public side, 
away from the private sector. The reason, I argue, is that the moderator constellation which 
had allowed the banks to exercise tremendous influence prior to the crisis fundamentally 
changed to their disadvantage after 2008. Increased business conflict, as identified by 
Pagliari, was only one of several changes to the pre-crisis configuration. 
 
Analytically, the results can be interpreted as an encouragement for scholars interested in 
post-crisis financial regulation to not only focus on the analysis of interest group influence, 
but to adopt a mixed research strategy drawing, in particular, on the insights of 
constructivism, transgovernmental approaches, as well as domestic institutionalist analyses. 
 
 
3.3 The wider literature on change in post-crisis financial governance 
 
This study also contributes to the growing body of literature focusing on the extent to which 
there has been broader change to the politics of international financial regulation following 
the worst crisis since the Great Depression. The topic is considered ‘[o]ne of the central 
questions confronting political economy over the last decade’,152 with ‘change’ having 
become ‘the catchword in the international regulatory debate’.153 In a 2009 speech, 
President Obama set the bar very high by promising ‘a new era of economic engagement’ 
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and that there would be no ‘return to the status quo’.154 Some scholars had equally high 
expectations. In 2009, Mügge summarized the widespread belief that ‘neo-liberal capitalism 
itself [was] at a crossroads’.155 One year later, Nesvetailova and Palan, argued that ‘the 
neoliberal project is most probably dead and buried […]’.156 
 
Others were less optimistic, warning that the potential for rapid change was limited. 
Morgan and Drezner, for instance, observed that policy-makers’ successful stabilization 
efforts in terms of pulling the global economy away from the brink of utter collapse had in 
fact pulverized any chance for lasting long-term change. They therefore predicted that 
policy-makers finding themselves back in their comfort zones would fail at implementing 
significant reforms.157 Helleiner adopted a nuanced position. As with some of his colleagues, 
he identified ‘a legitimacy crisis for the neo-liberal globalized financial regime’.158 However, 
at the same time, he cautioned that change should be considered a long-term process, 
observing that even episodes of monumental transformation, such as the establishment of 
the Bretton Woods System after the Second World War were the result of ‘a longer “critical 
juncture” dating back to the Great Depression’.159 In his view, fundamental change might 
therefore require more time than some of his peers suggested.  
 
Warning about a more specific challenge, Singer identified the institutional fragmentation 
of the US as one of the key stumbling blocks for fundamental change.160 Indeed, already 15 
years prior to the crisis, then former FDIC chair William Seidman had argued that ‘[y]ou 
have three totally independent agencies in the business. There is no power on earth that 
can make them agree – not the President, not the Pope, not anybody. The only power that 
can make them agree is the Congress of the United States by changing the structure so that 
the present setup does not continue’.161 By 2008, little had changed. Seidman’s statement 
had referred to the Fed, the FDIC, and the OCC, but, in addition, there were also the CFTC, 
the SEC, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (not to forget the countless state-level 
regulators). Over the years, there had been many attempts at consolidating these entities, 
but all of them failed. Post-crisis, policy-makers eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
They also debated merging the SEC and the CFTC, as well as elevating the role of the Fed to 
that of a ‘super-regulator’. However, these plans were soon dropped, given the political cost 
the merger would have incurred, and the criticism of the Fed’s perceived mismanagement 
of the crisis. 
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Given that the entities of one single bank holding company can potentially be subject to 
regulation by all of the surviving agencies listed above,162 sweeping reform would require 
inter-agency consensus, which Singer considered unlikely. With the US being held back by 
regulatory fragmentation, he was also sceptical about the country’s ability to provide global 
leadership, without which the chances of lasting change would be minimal.163 In a similar 
vein, Coffee warned that without global leadership, ‘the first and reflexive response of many 
regulatory agencies after a crash is simply to move the deck chairs around in a sufficiently 
noisy fashion to show that they are on the job’.164 
 
Focusing specifically on derivatives, some observers added that the product characteristics 
of these instruments made change in terms of enhanced regulation unlikely. Already prior 
to the crisis, structuralist authors, such as Bryan and Rafferty had considered substantial 
change a ‘near impossibility’, not only because ‘[d]erivatives are too elusive to be easily 
regulated’, but also because doing so would mean ‘to confront the […] nature of capitalism 
itself’.165 Along similar lines, LiPuma and Lee had argued that derivatives regulation would 
be futile, given the transnational and opaque nature of the market.166 Some regulators 
echoed similar concerns. For example, the outgoing CFTC chair, Walt Lukken, in 2008 told 
the US Congress that ‘[t]he dispersed and non-standardized nature of many OTC 
instruments makes finding a regulatory solution a challenging task’.167  
 
Regarding the relevance of the change that actually did occur over the last 10 years, 
scholars’ verdicts tend to fluctuate between disappointment and (modest) approval. 
Moschella and Tsingou have put forward a pessimistic assessment. Rather than ‘rapid and 
revolutionary’, change in their view has been ‘small and incremental’, often amounting to 
no more than ‘symbolic’, ‘marginal adjustments’.168 Limited to ‘policy instruments and 
settings’, reforms ‘at the level of policy goals have been quite rare, if not altogether 
absent’.169 Along similar lines, Fioretos identifies efforts in ‘[r]etrofitting’ rather than 
fundamental reformulations of financial governance’,170 although he acknowledges ‘intense’ 
reform activity which has led to ‘a more robust regulatory regime of financial market 
regulation […]’.171 
 
Several authors have studied the results of specific reform efforts. Focusing on Basel III, 
Porter appears cautiously optimistic, arguing that if Basel III had been the standard prior to 
the crisis, banks’ liquidity levels would have been much more solid.172 While not entirely 
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satisfied with the change achieved to this date, he points out that the reform ‘significantly 
increases the accountability of private financial actors for their risk management activities, 
imposing significant costs on them’.173  
 
Others harbour some reservations about the significance of the changes deriving from Basel 
III. Bell and Hindmoor have collected a series of sceptical assessments, ranging from the 
‘mouse that did not roar’, and a reform that ‘falls far short of its creator’s aims’, to an 
outcome that ‘on its own will not prevent another crisis’.174 Moschella and Tsingou point to 
the fact that the banks are still allowed to calculate their capital requirements themselves, 
and that a strong regulatory framework for SIFIs is still missing, as is a viable cross-border 
insolvency regime for failing banks.175 Regarding change in the accounting sector, Botzem 
speaks of a mix of ‘avoidance of confrontation, reframing of criticism and carefully renewing 
organizational leadership’, that in his view has caused minimal interference with self-
regulation.176 Brummer draws attention to the limited progress with regard to preventing 
excesses in executive compensation.177 Kastner and Kalaitzake discuss the lack of progress 
with regard to the development of a financial transaction tax.178 
 
Directing our attention to the ideational level, Baker has analyzed the rise of 
macroprudentialism, but cautions that the concept ‘remains an issue of dispute across the 
G20’,179 and that there is a lack of ‘[m]ore ambitious blue prints and guiding rationales’.180 
Adopting a broader ideational perspective, Helleiner observes that while post-crisis 
reformers are certainly interested in protecting the wider society from future shocks, their 
conceptualization of the ‘global public interest’ is much narrower, focused on the ‘public’ in 
a ‘prudential sense’, rather than informed by a broader political vision, similar to the one 
that dominated after Word War II.181 His book-length reflection on the significance of the 
broader strokes of post-crisis financial reform leads him to conclude that we are witnessing 
a ‘status quo crisis’, rather than an era of ‘transformative’ change.182  
 
With regard to the derivatives market, Omarova’s assessment of Dodd-Frank suggests that 
it ‘falls short of radically reshaping the structure or operation of derivatives markets’.183 
Focusing specifically on the elevation of CCPs to one of the main pillars of post-crisis 
derivatives market governance, Lockwood highlights that they remain private, profit-
oriented businesses relying on risk-management techniques very similar to those that had 
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failed during the crisis.184 Regarding trade reporting, it has recently become clear that a 
loophole in Dodd-Frank allows the banks to keep deals from certain offshore entities 
undisclosed.185 In addition, the information on those trades that do get reported can often 
not be properly used, given policy-makers’ coordination failure in terms of developing an 
integrated system of trade identification codes. 186  As a result, not even the basic 
transparency-enhancing reforms of the post-crisis framework have been an unconditional 
success. This is also the overall conclusion of Helleiner et al.’s book-length assessment of 
the post-crisis framework of derivatives regulation more generally. The editors suggest that 
the ambitious initiatives policy-makers promised to implement have often been affected by 
‘Delays and Inconsistences’, and, probably more significantly, by ‘Conflict and 
Fragmentation’, which has limited their overall effectiveness.187 
 
The empirical evidence on the margin case calls for a nuanced conclusion. On the one hand, 
the reform has resulted in a ‘seismic shift’188 in the governance of the uncleared market. 
While a number of exceptions apply, there is now a firm legal collateralization requirement. 
Trades need to be supported with margin. Collateral posted as IM has to be segregated and 
must not be rehypothecated. The margin rule for uncleared trades has also led to the shift 
of about 60% of the bespoke market to CCPs, even though, as we saw in table 1, this 
migration has been largely limited to interest rate and credit derivatives. Studied from a 
narrow angle, the margin reform has thus resulted in a veritable sea change that is anything 
but ‘symbolic’ or ‘incremental’. It has also demonstrated that a reform of the derivatives 
markets is in fact possible, against the predictions of structuralist observers and other 
skeptics. 
 
Yet, once we broaden the analytical angle, the significance of this ‘sea change’ begins to 
pale. As we will see, policy-makers imported the collateralization requirement from the 
cleared market, where it had already existed for numerous years prior to the crisis. Some 
authors, such as Baker and Hall argue that initial reform efforts often tend to be anchored 
within the existing environment.189 Policy-makers, however, did not take advantage of the 
momentum the margin reform provided, in order to explore more far-reaching 
opportunities for change. This lack of more substantial reform efforts indirectly confirms the 
assessment of those observers deploring the lack of more transformative change. Indeed, 
beyond a focus on ‘systemic risk’, there has been little debate about the ‘global public 
interest’ regarding the governance of the OTC derivatives market more generally. 
 
In addition, while CCPs have welcomed the new trades and are operating with high degrees 
of efficiency, central clearing has led to the emergence of new risks, many of which policy-
makers had initially not expected, when the G20 adopted the clearing and margining 
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mandates. Moreover, while the transition of trades from the uncleared to the cleared 
marketplace has led to a decline in the overall volume of the bespoke market, it has not 
reduced the centrality of the dealers, most of which have now also become globally 
systemically important banks. Indeed, the large banks continue to dominate the uncleared 
market as dealers, and, in addition, represent central pillars of the cleared market, given 
their role as clearing members of CCPs. In other words, there has been fundamental change 
in terms of the re-regulation of the uncleared market and the relative lack of bank influence 
over the corresponding policy process. However, the dealer banks remain pivotal actors in 
the cleared and uncleared market, and there has been little substantial debate about the 
broader public interest in post-crisis reform. 
 
Finally, recent announcements by CFTC chair Giancarlo regarding the need for ‘reforming 
the reform’, as well as the UK’s plans to engage in deregulation following Brexit, might 
result in a reversal of some of the requirements that have been adopted, which would 
further limit the change that has been achieved. 
 
The next chapter develops the analytical approach of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER II – The analytical approach 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter presents the analytical approach of the thesis. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical framework. In section 2.1, I explain different ways in which the banks can 
articulate their preferences. This study focuses on two vectors: the provision of information 
to policy-makers and the use of structural and structuring power. Section 2.2 addresses 
some of the challenges associated with studying interest group influence. In section 2.3, I 
develop my argument of conceptualizing interest group influence as a moderated variable. I 
suggest that the level of dealer bank influence is conditional upon the strength of six 
different moderators: the level of business unity, the level of public issue salience, the 
nature of policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the transnational policy 
community, the nature of inter-state power relations, and the domestic institutional 
environment. In section 2.4, I introduce the cases of derivatives deregulation prior to 2008, 
and mandatory margin requirements for uncleared derivatives after the crisis. Section 3 
describes the methodological approach of the study. Section 4 addresses the limitations of 
the thesis. 
 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the theoretical framework of the study which will be developed in this 
chapter.  
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Figure 6: The theoretical framework 
 
Source: Author 
 
As shown in figure 6, by conceptualizing influence as a moderated variable, this thesis is 
interested in understanding how the degree of influence of dealer bank preferences over 
policy outcomes is shaped by a number of conditions. 
 
 
2.1 Challenges associated with identifying interest group influence 
 
Identifying ‘influence’ can be a challenging endeavour, given that the concept is a latent 
variable that cannot be observed directly. As Lowery emphasizes, ‘interpreting, much less 
measuring political power or influence is difficult’.190  
 
Existing literature has highlighted several challenges. First, we should not derive the 
presence of ‘influence’ from ‘post-hoc correlations’. 191  Specifically, rather than 
automatically interpreting the (full) overlap of interest group preferences with the contours 
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of policy outcomes as evidence of ‘influence’, we should look for ‘causation’, which means 
finding evidence that a given policy outcome is the result of interest group activism.192 A 
second difficulty is related to the risk of being ‘tempted to take policy outcomes as proof of 
intentions and, from there, to impute the influence or control of the eventual 
beneficiaries.’193  Essentially, this is the risk of conflating by-products of a policy outcome 
with policy-makers’ core intention, and inferring the presence of influence from the overlap 
of these by-products with interest groups’ preferences. 
 
A third pitfall consists of overlooking the possibility that interest groups might actually 
exercise considerable influence ‘behind the veil’, by ensuring that only palatable proposals 
make it onto policy-maker’s agenda.194 When exercising this form of influence, interest 
groups rely on what is commonly understood as the ‘second face of power’, which in the 
words of Bachrach and Baratz, who have popularized the term, is related to ‘the dynamics 
of nondecision-making’. 195  Lowery warns that in such cases, the researcher might 
systematically underestimate interest group influence, because ‘[t]here will be no actual 
decisions to observe’.196 In many cases, the situation is less clear-cut, i.e. interest groups 
might not be able to completely keep an issue off the agenda, but they might succeed in 
having policy-makers put a less ‘harmful’ version of the originally planned proposal on it. Of 
course, interest groups might sometimes also be interested in the opposite, i.e. they might 
try to lobby policy-makers to make room for a particular issue on their busy agenda.197 
 
I differentiate between three levels of influence, ‘causal influence’, ‘congruence’ (in the 
sense of ‘happy coincidence’), and ‘loss’. Causal influence means that we can trace an 
outcome back to interest group activism which ‘successfully engender[ed] changes in 
regulatory policy content that cannot be attributed to other factors’.198 Congruence, by 
contrast, indicates that interest groups were pleased with a regulatory outcome, but that it 
was not the result of their causal influence. As Büthe puts it, ‘[w]e should therefore not 
simply assume that the effects of private regulations explain why they were provided’.199 
Rather, we need to uncover the precise causes that led to the adoption of a particular 
policy. Congruence and loss both indicate a lack of influence, the main difference being that 
in case of a loss, the policy outcome clashes with interest groups’ preferences.  
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2.2 Preference articulation and mechanisms of influence 
 
There are several ways through which interest groups can articulate their preferences and 
attempt to exercise influence. This study focuses on two key mechanisms: the provision of 
information (sometimes considered a form of ‘instrumental power’200) and the reliance on 
structural and structuring power. While the provision of information allows interest groups 
to articulate their preferences through words, the exercise of structural power involves 
articulation through (the threat of) action in terms of firms leveraging a credible threat to 
exit the jurisdiction through disinvestment. Structuring power can bridge both categories in 
terms of interest groups strategically providing information to policy-makers abroad so as to 
design their exit options from the domestic market. These mechanisms are not mutually 
exclusive. As we will see, the banks often used them in a complementary fashion, in 
particular prior to 2008. 
 
 
2.2.1 The provision of information 
 
The literature suggests that policy-makers acting in an environment marked by uncertainty 
often rely on interest group input in search of information about the perceived 
effectiveness and potential consequences of a given policy proposal. Resource constraints 
preventing them from generating the required information themselves often intensify this 
need, particularly if the policy to be decided on is technically complex.201 In many cases, 
policy-makers are also legally obliged to organize consultations to provide an opportunity 
for democratic participation in public decision-making, which frequently also results in the 
submission of information.202 
 
Hall and Deardorff conceive of interest groups as a ‘service bureau’ policy-makers can turn 
to for information in order to evaluate their policy proposals. 203  The provision of 
information can therefore act as a channel of influence.204 Chalmers argues that ‘[t]echnical 
policy-relevant information is the currency of influence for global financial governance’.205 
Information can be transmitted through written comments, through meetings, or other 
forms of exchange. It can be directed to legislators and/or regulators, both at the (supra-
)national or transnational level. 
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Dür introduces important qualification by noting that influence through information 
provision might in fact be dependent on several conditions. One is interest groups’ 
expertise on the issue in question. Another is policy-makers’ dependence on the particular 
information, which itself can be conditional on the complexity of the issue, and the 
availability of alternative sources of information, either from other submissions or from in-
house analysis. A third is the utility policy-makers associate with the submitted information 
in terms of promoting their overall goals of office-seeking and/or policy-seeking.206 Young, 
for example, emphasizes the possibility that policy-makers might value the provision of 
information, without necessarily acting upon it.207 
 
‘Information’ and ‘preferences’ can overlap to a large extent, but they can be differentiated 
by conceiving of ‘preferences’ as statements as to how how a certain policy should be 
designed, and of ‘information’ as articulated reasons supporting these statements. Of 
course, preferences can also be voiced without the submission of additional information.  
 
Analysis will reveal that, while the industry’s information was highly valued prior to the 
crisis, this was much less the case afterwards. Policy-makers tended to listen, but often 
challenged the utility of the submitted information and only rarely acted upon it.  
 
 
2.2.2 The projection of structural and structuring power  
 
Unlike the provision of information as a form of instrumental power, structural power tends 
to operate in a more subtle way.208 The core of the ‘structural power’ argument can be 
traced back to Lindblom’s observation of governments’ dependence on private businesses 
serving as a motor of economic growth through their control of resources deemed crucial 
for investment and production. This dependence allows firms to try exercise influence by 
threatening democratically elected policy-makers to ‘exit’ their jurisdiction through 
disinvestment, if they do not heed their preferences.209 Policy-makers have been known to 
adjust their proposals already in anticipation of the potential invocation of this threat by 
financial firms, which points to a particularly important dimension of structural power, i.e. 
its potential effectiveness without any explicit expression.210  
 
Since Lindblom’s key publication on the topic in 1977, the concept has been frequently 
critiqued, extended, and refined.211 However, the overall focus on the exit threat has 
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remained a constant element of this strand of research. This thesis adopts this perspective 
and conceives of structural power as dealer banks’ power to exit. Banks are often 
considered particularly privileged in this regard.212 First they provide credit, which is widely 
perceived as the ‘infrastructure of the infrastructure’.213 Second, the mobile nature of their 
business affords them the ‘ability to defy national regulators because of the 
internationalization of their markets’.214  The OTC derivatives business is particularly mobile. 
In the words of LiPuma and Lee, ‘OTC markets have no location and hence no address, 
contractual parties can be anywhere in the universe, and more specifically, the address of 
the computer site from which the trade was initiated may bear no relation to the location of 
the institution or agent initiating the trade’.215 
 
The credibility and thus effectiveness of the threat depends to a large extent on businesses’ 
availability of an attractive market for relocation. Culpepper and Reinke’s research on the 
forced recapitalization of banks at the height of the crisis provides some good illustration of 
this point.216 The study shows that the US and UK governments both shared a preference for 
ensuring their respective interventions would be as profitable as possible for their own 
taxpayers. However, because of variations in the extent to which their banks relied on the 
domestic market as a principal depository base, the outcome of their interventions was 
uneven. The forced recapitalization of the American banks was relatively successful, 
because no bank had a significant alternative depository base outside the US. This resulted 
in highly diminished levels of structural power, which in turn enabled the US administration 
to include not only the struggling financial institutions in the programme, but also the 
healthier ones, and therefore to structure the capital infusions such that they yielded an 
overall profit for the American taxpayer. By contrast, the relatively healthiest bank in the UK 
at the time, HSBC, was not dependent on its home market to the same extent as its 
domestic competitors. Given important income from Asia, it could also sustain its losses in 
the US. This situation afforded it tremendous structural power and the ability to boycott the 
UK government’s intervention. In the end, the only banks covered by the UK programme 
were the comparatively weak ones, and the overall outcome from the UK taxpayer’s 
perspective was relatively disappointing.  
 
Recent research has pointed to a more active role interest groups can adopt in designing 
exit options themselves. Farrell and Newman have coined the term ‘structuring power’ to 
denote ‘the ways in which actors can shape exit options through cross-national action’, 
which in turn can impact their ‘bargaining power’.217 For the purpose of this research, 
structuring power is understood as ‘shaping the rules of other jurisdictions’.218 This means 
that interest groups lobby policy-makers abroad to have foreign rules modified, such as to 
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ensure their compatibility with the rules under which they already operate in their domestic 
context. The aim is to facilitate the seamless relocation of their business, and thus to 
enhance the credibility of the exit threat.219 
 
Analysis will reveal that in the pre-crisis period, the US and the UK derivatives market acted 
as attractive relocation destinations for banks from the respective other side of the Atlantic. 
The industry effectively exercised both structural power and structuring power, particularly 
in the US. The dealers frequently prevented intrusive intervention by threatening to 
relocate the uncleared business to the City of London, where deregulation had already 
occurred in one sweeping move through the Big Bang in the 1980s. In addition, ISDA 
successfully lobbied many foreign governments to adjust their domestic legal framework in 
order to ensure the enforceability of key provisions of the Master Agreement. This form of 
structuring power then endowed the banks with additional structural power at home, as it 
enhanced the credibility of their exit threat. 
 
Post-crisis, the dealer banks, specifically in the US which acted as the first mover on the 
regulatory scene, initially appeared optimistic about their ability to kill the margin proposal 
by relying on their structural power. However, this hope turned out premature. We will see 
that the banks still vehemently fought the rules, but that threats of exit were widely absent, 
given the strong public ideational consensus in favour of reining in the market that policy-
makers had adopted on both sides of the Atlantic. Subsequently, the banks were so 
completely absorbed by the task of preventing public intrusion that they also did not 
exercise any substantial structuring power anymore. 
 
Beyond the provision of information and the exercise of structural/structuring power, we 
could also think of other methods of articulation and mechanisms of influence which are 
not included in this study. One such mechanism would be financial donations. Lobby money 
facilitates access to sympathetic policy-makers.220 While campaign contributions are limited 
to elected policy-makers, they also have the potential to exercise an indirect effect on the 
decision-making of unelected regulators. Gordon and Hafner argue that contributions to 
legislators can be interpreted as a signal to regulators reflecting interest groups’ willingness 
to ‘flex their muscles’ in terms of their ‘intention to fight agency decisions through 
subsequent action in the political arena’.221 However, this variable would be difficult to use 
for the present study. Most importantly, data for the EU has only recently been made 
available and does not cover the entire duration of the EMIR-related decision-making 
process, nor the pre-crisis period. This is not to say that campaign contributions were not 
relevant, particularly after 2008. Specifically, we will see that the banks made important 
expenditures with respect to the end-user treatment in the US. More generally, media 
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reports suggest that the financial sector in the US at certain times spent up to USD 1mn per 
day in its effort to try to shape Dodd-Frank.222 However, given the lack of sufficient data, 
this variable remains outside the scope of this analysis, the only exception being the US 
end-user case study.  
 
Another vector is the ‘revolving door’ through which many corporate and public officials 
shift between the private and public sector at different points in their careers, and which is 
often hypothesized to have a beneficial impact on interest group influence. I will address 
this factor further, when discussing the ‘state of the transnational policy community’ 
moderator. I will cover its relevance for the pre-crisis period, but it will not figure 
prominently for the post-crisis period, the reason being data limits regarding the identities 
of the public officials involved in the margin policy-making process, both at the private and 
public sector level. The most famous post-crisis example, which defies the often-purported 
positive effect of the revolving door on interest group influence, is CFTC chair Gary Gensler 
whose role will be discussed at great length in the end-user case.  
 
 
2.3 Dealer bank influence as a moderated variable 
 
Following the classical definition by Baron and Kenny, a moderator is a ‘variable that affects 
the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable 
and a dependent or criterion variable’.223 It is important to note that such a variable can 
also act as a predictor. This means that the six conditions can also have a direct effect on 
the policy outcome.224 Given the dissertation’s primary focus on explaining dealer bank 
influence over policy outcomes, rather than explaining the policy outcomes themselves, 
figure 6 does not depict this relationship. 
 
Drawing on the IPE literature, I identify six variables which I argue shape the strength of 
dealer bank influence over policy outcomes. These variables are: business unity, public issue 
salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the transnational community, inter-
state power relations, and the domestic institutional environment. For each moderator, I 
differentiate between three effects, positive, negative, and neutral. I use the terms 
‘moderator’ and ‘factor’ interchangeably, even though they denote different concepts in 
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classical statistical terminology.225 The following sections cover the expected individual 
effect of each moderator, as discussed in IPE theory.  
 
 
2.3.1 Business unity 
 
The first moderator of influence is the degree of business unity in the sector affected by a 
given regulation. It has an impact on the degree with which the interest groups targeted by 
a particular regulation can speak with one voice when submitting their preferences. Rooted 
within neo-pluralist approaches, this variable takes issue with an implicit assumption 
underlying the ‘structural power of business’ hypothesis, i.e. the assumption that business 
acts as a unitary actor. Questioning the ubiquitous validity of this assumption, these 
approaches draw attention to the distributive effects that many policies incur. The fact that 
interest groups often display ‘competing interests and values’ therefore moves to the 
centre of the analysis.226 A high degree of business unity allows interest groups to submit a 
clear message to policy-makers, which should foster influence. By contrast, low degrees of 
unity, which can manifest through ‘counter-active’ lobbying by dissenting groups, should 
dilute the message, and therefore reduce influence.227 
 
James and Quaglia argue that ‘[w]here the effectiveness of business organization is limited 
by heterogeneous preferences and weak coordination, policy-makers have reason to doubt 
the veracity of [the key mobilizing actors]’.228 Along similar lines, Dür and De Bièvre 
emphasize that preference heterogeneity encourages policy-makers to stick to ‘their 
preferred policies’.229 By contrast, preference homogeneity has the potential to propel 
interest group influence.230 Preference homogeneity often goes hand in hand with the 
presence of alliances of groups sharing the same position on a given issue. Following Pagliari 
and Young, acting through coalitions can ‘leverage’ interest group influence in several 
respects. First, it allows interest groups to join forces with respect to both monetary and 
non-monetary resources, such as information, reputation, and expertise. 231  Second, 
different coalition members often enjoy access to policy-makers through different channels, 
which allows the coalition to launch multi-pronged campaigns in its attempts to exercise 
influence over a specific policy outcome.232 Third, coalitions can function as a ‘signalling 
device’ in terms of displaying the extent to which an advocacy position enjoys wider 
approval and perceived legitimacy.233 Alliances need not necessarily always be organized in 
                                                        
225
 The term ‘factor’ is also used by James/Quaglia (2018:1). 
226
 Cerny (2010:4), see also Falkner (2008:25). 
227
 See Nelson/Yackee (2012:339), Heaney (2004:258), Lavelle (2014:121), Austen-Smith/Wright (1994), 
Bernhagen (2007:124), Yackee (2009:213f., 2005:107), Morgan (2008:658) 
228
 James/Quaglia (2018:11) 
229
 Dür/De Bièvre (2007:6) 
230
 Pagliari/Young (2014) 
231
 See also Nelson/Yackee (2012:340). 
232
 Empirical evidence for this conjecture has been found by Beyers/Braun (2014) and Carpenter et al. (1998). 
233
 Pagliari/Young (2014:585f.) 
 40 
the sense of ‘formal’ coalitions. Rather, consensus can also be displayed in form of groups 
lining up on the same ‘side’ of an issue, without explicit coordination or a common 
organizational framework.234 
 
James and Quaglia’s empirical research shows that one of the key reasons why the banks in 
the UK were not successful in preventing Brexit was preference heterogeneity within the 
banking sector itself. On the one hand, the big investment banks favoured Remain which 
would have allowed them continued access to the EU’s common market. On the other 
hand, many small retail banks lobbied against the big banks, given their fear of being 
boycotted by their non-corporate clients many of whom had subscribed to the arguments 
of the Leave camp.235 Pagliari and Young have studied the importance of business conflict 
with respect to the development of Basel II. Their research suggests that preference 
heterogeneity between banks and insurance firms on the treatment of residential 
mortgages under Basel II eventually led the BCBS to strengthen the related requirements. In 
the area of derivatives regulation, Pagliari has analyzed preference heterogeneity regarding 
CCP membership and capital requirements for CCPs, as designed by the CFTC. In both cases, 
the CFTC ‘took advantage of the policy space created by the conflict between different key 
stakeholders and decided not to deviate from their original proposal’.236 
 
The analysis in this dissertation will reveal that prior to the crisis, the dealer banks enjoyed 
maximum business unity. Not only did ISDA act as spearhead for the industry, it effectively 
monopolized the entire advocacy arena, together with the banks. No other private sector 
groups mobilized on a regular basis. As a result, the message sent by the large banks was 
crystal clear, which strengthened their influence. ISDA also fostered unity through its 
management of the market’s main contractual infrastructure in form of the Master 
Agreement, which serves as a boilerplate contract providing the backbone of the vast 
majority of all trades.237 
 
After the crisis, however, the lobbying scene became more populated and diverse. The 
dealer banks maintained their pre-crisis unity, but they lost their exclusive position of 
speaking for the market. For the first time ever, the banks’ clients (i.e. the buy-side and the 
end-users) raised their voice over the regulation of derivatives. Several authors have also 
noted the increased importance of NGOs in the post-crisis derivatives debate,238 but in the 
margin case they did not play a prominent role that changed the course of the policy 
process. By contrast, the buy-side actors made a decisive entry into the political arena. They 
agreed with the banks in disputing the need for regulatory intervention. Yet, beyond their 
opposition to intrusive rules, they turned out largely unable to reach wider consensus on 
how the new rules should actually be designed. The buy-side’s associations, in particular, 
were often held back by the large extent of preference heterogeneity among their 
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members. Unlike deregulation, re-regulation has more immediate distributive effects. 
Individual buy-side firms often interpreted the cost-benefit effects of the new rules very 
differently, which complicated the development of common positions. An important 
exception was SIFMA, the Securities Industry Financial Markets Association. Technically, it 
represents not only the banks that are active in the securities markets, but also buy-side 
firms, such as insurance firms and asset managers. However, the association appears to 
have been dominated by the dealer banks which exercised commanding influence in the 
drafting of most of its submissions. The association’s buy-side members often operated 
through SIFMA’s Asset Management Group. Given their bad reputation after the crisis, 
many banks did not lobby by themselves, but preferred to act under the umbrella of ISDA or 
SIFMA. Overall, the lack of business unity between the industry and the buy-side stymied 
the potential for dealer banks influence. 
 
By contrast, the importance of the emergence of the end-user community cannot be 
overestimated. To a large extent mobilized by the banks for their untarnished reputation 
and their credibility with policy-makers, non-financial firms became dealers’ strongest allies 
in arguing for an end-user exemption from the rules. To the IPE literature, this phenomenon 
is not entirely new. As already mentioned, Pagliari and Young have discussed parts of the 
end-user case with respect to the clearing requirement.239 Other studies have shown that 
the banks relied on a similar mobilization strategy in order to soften other post-crisis rules 
including capital requirements, and the plans for a financial transaction tax in Europe.240 The 
end-user case represents the only case in which the dealers exercised influence, although 
their influence was indirect and stronger in the US (where end-users are entirely exempt), 
than in the EU (where a clearing threshold applies). 
 
 
2.3.2 Public issue salience  
 
Public issue salience refers to ‘the relative importance or significance that an actor ascribes 
to a given issue on the political agenda. […] It is a measure of the attention actors devote to 
the issue in question and of the issue’s overall prominence in the minds of decision-
makers’.241 In the political arena, the desire of elected policy-makers to maintain their 
popularity and remain in office or to ensure a smooth transition for their successors will 
lead them to adopt policies reflecting the preferences of their electorate.242 Regulators, in 
turn, are equally receptive to the public’s preferences. According to Singer, they are highly 
receptive to elected policy-makers’ preferences as they strive to maintain their autonomy 
and prevent intervention in their work,243 which means they also respond to public issue 
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salience. In case of high issue salience, they will take measures reflecting those preferences, 
in order to let legislators know that ‘the issue has been “taken care of”’.244 Regulators’ main 
concern in this context is to avoid political interference in their activities, which might result 
in increased oversight or budget cuts.245 Culpepper has coined the term ‘quiet politics’ to 
characterize situations of low public issue salience, which he argues provides a fertile 
environment for interest group influence to take hold. In these situations, ‘managerial 
groups, which both understand the issues and care about them a great deal, […] wield 
disproportionate political influence’.246 If public issue salience is low, voters pay little 
attention, which means that policy-makers are likely to be more receptive to the narrow 
preferences of special interest groups.247 By contrast, Culpepper emphasizes that ‘business 
power goes down as political salience goes up’.248 If public issue salience is high, politics 
becomes ‘noisy’ and the voters’ preferences will supersede those voiced by private interest 
groups. 249 The distinction between policy-makers and regulators is tricky with regard to the 
EU, where the EU Commission is a member of WGMR (BCBS-IOSCO’s Working Group on 
Margin Requirements), but was also closely involved in the legislative discussions. 
 
Pagliari has shown that ‘low salience’ was the ‘default state’250 under which financial 
regulation in general, and derivatives regulation in particular took place prior to 2008. Three 
mutually related factors anchored this default state. First, the high level of complexity of the 
subject matter meant that financial regulation was widely considered ‘esoteric’,251 best left 
to the judgement of experts. Porter, for example, has noted that ‘there is very little that 
would not require a significant degree of background technical knowledge to understand. 
[…] The technical character of the [regulatory] institutions’ work is the key factor explaining 
the lack of political bargaining’.252 Along similar lines, Kapstein has argued that ‘one of the 
great ‘successes’ of financial supervisors over the past thirty years [since the foundation of 
the BCBS] has been to depoliticize the systemic risk environment and to transform crisis 
management into a technocratic exercise […]’.253 
 
Second, the complex subject matter caused significant information asymmetries between 
financial institutions and other societal stakeholders, which made it difficult for anybody but 
the dealer banks to effectively mobilize.254 High technical complexity also increased policy-
makers’ dependence on outside information to form a judgement on what policies to adopt 
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and how to design them.255 This leads to a third factor, which was policy-makers’ focus on 
the issues that voters care about in order to secure re-election.256 With the exception of 
unemployment, inflation, tax, and questions concerning homeownership (in US policy-
making), monetary and financial policy debates were usually of subordinate importance to 
the average voter.257 Prior to 2008, policy-makers, therefore, had few incentives to educate 
themselves on derivatives.258 They often also feared revealing their lack of understanding 
vis-à-vis the bankers whom they often revered for their wealth and reputation.259 Low issue 
salience thus opened the door for dealer bank preferences to prevail before 2008.  
 
It is important to highlight that in the pre-crisis period, there were several derivatives-
related scandals that put the spotlight on derivatives. The effect, however, was short-lived, 
probably because the tangible effects on the lives of the vast majority of voters remained 
limited. After a short period of heated debate, Down’s ‘issue attention cycle’260 set in, 
causing most policy-makers and the wider public to quickly lose interest in the issue.261 
Several individuals from both the public and private sector kept warning of a looming crisis, 
but their comments failed to raise issue salience to a level where policy-makers would have 
felt compelled to intervene in the market, a move which would have also been in conflict 
with the ideational consensus at the time. 
 
The severity of the global financial crisis, however, turned derivatives regulation into a ‘high 
salience’ issue. Large-scale bailouts and other financial rescue packages financed with 
taxpayers’ money, as well as the widespread recession and unemployment directly affecting 
people’s daily lives, put immense pressure on policy-makers to become directly involved in 
financial regulation.262 The relevance of high salience after 2008 has been illustrated by 
several recent studies. Woll has described the effect of high issue salience on hedge fund 
regulation, as has Pagliari, who, in addition to hedge funds, has also examined post-crisis 
regulation of CRAs and derivatives regulation.263 Helleiner has shown how the politicization 
of commodity price volatility at the height of the crisis encouraged policy-makers to 
mandate the imposition of position limits for commodity derivatives.264 Regarding the 
uncleared market, the Financial Times noted that after the crisis, ‘”credit derivatives” 
almost became a household phrase’.265 
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While ‘credit derivatives’ indeed became a negatively connoted catchword, most voters did 
not suddenly become experts in the field, nor did most policy-makers. However, in line with 
Wlezien’s idea of policy-makers engaging in a ‘thermostatic analysis of public opinion’,266 
they quickly and accurately sensed the need for more public intervention and expressed it 
accordingly. The analysis in this dissertation will reveal that banks’ previously impeccable 
reputation became ‘radioactive’.267 In the words of the Financial Times’ Gillian Tett, ‘the 
word “ISDA” has become distinctly toxic in Washington and Brussels’ political circles’.268 
 
Following the disastrous consequences of the crisis, public issue salience skyrocketed, which 
greatly limited the banks’ ability to influence the design of post-crisis rule making. Political 
analyst Robert Kaiser notes that ‘[b]ankers were among the most unpopular people in the 
society’ and ‘lost most of their political influence as a result of the crash’.269 In this heated 
climate, most banks avoided publicly lobbying legislators, hoping instead that the regulators 
who tend to be several steps removed from the public limelight would be more receptive to 
their demands, which, however, they were usually not. 
 
Beyond pressure exercised by the electorate, we can identify two additional sources of 
public issue salience. Indeed, while public attention by voters can keep corporate influence 
at bay, business groups are not always completely helpless at this stage. Rather, they can try 
to manipulate the level of public issue salience themselves, meaning that salience can be (or 
become) an endogenous feature of the policy-making process itself.270 If well crafted, this 
strategy can help them to be part of the game again, even if only in an indirect, though not 
necessarily less effective fashion. Keller argues that interest groups can enhance their 
chances of influence by adopting ‘a framing strategy that resonates positively with the 
broader public’ on the basis of ‘claims of why a certain policy is desirable, unfair or why a 
certain claim is legitimate’.271 Manipulating public issue salience can thus help the dealers 
to increase their influence. In the margin case, the banks could not directly implement this 
strategy themselves, given their tarnished reputation. However, they mobilized the end-
users to take over this part. The non-financial firms beat the drum for an exemption by 
claiming that subjecting them to margin requirements would equal punishing the victims of 
the crisis, and that the financial cost of being obliged to post collateral would hurt the wider 
economy (‘one dollar of margin is one dollar less to invest’).272 This support by the end-
users community in terms of creating what we could call ‘friendly’ issue salience was of 
quintessential importance for the banks, and it is the only case in which they were able to 
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successfully exercise influence.273 Further, as we will see, policy-makers can also raise public 
issue salience themselves, by launching a public awareness campaign. This was the case of 
CFTC chair Gary Gensler who increased the prominence of the end-user question in the US. 
Forcefully arguing for a tight regulatory framework, he turned the issue it into one of the 
most contested aspects of Dodd-Frank. 
 
Overall, prior to 2008, low public issue salience helped propel dealer banks’ influence, 
whereas after the crisis high public issue salience kept it at bay, with the exception of the 
end-user case, where creating, countering and dominating public issue salience was key for 
the end-users to succeed in securing a full carve-out in the US and wide-reaching privileges 
in the EU. 
 
 
2.3.3 Policy-makers’ ideational outlook 
 
Policy-makers’ ideational outlook is a relevant condition in that shared ideas and causal 
beliefs inform their interpretations of and interactions with their political, social, and 
economic environment.274 Compatibility between interest group preferences and policy-
makers’ ideational outlook provides a fertile environment for influence to take hold. 
However, if there is a clash between those two outlooks, the chance of influence decreases. 
In line with Weber who compared the role of ideas to ‘switchmen’ deciding which ‘tracks’ 
courses of action should follow,275 Goldstein and Keohane argue that ‘ideas influence policy 
when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ 
clarity about goals or end means relationships […]’.276 Kirshner goes one step further by 
insisting that ‘the power of ideas does more than just shape the possible. It defines the 
feasible’.277 
 
For the purpose of this study, the focus rests on policy-makers’ perspectives on the ways in 
which they believe financial markets operate and the implications this has for their stance 
on (de-)regulation. These perspectives frame policy-makers’ interpretation of interest 
groups’ preferences and the weight that should be attributed to them, which in turn has an 
impact on the extent to which their influence can take hold.278 While the thesis touches on 
the question of how policy-makers acquire new ideas,279 it is primarily interested in 
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understanding how a given policy-makers’ ideational outlook promotes or constrains 
interest group influence. 
 
Prior to 2008, the ‘deregulation consensus’ provided ample leverage for the banks to 
exercise influence, as it was preconditioned on the idea of ‘laissez-faire’ in terms of policy-
makers delegating decision-making authority to the banks themselves. The banks were 
thought to be sophisticated entities knowing best what was good for them and for the 
economy. Self-regulation by the industry was therefore considered sufficient to address any 
potential problems arising in the market. This intellectual climate widely opened the door 
for the dealers’ preferences to prevail. 
 
To a large extent, the banks’ influence was derived from the widespread confidence in 
efficient and self-regulating markets. In the words of Simon Johnson, the ‘financial industry 
gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital – a belief system’.280 The basis 
of this belief system was derived from a series of assumptions including the idea that the 
future represents the ‘statistical shadow of [the] past’, as suggested by Samuelson’s 
‘ergodic axiom’,281 that markets are characterized by perfect information, as postulated in 
the classical general equilibrium model,282 that investors always take rational decisions, as 
implied by the ideal of the ‘homo oeconomicus’, and that decision-making takes place in a 
world of calculable risk, rather than unpredictable uncertainty.283 The conclusion of Eugene 
Fama (widely considered the ‘father of modern finance’284) in a 1970 article that ‘the 
efficient markets model stands up well’ soon became accepted as sacrosanct, even though 
it came with several reservations.285 As a consequence of this intellectual outlook, public 
intervention was widely considered unnecessary, if not even harmful to the exercise of 
market discipline. 
 
Competitive deregulation in terms of a race towards being the jurisdiction that best 
implemented this ideational consensus therefore became policy-makers’ guideline. In a 
similar way to which Helleiner has described financial liberalization towards the end of the 
Bretton Woods period, states followed the old ‘‘“mercantilist” strategy to maximize [their] 
own benefits from the open system at other states’ expense’.286 Looking back after the 
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crisis, the SEC’s chair, Mary Schapiro admitted that ‘everybody a few years ago got caught 
up in the idea that the markets are self-correcting and self-disciplined, and that the people 
in Wall Street will do a better job protecting the financial system than regulators would’.287 
In sum, the deregulation consensus propelled the banks’ influence prior to 2008.  
 
Post-crisis, however, policy-makers adopted a new ideational outlook. In line with the 
constructivist assumption that crises can challenge existing ideational outlooks,288 policy-
makers began advocating the return of a more visible hand and an emphasis on ‘market-
shaping’, rather than ‘market-making’.289 Foot and Walter emphasize that ‘the rising 
prominence of the third norm of self-regulation suffered a serious setback in US regulatory 
and political circles as it did elsewhere’.290 Along similar lines, Pagliari and Young argue that 
‘[t]his shift in the ideational landscape has […] reduced the capacity of financial firms to rely 
on claims regarding the superiority of market-based solutions in order to oppose more 
stringent forms of regulation’.291 
 
Specifically, policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic started believing that public 
intervention was required, that the uncleared business needed to transition to CCPs as 
much as possible, and that those trades that remained in the bilateral marketplace needed 
to be margined. This new ideational consensus was at odds with what the industry believed, 
i.e. that market-based solutions remained the best solution to the crisis. Policy-makers’ new 
ideational consensus clashed with the banks’ preferences, which largely reduced their 
influence over the new rules. At the same time, however, it is not entirely clear to what 
extent policy-makers’ new ideational outlook was in fact the result of an ‘ideational’ 
change, rather than a response to increased public issue salience.292 Indeed, we will see that 
the initial public response to the crisis did not represent a clear break with the market-
based paradigm, as policy-makers first delegated the immediate post-crisis response to the 
industry itself, and only began tightening the reins once this approach turned out 
insufficient in light of growing public pressure for more intervention. Constructivist 
scholarship is aware of the problem of isolating the specific factors that cause change, given 
that ‘new ideas interact with existing institutional settings’.293  
 
Once policy-makers’ realized that self-regulation was inadequate, they embraced the idea 
of public intervention informed by a strong consensus in favour of the central clearing of 
uncleared derivatives. While they initially believed that the vast majority of uncleared 
trades would move to CCPs, it soon turned out that a significant portion of deals were 
insufficiently standardized for CCPs, meaning they would remain in the riskier bilateral 
space. These trades therefore required a separate regulatory treatment. Mandatory margin 
                                                        
287
 Schapiro quoted in Wyatt (2010) 
288
 Widmaier (2004:437), Blyth (2002:chapter 2), Baker (2013), Abdelal et al. (2010b:232) 
289
 E.g. Quaglia (2011), Helleiner/Pagliari (2010:89) 
290
 Foot/Walter (2010:245) 
291
 Pagliari/Young (2013:128) 
292
 See for example Pagliari (2013b:86ff.), Helleiner/Pagliari (2010:87), more generally Mügge (2014b:319). 
293
 Baker (2013:36) 
 48 
requirements became the solution of choice, as their imposition allowed transferring one of 
the key characteristics of central clearing (i.e. compulsory collateralization) to the bilateral 
market. Policy-makers associated two key benefits with the imposition of margin 
requirements. First, the new rules would account for the higher degree of systemic risk 
emanating from uncleared, as compared to cleared trades. Second, they would incentivize 
the transition to CCPs, thereby ensuring that the uncleared marketplace would only be used 
for trades unsuitable for central clearing. 
 
While the thesis does not explore the clearing rules themselves, it emphasizes that the 
ideational consensus on clearing and margining needs to be studied in conjunction, as the 
margin rules represent a derivative of the clearing mandate. Analysis will reveal that the 
industry supported the clearing consensus, as long as the use of CCPs was not mandatory. 
However, it largely rejected the margin consensus. With the banks’ preferences and policy-
makers ideational outlook no longer coinciding, as had been the case prior to 2008, the 
banks lost much of their influence. 
 
The last paragraph might lead some readers to believe that policy-makers’ decisions were 
guided more by functionalism (and public issue salience), rather than any ideational 
inspiration. While we should not exclude the presence of any functional logic, it is important 
to note that clearing and margining are, in fact, part of a broader ideational shift from 
microprudential to macroprudential regulation. Macroprudentialism is a multi-faceted 
concept which privileges a top-down regulatory approach focusing on the stability of the 
financial system as a whole, rather than just the health of individual institutions (as had 
been the case prior to the crisis). The networked character of financial markets and the 
systemic components of risk are some of the key concerns guiding policy-makers in the 
development of new rules.294 Macroprudentialism differentiates itself from the efficient 
market hypothesis in at least four respects:295 First, it places the analytical focus on the 
‘fallacy of composition’, meaning that the safety of the financial system cannot be simply 
deduced from the safety of its component parts. Second, it takes account of ‘endogeneity’, 
meaning that crises are not simply considered the result of an ‘exogenous’ shock’. Third it is 
informed by the notion of ‘procyclicality’, meaning that market actors’ behaviour reinforces 
the business cycle, given that they tend to underestimate financial risk during times of 
boom, while they overestimate it when the economy cools down. Fourth, it encourages 
awareness of ‘complexity’, meaning that financial risk operates at a cross-sector basis.  
 
Specifically, as Stefan Ingves, governor of central bank of Sweden (Sveriges Riksbank) and 
chairman of the BCBS noted in 2013, the margin rules ‘can also have broader 
macroprudential benefits, by reducing the financial system’s vulnerability to potentially 
destabilising procyclicality and limiting the build-up of uncollateralised exposures within the 
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financial system’.296 Policy-makers viewed margin requirements as a macroprudential tool 
allowing them to account for the higher systemic risk emanating from uncleared trades, and 
to promote central clearing, which limits interconnectedness. I will refer to this consensus 
as the ‘margining/clearing consensus’. 
 
Overall, while the pre-crisis ideational consensus provided leverage for bank influence, the 
new ideational outlook obstructed their influence after 2008. 
 
 
2.3.4 The state of the transnational policy community 
 
The literature has employed the term ‘policy community’ in different contexts, but a 
commonality across all approaches has been the focus on ‘the key features of 
interdependent actors from public and private sectors forming a group with clearly-defined 
boundaries’. 297 The term ‘transnational policy community’ has been coined by Tsingou to 
denote the close ties between policy-makers and banks that characterized public-private 
collaboration in banking regulation during most of the pre-crisis period. 298  
 
The origins of the transnational policy community can be traced back to the 1960s when 
public officials began to form a transnational regime under the umbrella of the BIS, first to 
monitor the expansion of the Euromarkets (which were frequently affected by high degrees 
of volatility) and subsequently also to overcome collective action problems over the 
regulation of financial markets. The policy community has since interacted through various 
settings, such as the BCBS, and consulted with interest groups on the best course of 
action.299 Over time, numerous other bodies and groups have been established, and they 
have often closely interacted with private financial sector officials.  
 
The interactions among the members of the transnational community are similar to those 
characterizing ‘epistemic communities’ which can be understood as ‘network[s] of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.300 Their 
members are united by several key elements, including ‘a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs’, ‘shared causal beliefs’, ‘shared notions of validity’, and ‘a common policy 
enterprise’.301 In addition, they often share a common elite professional background, which 
informs their credibility vis-à-vis each other, as well as vis-à-vis those policy-makers that 
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remain outside of the community.302 This close collaboration, of course, also helps to 
anchor the dominating ‘ideational outlook’.303 In such an environment, policy-making does 
not rely on threats and open pressure. Rather, it tends to be informed by learning, 
persuasion, and an emphasis on ‘best practices’.304 According to Djelic and Quack, ‘the 
additional value of the community dimension for understanding transnational governance 
arrangements lies in their potential to align the cognitive and normative orientations of 
their members over time’.305 In a similar way, Young argues that within the transnational 
policy community, ‘[p]rivate sector norms and preferences […] make their way into financial 
regulatory policymaking through a slow-moving and diffuse social process’.306  
 
Newman and Posner equally highlight the consensus-fostering attributes associated with 
policy-making at the transnational level, arguing that ‘[s]oft law proposals, by providing new 
policy ideas, force the engagement of competing regulatory factions’.307 They continue 
elaborating that ‘transnational policy proposals become political facts that undermine a 
blocking faction’s defense of the status quo […]’. 308  As an additional element they 
emphasize the legitimacy-enhancing effects of soft law at the domestic level in terms of 
providing a justification for regulators’ alignment of national standards with international 
frameworks.309 
 
If interest groups form an integral part of the transnational policy community, their chances 
of exercising influence are higher than if they are relegated to the margin, or not 
represented at all. The relevance of being part of such a community has been confirmed by 
Bernhagen et al. who conclude from a statistical analysis that interest groups that provide 
information while being part of a policy community tend to be more successful in shaping 
policy outcomes than those groups that only submit information, but are not well-
integrated.310 By contrast, they show that ‘the ability to offer relevant information may be 
ineffective, if a group faces hostile political decision-makers’.311  More generally, the 
literature has found that interest groups prefer lobbying ‘friendly’ policy-makers who 
support their cause, rather than ‘foes’ who tend to view it more critically.312 As Chalmers 
argues, ‘[t]he goal of lobbying is, on balance, not to change the minds of those who do not 
agree with you, but rather to subsidize the work of those who already do’.313  
 
                                                        
302
 Chwieroth (2007, 2015), Levine (2012) 
303
 See Fioretos (2016:73) 
304
 Helleiner/Porter (2009:15), Slaughter (2004:51ff.) 
305
 Djelic/Quack (2010:397) 
306
 Young (2014a:315) 
307
 Newman/Posner (2018:29) 
308
 ibid. 
309
 Newman/Posner (2018:24ff.) 
310
 Bernhagen et al. (2015) 
311
 Bernhagen et al. (2015:571) 
312
 E.g. Marshall (2010), Hall/Deardorff (2006) 
313
 Chalmers (2011:474) 
 51 
We will see that prior to the crisis, the banks enjoyed a privileged, central position within 
the transnational policy community, which facilitated their exercise of influence. One key 
reason was again related to the high complexity of derivative products, which already 
tended to keep issue salience low. As a consequence, the transnational policy community 
was largely undisturbed from the haggling of messy day-to-day policy-making in other 
areas.314 Helleiner and Porter emphasize that the ‘elite, and highly technical character of 
regulatory networks provide[d] privileged access points for business’,315 particularly for 
financial industry representatives who often ‘share[] a common background, expertise, and 
wordview’316 as the regulators. Along similar lines, Lall argues that it is the ‘issue-specific 
characteristics of global finance – in particular, its highly technical and complex nature’ that 
bestow on the large banks a privileged position within the ‘technical elite network’.317 The 
close-knit transnational community became even more interwoven by the embrace of the 
deregulatory ideational consensus, as well as the regular use of the revolving door 
connecting private and public office.318 The result was a form of ‘elite interlacement’319 
where ‘the public/private demarcation [became] obsolete’.320 
 
Within the confines of the transnational policy community, policy-makers formed a 
transgovernmental community, but prior to the crisis, the borders between those two 
communities blended seamlessly. Except for occasional interference by the CFTC, regulators 
and dealer banks were in full agreement over the deregulation consensus. Representing a 
nexus of its own, the transnational policy community thus developed into an elite ‘club’,321 
largely impenetrable to any ‘outside’ member, even for those from the broader financial 
sector itself.322  
 
After the crisis, however, the ‘demarcation line’ between the public and private members of 
the transnational community came into sharp relief. Tsingou shows that in banking 
regulation, the transnational ‘policy community is under stress but not broken’.323 Change 
has occurred, but it has remained limited. Indeed, she identifies a remarkable degree of 
‘resilience’, in the sense that, despite all reform efforts and some sharp rhetoric employed 
by regulators, ‘the special role of the financial sector is, if anything reinforced’ and the 
expertise of its representatives ‘ha[s] not been fully discredited’.324 
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We will see that in the margin case, the transnational policy community was more than just 
‘under stress’. The analysis will reveal that it was in fact severely shaken. The dealer banks 
were still part of the community, but they were pushed to its margin. By contrast, it was the 
transgovernmental community that now dominated. United by the new ideational 
consensus, and subsequently institutionalized in form of WGMR, the transgovernmental 
community retained most, if not all the constituting elements that had marked the 
overarching transnational policy community including the exchange of ideas, learning and 
persuasion, which greatly facilitated the development of the margin rules. 
 
The post-crisis literature has confirmed the relevance of well-functioning transnational 
regulatory networks for the emergence of the new regulatory regime. Helleiner et al., for 
example, argue that ‘[t]he speed with which the G20 agenda was developed can be 
attributed at least in part to the density of transgovernmental networks of financial officials 
with expertise in this area’.325 In another publication, Helleiner has noted that ‘[b]oth 
consensus formation and the development of specific new international regulatory 
standards for OTC derivatives were greatly facilitated by the density of transgovernmental 
networks among technocratic officials’.326 
 
During the development of the margin rules, regulators took notice of the dealer banks’ 
advice, but followed it only in rare cases. Moreover, the tone of their conversations with the 
banks became significantly more adversarial than before 2008. This was probably also 
related to changes to two other factors that previously had indirectly nourished the 
community, i.e. the emergence of a new ideational consensus, which the banks for the most 
part did not share, and the high degree of public issue salience, which massively reduced 
the previously ‘”Olympian” distance’ 327 from ordinary day-to-day policy-making in national 
arenas. As a consequence, the banks lost their privileged position within the community, 
which led to a significant decrease of their influence over the new rules. 
 
More generally, this assessment does not only apply to post-crisis derivatives regulation, 
but financial market governance more broadly. For example, in 2011, Robert Jenkins of the 
Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee publicly condemned the bank’s attempts at 
weakening post-crisis financial reform as ‘intellectually dishonest and potentially damaging’, 
and threatened that further recalcitrance on their part might only strengthen regulators’ 
resolution to rein in the market. ‘A profession which should stand for integrity and 
prudence’, he added, ‘now supports a lobbying strategy that exploits misunderstanding and 
fear’. He recommended that rather than complain about the cost of post-crisis reform, the 
banks should reduce risk and lower cost by cutting bonuses.328 
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Helleiner has equally noted that ‘the relationship between top regulators and the dealer 
banks has been less cosy and more confrontational than before the crisis’.329 Qualitative 
case study evidence collected by Young regarding the reform of capital requirements for 
banks also points in this direction. He references interview evidence characterising the post-
crisis relationship between the banks and regulators, the content of which could be drawn 
directly from the margin case. For instance, his interviewees report that ‘there was a 
significant drop in communication between financial industry associations and regulatory 
bodies at both the national and transnational levels. […] groups had to ‘muscle in’ to 
meetings’ and that overall, ‘engagements with regulators ‘stiffened’ considerably. 330 
Moreover, banks tended to learn about new proposals or changes to existing ones ‘at a 
much later stage than they had in the past’.331 He also notes that the information 
commenters often submit in response to consultations had previously been eagerly awaited 
by the regulators, even though they did not always act upon it in the way the banks hoped 
for, but that ‘this kind of equilibrium has changed’. In contrast to pre-crisis discussions, 
regulators often responded ‘with disinterest and scorn’. 332  The relevance of these 
statements becomes even clearer when linked to his other results including the fact that 
private financial interest groups have been largely unable to influence the content of a 
variety of transnational policies under Basel III.333 
 
Overall, prior to 2008, interest groups’ privileged status as respected members of the 
transnational policy community allowed them to exercise significant influence. After the 
crisis, however, they lost their central position, which went hand-in-hand with a loss of 
influence. At the same time, a tight-knit transgovernmental community emerged whose 
actions often diametrically contradicted the banks’ preferences. 
 
 
2.3.5 The nature of inter-state power relations 
 
The effect of the nature of inter-state power relations depends less on which kind(s) of 
power are exercised than whether its exercise leads to results whose contours are aligned 
with the banks’ preferences. 
 
While governance through the transnational/transgovernmental policy community 
emphasizes the importance of the exchange of ideas and information, the embrace of ‘best 
practices’, and an emphasis on persuasion, this does not mean that ‘power’ is entirely 
absent. Kahler and Lake observe that while networks are characterized by ‘the absence of a 
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third-party arbiter for dispute resolution’, they can also contain ‘elements of hierarchy’.334 
Inter-state power therefore matters, particularly when there is a lack of (ideational) 
consensus among the transgovernmental policy community. Interest groups cannot directly 
affect inter-state power relations. However, as Newman and Posner have argued, studying 
this variable is particularly important in order to avoid confusing ‘congruence’ with 
‘influence’, which might apply in cases where policy outcomes are the result of policy-
makers being driven by power-related considerations, rather than by interest group 
pressure.335 
 
At the most basic level, power can be considered ‘the production, in and through social 
relations, of effects on actors that shape their capacity to control their fate’.336 It is a multi-
faceted concept that manifests in numerous forms and can therefore also be parameterized 
in different ways. While the different forms of power often overlap in the empirical world, 
which can make it difficult to isolate them from each other, they represent analytically 
distinctive concepts. This study focuses on three different kinds of inter-state power, ‘power 
through market size’, ‘power as regulatory capacity’, and ‘power as structural power’. 
 
Post-crisis derivatives research has often focused on a fourth variation of power, i.e. power 
through the extraterritorial application of domestic law. This form of power played an 
important role in much of post-crisis derivatives regulation, given that Dodd-Frank and 
EMIR (the European Market Infrastructure Regulation) granted the CFTC and ESMA (the 
European Securities and Markets Authority) significant extraterritorial authority to pursue 
the cross-border extension of the domestic framework, the objective being to prevent a 
race to the bottom.337 Several studies have examined the extraterritorial application of 
domestic rules regarding clearing, trade reporting, and trade venues.338 In the margin case, 
however, the cross-border aspect of the rules was discussed separately from the cases 
explored in this study, and extraterritorial aspects appear not to have had any significant 
impact on the policy-process. The analysis of the case studies themselves will therefore not 
cover this variation of power. The implications of its lack of relevance, however, will be 
discussed in the conclusion. 
 
Power through market size 
 
The exercise of ‘power through market size’ is related to the assumption that policy-makers’ 
influence over regulatory outcomes is a function of the relative size of their domestic 
market for a given product or service.339 A policy-maker overseeing a relatively larger 
market than his foreign colleague can threaten to prevent market access to foreign 
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businesses from that other jurisdiction, which endows her with the power to shape 
regulatory outcomes, or even veto them. In line with Realist thinking, Drezner argues that 
‘[m]arkets have a gravitational effect on producers – the larger the economy, the stronger 
the pull for producers to secure and exploit market access’.340 Simmons observes that the 
financial power of the largest jurisdictions in terms of the size, depth, and liquidity of their 
markets allows them to export their preferred regulatory arrangements to other 
countries.341 Following this line of reasoning, a number of studies have traced the adoption 
of Basel I to threats by the US (and the UK) to close their markets to foreign banks.342 In a 
similar way, Bach and Newman’s analysis of the diffusion of insider trading laws reveals that 
close ties with the SEC represent a more powerful predictor of other jurisdictions adopting 
such laws, than membership within IOSCO.343 These empirical results, of course, also hint at 
the presence of ‘structuring’ power operating in the background, but backed up, supported, 
and sustained with power through market size. 
 
Power as regulatory capacity 
 
The analysis of the exercise of ‘power as regulatory capacity’ departs from the importance 
of market size, but adds ‘that a sizeable internal market must be coupled with potent 
regulatory institutions to yield power over global governance’.344 For Büthe and Mattli, it is 
the ‘effective representation of domestic interest that confer[s] the critical advantage in 
these regulatory processes’.345 Bach and Newman, in turn, conclude that ‘[r]egulatory 
capacity is the mechanism linking market size to power in international market 
regulation’.346 Much of scholarly analysis has focused on the recent growth in regulatory 
capacity of the EU, and the implications of this development for the EU’s power over 
international regulatory policy formation. Indeed, initially, the EU suffered from fragmented 
regulatory policy-making located at the national level and split across (sub-)sectoral lines. 
This often forced Europe to succumb to the preferences of the US. 
 
For example, in the 1990s, European policy-makers tried to convince the SEC of a mutual 
recognition regime for accounting standards, but did not succeed. One of the key reasons 
was that EU decision-making in the accounting sector was not centralized at the 
supranational level, but located at the national level, with the UK, Germany, and France 
often competing against each other, rather than aligning their preferences in a cohesive 
manner. As a consequence of this fragmented internal institutional set-up, European policy-
makers were unable to exercise leverage in accounting-related discussions with the SEC, 
which, in turn, feared that any equivalence decision of accounting standards might have 
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negative repercussions for the competitiveness of US stock markets.347 More generally, 
Newman and Posner have noted that US policy-makers were not always necessarily in 
complete consensus regarding the direction a certain policy should take, but that in most 
cases, there was ‘a regulatory actor that was able to steer the transnational rule-setting 
process despite the sometimes unsettled nature of the issues at home’.348 
 
However, as of the late 1990s, the EU began elevating its ‘power as regulatory capacity’ 
through political and institutional reforms leading to the growing centralization of financial 
policy-making authority at the supranational level. 349  The kick-start was the EU 
Commission’s adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan in 1999, which involved a large 
bundle of regulatory measures to promote the European integration of national financial 
services industries. At the institutional level, Alexandre de Lamfalussy, a former advisor to 
the BIS and founding president of the European Monetary Institute (the predecessor of the 
ECB), in 2001 provided recommendations on further strengthening the architecture of 
European financial services regulation.350 
 
Inspired by his recommendations, the EU developed the ‘Lamfalussy architecture’ which 
structured the financial policy-making process on the basis of the co-decision procedure of 
the EU institutions (i.e. Commission, Parliament, and Council) and the work of three 
European supervisory committees, one each for the securities, banking, and 
insurance/pension fund sector. The responsibilities of the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), and the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS) involved 
providing technical advice to the Commission, issuing joint standards, recommendations, 
and guidelines, as well as monitoring member states’ implementation efforts. Since the 
Lamfalussy committees lacked legal personality and direct formal enforcement powers,351 
this architecture did not result in the complete centralization of financial policy-making at 
the supranational level.352 Nonetheless, the new political and institutional framework raised 
the EU’s confidence sufficiently for it to claim the status of ‘global standard setter’.353 
Feeling emboldened, it began to strike back against unilateral US decision-making. This 
frequently caused US negotiators to voice ‘surprise and consternation that the EU and its 
member state supervisors would presume to ‘pass judgement’ on U.S. rules and 
supervision’.354 However, as opposed to the area of capital account liberalization, where the 
EU promoted the idea of a ‘managed’ form of globalization,355 it limited its newly gained 
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leverage in financial market regulation to foster the competitiveness of its own markets, 
rather than advocating a distinct approach.356 In the words of Posner and Véron, it 
exercised ‘power without purpose’,357 which did not lead to any restraint of bank influence. 
This also applied to the area of OTC derivatives regulation.  
 
After 2008, there were clear signs suggesting the EU intended to move beyond the exercise 
of shared regulatory authority with the US. Indeed, in 2009, the EU Commission emphasized 
that ‘Europe should play an instrumental role in shaping a global regulatory regime’ and 
that a ‘EU framework could serve as a reference for global regulation’.358 The EU secured 
the institutional capacity necessary for charting this new course by upgrading the 
Lamfalussy committees to independent supervisory authorities with enhanced powers.359 
The new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) which became operational in January 2011 took 
over all responsibilities of their predecessors, but were also given legal personality.360   
 
Reflecting on the effect of these institutional developments on post-crisis regulation, 
Helleiner and Pagliari have concluded that ‘analysts focusing on inter-state power relations 
would be right to identify the growing capacity of the European Union to act collectively, 
both unilaterally and at the international level, as [a] significant development […]’.361 First 
corroborating evidence can be found in the EU Commission’s refusal to provide market 
access to US financial institutions on the basis of simple mutual recognition of the 
underlying regulatory framework, which would have been the standard approach before 
the crisis. For example, non-European dealers operating in the EU were obliged to clear 
derivatives through CCPs located in and authorized by the EU. In addition, the EU no longer 
allowed US regulators to act as the sole supervisors of American credit rating agencies in 
Europe, but insisted on the establishment of local subsidiaries to be placed under its 
supervision.362  
 
Power as structural power 
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The third form of power considered by this study is ‘power as structural power’. The term 
was first introduced by Cohen who differentiates between ‘process power’ and ‘structure 
power’. Process power denotes an actor’s ‘ability to extract advantage within the existing 
interaction situation’, whereas structure power allows her to ‘favorably modify[] the 
interaction situation’.363 The term was subsequently popularized by Strange who defined it 
as ‘the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within 
which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises, and (not least) 
their scientists and other professional people have to operate’; it is ‘the power to decide 
how things shall be done’.364 In contrast to ‘relational power’, which operates through the 
(threat of) application of direct pressure, the effects of structural power are therefore often 
subtle.365 The analysis of structural power through Strange’s analytical lens is further 
complicated by the fact that its effect can sometimes also be unintentional, the result of 
‘non-decisions’, and/or a consequence of a structurally powerful actor simply ‘being 
there’.366 
 
Kirshner has proposed a slightly different variation of ‘structural power’ that is certainly not 
incompatible with the approaches of Cohen and Strange, but places a somewhat different 
emphasis. His conceptualization is inspired by Hirschman’s367 insights on the effects of 
asymmetric trade relations. Kirshner applies these insights to currency relations, with a 
particular focus on the pre-eminent position of the USD, which provides the link to this 
study. Drawing on Hirschman, he argues that being engaged in a free trade agreement with 
a large state has an impact on how a small state perceives its own interests, in the sense 
that over time, there will be an alignment of interests of the two trade partners, without 
any direct pressure being exercised by the larger on the smaller economy.368 Following 
Hirschman, this observation leads him to conclude that, in the resolution of currency-
related questions, ‘the US gains because participation in a dollar-based international 
monetary order […] shapes the perceived self-interests of states […]’.369 ‘[T]he special role 
of the dollar, simply by serving as the axis around which monetary affairs are organized, has 
provided the United States with […] structural power. Choices, frameworks, and relations 
are implicitly shaped by the dollar’s international role, and, as with the pattern of 
international trade, generate incentives that subtly influence the way actors go about 
calculating what is in their best political interest’.370 As Kirshner’s example shows, ‘power as 
structural power’ is not far removed from ‘power as market size’, and in the empirical world 
the lines might blur at certain times. However, one of the key differences is that the 
exercise of ‘structural power’ does not involve the voicing of any explicit threats, as policy-
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makers in the ‘smaller’ economy conclude by themselves that it is in their own best interest 
to act in a certain way.371 
 
This dissertation will reveal that, in the pre-crisis period, ‘power through market size’ 
allowed the US to veto global regulatory efforts it did not agree with. Once the EU had 
strengthened and centralized its institutional financial decision-making architecture, it used 
its ‘power as regulatory capacity’, but not in order to challenge the deregulation course. 
‘Power as structural power’ might have mattered in the sense that both the US and the UK 
felt that, with the respective other side of the Atlantic offering an attractive marketplace, it 
was in their own interest to respond to deregulation abroad with further deregulation at 
home in order to prevent the melting away of their respective market share. Prior to 2008, 
power in its various manifestations therefore reinforced the ability of the dealer banks to 
exercise influence. 
 
In the post-crisis period, there was often no need for the exercise of power, given policy-
maker’s strong embrace of the clearing/margining consensus and the presence of WGMR to 
foster agreement. However, it was probably not completely absent. Power was most likely 
exercised in two cases, by the EU in the two-way IM mandate case, and by the US in the FX 
case. In the two-way IM mandate case, the EU appears to have exercised power vis-à-vis the 
US Prudential Regulators, which would have preferred a one-way mandate, by relying on 
power through market size and power through regulatory capacity. However, besides 
power, the Prudential Regulators’ membership in the transgovernmental community of 
WGMR might have equally played a role. In the FX case, it seems that US structural power 
might have mattered, in that the EU’s reliance on the USD probably made it adopt an 
exemption from IM for certain FX products, against its own preferences and despite the fact 
that it held both ‘power as market size’ (with London being the leading market for these 
products) and ‘power as regulatory capacity’. However, it was the US that supplied the 
traded good, i.e. the currency, and the EU’s dependence on it endowed it with structural 
power to push through its preferred policy outcome. 
 
 
2.3.6 The domestic institutional environment 
 
As with inter-state power, the effect of the domestic institutional environment on dealer 
bank influence depends less on the institutions themselves, than on the way in which 
domestic institutional arrangements play out over the course of the policy-making process. 
Specifically, I concentrate on two dimensions, regulatory fragmentation and the domestic 
national institutional set-up, each of which can provide an opening for industry preferences 
to shine through. The focus of this thesis rests primarily on regulatory fragmentation. 
Sometimes fragmentation opens a window of opportunity for the banks if it moves the 
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policy process closer to their preferences. At other times, it can put into question progress 
that the banks thought had already been achieved on their way towards achieving 
influence. When speaking about the ‘domestic institutional environment’ with respect to 
the EU, I refer to the supranational, rather than the member state level (unless specified 
otherwise). In the next section, I will first briefly speak about the terms ‘institutionalism’ 
and ‘institutions’, before discussing each of the two dimensions listed above. 
 
The literature differentiates between various forms of institutionalisms and their effects on 
policy outcomes. Among the most common forms are rational choice, sociological, and 
historical institutionalism.372 They vary in function of how they position themselves on the 
micro-macro axis and the material-cogntive axis (i.e. interests vs. ideas) , although there can 
also be some overlap.373 The rationalist approach supports an understanding according to 
which self-interested, utility-maximizing individuals choose institutions on the basis of 
mostly fixed, exogenous preferences, the aim being to facilitate coordination that is 
considered necessary to create or maintain equilibrium.374 The historical approach, in 
contrast, emphasizes the temporal dimension and ‘see[s] institutions as the legacy of 
concrete historical processes’.375  The sociological version, in turn, studies institutions 
through the lens of cognition and the impact of collectively held norms and shared 
understandings.376 
 
I follow Moschella and Tsingou who loosely align their edited volume on post-crisis 
incremental change in financial regulation with the historical approach by adopting a 
perspective which in their own words is ‘more practical than theoretical’.377 This approach is 
also in line with Helleiner and Pagliari’s invitation to scholars to pay closer attention to the 
impact of ‘distinct domestic foundations of policies toward international financial 
regulation’.378 
 
There are several other studies in the IPE of finance literature which have followed a similar 
approach, both with regard to the impact of domestic institutions on international 
regulation and vice versa. Walter, for example, has studied how the influence of domestic 
institutions in several East Asian jurisdictions has led to ‘mock’, rather than ‘substantive’ 
compliance with the requirements of Basel I. The key reasons for ‘cosmetic’ compliance 
include the prevalence of bank-based financial systems, where banks closely cooperate with 
mostly family-owned businesses, as well as other ‘institutional’ features of the more 
interventionist, ‘developmental’ state.379 
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For the developed countries, Lütz has studied the effect of financial globalization on 
financial policy convergence. While she finds significant policy convergence regarding the 
content of banking rules, this does not apply to the institutional set-up of domestic financial 
regulation. She argues that the domestic institutional context ‘provid[es] actors with 
restrictions and opportunity structures’, as a result of which she observes ‘convergence 
within national diversity’.380 Focusing on the bottom-up direction, Mattli and Büthe argue 
that domestic ‘institutional complementarities’ in terms of the extent to which domestic 
stakeholders coordinate amongst each other, and the degree to which the representation 
of interests is organized hierarchically determine who can act as a first mover when 
international standardization is negotiated, and who has to assume the role of a follower, 
having to accept international rules less in line with their domestic institutional context.381 
 
For the post-crisis period, James and Quaglia have shown that the UK banks’ structural 
power to prevent/attenuate Brexit was limited by the ‘reconfiguration of institutional 
structures within government’. 382  Indeed, Prime Minister Theresa May closed the 
traditional communication channels of the industry with policy-makers by shifting 
responsibility for the Brexit negotiations to the newly established Department for Exiting 
the European Union and the Department for International Trade, at the expense of the 
Treasury which used to be the traditional interlocutor through which the banks had 
traditionally channelled their influence.383 
 
One of the key weaknesses associated with historical institutionalism as an analytical 
approach, whether followed narrowly, or more loosely, as in this thesis, is its struggle to 
offer ‘forward-looking explanation[s]’.384 This means that it is difficult to develop predictive 
hypotheses of the specific impact of institutions ex ante. As well, one might argue that it is 
often problematic to delimit precisely what exactly should be considered an ‘institution’, 
and what aspect(s) of domestic arrangements should be explored. Moschella and Tsingou 
note that the spectrum of possibilities is rather wide. Indeed, it can range from ‘formal 
institutions and rules’, ‘regimes’, and ‘supervisory practices’ to ‘policy practices and 
strategies of actors’.385 They themselves consider ‘institutions’ as ‘the result of political 
struggles and temporal processes that crystallise interests as well as routines and habits’.386 
This dissertation leans on their definition, but remains aware that this approach does not 
fully mitigate either of the two weaknesses. 
 
Regarding regulatory fragmentation, the US is considered a notorious case, as already 
mentioned in chapter I-3.3 with respect to the likelihood of meaningful post-crisis change. 
Singer, for instance, notes that the US regulatory agencies often tend to be in conflict with 
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each other about the precise contours of financial regulation.387 Indeed, the American 
financial regulatory bodies were formed over a long period of time, and they are equipped 
with different mandates in order to respond to different kinds of risk.388 The overall set-up 
is also reflective of traditional US scepticism vis-à-vis any attempt at concentrating 
power.389 However, as a result, there is often disagreement among the authorities as to 
which course of regulatory reform should be pursued. From a domestic institutionalist 
perspective, one might also associate an element of ‘path dependence’390 with this factor, 
in that policy-makers’ present-day decision-making follows a path-dependent trajectory. 
This particular aspect, however, will not be at the centre of the analysis. 
 
Overall, the analysis will reveal that prior to 2008, the domestic institutional structure on 
both sides of the Atlantic provided a benign environment for dealer bank influence to take 
hold. With the exception of the CFTC, which periodically attempted to regulate the 
uncleared market, there was cross-institutional consensus on deregulation, the effect of 
which was reinforced over time by positive feedback effects. 
 
For the post-crisis period, however, the picture is more complex. On the one hand, the 
shock of the crisis was intense enough to rally support for a fundamental re-calibration of 
the financial system through the imposition of margin requirements. On the other, agreeing 
on the precise ways in which to design the content and contours of post-crisis regulation 
often turned out more challenging than agreeing to simply not intrude in the market. In 
several cases in the US, regulatory fragmentation in terms of the differing mandates of the 
regulatory authorities, as well as historical legacies of jurisdictional battles started shining 
through. This sometimes provided an opening for industry preferences to be reflected in 
the policy outcome, even though this was probably not a result of causal influence. For the 
EU cases, regulatory fragmentation was less relevant, with the partial exemption of the end-
user case. In the pre-crisis period, the main centre of regulatory activity was in London, 
where decision-making was centralized, first at the level of the Securities and Investment 
Board, and subsequently the FSA (Financial Services Authority). When the EU introduced 
consolidated supervision, it was again less a question of a regulatory intrusion. For the post-
crisis period, there is no publicly available evidence suggesting that the ESAs did not all pull 
in the same direction. 
 
The second factor relates more narrowly to ‘national’ institutions, with a particular focus on 
the EU. Scharpf, for instance, points to the different effects of unitary vs. federal, 
parliamentary vs. presidential, and two-party vs. multi-party systems on political decision-
making.391. While the US is a truly federal system, the EU is a system sui generis: ‘Less than a 
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federation. More than a regime’.392 This thesis is less interested in categorizing the precise 
political system of the EU. The moderator also does not capture the augmentation of the 
supranational character of the EU, which we already discussed in relation to ‘the nature of 
inter-state power relations’. Rather, it focuses on the practical consequences related to this 
consolidation in light of the fact that the EU with its 28 member states has federal features, 
but is not a state. Post-crisis, the institutional consolidation of the EU meant that EMIR and 
the ESAs’ rules applied directly at the member-state level as a regulation. However, the 
rules sometimes also had to interact with other domestic institutions that differed across 
member states, or had not yet been institutionalized at the EU level. Again, this sometimes 
opened a window of opportunity for the banks, but without the overall effect necessarily 
being causally related to dealer bank influence. 
 
The thesis does not reflect on the impact of different ‘varieties of capitalism’,393 which are 
sometimes also associated with the domestic ‘institutional context’.394 The ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach invites the researcher to differentiate between two kinds of capitalist 
economies located at either end of a continuous spectrum. On the one end, we find liberal 
market economies (such as the UK and the US) that are traditionally dependent on financial 
intermediation through capital markets, as opposed to coordinated market economies, such 
as Germany, which rely on bank credit-based financial intermediation.395  
 
The key reason for the omission is a practical one, related to the lack of sufficient data on 
the individual preferences of EU member states, particularly for the post-crisis period (see 
also the discussion on the limitations of this study in section 5 of this chapter). At the same 
time, the repercussions of the omission for the overall research appear limited. As we will 
see, in the pre-crisis period, both the US and the EU favoured ‘market-friendly regulation’, 
i.e. different varieties of capitalism seem to have played a relatively minor role.396 It is also 
not entirely clear to what extent this theoretical lens could help us better understand the 
post-crisis regulatory response. The use of uncleared derivatives is not a priori limited to, or 
concentrated within any specific sector of the economy, although precise data about the 
exact distribution is scarce. 
 
Given that the uncleared derivatives business is typically intermediated by the dealer banks, 
the classical working hypothesis would be to expect that liberal market economies favour 
stronger regulation of the derivatives industry, given their relatively lower reliance on bank-
based credit intermediation, as compared to co-ordinated market economies.397 However, 
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as we will see, the earliest and strongest calls for stronger OTC derivatives regulation 
emanated from the US, and the limited data available to me suggests that not only the EU 
as a whole, but also some key actors in the UK supported a strong regulatory response. This 
suggests a rather uniform preference of public officials for regulatory intervention across 
different ‘varieties of capitalism’. We will also see that private sector responses did not 
display any pattern that might easily be reconciled with the varieties of capitalism logic. For 
these reasons, Pagliari equally dismissed the relevance of this factor in his research on the 
effect of public issue salience of derivatives regulation on the post-crisis response in the US 
and the EU.398 We might further add that derivatives are also available through non-bank 
broker dealers, which renders differentiating between bank/non-bank-based financial 
systems more challenging.399 
 
Summarizing the individual effects of these moderators, as discussed in existing accounts in 
the IPE literature, we can expect the dealer banks to exercise high levels of influence, if 
 
1) they can secure high levels of business unity, 
 
2) the public issue salience of the policy in question is low, or if the banks succeed 
in raising the public issue salience of their preferred version of a policy (‘friendly’ 
issue salience), 
 
3) policy-makers embrace an ideational consensus that encourages delegating 
decision-making power to the banks themselves  or that is otherwise in line with 
their preferences, 
 
4) the banks occupy a central position within the transnational policy community, 
 
5) inter-state power relations (understood as power as market size, power as 
regulatory capacity, and/or power as structural power) play out in a way that 
does not clash with their preferences, and  
 
6) domestic institutional arrangements (in terms of regulatory fragmentation and 
the domestic ‘institutional’ set-up) play out in a way that does not clash with 
their preferences. 
 
My overall argument, however, is that we can begin capturing the essence of dealer bank 
influence only, if we combine these theoretical explanations and focus on the 
interrelationships of the moderators, rather than just their individual effects. The literature 
on the banks’ ability to rely on the end-users to create ‘friendly’ issue salience already goes 
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in this direction, as it implicitly connects ‘business unity’ with ‘issue salience’.400 Moreover, 
some of the publications I have discussed in this chapter touch on the joint relevance of 
moderators in the narrative exposition of their case studies. Examples include James and 
Quaglia’s research on the UK banks’ lost battle to prevent Brexit, or Bell and Hindmoor’s 
analysis of banks’ structural power over capital regulation in the UK.401 
 
I suggest going beyond these efforts in favour of explicitly conceptualizing these 
connections between the moderators in the analytical framework. In other words, I argue 
that it is not just the individual presence of certain moderators, but their particular 
combination and interaction that leads to a particular level of dealer bank influence. Each of 
the theoretical explanations discussed above contributes important insight, but, on its own, 
each one is insufficient to equip us with a grounded understanding of dealer bank influence. 
In particular, I propose to focus on the dynamic effect that can sometimes exist among the 
moderators. For example, in some cases, the effect of one moderator can have little impact 
on dealer bank influence, whereas in other cases, it can produce cascading reactions by 
encouraging the effect of other moderators to change, with the joint effect resulting in a 
particular level of influence. Such an approach appears particularly promising for those 
cases where the needle on the barometer of dealer bank influence changes during the 
policy process, before settling on a final category, once the outcome has been produced. 
Overall, my argument suggests that a particular level of influence is more than just the 
result of the individual effects of each single moderator.  
 
 
3.  The cases: Derivatives deregulation prior to 2008 and the 
introduction of mandatory margin requirements after the global 
financial crisis in the US and the EU 
 
This thesis focuses on dealer bank influence over derivatives deregulation prior to 2008 and 
the introduction of mandatory margin rules for non-centrally cleared derivatives after the 
crisis. In terms of jurisdictions, it is limited to two cases, the US and the EU, which have the 
largest markets for uncleared derivatives, respectively accounting for 24% and 58% of the 
global market in 2007. Figure 7 provides a breakdown of global market share. In the thesis, I 
use the terms ‘EU’ and ‘Europe’ interchangeably. 
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Figure 7: The global market for OTC derivatives 
 
Source: Author, based on IFSL Research (2007:2, table 1 informed by BIS data). Percentages, average daily 
turnover for 2007. 
 
Given that prior to 2008, there was no specific margin rule, nor was the introduction of 
mandatory collateralization requirements seriously discussed, I concentrate on policy-
makers’ broader decisions over keeping the market deregulated and/or deregulating it 
further. I treat the pre-crisis period as one case, although, as we will see, there were several 
important decisions that served as markers on the deregulation path. The period of 
observation covers the time between the early 1970s and 2008. Considering the lack of 
existence of, or substantial debate about, a specific margin rule, one might ask whether the 
pre-crisis case would not better be considered as ‘background’, rather than a ‘case’. 
However, in light of the thesis’ interest in understanding change in dealer bank influence 
over policy outcomes in the regulation of OTC derivatives, as well as the corresponding 
changes to the moderator configuration, I treat the pre-crisis period as a full ‘case’.  
 
I use the term ‘deregulation’ with a certain amount of qualification. Most importantly, for 
the purpose of this research, ‘deregulation’ does not equal ‘lack of regulation’. Indeed, 
while some commenters tend to refer to the pre-crisis OTC derivatives market as ‘an 
unregulated and dysfunctional private casino’, allowing the large banks to bet money ‘in a 
regulatory void’,402 this observation is not entirely accurate. Carruthers, for example, 
emphasizes that ‘[t]he OTC market was not anarchic’.403 As we will see, there was in fact a 
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significant amount of public intervention. However, this intervention was undertaken with 
the aim of unleashing ‘the forces of competition and innovation, as opposed to regulatory 
restrictions’.404 Deregulation is qualitatively ‘different’ from much of the intrusive regulation 
that occurred post-crisis, but it is not equivalent to the presence of a ‘regulatory void’. Of 
course, these pre-crisis initiatives were also complemented with the explicit suppression of 
regulation, for example through the adoption of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000. However, even such suppression of regulation required legislation to ensure that 
‘deregulation’ could take hold. In addition, policy-makers supported self-regulation by the 
industry which established numerous bodies and initiatives for this purpose. Against this 
wider background, Harvey has concluded that ‘the “unregulated” image of the market was 
legally constructed’ through a series of regulatory decisions.405 For the purpose of this 
study, I therefore conceive of ‘deregulation’ as market-friendly regulation intended to 
remove restraints considered detrimental for market expansion. My approach is certainly 
not entirely novel. In his analysis of the emergence of the competition state following the 
intensification of economic globalization as of the 1990s, Cerny has noted a trend towards 
‘the actual expansion of de facto state intervention and regulation in the name of 
competitiveness and marketization’.406  A similar train of thought has been developed by 
Vogel who argues that deregulation often leads to ‘freer markets and more rules’.407 I follow 
these lines of reasoning and apply them to the pre-crisis period. 
 
Post-crisis regulation differs from ‘deregulation’. The margin rules are specifically designed 
to improve collateralization. Unlike before the crisis, regulation was therefore not premised 
anymore on the sole aim of minimizing the cost of doing business. As we will see, the main 
purpose policy-makers saw in the margin rules was two-fold: accounting for the systemic 
risk emanating from uncleared trades, and incentivizing their transition to the cleared 
marketplace. This means that the rules put a corset around the uncleared market, whereas 
they are designed to promote the growth of the cleared one. The margin requirements 
themselves are based on a detailed and complex rulebook covering almost every dimension 
of the collateralization process. I have selected seven specific requirements. Overall, this 
results in 8 cases for each of the US and the EU, or 16 cases in total: 
 
(1) Pre-crisis deregulation 
 
(2) The mandatory use of initial margin (IM) 
 
(3) The two-way IM requirement meaning that IM needs to be collected and posted by 
the dealers, rather than just collected, which would result in a one-way requirement  
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(4) The segregation requirement, meaning IM has to be kept separately from 
proprietary assets  
 
(5) The prohibition of rehypothecation, meaning IM must not be recycled by the 
receiving counterparty for its own purpose 
 
(6)  The exemption of commercial end-users from the margin rules 
 
(7) The exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards from IM, but 
 
(8) not from variation margin (VM) 
 
For the post-crisis period, the period of observation reaches from 2008 to the autumn of 
2017, when the bulk of the decision-making process on the margin rule was completed. The 
conclusion will reflect on more recent developments. 
 
Regarding the margin rule, I exclude all aspects pertaining to the calculation of the specific 
amounts of collateral that need to be posted, the amount of time counterparties have 
available to make payments after execution, as well as the kinds of assets deemed eligible 
for this purpose. The thesis also leaves aside all questions concerning the cross-border 
applicability of the rules, as well as the treatment of inter-affiliate swaps, which is often a 
closely related question. The cases I retain represent the building blocks of the new rules on 
which the excluded aspects build. These building blocks were also the parts of the rules that 
were completed first, whereas the decision-making process on some of the calculation 
requirements is still on-going to this date. 
 
At the regulatory level, the EU margin rules were developed jointly by the ESAs, while 
regulatory responsibility in the US was spread across several agencies. I concentrate on the 
rules developed by the CFTC (which has jurisdiction over most derivatives under Dodd-
Frank) and the joint group of the Prudential Regulators (PRs). There are five PRs: the Federal 
Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), and the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA). However, the agenda was driven by the first three of the group 
which were also the only PRs represented in BCBS-IOSCO’s Working Group on Margin 
Requirements. I therefore exclude the FCA and FHFA. While the Fed, OCC, and FDIC act as 
the US banking regulators, the CFTC is in charge of non-bank entities.408 
 
I also leave aside the SEC which has jurisdiction over brokers/broker-dealers. Following the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a ‘broker’ is any person that buys and sells securities for 
other parties, but is not a bank. Similar to a dealer bank, a broker-dealer is a broker that 
also trades for its own firm, often with another broker-dealer. Many banks own brokerage 
firms as separately regulated business units or subsidiaries. As a consequence, the list of the 
largest broker-dealers is very similar to that of the largest dealer banks. While the agency 
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published a first draft proposal in 2012,409 it did not add a final rule, or a second proposal 
during the period of observation. By contrast, the rule-making process pertaining to the 
cases I do examine was completed by the other agencies during that time. The lack of a final 
SEC rule might invite us to classify it as a successful example of influence by the broker-
dealers in terms of pushing regulation off the agenda. At the current stage, however, the 
case leaves too many question and data gaps to allow us to substantiate this conclusion. 
Given the lack of final SEC margin rules, security-based swaps in the bespoke US market, 
including single-name CDS, are currently not subject to any mandatory margin rules.410 The 
thesis does not address this issue any further. 
 
The EU was represented in WGMR through the ESAs and the EU Commission. This makes it 
difficult to differentiate between the legislative and regulatory level for the EU, given that 
the Commission is involved in both. Unlike in the US, where final rules by the agencies were 
in fact final, the ESAs final draft regulatory standards also needed to be approved by the EU 
Commission, as well as the Parliament and the Council. Comparing the US and the EU can 
therefore be challenging at times. Bach and Newman note that in these situations, ‘we can 
[still] compare processes that – while distinct – can be treated as analytical equivalents, 
provided the comparison is appropriately contextualized’.411 
 
 
4. Methodological approach 
 
Aiming to avoid the pitfalls associated with identifying influence, as explored at the 
beginning of this chapter, I employ the method of process tracing. In the words of George 
and Bennett, ‘the process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable’.412 More generally, ‘this procedure is 
intended to investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions 
are translated into outcomes’.413 
 
I used this method to study the extent to which dealer bank preferences translated into 
influence across the individual cases. Specifically, I examined the publicly available official 
documents associated with the policy process surrounding the development of the margin 
rules. These included draft/final legislation/rules, the comment letters submitted by interest 
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groups, transcripts of hearings, official policy reports, published statements, speeches, etc. I 
complemented this research by studying the financial press coverage of the margin rules. Of 
particular relevance was Risk.net, a financial news website with a dedicated focus on 
regulation and the derivatives markets, and FX Week, a magazine covering developments in 
the FX markets. In addition, I pursued an extensive keyword search in order to identify 
further information on the policy process. 
 
One might ask whether the strategy of relying on policy-makers’ and interest groups’ own 
statements is in fact the best way to identify their true preferences, even though it is widely 
adopted by scholars in the field.414 Indeed, the literature warns of the bias that might be 
introduced into the research by uncritically adopting this approach. Lowery, for instance, 
explains that neither interest groups nor policy-makers ‘take positions in a vacuum. Rather, 
they plausibly take positions on issues in anticipation of reactions from other actors’.415 
Specifically, there is the risk of interest groups and policy-makers both publicly adopting 
more ‘extreme’ positions than they actually espouse, particularly at the initial stage of the 
consultation process, so as to create some manoeuvring room for future negotiations. 
 
Associations have an additional motivation for potentially ‘over-stating’ their preferences. 
Young and Pagliari note that the comments submitted by associations ‘leave a record which 
demonstrates to their members that they are actively working for a given advocacy 
cause’.416 An association’s leadership might therefore have an incentive to be seen as 
particularly vocal and active in communicating its members’ preferences to policy-makers, 
which might encourage it to advocate exaggerated views. Of course, this presupposes that 
its members actually do share a common position on the issue(s) in question to begin with, 
which, as we will see, is not always the case.417 One might add that associations, as well as 
individual firms, also write with a third audience in mind, i.e. their members’ individual 
clients, to whom they might equally want to demonstrate commitment. Again, this could 
provide an incentive for overstating preferences.  
 
Disregarding this overall risk might have important repercussions for identifying interest 
group influence. If interest groups and/or policy-makers voice overstated preferences, and 
interest groups fail to achieve full victory, the final outcome might still overlap (perhaps 
even perfectly) with their ‘true’ position. The researcher, however, would wrongly 
underestimate their influence. The same applies to comparing policy-makers initial 
statements with the final policy outcome. The process tracing analysis, therefore, has to be 
conducted carefully. 
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In order to gain a better background understanding of the policy process, I complemented 
the detailed document analysis with anonymous research interviews. In total, I conducted 
104 anonymous conversations with experts. All interviews took place in person or over the 
phone and were semi-structured. I provided thematic anchors, but allowed for flexibility for 
the respondents to elaborate on points of interest. In order to protect all interviewees’ 
identities (a consistently voiced concern given the recent nature of the margin reform), and 
because the interviews were used only to gain background understanding to support my 
detailed document analysis, I do not provide any information from these interviews or 
about the interviewees at any point in the thesis. 
 
Overall, the data basis for the US cases is superior, compared to those for the EU. For 
example, the official documentation of many sessions of the EU Parliament is often 
succinct, and does not reach beyond the publication of a list of agenda topics in bullet point 
form. In some cases, a link to a video recording of a session might be provided, but in 
practice, the content is often not accessible, or of suboptimal quality, or provides only 
partial coverage. The reports and studies prepared by the Parliament are usually very 
detailed, and in many cases one can consult the different versions leading to the final 
version. However, there is often little contextual information, which can complicate analysis 
of the documents. The official documentation of EU Council meetings is usually also not 
very detailed, given that the wording tends to be the result of careful negotiations by 
member state representatives who are used to meeting behind closed doors. The reports of 
the Commission, by contrast, tend to provide both detail and context. However, they 
represent only one segment, although a very important one, of the EU’s decision-making on 
the margin rules. By contrast, the US Government Publishing Office provides verbatim 
coverage of Congressional hearings, and thus a much richer source of information. 
 
At the regulatory level, the ESAs’ coverage of the rule-making process is by definition of a 
technical nature, but considerably more so, when compared to their American peers. 
Indeed, the US regulatory agencies often publish detailed minutes of their meetings from 
which important details about the decision-making process can be inferred. In addition, 
there is a rich archive of speeches, which serves a similar purpose. Regarding the text of the 
regulatory rules themselves, the American Procedures Act stipulates that the comments 
submitted by interested parties need to be reviewed, which often results in more detailed 
contextual explanations of why a particular agency (or group of agencies) adopted a certain 
policy.418 The ESAs also carefully considered the comments submitted in response to their 
own proposals. For instance, they published a lengthy ‘feedback table’ with additional data 
going beyond the information provided in the final draft regulatory standards.419 However, 
from a researcher’s perspective, the US documents provide more contextual richness. With 
very few exceptions, there was also very little detailed, publicly available information on the 
individual EU member states’ preferences regarding the margin rules. 
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5. Limitations of the study 
 
This study is affected by a number of important limitations. First, regarding the pre-crisis 
chapter, the reader will notice its principal focus on deregulation by the US. This imbalance 
is informed by the fact that the UK liberalized through one big step in the adoption of the 
Big Bang legislation in 1986, while deregulation in the US was a multi-step and multi-year 
process. The EU appeared on the scene rather late, meaning it will not be covered in great 
detail either. Tsingou confirms that the pre-crisis deregulation was ‘predominantly US-
centred’,420 which might justify the imbalance. Second, regarding the post-crisis chapters, 
my power-related arguments suffer from the weakness that there is often not sufficiently 
robust evidence to clear all doubts about the potential validity of alternative, competing 
explanations. The third weakness pertains to the post-crisis chapters more generally. It 
concerns the fact that the empirical evidence tends to be weaker for the EU than the US 
cases. This ‘evidence differential’ is to a large extent informed by the challenges which 
arose during the research process and which were already discussed in section II-4. 
 
This limitation has important implications. Most significantly, the thesis says little about the 
ways in which the preferences of the individual EU member states contributed to the 
shaping of the EU’s positions. Ideally, we would be interested in a more detailed exploration 
of the ways in which the UK in particular, but also Germany, and France (which host the 
largest national continental EU markets) contributed to each of the outcomes discussed in 
this study. For the same reason, the policy process leading to the emergence of the G20 
consensus and the establishment of WGMR will also not be discussed in detail. While the 
focus of the dissertation rests on dealer bank influence, rather than that of the EU’s 
member states, we might feel more confident about our conclusions regarding industry 
influence, if we knew more about the preferences of UK, German, and French policy-
makers. Given a lack of data, the study also remains silent on the preferences of the 
individual ESAs, whereas this aspect of the policy-making process will be explored in detail 
for the US cases.  
 
Other limitations apply more evenly to the US and EU cases. Indeed, as a fourth limitation, 
the reader might identify an imbalance regarding the thoroughness with which the thesis 
explores the various mechanisms through which the industry tried to exercise influence, 
particularly with respect to the post-crisis period. Specifically, the thesis says little about the 
exact mechanisms through which the banks might have tried to exercise influence through 
the provision of information. For example, I often do not differentiate between direct 
lobbying of legislators vs. regulators, and whether this lobbying took place at the domestic 
or the transnational level. For the EU case, the lack of detailed transcripts of discussions 
held in the EU Parliament and EU Council further complicated the task of identifying these 
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mechanisms. In a similar vein, differentiating between the domestic and transnational level 
proved difficult, because interest groups often submitted (nearly) identical letters to their 
domestic regulators as well as WGMR, and/or often cc’d policy-makers from the other side 
of the Atlantic as well. This complicated the accurate tracing of the way in which dealer 
bank influence might have been exercised in this form. There is one important exception. 
The end-user case was almost exclusively discussed at the domestic level, both in the US 
and the EU, whereas it did not rank high on WGMR’s agenda. Moreover, in terms of 
sequencing, the US was already much more advanced when the EU began its official 
deliberations. This allows me to provide a much richer picture of the mechanisms through 
which influence was exercised, whereas the analysis in this respect is coarser with respect 
to the other cases. 
 
Fifth, while the thesis covers a total of 7 post-crisis cases (or 14 if counted at the 
jurisdictional level), important areas of the margin rules remain outside its scope. As already 
indicated in section 3 of this chapter, the thesis disregards all issues pertaining to eligible 
forms of collateral for both IM and VM, the calculation of the numerical amounts of IM that 
need to be posted, including the definition of the IM thresholds that apply, and the time 
period within which it has to be posted to the counterparty. We cannot exclude that the 
industry gained back some of its influence over the discussion of these issues. For example, 
seemingly small details regarding calculation requirements might have a tremendous effect 
on the actual amounts of collateral that need to be posted. The industry could have lost 
with respect to the broad strokes of the margin rules discussed by the thesis, but it could 
still have exercised some influence, potentially even significant influence, over the finer 
lines of the calculation of the amounts that need to be posted. Overall, this would still signal 
a relative loss of influence compared to the pre-crisis period, but the argument would need 
to be made in a more nuanced fashion. Without further research, we cannot provide a 
definite answer to this question. Overall, given this series of limitations, we should be 
extremely careful with respect to generalizing the results derived from the individual case 
studies. More generally, the analysis might over- or underestimate the relevance and 
importance of some nuances. The complexity of the margin rules, the multi-level and multi-
agency character of the decision-making process, as well as the overall challenges 
associated with identifying influence make these risks appear particularly pertinent. The 
conclusions of this research should therefore be interpreted cautiously. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the analytical framework of the study. The theoretical model I 
suggest concerns how the influence of dealer bank preferences, articulated through the 
provision of information and the projection of structural/structuring power is moderated by 
a number of variables, and how the particular level of influence depends on the individual, 
joint, and dynamic effect of these moderators. The moderators are business unity, public 
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issue salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the transnational policy 
community, inter-state power relations, and the domestic institutional environment. The 
case studies to which I apply this model include derivatives deregulation prior to 2008 and 
selected aspects of the mandatory margin requirements developed after the crisis. The 
thesis relies on detailed empirical work. Nonetheless, it is affected by several analytical and 
empirical limitations, meaning its conclusions should be interpreted cautiously. 
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CHAPTER III - Dealer banks’ high influence over the 
deregulation of OTC derivatives markets prior to 2008 
 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter suggests that in the pre-crisis period, the industry exercised strong influence 
over the deregulation of OTC derivatives markets. The dealer banks benefited from a highly 
advantageous constellation of factors that individually and jointly allowed them to exercise 
influence over policy-makers’ promotion of the deregulation of OTC derivatives. Each of the 
moderators identified in the framework worked to the industry’s advantage, but many of 
them also fed into one another, which reinforced the overall, positive effect on the strength 
of dealer bank influence. As well, given the complexity of the derivatives business, policy-
makers were dependent on the information the banks provided them. In addition, the 
industry successfully exercised (or threatened to exercise) both structural and structuring 
power. Figure 8 illustrates the pre-crisis case graphically.  
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Figure 8: The pre-crisis deregulation cases in the US and the EU 
 
Source: Author 
 
A green sphere indicates that the respective moderator had a positive individual effect on 
the relationship between dealer bank preferences and policy outcome. By contrast, a red 
stop sign would signal the opposite. The continuous, thick, green arrow represents the high 
level of dealer bank influence. This kind of figure cannot capture a case in all of its facets, 
but it can anchor the analysis by visualizing some important elements. 
 
The next sections explore the ways in which the six moderators individually and jointly 
fostered dealer bank influence. Section 2 focuses on the ideational outlook which, based on 
the ‘efficient market hypothesis’, encouraged competitive deregulation. Section 3 shows 
that there was maximum business unity, with ISDA acting as the central voice of the market 
and serving as the monopoly provider of its contractual infrastructure, which placed it in a 
position from which it could exercise structural/structuring power. 
 
Section 4 discusses the low degree of public issue salience of derivatives regulation, which 
was only briefly disrupted by occasional derivatives-related scandals. This section also 
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reveals the extent to which the banks and policy-makers shaped a close-knit transnational 
policy community. Their privileged position within the transnational policy community 
allowed the banks to fend off public intervention in favour of private self-regulation when 
issue salience temporarily rose following some corporate scandals in the early 1990s. 
Section 5 reveals that transatlantic power relations among policy-makers promoted, rather 
than constrained derivatives market deregulation. 
 
 
2. The ideational deregulation consensus 
 
The ideational outlook of the pre-crisis era was premised on the efficient market hypothesis 
which encouraged competitive deregulation, and thus opened the door for dealer bank 
preferences to prevail. Three innovations were particularly relevant. The first was the Black-
Scholes equation published by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes in 1973.421 The formula is 
premised on an options pricing model, the use of which provides information as to how to 
perfectly hedge a given option. This created the widely-shared impression that ‘risk’ had 
lost its unpredictable character, having become a manageable statistic instead. Many 
market participants embraced the formula without critically questioning it, in the belief that 
it would consistently provide accurate predictions of market prices. In fact, however, it was 
the widespread use of the formula itself that provided for this result. A textbook case of 
‘performativity’,422 the formula’s popularity allowed for the ‘remake [of] observable reality 
in [its] own image’,423 i.e. market events following the course predicted by the formula were 
not a sign of its mathematical prowess or ingenuity, but a testament to its wide-spread use. 
 
The second innovation was the development of the VaR (Value at Risk) methodology 
introduced by JP Morgan in the 1980s, which soon become heralded as a form of 
sophisticated risk management. VaR allowed market participants to quantify the risk of an 
investment in terms of the extent and occurrence ratio of losses to be expected over a given 
time period. VaR, however, suffered from several limitations including: First, short time 
frames of observation usually not exceeding one year; second, the idea that the Gaussian 
probability distribution could be fitted to most, if not any price movement data, without the 
need to account for rare, but disastrous ‘black swan’ events; third, the failure to include 
additional safeguards to protect against built-in procyclicality which would force firms to 
deleverage once a certain risk limit was broken. Rather, the formula was inspired by the 
assumption that ‘irreducible uncertainty could be transformed into manageable risk’.424 
Most policy-makers did not worry about these and other limitations associated with 
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perfectly rational decision-making. Indeed, regulators endorsed VaR as an approved method 
for the industry to calculate risk and required capital levels in the Basel II Accord.425 
 
The third development concerned the invention of the CDS. Originally developed by Bankers 
Trust in 1991, but first produced at a higher volume by JP Morgan, CDS fostered the belief 
that risk could be outsourced to the institution(s) most prepared and capable of sustaining 
it.426 The Fed subsequently permitted banks that relied on CDS as a risk management device 
to reduce their capital requirements.427 
 
One of the strongest defenders of the market-based approach was Fed Chair Alan 
Greenspan who believed that ‘markets are an expression of the deepest truths about 
human nature and …, as a result, they will ultimately be correct’.428 He also insisted that the 
use of hedging through derivatives had invariably minimized risk, as it was now borne by the 
counterparties most able and willing to assume it.429 In his view, ‘[c]oncentrations of risk are 
more readily identified, and when such concentrations exceed the risk appetites of 
intermediaries, derivatives and other credit and interest rate risk instruments can be 
employed to transfer the underlying risk to other entities. As a result, not only have 
individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk 
factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient’.430 Regarding 
the use of margin requirements, a member of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
confidently stated that ‘[d]erivatives market participants can and do simply decline to deal 
with counterparties who are considered to be not creditworthy and unable to post 
sufficient collateral’.431 
 
In the UK, the free-market philosophy was equally dominant. Looking back, the FSA in 2009 
explained that ‘the predominant assumption was that increased complexity had been 
matched by the evolution of mathematically sophisticated and effective techniques for 
measuring and managing the resulting risks.’432 ‘[T]he predominant assumption behind 
financial market regulation – in the US, the UK and increasingly across the world – has been 
that financial markets are capable of being both efficient and rational, and that a key goal of 
financial market regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce inefficient 
and illiquid markets’.433 The conclusion was clear: ‘[W]holesale market customers are by 
definition sophisticated and do not need protection’.434 Along these lines, the governor of 
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the Bank of England, Robin Leigh-Pemberton in 1984 declared that the work of regulators 
should be informed by ‘reliance on market forces as [much as] we can defend politically’.435 
 
Overall, the risks of deregulation appeared minimal and manageable, which ignited a 
competitive race among policy-makers in terms of each jurisdiction striving to attract as 
much of the uncleared business as possible in order to promote economic activity and 
growth. The deregulation consensus paired with the desire to win this race made policy-
makers very receptive both to threats of the industry moving the uncleared business 
overseas, but also to information on how an ‘exit’ could be prevented and/or how 
additional business could be attracted.  
 
 
3. Maximum business unity with ISDA acting as the uncontested 
voice of the market 
 
The key private sector actor in the pre-crisis period, beyond the individual banks 
themselves, was ISDA as the industry’s peak business association. It spoke as the central 
voice of the market, having successfully ‘turned competitors into collaborators’ since its 
formation in 1985.436 Neither the buy-side, nor the end-users participated in the debate to 
any significant extent. With business unity thus being undisturbed by conflict, the industry 
could send a clear signal about its preferences. Indeed, in the years of the pre-crisis period, 
ISDA in the eyes of some observers ‘traveled an amazing course’.437 In the words of leading 
financial analyst, Frank Partnoy, it was widely considered ‘to be the most powerful and 
effective lobbying force in the recent history of financial markets’.438 
 
Of crucial importance was the establishment and widespread use of ISDA’s ‘Master 
Agreement’. First published in 1987 and later updated in 2002, the Master Agreement 
emerged from the Code of Standard Wording, Assumptions and Provision for Swaps (known 
as the ‘Swaps Code’) published in 1985.439 Representing a ‘technical system’ through which 
counterparties ‘identify themselves as part of a common enterprise’,440 it structures the 
backbone of nearly all uncleared trades by providing key definitions and a catalogue of 
provisions from which the counterparties can chose to tailor the bilateral contract according 
to their preferences.441 By managing the market’s key contractual infrastructure, ISDA 
further consolidated its monopoly position as the market’s leading voice. 
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The highly mobile character of the OTC derivatives business already by itself made 
structural power in terms of the ‘exit’ threat a relatively easy-to-pursue strategy for the 
banks. However, ISDA also actively shaped its exit options by employing structuring power. 
Specifically, it successfully lobbied foreign jurisdictions to adjust their national legislative 
frameworks in such a way as to ensure the enforceability of the key provisions enshrined in 
the Master Agreement. Of crucial interest to ISDA was to secure ‘safe harbour’ status for 
OTC deals and to receive exemptions from gambling legislation as well as ‘automatic stay’ 
provisions under the respective bankruptcy code.442 The idea was to prevent uncleared 
deals from being prosecuted as purely ‘speculative investments’ and to guarantee that in 
case of a credit event, the surviving counterparty could ‘jump’ the creditor queue and 
directly engage in close-out netting without interference by a local bankruptcy judge.443 
ISDA defines ‘close-out netting’ as ‘a process involving termination of obligations under a 
contract with a defaulting party and subsequent combining of positive and negative 
replacement values into a single net payable or receivable [amount]’.444  
 
In order to facilitate and coordinate the necessary reforms, ISDA developed a ‘Model 
Netting Act’ on the basis of which it provided detailed information to policy-makers, 
instructing them precisely how their respective legal frameworks needed to be changed in 
order to provide the desired legal certainty.445 The logic of competitive deregulation, and 
the wish to ensure the domestic market remained part of ‘the game’ encouraged policy-
makers in many jurisdictions to implement the changes ISDA asked for without much 
hesitation.446 In Ireland, for example, the minister in charge made the following statement: 
‘I understand that it was the understanding to move ahead more quickly than many of our 
competitors. […] a number of major players in the North American market have signalled 
their interest in Dublin…’.447 In Japan, ISDA provided ‘substantial assistance’ to policy-
makers and the ‘final draft [of the Netting Law] draws upon the logic of ISDA’s Model 
Netting Act’.448 
 
In 1994, the BCBS gave banks permission to include the close-out netting methodology in 
their capital requirements calculation for countries that had guaranteed the legal 
enforceability of the measure.449 By 2010, around 40 jurisdictions had adopted the required 
changes, including the EU which adopted two related directives in 1996 and 2002.450 ISDA’s 
principal argument justifying these efforts was inspired by the dominating ideational 
outlook of the time, meaning that business unity and the ideational consensus fed off each 
other. The association insisted that close-out netting improved market efficiency and that it 
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reduced systemic risk, as uncontrolled chain reactions following a credit event would be 
prevented.451 More generally, the use of the Master Agreement was widely considered to 
provide for ‘a reduction in transactions costs, lower legal fees, less legal risk, and reduced 
default risk’.452  
 
While these benefits facilitated trading across multiple jurisdictions, they of course also 
eased the relocation of business to other countries, meaning this form of structuring power 
also reinforced the structural power of the industry. In fact, as the ‘master’ behind the 
Master Agreement, ISDA came close to assuming itself the role of a regulator. For example, 
in 1998, when Long-Term Credit Bank, one of the largest Japanese banks, risked failing, 
policy-makers first turned to ISDA in order to determine whether the bank’s nationalization 
would be considered a ‘credit event’ under the Master Agreement. A contract volume of 
USD 450bn was at risk. The Japanese authorities proceeded with their bailout plan only 
after ISDA had published a document resembling a ‘no action letter’ (normally considered 
the prerogative of public regulatory agencies), reassuring policy-makers that the 
nationalization would not cause an uncontrollable chain reaction.453  
 
 
4. Predominantly low public issue salience, a largely supportive 
domestic institutional environment, and the banks’ central position 
within the transnational policy community  
 
The UK deregulated the market in one large leap in the form of the Financial Services Act of 
1986, as a response to the problems associated with Keynesianism, including stagflation, 
unemployment, and low economic growth. 454  The ‘Big Bang’ guaranteed the legal 
enforceability of uncleared derivatives, regardless of the extent to which they were deemed 
‘speculative’.455 This set the standard to be reached for the US, whose principal legislative 
reference for the governance of derivatives markets was the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936 adopted after the damage caused by speculation during the Great Depression.456 
 
In 1974, Congress had passed an amendment stipulating ‘that futures and options contracts 
on virtually all commodities, including financial instruments, be traded on a regulated 
exchange […]’.457 It also established the CFTC, and charged it with regulating and supervising 
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commodity futures, after the SEC had refused to assume jurisdiction over the market.458 
Note, however, that the SEC had jurisdiction over broker-dealers and their use of 
derivatives. 
 
For most of the pre-crisis period, public issue salience was low. With the average (‘median’) 
voter showing little interest in derivatives regulation, policy-makers tended to fully listen to 
the industry. In addition, the banks did not shy away from using (or threatening to use) their 
structural power of exiting the market to ensure policy-makers remained attentive to their 
demands. Several derivatives-related scandals in the 1990s risked causing an end to this 
form of ‘quiet politics’,459 which had provided important leverage for the banks’ influence. 
However, public attention quickly faded away, one reason being that the crisis did not spill 
over into most voters’ private lives. The domestic institutional environment was widely 
supportive of deregulation, the only exception being the CFTC which occasionally attempted 
to secure jurisdiction over the uncleared market. However, acting in unison with the 
regulators through the transnational policy community, the banks always convinced 
Congress that they had the situation under control and that enhanced self-regulation would 
render public intervention unnecessary.  
 
Following the UK’s Big Bang, the dealer banks’ concerns grew that uncleared deals would 
become subject to the exchange-trading requirement, and thus part of the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction. This would have rendered the market much less profitable, given higher levels 
of transparency and the tight corset of rules applying to exchange-traded derivatives.460 
There was also growing concern that trades remaining outside the exchange-traded market 
could potentially be considered legally unenforceable.461 In 1987, these fears materialized, 
when the CFTC voiced the idea of treating uncleared derivatives, in particular commodity 
derivatives, as futures. It also began examining the portfolio of Chase Manhattan and 
indicated that bespoke trades might be unenforceable under the CEA. 
 
The dealer banks responded by flexing their structural power muscle and exiting the US.462 
According to one observer, ‘[t]he domestic commodity swap business ceased to exist as all 
deals moved overseas […].’463 As a result, Congress quickly made the CFTC drop the idea, 
with the aim being for business to return to the US market. In 1989, the agency published 
the ‘Swap Policy Statement’ according to which most derivatives were excluded from 
regulation, on the condition that they were bespoke (and thus unsuitable for trading on an 
exchange) and exclusively marketed to ‘sophisticated’ investors.464 As a consequence, the 
domestic commodity swaps market soon recovered.465 
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However, in 1990, the CFTC’s decision, later upheld in court, to classify Brent oil forward 
contracts as futures once again caused the industry to question the agency’s reliability.466 
The banks therefore lobbied Congress to put an end to the uncertainty the CFTC kept 
causing. Responding to this pressure, Congress in 1992 passed the Futures Trading Practices 
Act which provided the CFTC with the legal authority to grant exemptions from 
regulation.467 On this basis, the agency in 1993 adopted ‘Exemptions for certain Contracts 
Involving Energy Products’. As a consequence of this rule, public oversight was reduced, 
particularly over certain energy trades. The CFTC justified this decision by citing the need to 
‘enhance[] the global competitive position of U.S. businesses’.468 None of these decisions 
attracted wider public attention. 
 
Low issue salience, however, risked coming to an end in the early 1990s, when a series of 
derivatives-related scandals directed public attention to the uncleared business. In 1991, 
Gibson Greetings, the US’s second largest greeting card producer found itself in a loss spiral 
caused by its unsuitable use of derivatives, with the situation being aggravated by the fact 
that its dealer bank, Bankers Trust, had misled it on several accounts. The corporation 
eventually accumulated a loss of USD 27.5mn, i.e. about 10 times the limit it had set.469 In 
1993, German corporation Metallgesellschaft lost 1.37 billion USD through misapplied OTC 
oil trades taken out for hedging purposes by its US subsidiary.470 The problems continued in 
1994, when the Fed unexpectedly increased interest rates by 25 basis points from 3 to 
3.25%, and eventually to 6.8% by the end of the year. This placed many firms with interest 
rate swaps in their portfolios in serious difficulties. Among the most prominent victims were 
Procter&Gamble and Orange County. The consumer goods manufacturer had turned to 
Bankers’ Trust for help to improve its cost management. However, the interest rate swaps it 
purchased were only favourable to the firm as long as interest rates were falling, a fact it 
had not fully understood. After the interest rate hike, it found itself confronted with a pre-
tax loss of USD 157mn.471 Orange County suffered an even worse fate, having to file for 
bankruptcy. As part of its overall investment strategy, it had bought inverse floaters which 
are debt securities whose coupon varies inversely with respect to the prevailing interest 
rate. This means they provided income for the county as long as interest rates were stable 
or decreasing.472 However, when interest rates suddenly rose, ‘the inverse’ occurred, 
resulting in an overall loss of USD 2bn.473  
 
Congress was alarmed by this development. Representative Jim Leach (R-IA) compared the 
OTC derivatives market to a ‘pyramidal house of cards’. His colleague Byron Dorgan (D-ND) 
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approvingly quoted a Fortune article which placed the blame on the doorstep of the dealer 
banks: ‘The threat is not from foreign competition, or government deficits or regulation. It is 
from Wall Street, and a new form of sophisticated financial bingo called derivatives... 
[D]erivatives could swamp our economy in a sea of red ink .... A single default... could ignite 
a chain reaction that runs rampant through the financial markets. Inevitably, that would put 
deposit insurance funds, and the taxpayers behind it, at risk’.474 Responding to high issue 
salience, Congress discussed several bills that would have reined in the uncleared market. 
The Derivatives Safety and Soundness Act of 1994 and the Derivatives Supervision Act of 
1994 would have imposed capital, disclosure, and accounting rules.475 The Derivatives 
Limitations Act of 1994 in turn would have adopted an even more aggressive approach by 
prohibiting proprietary trading by federally insured depository institutions.476 
 
The industry, however, did not remain inactive. Already prior to these scandals, it had 
established the G30, a transnational expert body composed of (former) representatives 
from the private and public sector, think tanks, as well as academia, which together formed 
the nucleus of the transnational policy community.477 The objective was to keep regulatory 
intrusion at bay. In 1993, the G30 published a report produced under the guidance of 
former Fed governor Paul Volcker who chaired the group and provided it with an 
authoritative aura, given his towering reputation acquired during his tenure at the Fed 
when he had managed to rein in rampant inflation in the 1970s. 
 
The dealers made several commitments including the promotion of expertise on the part of 
dealer bank officials, the development of a suitable operational infrastructure to manage 
trade flows, and the sharing of qualitative information on the business with regulators.478 
The report insisted that through the use of derivatives ‘systemic risks are not appreciably 
aggravated, and supervisory concerns can be addressed within present regulatory 
structures and approaches’.479 
 
The G30 report was widely endorsed by regulators including the Fed, OCC, FDIC, CFTC, BCBS 
and IOSCO, each of which was satisfied with the commitments the industry had made. The 
Fed, for instance, recommended that bank’s ‘[s]enior management should evaluate 
regularly the procedures in place to manage risk to ensure that those procedures are 
appropriate and sound’.480 The OCC tasked banks with the responsibility of ensuring that 
the derivatives business was conducted in line with firms’ ‘overall risk management 
philosophy’ and ‘business strategies’.481 The CFTC stated that ‘no fundamental changes in 
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regulatory structure appear to be needed’482 and the SEC’s chair Arthur Levitt advocated 
that securities firms’ efforts to address legal problems should remain entirely ‘voluntary’.483 
At the transnational level, BCBS and IOSCO joined the choir praising self-regulation. The 
BCBS relied on the report when publishing its ‘guidelines [that] bring together practices 
used by major international banks’. Underlining the voluntary character of the approach 
and clarifying that it did not mean to impose regulation by any means, the committee 
added that ‘[w]hile no bank may follow the framework precisely, it could provide guidance 
to all banks’.484 IOSCO, in turn, saw no need to issue ‘normative standards’.485 
 
The banks occupied a central position within the transnational policy community and 
formed a nearly inseparable symbiosis with policy-makers. For BIS General Manager Sir 
Andrew Crockett, the close-knit community espoused ‘Masonic’ elements. In his eyes, the 
groups’ activities demonstrated to public and private sector members alike that ‘their 
interests are not different’.486 In the words of John Heimann, former Comptroller of the 
Currency and at the time a senior official with Merrill Lynch, the G30 enjoyed ‘credibility 
because of member prestige’.487 Several regulators from the SEC argued that the ‘G30 
would not have come up with recommendations that were not good and sound’.488 
 
The G30’s report also served as a key piece of information when Congress deliberated 
public intervention in 1994. Indeed, a copy of the report was listed as the first supporting 
piece of information in a compilation of documents House members had at their disposal 
when pondering their decision.489 
 
During the public hearings, ISDA insisted that public intervention ‘would interfere with the 
management of banks and their affiliates in a rapidly evolving and competitive activity.’ 
Rather, ‘industry participants should be allowed to continue their voluntary cooperation 
with regulators’.490 The ABA (American Bankers Association) told Congress, the proposed 
legislation ‘would seem to accomplish nothing that the regulatory authorities […] are not 
already doing’. It warned policy-makers not to underestimate the effects ‘such legislation 
may have on the financial marketplace’.491 Bank of America emphasized that ‘[e]veryone is 
concerned that an attempt at legislation could cause significant dislocations in the way the 
market operates’. To ensure policy-makers understood the message referencing the 
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industry’s structural power, it added that the OTC market ‘is one of the only truly global 
product markets, which can move at the drop of a pin’.492  
 
Congress understood. Representative Leach and his colleagues dropped their inflammatory 
rhetoric against derivatives. Rather, Leach acknowledged that ‘“[w]e've seen that when you 
have uneven regulation, money flows to the least regulated [jurisdiction],” […] “The only 
way to have even regulation is to have legislation”’.493 The administration also did not 
favour intervention. Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen said it was necessary ‘to be careful 
about interfering in markets in too heavy-handed a way’.494 The regulators once again 
seconded the industry. The OCC, for example, stated that regulation was not ‘necessary’ 
and that it would act promptly if it ‘f[ou]nd current measures to be inadequate’.495 The FDIC 
declared that Congress did not have to worry since ‘there are both regulatory and market 
safeguards that help to prevent a derivatives induced default at a large institution’.496 
Greenspan believed the Fed was ‘ahead of the curve on this issue as best one can get’.497 
His support, in particular, was considered of tremendous importance.498 Indeed, a senior 
banker told the press (probably only half-jokingly) that the industry actually did not even 
have to lobby Congress, ‘“since we have Alan Greenspan […] doing that”’.499 Through their 
close cooperation as part of the transnational policy community, the regulators and the 
banks succeeded in convincing Congress not to adopt any of the bills. It certainly also 
helped that the direct repercussions the corporate scandals had on individual voters’ lives 
appeared limited. The public’s attention, and therefore policy-makers’ interest in the issue, 
soon moved to other topics, thus allowing ‘quiet politics’500 to take over the reigns again.  
 
Note that, despite the industry’s success at preventing legislation, not everybody was 
convinced that deregulation was actually as risk-free and unproblematic as the 
transnational policy community, with the banks at its centre, had tried to make policy-
makers believe. For example, in 1992, Gerald Corrigan, president of the New York Fed, told 
the dealer banks that ‘”you had all better take a very, very hard look at off-balance sheet 
activities”’,501 where much of the derivatives-related exposure began piling up. One year 
later, Brian Quinn, Executive Director at the Bank of England commented on the G30 report, 
emphasizing that its overall conclusion suggesting that derivatives did not add any risk 
‘strikes [him] as somewhat complacent’. He warned that ‘[i]f the demand for this new 
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source of profit should expand more quickly than the supply of people capable of doing the 
business, there can only be trouble ahead’.502 
 
One year later, the United States General Accounting Office published a report whose 
conclusions anticipated much of the 2008 crisis. It highlighted that ‘[b]ecause the same 
relatively few major OTC derivatives dealers now account for a large portion of trading in a 
number of markets, the abrupt failure or withdrawal from trading of one of these dealers 
could undermine stability in several markets simultaneously, which could lead to a chain of 
market withdrawals, possible firm failures, and a systemic crisis. The federal government 
would not necessarily intervene just to keep a major OTC derivatives dealer from failing, but 
to avert a crisis, the Federal Reserve may be required to serve as lender of last resort to any 
major US OTC derivatives dealer, whether regulated or unregulated. […] The 
interrelationships among OTC derivatives dealers and markets worldwide increase the 
likelihood that a crisis involving derivatives will be global’.503  
 
However, with issue salience having reached low levels again and the ideational 
deregulation consensus remaining largely unchallenged, the warnings did not have any 
significant effect. Also, they were never voiced in a coordinated fashion, and thus did not 
reach a level that could have disrupted low issue salience. The technical complexity of the 
derivatives business (which even Greenspan after the crisis admitted he had not fully 
understood in all its elements 504 ) further complicated raising long-term interest in 
regulation.505 The dominant mantra thus remained that ‘what was good for Wall Street was 
good for America’.506 
 
Under the leadership of Corrigan, who in the meantime had moved through the revolving 
door from the New York Fed to Goldman Sachs, and following a suggestion by SEC chair 
Levitt, the industry in 1994 established the Derivatives Policy Group as another vehicle of 
the transnational policy community. In 1995, the Group formed the Framework for 
Voluntary Oversight through which the banks once again promised to enhance risk 
management, to provide the regulators with confidential reports on credit risk exposure, 
and to prepare and implement guidelines for the adequate management of counterparty 
relationships.507 Corrigan emphasized that the industry was very serious about adhering to 
this form of self-regulation. In his words, the Group’s promises were ‘commitments’, rather 
than ‘recommendations or proposals’.508 
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It took another shock with a corresponding increase of public issue salience to reanimate 
the discussion about the need for regulation. The crisis in question occurred in 1998 with 
the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund with rock star status, 
which, for several years, had provided double-digit returns to its investors.509 Relying to a 
large extent on the Black-Scholes formula and having Scholes himself as a board member, 
LTCM had invested in a ruble-denominated security known as the GKO (signifying the 
Russian initials of the product) on which the Russian government had promised a 40% 
return. To hedge this investment, the fund had bought forward contracts on the ruble. In 
theory, this should have provided for a flat book, with losses on the GKO being recovered 
through the forward. However, once the Russian government defaulted on its debt and 
prohibited its banks from meeting their requirements under FX contracts, LTCM saw itself 
confronted with exposure levels spiralling out of control.510 The ensuing chain reaction 
swept through the financial markets, causing a serial break of VaR limits, which in turn 
risked provoking a fire sale. In order to prevent the worst, a group of banks joined forces 
and bought what was left from the firm that had lost 90% of its capital (~USD 4.6bn).511 
 
Once again alarmed, the US Congress charged the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets with drafting a report on LTCM’s debacle. The report noted that ‘[t]he near 
collapse of Long-Term Capital Management […] highlighted the possibility that problems at 
one financial institution could be transmitted to other institutions, and potentially pose risks 
to the financial system’.512 However, in line with the ideational outlook of the time, a second 
report concluded that ‘[t]he sophisticated counterparties that use OTC derivatives simply do 
not require the same protections under the CEA as those required by retail investors’.513 
 
 One of the few regulators not convinced of returning to ‘business as usual’ was CFTC chair 
Brooksley Born. In 1998, she published a concept release intended to take stock of the state 
of the OTC market, and to derive conclusions about the potential need for regulation. The 
text itself was carefully worded, insisting that ‘[t]he Commission has no preconceived result 
in mind. The Commission is open both to evidence in support of broadening its exemptions 
and to evidence indicating a need for additional safeguards’.514 However, Born’s public 
comments on the concept release made it clear that the agency was in fact pushing for 
regulation.515 In one of her 1999 speeches she summarized this ambition in one sentence: 
‘These issues [i.e. the issues the CFTC felt the uncleared market was negatively affected by] 
include lack of transparency, excessive leverage, insufficient prudential controls, and the 
need for greater coordination and cooperation among international regulators’.516 Among 
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other measures, Born also considered imposing mandatory margin requirements on 
uncleared derivatives.517 
 
Her move did not go unnoticed.518 US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (another Goldman 
Sachs veteran), Fed governor Greenspan, and SEC chair Levitt immediately responded with 
a joint statement intended to undermine the CFTC’s authority: ‘We seriously question the 
scope of the CFTC's jurisdiction in this area, and we are very concerned about reports that 
the CFTC's action may increase the legal uncertainty concerning certain types of OTC 
derivatives’.519 In addition, they convinced Congress to issue a temporal ban on any 
derivatives-related regulation for a period long enough to ensure Born could not interfere 
anymore until the end of her mandate.520 
 
The policy discussions on Capitol Hill regarding the need for public intervention followed the 
same pattern as in the early 1990s. The banks insisted they had the situation under control.  
They also pointed to their commitment to further self-regulation. Indeed, in 1999, the 
Counterparty Risk Management Group (CPRMG), another private sector body, once again 
co-led by Corrigan, published a report on the lessons of LTCM’s failure. It suggested the 
banks improve their trade documentation and pursue informal exchanges with 
regulators. 521  However, the report also insisted that its conclusions were 
‘recommendations’, rather than ‘static or “one size fits all”‘ commitments. Above all, it 
clarified that ‘[i]t would be a mistake to attempt to codify risk management practices in that 
fashion’.522 ISDA warned Congress that the ‘”... recent actions and statements of the CFTC 
culminating in its Concept Release concerning privately-negotiated swaps have undercut 
and imperilled the legal certainty that has until now existed for swaps through in large 
measure, the foresight and efforts of Congress. Moreover, the CFTC has sent a chill through 
this business by raising the specter that it may seek to impose new restrictions on privately-
negotiated swap transactions’.523 A dealer bank alliance composed of Citigroup, Chase 
Manhattan, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley reminded 
legislators of the banks’ structural power of using the exit by voicing the barely concealed 
threat that a ‘yes’ in favour of the bill would ‘”prevent the flight of our domestic financial 
derivatives business abroad”’.524 
 
The threat was once again effective. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) showed himself impressed 
after ‘an electronic demonstration’ the industry had organized on Capitol Hill during which a 
bank official ‘transacted a trade right in front of [policy-makers] on his computer on a 
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European market …’.525 This demonstration did not mean that policy-makers actually fully 
understood what they had just seen on the screen. Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) a few years 
later made the following statement which revealed to extent to which policy-makers had to 
rely on the information the industry provided them with. He said that ‘I hope we won’t do a 
test here to ask Senators to define what a derivative is. In fact, we have been checking 
Webster’s, trying to make sure we understand the definition of derivative. After having read 
the definition, I don’t think it clears up anything’.526 Indeed, prior to 2008, many policy-
makers were often hugely impressed by bankers’ (personal) financial success, to the extent 
that they believed that the industry’s business decisions could not be anything but smart 
and correct, and that it was Congress’ duty to provide the banks with the best conditions to 
expand their market share.527  
 
In the hearing during which the live demonstration of the trade took place, Senator Phil 
Gramm (R-TX) pointed out that ‘[w]e have competition from all over the world that would 
very much like to see this goose that lays the golden egg, these financial markets, roosting 
in their coop. They are trying to do things to attract it’.528 
 
Rather than imposing constraints on uncleared derivatives, Congress decided to deregulate 
the market once and forever through the adoption of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 which codified the previously temporal prohibition of the CFTC 
to regulate the uncleared market. While a crucial decision, the public barely took notice of 
it, since the media were largely pre-occupied with the Supreme Court’s vote on the winner 
of the presidential elections (Al Gore vs. George W. Bush).529  Even within Congress, the bill 
did not attract much attention, having been added at the last minute as a rider to an 
11,000-page omnibus appropriations conference report and put up for vote only a few days 
before the Christmas break.530  
 
US firms were determined to ensure the OTC business would remain free from any further 
intrusion. By the mid-2000s, the New York Fed’s president and CEO, Timothy Geithner, 
started being concerned about the growing operational infrastructure problems of the 
market. Indeed, the dealers suffered from backlogs of trade confirmation caused by the 
widespread reliance on handwritten notes and faxed orders, rather than electronic trade 
processing. Moreover, they often novated (i.e. re-assigned) trades to a new counterparty 
without informing the other one, which caused further confusion. Geithner convinced the 
banks to optimize their back-office activities, which resulted in a drop of the backlog of 
unconfirmed CDS by 92% and a tripling of electronic trade processing of equity derivatives 
to 94% by 2008.531 However, in a volume published after the crisis, he stated he was realistic 
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enough not ‘to overstate the importance of these reforms. […] Large banks and nonbanks 
had a mutual interest in upgrading their derivatives infrastructure, so we managed to 
persuade them to upgrade it. But we couldn’t persuade enough of them to reduce their 
leverage or manage their risks more carefully, because they didn’t think that was in their 
interest’.532  
 
Overall, with the exception of the CFTC, which occasionally attempted to intervene in the 
uncleared market, the US domestic institutional environment was benign for the banks to 
exercise influence. From a domestic institutional point of view, securing the success of 
deregulation was largely unproblematic, particularly if it meant for regulators to simply not 
get involved with counterparties’ decision-making rationales. Policy-makers realized they 
could keep the US’ market share stable or growing only if they continued on the 
deregulation path. The industry’s past success in terms of securing market growth also 
provided positive feedback effects, which increased the weight of its voice and influence. As 
well, the deregulation consensus had acquired a strong institutional presence in the other 
regulatory agencies, which kept the CFTC in check and helped ‘guide’ Congress’ actions. 
 
Around the turn of the millennium, the UK equally assured the market that the deregulated 
status of uncleared derivatives would not be touched upon. In the 1990s, policy-makers and 
financial firms had begun noticing the shift from traditional ‘relationship banking’ to 
‘transaction banking’, where clients’ main criterion for the choice of their bank was the 
price of the transaction, rather than their past relationship with an individual firm. In their 
view, the US banks appeared to be clearly winning the race.533 In order to retain the 
business, policy-makers therefore decided to reinforce the deregulated status of uncleared 
derivatives through the Financial Services and Market Act of 2000 which explicitly exempted 
bespoke trades between sophisticated counterparties from regulation.534 
 
Institutionally, the domestic environment provided an equally fertile environment for the 
banks to influence policy outcomes. The regulatory authorities which could have 
constrained the market, first the Securities and Investment Board and later the FSA both 
subscribed to a ‘noninterventionist approach’, which over the years became deeply 
engrained in both authorities’ institutional identity.535 Regulators’ expectations vis-à-vis the 
banks were detailed in The London Code of Conduct.536 Its leitmotif ‘[was] that the 
wholesale markets are for professionals, and participants are expected to look after their 
own interests. Core principles will generally assume that their counterparties, whether or 
not also professionals, have the capability to make independent decisions; all principals 
should assess for themselves the risks of dealing in the wholesale markets’.537  
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Predominantly low levels of issue salience, a benign domestic institutional environment, 
and the banks’ privileged position within the transnational policy community thus 
individually and jointly provided the ground for deregulation to take hold, persist, and 
continue. 
5. Inter-state power relations fostering the deregulation trend 
 
The nature of transatlantic inter-state power relations further supported the strength of 
this factor constellation. During extended periods of the pre-crisis period, inter-state power 
between public policy-makers did not play any major explicit role. One might argue, though, 
that structural power kept lurking in the background of competitive deregulation, in the 
sense that policy-makers felt it was in their own interest to pursue this course of action to 
prevent the respective other side of the Atlantic from siphoning away market share. 
However, there were also two episodes where power was more clearly at play. The 
outcome, however, never constrained the banks and their successful exercise of influence. 
 
In the first case, the UK was concerned that its deeply rooted regulatory structure based on 
the consolidated supervision of financial institutions might disadvantage its banks vis-à-vis 
their US competitors. Consolidated supervision means that prudential supervision was 
exercised over financial groups across all organizational levels including the holding 
company as well as its divisions and subsidiaries. It also meant that no part was exempt 
from capital requirements.538 The SEC, by contrast, did not impose regulation on its broker-
dealers on a consolidated basis. In addition, most of the US derivatives business used to be 
channelled through unregulated holding institutions, which did not have to post capital, and 
therefore frequently succeeded in outcompeting their UK peers.539 Indeed, US shops, above 
all Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, dominated the list of the securities firms most 
appreciated by UK clients in London.540  
 
To resolve the predicament, the UK brought up the issue within IOSCO,541 hoping for the 
development of an international capital adequacy standard for securities firms, similar to 
the one the BCBS had succeeded in establishing for the banks a few years earlier.542 From 
the SEC’s point of view, however, this would have equalled intrusive regulation of the 
uncleared business. The failure of US investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 
following irregularities in its junk bond business increased the UK’s hope that the SEC would 
support a global arrangement.543 
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The agency, however, refused taking this step, claiming that increasing the transparency of 
holding companies through more detailed reporting requirements was sufficient. This 
course of action, of course, fully reflected the deregulation consensus. It meant little 
interference with securities firms’ derivatives business, which was fully in line with the 
industry’s preferences. Congress was equally satisfied with this solution and did not 
demand any further action.544 The SEC therefore vetoed any IOSCO-led solution. According 
to a 1992 IOSCO report, it considered ‘that prudential consolidation does not provide any 
discernible advantages. […] [It] creates unnecessarily high expectations and therefore risk 
along with unnecessary costs’.545 
 
What put the SEC in the position to torpedo international regulation was its dominant 
market share. Singer argues that ‘[d]ata on the derivatives business of firms in the late 
1980s and early 1990s are notoriously difficult to find, and the patchy data that do exist […] 
are generally not helpful as indicators of international market share’.546 Nonetheless, to 
policy-makers, results such as those of the survey referenced above were sufficient to 
indicate the US’s leading position in the market. With the American investment banks 
arguably controlling the bulk of the uncleared business, an international agreement against 
US preferences was not viable. The EU at that time did not play any major role at the 
international level. 
 
The topic of consolidated supervision, however, only temporarily disappeared from policy-
makers’ agenda. Following its steps towards institutional consolidation, the EU picked it up 
again a decade later in the early 2000s. This time, the SEC found itself in a situation where 
the other side of the Atlantic disposed of both market power and power through regulatory 
capacity. This combination paralyzed its own veto power, and the US had to align itself with 
Europe’s preferences. Indeed, following a series of market-integration reforms,547 the EU 
adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive of 2002 which stipulated that all non-EU 
financial conglomerates with operations in Europe were to become subject to consolidated 
supervision. The content of the directive, however, ‘was more an accident of history than an 
indicator of a willingness to manage globalization’,548 i.e. policy-makers did not intend to 
abandon the deregulatory paradigm. Rather, its objective was to promote financial 
integration within the EU and to streamline the regulation of European universal banks.549 
The directive had EU-wide application, i.e. it covered the entire European market, including 
the City in London, which provided EU policy-makers with a lever during their transatlantic 
negotiations with the SEC. It required foreign jurisdictions to successfully complete an 
equivalence determination in order for their firms to continue enjoying access to the 
European market. The non-attribution of the equivalence label would have had serious 
consequences. For example, it would have resulted in foreign conglomerates being 
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supervised directly by the EU, which would have entailed the financially burdensome ‘ring-
fencing’ of their assets, as well as other costs.550 
 
Again, we lack the necessary data to comprehensively evaluate the situation from a market 
share perspective. The BIS, however, has collected some data on national shares for interest 
rate and FX derivatives. This data suggests that for interest rate derivatives, the EU in 2004 
accounted for 69% of global market volume (the global share of the UK being 42%), with the 
US trailing behind with 24%. Regarding the FX sector, the ranking was similar, with the EU 
leading with 49% (the global share of the UK being 32%) and the US market accounting for 
no more than 19%.551 The threat of the US losing access to the EU market, therefore, 
appears to have been meaningful. Without rapid action, the US securities firms under SEC 
supervision would have no longer had the opportunity to conduct business in Europe. 
Further confirmation underlining the seriousness of the EU’s threat and thus the 
effectiveness of its power as market share cum regulatory influence can be found in the 
response by US financial firms which immediately started pushing for the adoption of the 
regulatory changes necessary for obtaining a positive equivalence decision by the EU. As 
Maxfield notes, ‘[a]ny foot-dragging by US authorities would [have] put US firms‘ European 
operations at a competitive disadvantage against European firms operating in Europe’.552 
 
The SEC complied, and in 2004 established the Consolidated Supervised Entities programme 
which brought securities firms’ entire corporate structure under consolidated supervision. 
While of voluntary nature, all of the five large broker-dealers (i.e. Bear Stearns, Goldman 
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley) eagerly participated.553 Despite 
this regulatory activity, it is important to stress that neither the SEC’s programme, nor the 
EU’s directive restrained firms’ uncleared business.554 While the SEC obliged the firms in the 
programme to keep a minimum capital base of USD 1bn and to inform the agency if the 
base decreased to less than USD 5bn,555 it provided for immediate compensation by 
allowing them to significantly increase their leverage ratio (i.e. the ratio of debt to equity). 
Transatlantic power relations among policy-makers therefore did not constrain the dealers’ 
pre-crisis influence either. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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This chapter has analyzed dealer banks’ dominant influence over the deregulation of OTC 
derivatives prior to 2008. The banks, whose preference was to keep intrusive regulation at 
bay, benefited from a unique factor constellation. Each of the six moderators identified in 
the analytical framework served as an open floodgate providing leverage for their influence 
to take hold. First, the industry benefited from maximum business unity, with conflict being 
virtually absent. This allowed ISDA and the banks to send an undiluted message about their 
preferences. Through the Master Agreement, ISDA also served as the monopoly provider of 
the market’s contractual infrastructure. Its success in having key jurisdictions adjust their 
legal framework such as to ensure compatibility with the contractual arrangements 
contained in the Master Agreement, allowed the banks to exercise structuring power in 
terms of shaping its exit options. This, in turn, endowed the industry with further structural 
power, and it frequently threatened to move the highly mobile uncleared business across 
the Atlantic to the City of London, if policy-makers did not heed bankers’ demands. Second, 
the dominance of the efficient market hypothesis made the risks of deregulation appear 
minimal, animating policy-makers to enter a race of competitive deregulation in terms of 
each jurisdiction striving to attract as much market share as possible. Third, the banks also 
benefited from the fact that public issue salience was generally low, and that warnings 
against the risks of deregulation never succeeded in mobilizing a critical audience. Following 
sudden spikes of issue salience, the industry’s central position within the transnational 
policy community allowed for a joint bank-regulator effort to tame the risk of public 
intervention, keep the CFTC in check at the domestic institutional level, and to subsequently 
enshrine the unregulated status of OTC derivatives through the adoption of corresponding 
legislation. The high complexity of derivatives also meant that policy-makers willingly relied 
on the information the banks supplied them with. The nature of inter-state power relations 
between policy-makers never challenged the deregulation course, and in the case of the 
SEC even further promoted it. The domestic institutional environment was also benign for 
dealer bank influence to take hold. In the US, the CFTC several times tried to regulate the 
market, but was reined in by the other agencies which had all largely embraced the 
deregulation course as part of their institutional identity. 
 
The high level of bank influence was not only promoted by the individual effects of the 
moderators, but also by their joint interaction. The absence of business conflict fostered the 
banks’ position within the transnational policy community whose members subscribed to 
the deregulation consensus, which consolidated support for deregulation among most 
members at the domestic institutional level, which again fed back into the ideational 
deregulation consensus. The dominance of this consensus also ensured that inter-state 
power plays never had a market-constraining effect. Predominantly low levels of public 
issue salience provided further stability to this configuration. Occasional spikes of issue 
salience and the attempts by the CFTC to rein in the market could not shake this 
constellation, and therefore did not lower dealer banks’ level of influence.   
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CHAPTER IV – Over-arching changes to the post-crisis 
factor constellation 
 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis of dealer bank influence over the development of the 
post-crisis margin rules, this chapter explains the post-crisis context within which the 
development of the new requirements took place. It covers several changes that transcend 
the analysis of the individual rules. Discussing these aspects separately upfront is 
advantageous, as it facilitates our understanding of the debate on the individual rule 
elements covered in the subsequent chapters. Specifically, this chapter focuses on three of 
the moderators in the overall post-crisis configuration, i.e. high public issue salience, the 
ideational clearing/margining consensus, and the dealers’ loss of their privileged position 
within the transnational policy community. It will be limited to overarching commonalities, 
while the individual case study chapters will provide further evidence and case-specific 
nuance. The other moderators, i.e. business unity, inter-state power relations, and the 
domestic institutional environment remain outside this part of the analysis. 
 
Section 2 shows that policy-makers’ immediate response to the crisis was not to drop the 
deregulation consensus, but to privilege continued self-regulation by the industry. The 
banks did not oppose central clearing and margining per se, but expected them to be 
industry-led initiatives, without any intrusion by policy-makers. The dealers were initially 
fully convinced they would be able to continue exercising dominant influence over the 
design of the post-crisis derivatives governance arrangements. However, their progress 
towards addressing the problems in the market was limited, and, this time, they faced a 
backlash. 
 
Section 3 reveals that the unprecedented public intervention required to stabilize the 
economy after the crisis made the public issue salience of derivatives regulation skyrocket. 
As a consequence, policy-makers deemed continued reliance on self-regulation untenable. 
Instead, they advocated public intervention and an end to competitive deregulation.  
 
Section 4 explores the new ideational consensus that emerged in response to policy-
makers’ determination to turn their backs to the deregulation of the uncleared market. The 
main pillar of the new consensus was the promotion of central clearing, given that centrally 
cleared derivatives had fared much better during the crisis than many bespoke ones. 
Section 4.1 examines the clearing consensus which was informed by several ideas: First, the 
idea that CCPs would reduce interconnectedness, second, the fact that they had 
successfully weathered the crisis, third, the reassurance by CCP officials that they were 
willing to take over the new business and that regulators had experience in overseeing 
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these entities, and fourth, that the overall idea allowed policy-makers to show strength and 
determination during times of crisis. Section 4.2 reveals that policy-makers soon had to 
realize that a substantial fraction of the bespoke market would be unsuitable for central 
clearing, which required identifying a different regulatory solution for uncleared products. 
They settled on mandatory collateralization, so as to import a key feature of the cleared 
into the uncleared market. The new ideational consensus was two-fold: Policy-makers 
believed that mandatory margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives would 
account for the higher systemic risk emanating from bespoke trades and that they would 
encourage investors to shift suitable trades to CCPs. Section 4.3 shows that the US 
immediately acted upon the new consensus, taking on the role of a first-mover in the 
development of the margin rules. Europe, however, soon began lagging behind. From the 
point of view of the US, some skeptical EU voices questioning the utility of margin 
requirements cast doubt on Europe’s willingness to follow through with the reform. This 
raised the spectre of the return of competitive deregulation. Following strong 
encouragement by the US, policy-makers therefore decided to establish an international 
working group through BCBS-IOSCO (known as the Working Group on Margin Requirements 
(WGMR)), which solidified the ideational post-crisis consensus and committed itself to the 
development of a harmonized set of global rules. 
 
Section 5 discusses evidence of the deteriorating relationship between regulators and the 
industry within the transnational policy community that was characteristic of the rollout of 
the margin requirements more generally, but without being tied to a particular rule 
element. It indicates that the banks found themselves expulsed from the centre of the 
community, relegated to its margin. 
 
 
2. The initial persistence of the deregulation consensus: Self-
regulation by the industry as the first public response to the crisis 
 
As the 2008 crisis began to unfold, policy-makers did not immediately abandon the 
deregulation consensus that had dominated in the pre-crisis period. In April 2008, the 
Financial Stability Forum limited itself to recommending that ‘[m]arket participants should 
act promptly to ensure that the settlement, legal and operational infrastructure underlying 
OTC derivatives markets is sound’.556 The communiqué of the G20 summit in Washington, 
D.C. of November 2008 did not deviate from the deregulation consensus either. For 
example, the declaration recommended that ‘[r]egulators should […] encourage financial 
firms to reexamine their internal controls and implement strengthened policies for sound 
risk management. […] Supervisors should ensure that financial firms develop processes that 
provide for timely and comprehensive measurement of risk concentrations and large 
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counterparty risk positions across products and geographies’.557 Regarding the OTC market, 
the G20 charged regulators with the task of ‘speed[ing] efforts to reduce the systemic risks 
of CDS and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions […], expand OTC derivatives 
market transparency; and ensure that the infrastructure for OTC derivatives can support 
growing volumes’.558 Fed chair Ben Bernanke clearly approved of emphasizing firms’ self-
regulatory efforts. ‘Correcting these weaknesses’, he observed ‘is, first and foremost, the 
responsibility of the firms’ managements and they have powerful incentives to do so’.559  
 
The industry immediately began developing plans, strategies, and commitments to address 
the problems revealed by the crisis. The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group 
(CRMPG), a group composed of senior officials from the largest US and EU dealer banks 
whose aim was to promote strong corporate risk management strategies, decided on a 
series of recommendations including the improved management of valuation disputes as 
well as more sophisticated trade confirmation and collateral management processes.560 In 
addition, it discussed the advantages of central clearing. ‘A central counterparty’, it argued, 
‘helps address many of the deficiencies of the current market foundation’. The group 
therefore suggested ‘that the industry move with deliberate speed toward the creation of 
one or more such counterparties […]’.561 The dealer banks did indeed associate some key 
advantages with central clearing:562 For example, some of them expected that the increased 
standardization of trades through central clearing might lower their operational costs. 
Others were optimistic that central clearing might turn into a new business line they would 
be able to control. There was also a strategic component in that the industry hoped that its 
embrace of central clearing would prevent policy-makers from adopting even more far-
reaching reforms, such as the mandatory trading of contracts on exchanges. 
 
However, from the banks’ point of view, it was imperative that these initiatives were 
industry-led and would ‘not compromise the integrity or robustness of the [uncleared] 
marketplace’, as the CRMPG put it.563 This clarification left no doubt that the industry was 
unwilling to give up the deregulated status of bilateral trades. Rather, it argued that reforms 
had to be conducted ‘in a manner that preserves the ability of firms to execute and 
maintain bespoke transactions which serve legitimate economic interests’.564 The dealer 
banks were therefore not prepared to lose any influence over the development of the 
contours of the post-crisis derivatives market. In line with the industry’s previous 
commitments, CRMPG declared it ‘firmly believes that these recommendations are more 
than just aspirational in nature. Rather, they are concrete goals that, if implemented by 
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major market participants, will substantially enhance the credit market’s resilience to stress 
events and conditions, including the failure of one or more major counterparties’.565  
 
Following these initial promises, the large dealers, known as the G15,566 pledged that each 
of them would centrally clear at least 95% of new eligible credit derivative trades and 90% 
of new eligible interest rate derivatives as of the end of 2009.567 In 2009, the banks renewed 
these promises, declaring that ‘[t]he industry commits to broaden the set of OTC derivatives 
for clearing, taking into account risk, liquidity, default management and other factors. The 
industry also commits to elevated targets for clearing dealer-to-dealer swaps and to work 
with clearinghouses to accelerate the growth of clearing for transactions between dealers 
and buy-side market participants’.568 The dealers also committed themselves to ‘proactively 
inform’ the relevant authorities’,569 in case the successful completion of these projects were 
to be threatened by unexpected delays. Regarding the margining of trades that would 
remain uncleared, the banks pledged to ‘enhance bilateral collateralization arrangements to 
ensure robust risk management’.570 In Europe, the Derivatives Working Group comprising 
industry representatives and public sector officials from (supra-)national authorities worked 
on similar market-based solutions to those being developed in the US.571  
 
 
3. High public issue salience of derivatives regulation and policy-
makers’ embrace of a market-shaping philosophy 
 
Up until this point, the policy process looked very similar to the pre-crisis era, with the 
banks in the driver’s seat. The industry’s effective progress towards meaningful self-
regulation was limited, falling short of the expectations it had created, which also did not 
differ significantly from the pre-crisis period. For example, by the end of 2009, no more than 
a third, rather than the promised 90% of eligible interest rate contracts were centrally 
cleared, and, in the eyes of the regulators, there were few indications of far-reaching 
improvements to counterparty risk management.572 In Europe, the industry’s progress 
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towards clearing was even further limited, given policy-makers’ insistence on central 
clearing activities being located inside the EU, rather than in the US.573. 
 
What was different this time was the persistently high public issue salience attributed to 
derivatives regulation and financial regulation in the US and Europe more generally.574 The 
dramatic consequences of the crisis which quickly turned into the worst recession since the 
Great Depression in terms of record unemployment and wide-spread foreclosures meant 
public attention would not vanish as quickly as during earlier episodes of distressed 
derivatives markets.575 In addition, unprecedented public intervention in form of the large-
scale bail-out of AIG, the Treasury’s purchase of illiquid assets through the USD 700bn 
Troubled Asset Relief Programme - both funded with tax-payer money of which financial 
firms decided to use a portion to pay for bonuses while the average voter was suffering -, as 
well as various other broad-based Fed-administered lending facilities comprising an 
additional several hundreds of billions of USD kept the American public on its toes. 576 
Another factor capturing public attention was the high volatility of commodity prices that 
had resulted in steep price increases, which were widely attributed to speculation by 
financial investors.577 As a consequence, the industry found itself confronted with an 
unprecedented degree of outrage and antagonism, particularly in the US Congress, where 
policy-makers’ statements across the aisle were garnished with an unheard degree of 
hostile metaphoricity. As a result, a broad coalition of policy-makers advocated dispensing 
with self-regulation and pursuing public intervention in the OTC derivatives market. 
 
The chair of the House Agriculture Committee, Collin Peterson (D-MN) argued ‘I trust these 
guys about as far as I could throw them’,578 and Brad Miller (D-North Carolina) specified he 
considered them ‘an agent of destruction for the gross domestic product and of 
impoverishment for the middle class’. 579  One of the representatives of New York, 
Democratic Congressman Joseph Crowley, demanded ‘ending the era of Cowboy Capitalism’ 
and his colleague Carolyn McCarthy (D-New York) decried the ‘irresponsibility, arrogance, 
and hypocrisy’ of the financial sector.580 
 
Congressman Jeb Hensarling (R-Texas) condemned compensation being financed with 
bailout money as ‘the outrage of the week’, but insisted that ‘the greater outrage ought to 
be taxpayer money used to sustain counterparties to make them whole, counterparties who 
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undertook a risk versus taxpayers who did not take the risk’.581 Republican presidential 
primaries candidate of 2008, Mike Huckabee, in turn, deplored that Congress had ‘ask[ed] 
taxpayers to suck up the staggering results of the hubris, greed, and arrogance of those who 
sought to make a quick buck by throwing the dice’.582 Andre Carson (D-IN) weighed in, 
demanding that ‘[t]ax subsidized corporate welfare must end. It is unbecoming, unjust, and 
unpatriotic. […] The greed of Wall Street that flourished under these deregulation policies 
have [sic] now brought our economy to her knees’.583  
 
Speaking about CDS, Barney Frank (D-Mass.), chair of the House Financial Services 
Committee, argued that bankers ‘were issuing life insurance on vampires. They didn’t think 
they needed any money because vampires don’t die. And then when the vampires died, 
they didn’t have any money’.584 Unsatisfied with the statement by ISDA’s CEO, Robert 
Pickel, that his organization did not perform any self-regulatory functions and therefore did 
not take any action against AIG writing CDS for half the world, Brad Sherman (D-California), 
summarized ISDA’s mission with the words that ‘if the devil wants to join your organization, 
the only question is, does his dues check clear’.585 He demanded decisive action, refuting 
the classical answer of ‘“Well, this is just a private market decision.” Tell that to the 
taxpayers who have bailed out AIG. […] Let us not be told that the present system is fine as 
long as the taxpayers write the check’.586 During a radio show in his home state, Senator 
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) even went as far as to suggest that the AIG leadership ‘follow the 
Japanese example and come before the American people and take that deep bow and say, 
I’m sorry, and then either do one of two things: resign or go commit suicide’. He went on to 
specify that ‘in the case of the Japanese, they usually commit suicide before they make any 
apology’.587  A comment Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, made in an interview 
according to which he was ‘doing God’s work’ was unsuitable to calm down policy-makers’ 
outrage.588 
 
Summing up the public mood, Barney Frank and Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT, chair of the 
Senate Banking Committee), whose names would become associated with the Dodd-Frank 
Act argued that time was ripe for public intervention. In a meeting with bankers, Frank said 
‘[t]here’s going to be a bill, and either you’re going to have to get on the bus or be run over 
by it’,589 language that very much contrasted with policy-makers’ pre-crisis rhetoric aimed 
at letting the industry drive the bus itself. In a 2012 article entitled ‘Why Dodd-Frank is 
necessary’, Dodd reflected on his work on the bill as representing ‘a long overdue 
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regulatory overhaul […] that fundamentally changed the way the financial sector 
operates’.590  
 
Regulators voiced their support. CFTC chair Gary Gensler stated ‘I support the concept of 
regulating derivatives because they helped cause the problem’.591 FDIC chair Sheila Bair 
stated ‘[t]he Industry Needs Regulation to Prevent Excesses’592. Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo 
supported ‘regulatory reorientation’,593 and Fed chair Ben Bernanke, in a reversal of his 
initial position, called for ‘changes to the financial rules of the game’, urging ‘Congress to 
close regulatory gaps’.594 Further impetus for ending self-regulation was provided by the 
team of the ‘Three Marketeers’, Greenspan, Summers, and Rubin who had wholeheartedly 
embraced derivatives deregulation in the 1990s, a decision they now publicly distanced 
themselves from. Most famously, Alan Greenspan acknowledged being ‘in a state of 
shocked disbelief’ and feeling ‘distressed’ by the ‘flaw’ he had identified in his prior 
regulatory philosophy. ‘The whole intellectual edifice […] collapsed’, he declared.595 In a 
similar way, Larry Summers, now President Obama’s chief economist, presented himself as 
‘reeducated’ by the crisis, admitting to not having had ‘perfect foresight’ when deregulating 
derivatives.596 Robert Rubin, in turn, had already insisted prior to the crisis having always 
been aware of the fact that derivatives ‘could pose problems’, particularly ‘when the system 
is stressed’, but that back in the 1990s his concerns had not been listened to.597 More 
generally, CFTC chair Bair declared the end of competitive deregulation. ‘Pursuing financial 
institution competitiveness as a policy goal in a way that compromises safety-and-
soundness, […] will ultimately harm both our financial institutions and our economy’.598 
 
The only group of policy-makers less convinced of the need for public intervention, and 
therefore more inclined towards continued self-regulation, were the Republicans. They 
were as outraged as the Democrats about the misuse of bailout money for compensation 
purposes, but they doubted that derivatives were the culprits of the crisis. ‘[L]ook[ing] at all 
the root causes of our economic turmoil’, Hensarling declared, had not made him feel ‘quite 
convinced […] that the derivatives market is among them’.599 His colleague, Congressman 
Scott Garrett (R-NJ), shared similar convictions, warning not to extrapolate from AIG. In his 
view, reforms should not be undertaken solely informed ‘by the fact that one high profile 
financial institution, AIG, made a bad investment decision’.600 Referring to the industry’s 
commitments, he observed that ‘[t]he private sector has made significant progress in a 
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relatively short period of time […], and I think we should look at this further’.601 In a similar 
vein, Congressman Spencer Bachus (R-Alabama) applauded the industry’s pledges, 
considering them ‘efforts to remind us that market-based solutions are capable of 
generating the information that investors and companies need to make informed 
decisions’.602 However, the Republicans’ scepticism did not change the course of the 
debate. 
 
Compared to the US, the political system of the EU is marked by a complex combination of 
inter-governmentalism and supranational centralization, which is often perceived as several 
steps removed from the average citizen. Also, the European Parliament does not publish 
minutes of its sessions to the same extent and with the same degree of detail as the US 
Congress, and the deliberations of the EU institutions figure much less prominently in the 
news. The tone of the political debate in Europe was therefore less dramatic.603 Moreover, 
the crisis was initially widely associated with problems having originated in the US, rather 
than in Europe, even though financial institutions from the EU, such as some German 
Landesbanken had avidly invested in MBS-related products.604 Nonetheless, derivatives 
regulation was still a highly salient issue. 
 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Charlie McCreevy, argued that 
‘[w]hen the crisis started, neither the market nor supervisors knew who was bearing what 
risk in the economy. But now, it has become obvious: It’s the taxpayer’.605 His successor 
Michel Barnier who believed the lack of regulation had turned the OTC derivatives market 
into a ‘Wild West territory’606 called for a ‘new deal between financial regulation and 
society’.607 Regarding the role derivatives had played in the crisis, Christian Noyer, governor 
of the Banque de France, argued it was ‘crystal clear that […] financial innovation based on 
credit derivatives was at the heart of the financial crisis’.608 Pointing to the repercussions of 
the crisis, his counterpart at the Bank of England, governor Mark Carney agreed that ‘over 
the counter (OTC) derivatives markets were a path for contagion rather than a source of 
strength’.609 
 
The EU Parliament equally noted that ‘OTC derivatives have helped to make large market 
participants mutually dependent even when they are regulated entities’,610 thus questioning 
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one of the industry’s pre-crisis arguments according to which derivatives regulation was 
unnecessary given that deals were exclusively made by counterparties that were 
sophisticated and already heavily regulated themselves. The EU Commission, in turn, 
criticized the structure of the OTC derivatives market, observing that ‘the private nature of 
contracting with limited public information, the complex web of mutual dependence, the 
difficulties of understanding the nature and level of risks – increases uncertainty in times of 
market stress and accordingly poses risks to financial stability’. 611  Making a similar 
argument, the EU Council concluded that ‘such characteristics increase uncertainty in times 
of market stress and accordingly, pose risks to financial stability’.612  
 
OTC derivatives were not only criticized for their role in the failures of Lehman Brothers and 
AIG, but also for their contribution to the Greek sovereign debt crisis.613 Banks’s reputation 
in the EU received a severe hit once it became clear that Goldman Sachs had assisted the 
Greek government to swap its debt into the future, while at the same time purchasing CDS 
to protect itself against a potential Greek default.614 Against this background, the heads of 
state/ government from France, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg urged EU Commission 
President Barroso to study ‘the role and impact of speculative practices in connection with 
CDS trading in the government bonds of European countries’, and the EU parliament also 
pushed for encompassing reform in this area.615 The European Parliament’s vice-president, 
Arlene McCarthy, called on the Commission to take measures ‘to stop banks assisting 
European governments in hiding public debt’.616 The banks were dealt another blow when 
the EU Commission opened judicial procedures against several financial institutions 
suspected of having formed cartels in order to manipulate the London and Euro Inter Bank 
Offered Rates, LIBOR and EURIBOR.617 While derivatives had impacted each of these events 
and developments in different ways and to varying extents, the ‘d-word’ acquired a bad 
taste. 
 
As in the US, putting an end deregulation, thus, ranked high on policy-makers’ agenda. 
French President Sarkozy stated that ‘[s]elf-regulation as a way of solving all problems is 
finished. Laissez-faire is finished’.618 Lord Adair Turner, the head of the UK’s FSA, admitted 
to the ‘intellectual failure’619  of the pre-crisis system and called upon his regulator 
colleagues to ‘not treat it as a given that direct product regulation is by definition 
inappropriate’.620 Joaquin Almunia, EU Commissioner for Competition, argued ‘[t]he age of 
deregulation has produced a financial sector which has grown too large and too complex for 
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comfort; which serves its own interests a whole lot better than the interest of the rest of us; 
and which poses a serious threat to the stability of our economies’.621 Along similar lines, 
Barnier demanded ‘a paradigm shift away from the traditional view that derivatives are 
financial instruments for professional use and thus require only light-handed regulation’.622 
The EU Council emphasized ‘[t]he financial crisis has clearly demonstrated the weaknesses 
of the current regulatory framework’623 and that ‘[i]ncentives to promote the use of CCPs 
have not proven to be sufficient […]’.624 It therefore approved a move ‘from so-called “light-
handed regulation” to a more ambitious and comprehensive regulatory policy’.625 The UK 
FSA and HM Treasury, as well as the EU Commission each also provided a list of more 
technical reasons they believed made self-regulation inadequate for solving the problems in 
the market for uncleared derivatives.626 
 
 
4. The emergence of the clearing and margining consensus 
 
4.1 The transatlantic consensus on the clearing mandate 
 
Building on their earlier efforts of encouraging the industry to move trades to CCPs, policy-
makers quickly settled on central clearing as the overarching objective of the new 
regulatory system. The empirical evidence reveals four inter-related reasons that made the 
clearing idea appear as the ideal candidate.  
 
First, policy-makers pointed to the suitability of the clearing mechanism for reducing 
interconnectedness. Geithner highlighted that ‘[c]learing has the attribute that no longer 
would the financial system be so interconnected. Individual firms, rather than having 
exposures to each other, would have the clearinghouse that has to have the discipline of 
daily mark-to-market and daily posting of collateral.’627 The other US regulators agreed. 
CFTC chair Gensler stated that ‘[b]y mandating the use of central clearinghouses, 
institutions would become much less interconnected, mitigating risk and increasing 
transparency’.628 FDIC chair Bair pointed out that ‘concentrations of derivatives exposures 
among certain dealers helped catalyze systemic breakdown’ and therefore wished to see 
standardized derivatives to be traded ‘through a regulated, centralized counterparty 
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system’.629 The Fed insisted that ‘CCPs offer an important tool for managing counterparty 
credit risk, and thus they can reduce risk to market participants and to the financial 
system’.630  
 
European policy-makers joined the chorus. For Jean-Pierre Jouyet, president of the French 
Autorité des Marchés Financiers, ‘CCPs are the fire-doors’ breaking up the high degree of 
financial interconnectedness among market actors that ‘shut automatically’ in case of an 
institution’s failure.631 The UK FSA and HM Treasury considered central clearing ‘a key step 
in mitigating this risk. A CCP can impose consistent and robust risk management practices as 
well as act as a circuit breaker to the default of a member’.632 At the Bank of England, 
Andrew Haldane viewed central clearing as a solution to the crisis as CCPs’ ‘hub-and-spokes’ 
structure serves as a shock absorber, breaking the loss cascade that would normally ensue 
in the uncleared world, following a large counterparty’s default.633 
 
The EU Commission declared that it is ‘[…] robust margining procedures and other risk 
management controls that render the CCP the most creditworthy counterparty. Margins are 
effective, initial margins are always calculated irrespectively of the counterparty of the 
trade, future replacement cost is duly taken into account and exposures are generally fully 
collateralised on a daily basis’.634 The EU Council equally approved of central clearing, calling 
the margin system ‘the primary line of defence for a CCP’.635 The EU Parliament, in turn, 
commissioned an academic expert study on the basis of which it ‘[b]ack[ed] the call for the 
compulsory introduction of CCP clearing’.636  
 
Second, policy-makers and regulators noted that CCPs had proven their resilience and 
reliability during the 2008 crisis.637 For example, LCH.Clearnet, which had held USD 9tn of 
Lehman’s cleared interest swaps, wound down the portfolio with minimal disruption, 
auctioning off the positions within less than a month of the bankruptcy without imposing 
any losses on other counterparties.638 This process crucially hinged on the USD 2bn of IM 
Lehman had posted with the clearing house.639 By contrast, untangling Lehman’s uncleared 
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business turned out a hugely difficult process that took years and resulted in much more 
substantial losses.640 Indeed, 10 years after the crisis, the insolvency proceedings have still 
not been completed.641 
 
The CFTC observed that CCPs had ‘met all their financial obligations without the infusion of 
any capital from the Federal government. This was not the case in the world of uncleared 
swaps’.642 The Fed noted that ‘[t]he collateral Lehman Brothers had posted covered all 
losses on its positions, and thus the clearinghouse did not have to use any of its other 
financial resources’.643 Gensler also pointed out that, if AIG had been subject to the ‘harsh 
discipline’ of the margining regime imposed by CCPs, its problems would have been 
identified much earlier and could thus have been contained at a less critical stage.644 More 
generally, he observed that ‘[t]hroughout this entire financial crisis, trades that were carried 
out through regulated exchanges and clearinghouses continued to be cleared and 
settled’,645 with Comptroller of the Currency, John Dugan and FDIC chair Bair, making very 
similar statements.646  
 
In Europe, Haldane attributed the attractiveness of the clearing model to its successful 
performance during the crisis: ‘Experience during the crisis means we now know why [to 
pursue it]’.647 In a similar way, the EU Commission observed that ‘CCPs have proven to be 
resilient even under stressed market conditions as the one we are facing today and showed 
their ability to ensure normal market functioning in case of failure of a major market player 
[…]’.648  
 
Third, the existence of fully operational CCPs that could take on uncleared derivatives and 
that regulators had experience in supervising rendered the clearing solution even more 
attractive. In the US, the CFTC and SEC could draw on decades of experience in regulating 
and supervising derivatives clearing agencies and securities clearing agencies 
respectively.649 Gensler’s immediate predecessor Walt Lukken who left the CFTC in 2008 
emphasized that ‘[c]learinghouses have been functioning for many years as a means for 
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mitigating the risks associated with exchange-traded financial products’. 650  The Fed 
observed that the markets were already beginning to transition the OTC business to CCPs, 
which would facilitate the process of rolling out the new model for OTC derivatives: ‘Market 
participants have already established several CCPs to provide clearing services for some OTC 
interest rate, energy, and credit derivative contracts. Regulators both in the United States 
and abroad are seeking to speed the development of new CCPs and to broaden the product 
line of existing CCPs’.651  
 
In Europe, the UK FSA noted ‘[t]here are currently six potential providers of CCP services 
which have announced their intention to launch CDS clearing’.652 The EU Commission also 
commented favourably, emphasizing that clearing was ‘the most immediate way of 
addressing the limitations’ the crisis had revealed and ‘the most effective way of reducing 
credit risk [that] is broadly feasible in all market segments’.653 Table 2 provides an overview 
of the largest CCPs operational in 2010. 
 
Table 2: Central clearing market structure in 2010 
 
Source: IMF (2010:94) 
 
Crucially, not only the regulators and some of the large banks favoured the clearing 
solution, but the CCPs themselves were also eager to take on the new business. 
LCH.Clearnet emphasized that ‘CCPs across the world performed in an exemplary fashion at 
the height of the financial crisis in 2008, providing safe harbours at a time of extreme 
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uncertainty’.654 CME observed that ‘[o]ur clearinghouse has a proven ability to scale 
operations to meet the demands of new markets and of unexpected volatility’.655 The firm 
signalled it was ready ‘to help alleviate the risks to the economy’ emanating from the entire 
OTC market.656 Referring specifically to CDS, Eurex voiced its optimism that clearing ‘will 
bring significant benefits to the OTC market […]’.657 ICE communicated to policy-makers that 
‘we could be ready to begin that process by year’s end. We don’t need a significant lead 
time’.658 
 
Fourth, the speed with which policy-makers thought they could implement the clearing 
solution must not be underestimated. Indeed, high issue salience acted as a further 
incentive for policy-makers’ quick and solid embrace of the clearing solution. According to 
this interpretation, the height of the crisis, with every regulatory agency being under 
intense public scrutiny, was not the time to experiment with any new form of financial 
infrastructure. CCPs were ready, had weathered the crisis well, and allowed regulators to 
demonstrate leadership and strength at times when high levels of public attention called for 
decisive action. Given the complexity of the topic, many legislators struggled to fully 
understand the concepts of derivatives and clearing. Early in the process, Barney Frank, for 
example, confessed his inability to recognize a derivative even ‘if it hit [him] on the face’.659 
Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID) asked: ‘What exactly are we talking about there when we talk 
about establishing a clearing counterparty or a clearing system?’660 However, despite the 
complexity of the concept, it was clear that policy-makers demanded a decisive response to 
the crisis. Collin Peterson’s (D-MN) call for rapid action was representative, when he urged 
regulators to give him a ‘sense of how quick we can get this clearing mechanism 
established’.661  
 
Building on the clearing consensus and acting on their expectation of a fully operational 
clearing infrastructure being quickly available, the G20 at their Pittsburgh summit of 2009 
formalized the objective of having all standardized derivatives centrally-cleared ‘by end-
2012 at the latest’.662 For trades remaining in the uncleared marketplace, higher capital 
requirements were decided.663  
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4.2 The transatlantic agreement on the need for margining uncleared 
derivatives 
 
Policy-makers initially expected that 90% or even more of the OTC market would transition 
to CCPs. Sheila Bair, for example, at one point spoke of ‘limited circumstances’ under which 
OTC deals would remain uncleared.664 However, policy-makers overestimated the share of 
OTC deals fitting the profile for central clearing.  
 
There were three main challenges. First, central clearing requires a minimum level of 
fungibility in terms of trades sharing very similar, ideally identical, characteristics. For 
example, multilateral netting can only performed efficiently if trades are similar enough to 
each other to cancel each other out.665 Moreover, the calculation of margin requirements 
hinges on the liquidity of the trade in question, meaning there must be a sufficiently high 
number of buyers and sellers whose transactions can provide the required data.666 Given 
that CCPs (re-)calculate VM on a daily basis, the underlying computations need to be 
relatively easy to perform. The central clearing of sparsely traded bespoke contracts is, 
therefore, operationally and conceptually difficult (and thus also unprofitable). In times of 
crisis, the central clearing of unsuitable contracts can actually enhance risk and incur losses 
for the CCP, if the clearing house is unable to find new counterparties willing to quickly 
purchase the unwound trades and/or provide similar ones for replacement purposes.667 
Research by the FSB reinforced these concerns by showing that many bespoke trades were 
tailored to an extent that their valuation might take several days, which rendered them 
unsuitable for central clearing.668 As we saw in table 1, central clearing has been most 
significant with respect to interest rate and credit derivatives which tend to display a 
relatively high level of standardization, whereas other contract types have largely remained 
in the uncleared marketplace. 
 
A second, closely related problem was that standardization turned out to be not as easily 
achievable, as policy-makers initially expected. Indeed, many trades are intentionally tailor-
made to provide for optimal hedging, which can be beneficial from an accounting 
perspective. The rules of the International Accounting Standards Board and the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board both stipulate that in order for hedge accounting benefits to 
prevail, the hedge must be ‘highly effective’, meaning the derivative and the underlying risk 
must co-evolve in a highly correlated manner. For example, according to IAS 39, the hedge 
must offset fair-value gains and losses on the hedged item within a band of 80-125%. 
Similar rules apply under US GAAP. The lack of hedge accounting treatment introduces 
volatility to a firm’s profit and loss accounting which, in turn, can result in enhanced capital 
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costs.669 Initially, many policy-makers appeared to believe the hedge accounting corridor 
was large enough for standardization and central clearing to occur, but this optimism soon 
vanished. 
 
A third concern emerged once policy-makers realized market actors’ widespread tendency 
‘to exploit loopholes in regulations’.670 For example, one specialist observed that ‘good 
lawyers can make any derivative customized in about 10 minutes if it will enable the issuer 
to escape additional regulatory cost’.671 This realization about the potential ease with which 
market actors might engage in regulatory avoidance further lowered the initial optimism 
regarding the uptake of central clearing. 
 
Policy-makers therefore had to correct their initial expectations about the extent of central 
clearing downwards. In practice, this process did not work as smoothly as it might appear 
from reading these paragraphs. Rather, it was a slow process of learning that already began 
in 2009. Regarding updated estimates about the ratio of cleared derivatives, the UK FSA in 
2009 expected that half the market of CDS could remain uncleared.672 In a similar spirit, the 
IMF in 2010 estimated that one third of CDS, one quarter of interest rate derivatives, and 
two thirds of the other asset classes would remain uncleared.673 The EU Commission simply 
observed that ‘not all OTC derivatives are suitable for CCP-clearing’.674 In the US, Geithner 
was not yet willing to give up hope, and declared that the Administration was planning to 
‘propose a broad definition of ‘standardised’ OTC derivatives that will be capable of 
evolving with the markets […]’.675 However, it was obvious that this would be a challenging 
endeavour. In fact, the term ‘standardized’ has never been clearly defined in either 
jurisdiction. Rather, both the US and the EU legal provisions stipulate precise product 
categories for which central clearing has become mandatory.676 The Fed in later years 
expected a clearing ratio of no more than 60%,677 which is very close to the ratio reached in 
2018 (see table 1). 
 
The likelihood of a significant fraction of OTC deals remaining uncleared meant a regulatory 
solution for this market segment had to be found. The consensus quickly settled on margin 
requirements which represent one of the key defining parameters of settlement via central 
clearing. Already in 2009, policy-makers had discussed a potential margin mandate. The FSF 
had recommended that ‘[a]uthorities should review enforcing minimum initial margins and 
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haircuts for OTC derivatives and securities financing transactions’.678 Later in the same year, 
the G20’s Pittsburgh Working Group had called upon policy-makers to ‘enhance incentives 
needed for the use of central counterparties’ and had identified margin requirements as a 
viable ‘aspect’ for ‘making regulatory regimes more effective’,679 but the final communiqué 
did not include an explicit reference to margin for uncleared derivatives. In both cases, the 
initial optimism about the applicability of the clearing solution had relegated the need of 
margining uncleared trades into the background. 
 
However, once it became clear that central clearing would not cover the entire market, 
there appeared to be shared consensus on moving forward with the margining mandate. 
Most importantly, margin requirements would allow policy-makers to import a key element 
of central clearing into the uncleared market. In Europe, Noyer in 2010 noted that ‘[a] 
consensus among policy makers and beyond has […] emerged to try and force a change in 
the OTC derivatives market to make it adopt as much as possible the technical features and 
infrastructures of organised markets.’680 In the UK, both the UK’s FSA and Treasury already 
voiced support for subjecting uncleared derivatives to margin requirements one year earlier 
in 2009. They commented that ‘[t]he near-collapse of AIG is an example where commercial 
decisions regarding these bilateral arrangements resulted in incomplete mitigation of the 
counterparty risk. It is therefore essential that steps are taken to ensure that these types of 
transactions are adequately risk managed’.681 At the supranational level, the De Larosière 
report of 2009 equally recommended ‘to take a wide look at the functioning of derivative 
markets’, advising that for OTC derivatives ‘the development of appropriate risk-mitigation 
techniques […] could go a long way towards restoring trust in the functioning of these 
markets’.682 The European Parliament in 2010 argued that ‘derivative markets require a 
comprehensive collateralisation policy encompassing both central and bilateral clearing 
arrangements’.683  One year prior to that report, the European Council had already 
advocated ‘proper collateralisation for bilateral clearing’ and the Commission had 
considered it essential to ‘strengthen bilateral collateral management’.684 
 
Across the Atlantic, Gensler in 2009 observed that ‘[c]ustomized derivatives are by their 
nature less standard, less liquid and less transparent. Therefore, I believe that higher capital 
and margin requirements for customized products are justified’.685 Bernanke considered 
margin ‘an appropriate cost of protecting against counterparty risk’686 and Tarullo stressed 
the importance of margin, in particular IM, pointing to the ‘checks and balances initial 
margins would have placed on AIG’s positions’. ‘[S]trong capital standards alone are not 
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enough to contain systemic risk’.687 As the agency in charge of managing the resolution of 
failing insured depository institutions, the FDIC also welcomed margin requirements as a 
safety-enhancing feature that would make it possible ‘to significantly raise the cost of being 
too big or interconnected’ and ‘to reduce the opacity in the OTC market’.688 In line with the 
other agencies, FDIC chair Bair also pointed out that initial margin would have restrained 
AIG’s appetite to write CDOs and its clients to blindly trust the firm: ‘The exchange of initial 
margin would have placed some check on AIG's ability to present itself as a guarantor of an 
impossibly large volume of subprime collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and would have 
discouraged institutions from relying unquestioningly on the AIG guarantee.’689 
 
By comparison, the OCC was probably the least ambitious regulator. In 2009, a 
spokesperson for the agency insisted ‘[t]he system has always worked on derivatives’, and 
one year later, Comptroller of the Currency Dugan still warned of ‘swing[ing] the regulatory 
pendulum too far too fast’.690 Nonetheless he appeared supportive of margin requirements, 
making the same argument about AIG as the other regulators: ‘These margin requirements 
would likely have limited the volume of trades that AIG could have done, or forced them to 
exit the transactions prior to the losses becoming so significant that they threatened the 
firm’s solvency’.691  
 
Most members of the US Congress who were supportive of encompassing reform rarely 
evoked the technical aspects of margin requirements for uncleared derivatives directly, but 
those who did also supported the concept. For Frank and Petersen, capital and margin 
requirements were essential for ‘creat[ing] a strong incentive for dealers and users of 
derivatives to trade them on an exchange or electronic trading platform or have them 
cleared whenever possible. Significantly higher capital and margin charges will apply to non-
standardized transactions that are not exchange-traded or centrally-cleared’. 692 
Congressman Brad Sherman (D-California) emphasized that ‘there ought to be reserves’693 
and Gregory Meeks (D-New York) stated the reform of margin requirements ‘brings the 
focus back to systemic risk by addressing issues of leverage and safety and soundness’.694 In 
the Senate, Gaylord Conrad (D-North Dakota) referred to AIG by saying that ‘we have got an 
absolute obligation to make sure that can’t happen again, and I don’t know how you do that 
without some margin requirement’.695 Chris Dodd also insisted that ‘[m]ore collateral in the 
system, through margin requirements, will help protect taxpayers and the economy from 
bailing out companies’.696 
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Speaking for the Administration, US Treasury Secretary Geithner in 2009 declared that ‘[t]he 
shock absorbers that are critical to preserving the stability of the financial system—capital, 
margin, and liquidity cushions in particular—were inadequate to withstand the force of the 
global recession, and they left the system too weak to withstand the failure of major 
financial institutions’.697 He perceived of margin requirements as an indispensable tool for 
encouraging counterparties to standardize their trades, promote the shift to CCPs, and 
prevent regulatory arbitrage. In his words, margin requirements ‘create incentives for 
market participants to use centralized clearing and standardized contracts so that they do 
not needlessly externalize risks to the financial system by avoiding central clearing’.698 
 
4.3 The US as the ‘first mover’, doubts about the EU, and policy-makers’ definite 
embrace of margin requirements 
 
The US Administration’s confidence in margin requirements was so profound that it firmly 
committed to them, even before the EU (or any other jurisdiction) had formally embraced 
the idea. Rahm Emanuel, president Obama’s chief of staff, pushed Barney Frank to move 
quickly, hoping that Obama would be able to present a strong response to the crisis at his 
first G20 summit in London 2009.699 US leadership in leaving the crisis behind was of 
paramount importance to Obama. He explained that ‘[w]e will act boldly to lift the 
American economy out of crisis and reform our regulatory structure, and these actions will 
be strengthened by complementary action abroad. Through our example, the United States 
can promote a global recovery and build confidence around the world; together with the 
other members of the G-20 we can forge a secure recovery, and future crises can be 
averted’.700 Along similar lines, Geithner declared the failure of laissez-faire regulation, 
pointing out that ‘[t]he United Kingdom’s experiment in a strategy of ‘light touch’ regulation 
to attract business to London away from New York and Frankfurt ended tragically’.701 
Without dwelling on the past deregulatory efforts of his own country, he praised the US as 
the jurisdiction with ‘the highest standards for disclosure and investor protection, […], the 
strongest protections for depositors and against money laundering […]. We did not lower 
our sights to match the more limited ambitions of others. We knew we would be more 
vulnerable if we did’.702 
 
Inspired by this track record, he soon explained the US’s ambition to ‘propose regulations 
for the Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives market that go beyond G-20 [Pittsburgh] 
commitments’.703 The US Treasury’s under secretary for International Affairs, Lael Brainard, 
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insisted that strong action by the US would act like a magnet, meaning that ‘[b]y moving 
first and leading from a position of strength, we are elevating the world’s standards to 
ours’.704 To Geithner, leading from a position of strength represented ‘an enviable position’, 
most importantly because he believed that ‘all [jurisdictions] know that if anybody tries to 
compete by lowering those standards, it would be adverse to their interests’.705 Margin 
requirements for uncleared derivatives became a key component of this agenda and 
formed part of the Dodd-Frank discussions from the first draft onwards. US policy-makers 
perceived strong regulation as potentially competitiveness-enhancing. At the same time, 
however, they were aware that acting as the first mover could also hurt the 
competitiveness of their domestic firms. Geithner, therefore, declared the need ‘to work 
with authorities abroad to promote implementation of complementary measures in other 
jurisdictions, so that achievement of our objectives is not undermined by the movement of 
derivatives activity to jurisdictions without adequate regulatory safeguards’.706 His objective 
was to ‘encourag[e] a race to the top, a race to higher standards’,707 and he explained the 
US was working hard in order ‘to encourage [the EU and Asia] to adopt equally robust 
standards […]’.708 
 
However, questions were soon raised about the EU’s seriousness in following up on the 
adoption of the new margin rules. Despite all the support key European policy-
makers/institutions had voiced in favour of this project, there was initially little evidence of 
concrete steps taken in this direction. US policy-makers’ concerns can be grouped in two 
categories, one related to the EU’s institutional complexities, the other to the extent of its 
regulatory ambitions regarding margin. Regarding the first category, the US was aware that 
the comparatively low speed of EU policy-making was informed by Europe’s complex 
decision-making procedures characterized by an intricate combination of supranational and 
inter-governmental elements.709 However, beyond these well-known complexities,  the EU’s 
new regulatory architecture posed some additional problems. Indeed, when the US passed 
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the EU’s ESAs were not even yet operational.710 One year later, 
when the ESAs had eventually resumed their work, there was still major uncertainty about 
the distribution of key responsibilities at the supranational level. For example, ESMA and 
the Council disputed which body was in charge of determining the clearing eligibility of 
trades. The eventual outcome was a typical case of EU policy-making, resulting in a complex 
compromise of shared responsibility between ESMA, the Council, Parliament, and the 
Commission.711 Achieving this compromise, however, cost time and cast some doubt on the 
EU’s ability to act. 
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US policy-makers were also worried about the strength of the new EU rules. As discussed in 
the previous section, there had been much support for margin requirements in the EU, but 
upon closer analysis, these comments often appeared overshadowed by more sceptical 
voices. For example, in 2009 EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy argued that bilateral 
swaps needed to be ‘tightened and made more secure’, but cautioned that ‘[t]he route to 
get there has still to be worked out’.712 He was also unsure how to best enhance central 
clearing in the market: ‘The question is how to do this: Should we provide incentives, for 
example through regulatory capital, or should we mandate the use of CCPs?’, he asked.713 In 
its first consultation on ‘Possible initiatives to enhance the resilience of OTC Derivatives 
Markets’, the EU Commission discussed various options including improvements to 
collateralization, but provided a wide spectrum of possible solutions ranging from ‘self-
regulatory initiatives’ to ‘appropriate legislative instruments’.714 The next consultation 
document on ‘Derivatives and Market Infrastructures’ published one year later did insist on 
the ‘timely and accurate exchange of collateral and appropriate and proportionate holding 
of capital’ for uncleared derivatives.715 Reflecting on the state of the development of 
derivatives rules in Europe and the US, the EU Commission in 2010 therefore identified ‘no 
significant risks of regulatory arbitrage’, but immediately cautioned that it would be ‘very 
difficult to predict’ if this were to remain the case after the adoption of the required 
legislation and technical standards.716 
 
Adding to these concerns, it had become evident that at least some policy-makers in the EU 
doubted the need to impose both, capital and margin requirements on uncleared trades. In 
2009, McCreevy made it sound as if margin requirements were an optional approach, saying 
that ‘[o]ne approach might be stricter collateral requirements. We could also think about 
raising the regulatory capital cost for bilaterally-cleared derivatives’.717 The tension kept 
brewing for several years. In 2011, a press article summarized a statement by ‘[a] source 
close to the rule-making process’ according to which ‘the capital versus margin debate is a 
live one, and it is not clear how close the two sets of rules [i.e. the US and EU ones] will 
be’.718 Another anonymous European regulator agreed on the need for VM, the imposition 
of which he considered a must, but cautioned that ‘with initial margin the question is more 
open […] Coming up with sensible regulation is tricky’.719 The article concluded that ‘[t]he 
lack of enthusiasm from foreign regulators means sparks are beginning to fly in the US’.720 
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In light of the EU’s apparent hesitation to act, the US realized it found itself in a vulnerable 
position. Congress had adopted mandatory margin requirements through Dodd-Frank in 
2010, followed by a first round of proposals by the CFTC and Prudential Regulators in 2011, 
while the EU was still acting indecisively. The Republicans were already fretting that ‘there 
is no indication’ of other jurisdictions following along, warning that ‘[t]he rules are 
unenforceable globally’.721 The Democrats were also starting to feel uncomfortable. Barney 
Frank cautioned that ‘[t]here is a danger that various financial institutions in each country 
will lobby to the point where there is an overall reduction’.722 Congressman David Scott (D-
Georgia) also considered it ‘unlikely that foreign jurisdictions will adopt similar laws as that 
within the Dodd-Frank law, since the issue was not addressed as part of the G-20 
accords’.723 
 
Given the absence of the ‘race to higher standards’ Geithner had hoped for back in 2009, he 
identified margin requirements as an area involving ‘remaining work towards alignment’ 
and recognized ‘the need to develop a global margin standard’.724 He warned that the 
failure to establish a global regime would undermine the objective of promoting central 
clearing, as the derivatives business would shift to the least regulated market, the result of 
which would be ‘a recipe for another crisis’.725 Fed Governor Tarullo emphasized that 
‘[s]uch an agreement would increase the stability of the financial system by reducing the 
likelihood of a race to the bottom in jurisdictions that do not implement equivalent 
standards’.726 Using Helleiner’s terminology, we can say that policy-makers realized that 
whereas the ‘benefit’ of deregulation could be ‘consumed’ through unilateral liberalization, 
the expected benefit of regulation required collective action to prevent ‘free-riding’ by 
those trying to attract business through unilateral deviation.727  
 
In Europe, the supporters of a margin mandate shared Tarullo’s perspective. Edouard 
Vieillefond, Deputy General Secretary of the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers, in 
2011 remarked that the EU and the US were in consensus about 90% of the new derivatives 
regulations and applauded the US whose proposals he considered ‘a move in the right 
direction in that they create cost differential between uncleared and cleared derivatives’.728 
However, at the same time, he warned that if the two jurisdictions ‘[…] don’t have the same 
[…] rules for margining and capital including the same capital and collateral requirements 
for uncleared bilateral derivatives, it won’t be manageable’. 729  The EU Commission 
concurred, stating that ‘[t]he importance of an internationally coordinated approach cannot 
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be overstated. Given the global nature of the OTC derivatives market, the lack of 
internationally coordinated action would only lead to regulatory arbitrage’.730  
 
Policy-makers therefore decided to formally elevate the role of margin requirements by 
making it a priority for the G20. At their Cannes summit in November 2011, the leaders 
decided to expand the remit of the Pittsburgh reforms by including mandatory margin 
requirements among the key requirements for global OTC derivatives reform: ‘We call on 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization for 
Securities Commission (IOSCO) together with other relevant organizations to develop for 
consultation standards on margining for non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives by June 2012 
[…]’.731 As with prior global regulatory standards, the aim was to pursue stability-enhancing 
reform, while keeping incentives for competitive deregulation at bay.732 The work of WGMR 
soon dissipated any doubts about Europe’s determination to pursue the margin mandate. 
The group provided two justifications for IM, a ‘macroprudential’ one in terms of the 
‘[r]eduction of systemic risk’, and a market-shaping one in terms of the ‘[p]romotion of 
central clearing’.733  The clearing/margining consensus would subsequently act as the 
ideational bedrock for the development of the specific collateralization requirements. 
 
 
5. Relegated to the margin: The loss of the banks’ privileged 
position within the transnational policy community 
 
As the individual case studies will show in more detail, the interactions between private 
sector groups and regulators became rather confrontational after the crisis. For example, 
Theo Lubke, senior vice president and head of the financial infrastructure department of the 
New York Fed told ISDA that ‘[i]t is simply unacceptable in today’s environment that the 
design and structure of the OTC derivatives market can be controlled by a handful of large 
dealers.’ ‘There is opacity in the OTC market that doesn’t have commensurate public policy 
benefits. This is not something that can continue’.734 CFTC chairman Gary Gensler made it 
very clear that the time for the dealer banks to enjoy a privileged position within the 
transnational policy community had come to an end. ‘Right now’, he said, ‘we have a 
dealer-dominated world, and that nearly drove us off a cliff’.735  
 
There were clear signs pointing towards an estrangement between the public and private 
sector representatives of the transnational policy community. For example, it appears that 
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at least some previously well-connected lobbyists often had to rely on specialized news 
outlets or regulators’ websites to remain up to date on the margin rule. Moreover, while 
regulators seemed to appreciate the fact of being supplied with information, they often did 
not show any reaction after an industry-moderated presentation, whereas prior to 2008, a 
subsequent exchange of views had been the norm. As a consequence, lobbyists frequently 
felt left ‘high and dry’, having to wait for the next draft proposal or final rule to see which 
course the requirements were taking. Moreover, regulators often appeared to resent the 
attitude some interest group representatives tended to display. In particular, the efforts by 
some commenters to ‘educate’ public officials on why public intervention was misapplied 
often did not fall on fertile ground. More generally, an anonymous banker quoted in The 
New York Times expressed his frustration about the deterioration of the industry’s overall 
relations with the regulatory community by saying that ‘[w]e’re on the outside, knocking on 
the window and saying, ‘Hey, listen to us just a little bit’.736 
 
At least some regulators also seemed split regarding the utility of maintaining close 
relations with the industry, which, compared to the pre-crisis period, was a rather big 
novum.737 On the one hand, many regulators still felt the need to communicate with a 
variety of constituents who were knowledgeable about the market and could supply 
information. On the other hand, there appear to have been others who began viewing close 
interactions rather critically. Their justification seemed to be that there was a need for more 
transparency, and that such relationships risked privileging those parties who could afford 
travel and meetings, which in turn might enable them to exercise more influence over the 
rules, compared to their peers who lacked the resources to engage in this form of 
interaction. Further research would be needed to substantiate the extent to which these 
concerns were representative of the wider regulatory community involved in the 
development of the margin rules. 
 
In sum, there were clear signs pointing towards the alienation of the transgovernmental 
community from the banks. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss some key features of the post-crisis regulatory 
context which transcended the decision-making process of the individual rules. These 
features are related to three of the moderators: public issue salience of derivatives 
regulation, the post-crisis ideational consensus, and the state of the transnational policy 
community. 
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Policy-makers initially intended to continue embracing the deregulation consensus with a 
focus on industry self-regulation. However, the dealer banks’ lack of substantial progress on 
this front, combined with the dramatic consequences of the crisis, caused the public issue 
salience of derivatives regulation to shoot to and remain at stratospheric levels. On both 
sides of the Atlantic, derivatives became a ‘red flag’ to policy-makers who decried the 
reckless actions of the banks and demanded decisive action. Policy-makers subsequently 
abandoned the deregulation consensus and decided to rein in the OTC derivatives market. 
 
The ideational consensus centred on channelling uncleared trades through CCPs which had 
successfully withstood the crisis and were eager to take on the new business. Policy-makers 
believed central clearing would decrease the high degree of interconnectedness that had 
served as an incendiary mechanism during the crisis. However, it soon turned out that 
insufficient levels of standardization would cause a significant proportion of bilateral trades 
to remain in the uncleared marketplace. Policy-makers therefore chose to import margin 
requirements which represent a key element of central clearing into the uncleared market, 
the idea being that collateralization would address the higher systemic risk inherent in 
bespoke trades, and that it would incentivize investors to move suitable trades to CCPs. The 
US immediately acted on the new consensus, taking on the role of first-mover. The EU, 
however, lagged behind. Moreover, several comments by EU policy-makers questioning the 
need for IM created the impression of a growing risk that the post-crisis ideational 
consensus could falter. Policy-makers therefore decided it was necessary to promote the 
development of globally harmonized rules, and established WGMR to serve as a focal point 
for this purpose. 
 
The chapter also discussed case-study over-arching evidence regarding the estrangement 
between the members of the transnational policy community, with regulators displaying a 
more reserved attitude towards the dealer banks than had been the case prior to the crisis. 
 
Overall, three of the moderators that prior to the crisis had fostered dealer bank influence, 
i.e. public issue salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook, and the state of the 
transnational policy community, had flipped. 
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CHAPTER V - Making the use of IM mandatory 
 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter analyzes the first of the post-crisis case studies: the imposition of the 
mandatory use of IM, a policy the banks vehemently opposed. It argues that in both the US 
and the EU, the dealer banks lost the battle against the introduction of IM as a regulatory 
principle. Section 2 shows that they opposed the compulsory use of IM because it would 
reduce the profitability of the uncleared business. In the early stages, the industry was 
confident that the margin mandate might in fact die in Congress. Alternatively, in case it 
were to survive against all odds, the banks believed that chances were high that Europe 
would not follow along. This would leave the US isolated internationally, in which case the 
banks were convinced their threat to exit the market would finish off the idea. In either 
case, there would be a return to business as usual, meaning that deregulation with a focus 
on industry-led self-regulation would prevail. 
 
However, with the formation of WGMR, it became clear that margin requirements would 
not simply disappear from policy-makers’ agenda. The industry responded with a radical 
advocacy campaign against margin requirements. The banks submitted information seeking 
to refute claims that OTC derivatives had been negatively implicated in the crisis. They also 
insisted that they were already protecting themselves sufficiently against any risk in the 
market. Specifically, the dealers argued that if any public intervention were to be envisioned 
at all, policy-makers should limit themselves to mandating the use of VM which, according 
to the industry, was already a business standard. The banks also warned against the steep 
macroeconomic costs of a mandatory IM regime. 
 
The industry received support from the buy-side which equally objected to the mandatory 
use of IM, the main arguments being that its use of bilateral derivatives was ‘safe’, and that 
imposing IM would only increase the financial burden for their customers. Preference 
homogeneity between the sell- and the buy-side thus allowed the industry to submit a clear 
signal to policy-makers about its objection to the IM mandate. 
 
Section 3 reveals that the dealers lost the battle against the mandatory use of IM, with 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic pushing ahead, against the banks’ preferences. 
Boosted by the high degree of public issue salience of derivatives regulation, policy-makers 
dismissed most of the information they received from the market. Regarding the sell-side, 
they were sceptical about the collateralization levels the industry claimed had already been 
achieved. In addition, they did not consider the financial burden associated with the new 
rules as unbearable as the banks claimed. Regarding the buy-side, policy-makers warned 
that the use of bilateral derivatives by these entities was actually not as ‘safe’ as they 
insisted. Overall, the transnational policy community of the pre-crisis period had 
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disintegrated into a strong transgovernmental community composed of regulators from 
both sides of the Atlantic who were committed to the idea of making the mandatory use of 
IM a reality, on the one hand, and the industry which found itself pushed to the sidelines, 
on the other.  
 
Applying the theoretical framework, we can say that the shock of the crisis and the huge 
public outcry it caused disrupted the stability of the pre-crisis configuration in which dealer 
bank influence had been dominant. High issue salience led to the adoption of a new 
ideational consensus which was shared at the domestic institutional, as well as the 
transgovernmental level. The new ideational consensus also led to a reformation of the 
transnational policy community in terms of the dealer banks being pushed to its margin. 
With the ideational consensus being shared on both sides of the Atlantic, there was no need 
for policy-makers to invoke inter-state power. The result was a loss for the banks, which 
could not prevent the adoption of the IM mandate, despite high levels of business unity. 
 
Figure 9 summarizes the constellation of this case. The dotted contours of the power 
moderator indicate that it was neutral. The barely visible dotted arrow line, superimposed 
by the red lightning bolt, indicates the lack of dealer bank influence.  
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Figure 9: The mandatory use of IM cases in the US and the EU 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
2. Dealer bank opposition to IM supported by the buy-side 
 
The industry strongly opposed the mandatory use of IM. The margin rules risked turning a 
previously highly profitable segment into a dime business. As already mentioned, in the first 
nine months of 2009 alone, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Citi, and Morgan 
Stanley had earned USD 53bn from their derivatives business.738 According to a Standard & 
Poor’s estimate, the overall package of post-crisis derivatives regulation risked shaving off 
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an annual USD 4-4.5bn from dealers’ revenue.739 JP Morgan alone anticipated an overall 
loss of USD 2bn.740 The Financial Times reported that ‘[a]s the dominant players, the largest 
banks should be the losers’.741 Testifying in front of Congress, former ISDA representative 
Mark Brickell spoke about policy-makers ‘shooting doves with an 8-gauge’.742 
 
Indeed, the stakes for the industry were enormous. First, the mandatory use of IM would 
enhance transparency, as a consequence of which clients might find it easier to identify 
which fraction of the cost of a deal was related to collateralization and which represented 
profit for the banks. This level of transparency, some of the banks feared, might incentivize 
clients to use standardized trades and move to CCPs, where higher levels of transparency 
and lower cost tend to prevail. Second, and relatedly, if trades were to move to CCPs that 
guarantee their performance, the dealers would no longer be able to point to their own 
‘investment grade’ status in order to justify the hefty price tags informed by the promise 
that they would assume performance under all conditions.743 Along these lines, hedge fund 
manager Michael Masters told the US Congress that with the rise of CCPs, the banks will 
‘lose oligopoly pricing power because any two counterparties can trade, regardless of their 
respective credit ratings’.744  
 
Initially, ISDA and the large banks may have believed that despite all the promises and 
announcements policy-makers had made, the margin idea would probably never see the 
light of the day. Similarly, at least some bank officials may have felt that the complexities of 
shepherding any policy project through Congress, not to speak of the difficulties of global 
coordination would likely derail the project sooner, rather than later. The sceptical voices 
emanating from the EU about the need to introduce both capital and margin requirements 
(referenced in section IV-4.3) might have only further reinforced this perspective. The 
statement of an anonymous US dealer bank lawyer to the press that he ‘very much 
doubt[s]’ ‘our regulators somehow find a way to get other jurisdictions to follow our 
rules’745 can be considered representative of this conviction. According to the industry’s 
reasoning, the lack of a global rule would leave the US isolated internationally, thus allowing 
the banks to finish off the proposal at the national level by making the ‘exit’ threat. There 
was also the hope that public issue salience would cede again, and with it policy-makers’ 
urge to implement the margin mandate. In Europe, a similar perspective appeared to 
prevail. A few banks seemed to believe that explicit threats on their part might not even be 
required, and that the discussion would quickly revert to the usual conversation about 
enhancing private sector solutions, meaning that the OTC market would essentially remain 
deregulated. 
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The formation of the WGMR, the international working group on margin requirements 
established by BCBS and IOSCO, destroyed these hopes. When it became clear that the 
ideational consensus was strong enough for the project to become a reality on both sides of 
the Atlantic, the banks lost the ability to make the exit argument with any degree of 
credibility. The key reason was that with the exception of Japan and the partial exception of 
Singapore, the derivatives market outside the US and the EU (plus Switzerland) was not well 
enough developed at the time to allow for a quick shift of the business to other 
jurisdictions. This means that unlike HSBC and Deutsche Bank in the forced capital injections 
case briefly discussed in section II-2.2.2, the large dealer banks lacked a realistic target to 
relocate their OTC business. From that moment, threats of relocation were not a dominant 
component of their advocacy strategy anymore. Once ISDA and the dealer banks realized 
that this time would be different and that there was a real risk of them not getting away 
with the promise of self-regulation, they began fighting tooth and nail on both sides of the 
Atlantic to prevent the adoption of the IM mandate.  
 
The information ISDA and the sell-side submitted to policy-makers formed part of two main 
arguments. The first one involved denying that OTC derivatives had had any harmful effect 
during the crisis. The industry also praised the status quo, insisting that the use of VM and 
the application of capital requirements, as well as other forms of risk-mitigation already 
provided enough protection against current and potential future exposure. The second 
argument consisted in submitting estimates about the dramatic consequences a binding IM 
mandate would have for the global economy. 
 
Indeed, in 2009, the City of London co-authored a report arguing that ‘[t]here is very little 
evidence to suggest that these [i.e. CDS] contributed in any significant way to the crisis’.746 
This sentiment was widely shared among the industry. Frédéric Oudéa, chair and CEO of 
Société Générale claimed that derivatives had been largely unrelated to the crisis of AIG. He 
insisted that concerns about a default of AIG potentially dragging down the entire economy 
had been largely exaggerated and unwarranted. ‘[S]uch contagion fears may have been 
unfounded, due to the relatively manageable derivatives exposure of individual 
counterparties to AIG’.747 The European Banking Federation concluded ‘that OTC derivatives 
markets have been quite resilient, have remained open and functioned efficiently 
throughout the financial crisis’.748 ISDA attributed the perceived superb functioning of the 
derivatives market to the widespread use of its Master Agreement, concluding that the 
existing ‘infrastructure works extremely well’.749  
 
In ISDA’s view, banks were taking their responsibilities in the trading of OTC derivatives 
extremely seriously. For example, the association emphasized that dealers ‘are in the 
business of taking credit risk, which is weighed carefully against the probability of default, 
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the size of potential losses relative to capital, and consideration of any loss mitigation that 
may exist’.750 Self-regulation should therefore prevail. Morgan Stanley wrote ‘the decision 
to require margin and the details of how it is handled should be left to an individual 
negotiation […]’.751  JP Morgan agreed, saying that firms should be trusted to take 
collateralization decisions on their own, ‘as part of their overall risk management 
process’.752 Building on this praise of the status quo, the industry argued that OTC deals 
were already well collateralized thanks to the consistent use of VM to protect against 
current exposure. ISDA referenced the results of its own margin surveys suggesting that in 
2010, 83% of respondents had bilateral collateral agreements in place (up from 65% in 2009 
and 63% in 2008), with the remainder being unilaterally collateralized.753 Deutsche Bank 
equally insisted that ‘the vast majority of exposures between financial firms are already 
collateralized on a bi-lateral basis’.754 The European Banking Federation emphasized that 
‘collateralisation is such a key interest for banks that uncollateralised transactions are 
infrequent’.755 To the French Banking Federation, appropriate collateralization and tracking 
credit exposure represented ‘the top priorities of the financial industry’, meaning ‘there is 
no need for additional legislative instruments’. 756  To BNP Paribas, appropriate 
collateralization was ‘at the forefront of institutional thinking generally’,757 and to the 
German Banking Industry Committee it was ‘a core interest of all institutions’.758 
 
ISDA suggested that regulators limit themselves to making the consistent exchange of VM a 
legal requirement, without adding any further requirements.759 The association claimed this 
move would have minimal disruptive effects, given that ‘the infrastructure for VM 
collections is currently in place’.760 Barclays provided a corroborating statement, saying that 
‘institutions collect ‘variation’ margin on a regular basis in line with any increase or decrease 
in exposure […]’.761 JP Morgan ‘[did] not believe that beyond the introduction of CCPs for 
standardised contracts, there are systemic changes that can be made in improving the 
coverage of collateralised credit exposures’.762 
 
Regarding potential future exposure, the banks believed that capital requirements provided 
sufficient protection. ISDA explained that ‘[r]equiring both IM and increased capital for the 
same swaps will result in duplicative and unnecessary costs’.763 It continued claiming that 
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putting aside capital for this purpose ‘has proved to be an effective risk mitigant’.764 UBS 
commented that ‘capital requirements […], rather than IM, is what avoids systemic risk’.765 
SIFMA concurred that ‘[c]apital requirements already differentiate the perceived 
differences in risk presented by centrally-cleared versus non-centrally cleared derivatives’ 
and that the use of IM would result in a massive form of ‘overcollateralization’.766 Barclays, 
Société Générale, Intesa San Paolo were of the same view.767 
 
Second, the industry warned that the mandatory use of IM would hurt the global economy. 
ISDA claimed that IM would ‘ha[ve] the potential to significantly strain the liquidity and 
financial resources of the posting party’.768 It presented numerous estimates according to 
which the aggregate cost of the new rules would range from USD 1-30tn, depending on the 
precise design of the new regime.769 It warned policy-makers of the ‘irreparable damage to 
the OTC derivatives business because of the dramatic increase in the cost of providing such 
products’, the effect of which ‘would be tantamount to reducing the monetary base 
available to the economy’.770 Morgan Stanley explained that the funding for IM would be 
‘coming off banks’ balance sheets that would ordinarily be deployed into the economy for 
lending […]’.771 The German Banking Industry Committee issued a similar warning.772  
 
The buy-side equally rejected the imposition of IM. While not part of a formal alliance with 
the banks, buy-side firms advanced very similar arguments. In their public advocacy, asset 
managers, insurance firms, and pension funds relied on a two-pronged strategy. Above all, 
they claimed they were ‘safe’ entities because existing legal requirements already 
precluded any form of potentially dangerous use of uncleared derivatives. The mandatory 
use of IM would therefore unnecessarily increase the financial burden of their clients. 
 
The buy-side firms’ first argument against the imposition of IM was that their use of 
derivatives was ‘safe’. The American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI), for instance, argued that 
‘life insurers […] pose minimal risk to the financial markets – their trades are risk reducing in 
nature and almost fully collateralized’.773 MetLife advanced the identical argument.774 ACLI, 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, and the Association of British Insurers also 
emphasized they were prohibited from using derivatives for any purpose other than 
hedging.775 The Association of British Insurers claimed that because of their solid business 
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model and prudent use of derivatives, ‘pension and insurance funds […] are extremely 
unlikely to default’.776 Pension funds concurred. Associations including SIFMA AMG, the 
Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets, the American Benefits Council, and 
the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) pointed to the ‘comprehensive 
regulatory regime’ 777  which required firms to pursue ‘prudence and diversification 
requirements, professional management standards, transparency requirements, and limits 
on leverage’.778 Pension funds, in particular, claimed they were ‘exactly the type of 
counterparties whose swap activity does not increase systemic risk’.779 European pension 
funds argued along similar lines, insisting they ‘do not have the potential to create systemic 
risk’780, because of their status as ‘not-for-profit’ businesses, because their statutes 
precluded the use of derivatives for speculation, and because they did not employ 
leverage.781 
 
Asset managers adopted the same line of reasoning. For the US, the Investment Company 
Institute (ICI), pointed to federal securities law, whose ‘oversight prevents excessive 
speculation and contributes to the stability of funds, ensuring that they do not contribute to 
systemic risk’.782 In Europe, investment funds, such as the members of the European Fund 
and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), the German Investment Fund Association 
(BVI), its Italian counterpart, Assogestioni, and its French sister association AFG (French 
Asset Management Association) insisted that the EU’s UCITS (Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities) Directive served a similar purpose, for example by 
limiting leverage and by forcing funds to hold enough resources to meet all derivatives-
related obligations.783 Speaking for both pension funds and asset managers, the European 
Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) argued that any residual risk was fully 
under control, ‘given that we already operate a daily [VM] process’.784  
 
Second, the buy-side firms warned of the increased cost of a binding IM mandate for their 
respective clients. Insurance firms such as ACLI, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Group, and 
the German Insurance Association pointed to ‘the potential increase in product costs to the 
consumers who rely on insurers for their financial security’.785 Insurance Europe told 
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regulators the imposition of IM would be ‘distinctly disadvantageous’ to its clients.786 
Pension funds, in turn, informed regulators that the victims of a binding IM mandate would 
be ‘the pensioners and many millions EU citizens [sic] saving for their retirement’, as the 
extra cost would ‘mak[e] it more expensive for pension schemes arrangements to insulate 
themselves from risk’.787 CalSTRS estimated the financial burden for policy-holders to be 
‘significant’788 and the European Federation for Retirement Provision emphasized the 
‘disastrous impact’ IM could have, including ‘less hedging and hence increasing risks in the 
system’, even more so as pension funds lacked netting opportunities, ‘given the large one-
sided exposure’ of their portfolios.789 PensionsEurope announced that the mandatory use of 
IM would not only harm policy holders, but also the wider economy, as pension funds 
would have less resources available to invest and thus ‘contribute to the long-term 
financing of the European economy’.790 
 
Investment funds, such as BlackRock, equally warned that the costs of IM would be borne 
by the clients, because of ‘capital being locked away that would otherwise be available for 
investment […]’.791 To SIFMA’s AMG, IM would ‘make swaps unnecessarily costly’.792 PIMCO 
developed this thought further, explaining that ‘[h]igher transaction costs will, in turn, lead 
to lower returns for the end users that continue to use non-cleared swaps […].’793. Hedge 
funds also opposed a mandatory margin regime. Prior to the crisis, most of them had 
already been contractually required to post margin, but the largest ones had sometimes 
been in a position to make the banks/brokers compete for their business by lowering the 
cost.794 Despite their name, the hedge funds could not claim using derivatives exclusively for 
the purpose of ‘hedging’, but they joined the other buy-side actors in warning about the 
costs of a mandatory IM requirement. The Managed Funds Association (MFA) argued that 
‘this mandate will directly affect the cost to buy-side firms when entering into uncleared 
swaps’.795 Along similar lines, the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) 
rejected the formal imposition of IM as ‘largely unnecessary’ as ‘the cost of capital would 
ultimately be passed on to the client […]’. 796 AIMA also pointed out that the ‘[t]wo-way 
exchange of variation margin is today considered best practice in the industry’.797 MFA 
made the same claim.798 Union Investment went as far to insist that the G20 at their Cannes 
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summit had, in fact, not mandated the use of IM, meaning that there was no need for 
policy-makers to heed in that direction.799 
 
After having voiced their enthusiastic support for reform at the start of the policy-making 
process, CCPs and exchange houses were rather silent during most of the remaining debate. 
The mandatory use of IM would cause the OTC market to become ineffective, with CCPs 
ideally placed to provide a solution.800  In Europe, the London Stock Exchange and 
LCH.Clearnet, for example, preferred not to comment on how collateralization of bilateral 
credit exposures could be enhanced. 801  An exception was Germany’s EUREX which 
considered mandatory IM ‘the best way forward to protect against counterparty default 
[…]’.802 
 
The only voices outside the public sector unequivocally supportive of binding IM 
requirements were the NGOs. Americans for Financial Reform (AfR), for example, attributed 
the bulk of the crisis to ‘the overly leveraged, undercapitalized, under collateralized [sic] and 
opaque nature of unregulated swaps transactions among dealers and their counterparties 
[…]’ and urged regulators to adopt strong requirements.803 Public Citizen perceived strict 
rules as the only effective means against ‘reckless derivatives speculation’.804 In Europe, 
trade unions, such as the European Trade Union Confederation, the Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund, and SOMO (the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations in 
the Netherlands) made similar arguments.805 
 
 
3. A loss for the industry: Regulators pushing ahead 
 
Despite the high degree of business unity displayed among private interest groups, the 
dealer banks lost the battle against the mandatory use of IM which became a requirement 
under the rules of the CFTC, the PRs, and the ESAs.806 As we already saw in section IV-4, 
there was strong ideational consensus in favour of margining, with legislators and 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic supporting the measure.  
 
High levels of public issue salience facilitated the adoption of the IM mandate. Both Dodd-
Frank and EMIR made the use of IM and VM mandatory, without providing any blanket 
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exemptions for the buy-side.807 Given their tarnished reputation, the banks barely spoke up 
during the legislative process, particularly in the US. We therefore need to look to the 
regulators in order to get an impression of how the information the banks and the buy-side 
submitted was interpreted.  
 
Regulators on both side of the Atlantic were not impressed by market actors’ arguments 
against IM. With the harsh wind of public issue salience blowing against everybody who 
voiced concerns against regulation, and reinvigorated by the ideational clearing and 
margining consensus, they felt little restraint to dissect commenters’ claims one after the 
other. Regarding the level of already existing collateralization, they did not doubt that VM 
was used, but they were sceptical about its scope of application. Nout Wellink, president of 
the Dutch central bank and Ingves’ predecessor as BCBS chair summarized this scepticism, 
saying that despite various claims to the contrary, ‘it is unclear to what extent positions are 
covered by collateral’.808  
 
Regulators also discarded the industry’s idea of using capital requirements as an alternative 
for mitigating against potential future exposure. WGMR explained that margin was 
‘”targeted” and dynamic’ in the sense of being adjusted to individual portfolios, whereas 
capital had to cover firms’ activities ‘collectively’, meaning it might ‘be more easily depleted 
at a time of stress’.809 The CFTC may have been particularly vocal against the exclusive focus 
on a ‘capital requirements’ solution, not just for the reasons elaborated by WGMR, but also 
given the fragmentation of the US regulatory system, as a result of which it would bear the 
responsibility for market stability, but without having a say over the design of the capital 
rules themselves that have traditionally been part of the PRs’ (and SEC’s) jurisdiction. 
 
The banks’ ‘cost’ argument also did not withstand regulators’ scrutiny, particularly since the 
regulators decided to introduce IM thresholds. Given its technical nature, this specific 
aspect of the rules never attracted the spotlight of public issue salience, but it allowed the 
regulators to tailor the new requirements to the largest and potentially most 
interconnected, and thus the riskiest entities. The values were USD 8bn of material swaps 
exposure (i.e. in order to be covered, entities needed to have an average daily aggregate 
notional exposure of uncleared swaps of a minimum of USD 8bn) and USD 50mn of 
aggregate credit exposure. IM did not have to be exchanged below these thresholds.810 
Taking these thresholds into account, the regulators’ own estimates suggested a liquidity 
need towards the lower end of ISDA’s projections.811 The OCC, for example, approximated 
the cost of IM to USD 2.05tn.812 BCBS-IOSCO conducted a Quantitative Impact Study 
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revealing a liquidity need of Euro 0.7-1.7tn813. For Europe, the Dutch central bank expected 
the cost to be USD 608bn,814 whereas the ESAs projected a range of Euro 116-420bn.815 
 
Unlike the majority of market actors, regulators did not consider this burden to be 
unbearable. The Committee on the Global Financial System housed at the BIS studied the 
liquidity needs caused by post-crisis rules more generally. It concluded ‘there is no evidence 
or expectation of any lasting or widespread scarcity of such assets in global financial 
markets’.816 Figure 10 illustrates the Committee’s findings across a range of different types 
of collateral assets (left-hand panel) and a breakdown for different national jurisdictions 
(right-hand panel). 
 
Figure 10: Supply of high-quality assets 
 
Source: Committee on the Global Financial System (2013:21). The right-hand panel does not include 
commercial bank and central bank balances. 
 
Along similar lines, the Bank of England equally did not identify any ‘need to panic about 
excessive and difficult-to-meet collateral requirements’. It highlighted ‘that there is a lot of 
high-quality collateral available and the amount of it is not numerically decreasing, but 
actually increasing’.817 Among other factors, this comment referred to central banks’ 
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growing balance sheets and the related cash infusions into the financial markets. Figure 11 
provides an overview of central banks’ growing balance sheets in function of domestic GDP.  
 
Figure 11: Central banks' growing balance sheets 
 
Source: Hartmann (2018:312) 
 
Both graphs display the availability of sufficient funds to finance counterparties’ collateral 
needs, as perceived by the regulatory community. The BIS also conducted a macroeconomic 
analysis which contradicted the sell-side’s claim about the negative macroeconomic effects 
of a binding IM mandate. The study revealed that the overall package of post-crisis OTC 
derivatives reforms would boost, rather than constrain, expected GDP by an annual 0.09-
0.13%.818 
 
The regulators also pointed out that, compared to the costs of the financial meltdown to 
which derivatives had contributed, the predicted liquidity need was not out of proportion. 
Gary Gensler, for instance, argued that the crisis had shown ‘how “expensive” derivatives 
markets can be without sufficient regulation’ and that the new rules were necessary 
‘precisely because the current system cost taxpayers very heavily’.819 A Fed study revealed 
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that the output loss the crisis had imposed on the US alone ranged from USD 6 to 14tn, or 
USD 50.000 to 120.000 per household.820 Regulators also interpreted the cost of the crisis as 
a reflection of market participants’ previous failure to adequately manage the counterparty 
risk associated with OTC trades. Stephen Cecchetti of the BIS observed that ‘[i]n the past, 
some parties seem to have simply ignored the credit component [inherent in OTC 
trades]’.821 The ESAs backed this argument, declaring that the idea of ‘establishing robust 
risk management’ was a key purpose of the rules. 822  A US regulator commenting 
anonymously to the press said ‘[t]here is going to be more liquidity tied up, but you might 
even find some regulators who would say there was a little too much liquidity sloshing 
around prior to the crisis’.823 
 
More generally, and in line with the post-crisis ideational consensus, regulators emphasized 
that counterparties should consider the liquidity cost as a stimulus to move their trades to 
CCPs where they would benefit from multilateral netting, which would bring down the cost. 
Speaking on behalf of WGMR, the governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, explained 
that ‘[w]e needed to provide the economic incentives between central clearing and bilateral 
trades’.824 Along similar lines, US deputy Treasury secretary Neal Wollin confirmed that 
financial incentives were necessary in order ‘to speed up the process of standardization’.825  
 
Regarding the scope of coverage, regulators in both the US and EU insisted that the new 
rules had to be applied consistently across all types of firms (with the exception of 
commercial end-users, a case discussed separately in chapter VII of the thesis). Regulators 
felt an encompassing mandate was required, if only to prevent regulatory evasion by the 
sell-side. Many of them also appeared unconvinced that ‘hedging’ was as riskless as the 
buy-side had claimed. Indeed, hedging requires perfectly aligned interest between both 
counterparties, which does not always apply in real-life situations, meaning that almost by 
definition, it introduces a speculative element into the larger picture. 
 
In addition, the regulators disputed the claims that asset managers, insurance firms, and 
pension funds were ‘safe’ entities that could be exempt from the rules. For example, the 
PRs observed that these firms ‘by the nature and scope of their financial activities present a 
higher level of risk of default and are integral to the financial system, and thus, pose greater 
risk to the safety and soundness of their […] counterparties and the stability of the financial 
system’.826 The PRs shared this interpretation,  insisting that the scope of the rules extend to 
these firms ‘[b]ecause financial counterparties are more likely to default during a period of 
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financial stress, they pose greater systemic risk […]’.827 The ESAs equally decided for the 
rules to apply to ‘all entities undertaking OTC derivatives transactions’.828 
 
The proposed and final rules often did not engage directly with the claims the buy-side firms 
had made in order to justify special treatments. However, the margin rules were not the 
only way through which regulators began targeting these firms. Indeed, the post-crisis 
period saw a major public effort of bringing these entities out of the ‘shadow’. The 
justification for these endeavours also served as an explanation for including these firms in 
the margin framework, even though the determination of the margin rules in some cases 
preceded the output of these broader discussions. 
 
Regulators justified their alertness vis-à-vis the buy-side’s use of derivatives on the grounds 
of the growing similarity between the activities of these firms and the tasks traditionally 
performed by banks, and the resulting rise of interconnectedness which could provoke 
uncontrollable chain reactions at times of individual and/or collective distress. Regarding 
insurance firms, Fed governor Tarullo noted that their liabilities were traditionally related to 
specific occasions, such as death or property destruction, meaning these firms were less 
susceptible to runs than banks. However, he observed that recent trends had created 
important vulnerabilities. For example, the closing of accounts had become easier than in 
the past, often not requiring the occurrence of any ‘special occasion’ anymore. Moreover, 
he pointed to insurance firms’ growing engagement in traditional banking activities, such as 
securities lending, repo,829 and OTC derivatives that ‘can create a balance sheet with much 
tighter connections to the rest of the financial system and greater liquidity risk in times of 
financial market distress’.830 AIG was considered the typical example of an insurance firm 
having embraced these trends. 
 
The US Office of Financial Research (OFR) (created by Dodd-Frank to support the equally 
newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) that was charged with 
identifying and responding to systemic risk831) identified further vulnerabilities. It observed 
that insurance firms ‘could pose systemic risk’, given their exposure to low interest rates 
and equity market volatility. It concluded that ‘[t]he impact of shocks through these 
channels could be substantial’.832 FSOC therefore designated the largest insurance firms 
including AIG, MetLife, and Prudential as SIFIs, imposing upon them enhanced capital and 
liquidity requirements, as well as the obligation to prepare plans for an orderly 
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dissolution. 833  The FSB shared similar concerns. In 2013, it collaborated with the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors to create a list of G-SIFI insurers ‘whose 
distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and interconnectedness, 
would cause significant disruption to the global financial system and economic activity’.834 
Similar to the US insurers identified by FSOC, these firms were subject to ‘recovery and 
resolution planning requirements; enhanced group-wide supervision; and higher loss 
absorbency requirements’.835 
 
Regarding pension funds, the Joint Forum noticed that the growing longevity of policy-
holders had often encouraged riskier business practices. For example, many pension funds 
had started using longevity swaps. These are derivative contracts through which pension 
funds transfer the risk of a policy-holder exceeding her statistical life expectancy to an 
insurer or a bank which in turn is compensated for taking on that risk in form of regular 
payments.836 The Joint Forum concluded that this market had not yet reached levels 
warranting ‘systemic concerns’, but that its ‘massive potential size and the growing interest 
from investment banks in mobilising this risk make it important to ensure that these 
markets are safe, both on a prudential and a systemic level’.837 The FSB, in turn, cited 
pension funds’ use of derivatives to hedge against longevity among other sources of risk as 
key factors contributing to leverage and financial interconnectedness.838  
 
With respect to asset managers, OFR identified a number of factors feeding into systemic 
risk including firms’ desire to reach for yield, herding behaviour encouraged by competitive 
pressures, the use of leverage, and the potential for large and sudden redemption by 
investors. 839  It identified close similarities between asset managers and banks: ‘For 
example, asset managers may create funds that can be close substitutes for the money-like 
liabilities created by banks; they engage in various forms of liquidity transformation, 
primarily, but not exclusively, through collective investment vehicles; and they provide 
liquidity to clients and to financial markets’.840 IOSCO issued similar warnings, committing 
itself to investigate asset managers’ ‘liquidity management, leverage, operational risks and 
securities lending’.841 The FSB highlighted similar factors ‘as potential structural sources of 
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vulnerability associated with asset management activities’. 842  Taken together, these 
considerations reinforced regulators’ determination to not grant any carve-outs. WGMR 
recommended imposing mandatory IM without any blanket exemptions.843 At the domestic 
level, the CFTC, the PRs, and the ESAs, each followed this course and equally did not provide 
any sector-based carve-out.844 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the dealer banks failed to exercise influence over the 
introduction of IM as a requirement, a policy to which they strongly objected. Initially, the 
industry had hoped that the IM idea would either not survive in Congress, or not be 
adopted in Europe, which would leave the US internationally isolated. As a consequence, 
American policy-makers would become vulnerable to the projection of structural power, 
allowing the industry to kill the idea by threatening to relocate the business overseas. 
 
Once it was clear that Europe was fully on board and that WGMR would be working on 
international standards, the industry led a fierce lobbying campaign against IM. It claimed 
that OTC derivatives had barely caused any damage during the crisis, that reliance on VM 
and capital requirements represented a sufficient risk-mitigation strategy, and that the 
overall macroeconomic cost of the IM mandate would be unjustifiably high. The industry 
benefited from high business unity as the buy-side equally opposed the IM mandate. 
Insurance firms, pension funds, and investment firms insisted their use of bilateral 
derivatives was completely safe and that the compulsory use of IM would impose additional 
costs on their clients. 
 
The regulators, however, refuted the validity of each of these claims. As a result, the 
industry found itself pushed to the sidelines of the transnational policy community that 
turned into a tight-knit transgovernmental community of regulators defending the IM 
mandate. Policy-makers were also united by their strong embrace of the margining 
consensus, as well as the high public issue salience of derivatives regulation, which 
engraved the need for IM within their institutional identity. Policy-makers’ broad agreement 
on the IM mandate, once WGMR was established, meant that transatlantic power relations 
probably did not play any major explicit role. 
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Overall, the banks lost the IM battle because the large-scale consequences of the crisis and 
the huge public outcry it caused catapulted public issue salience to a record high. This in 
turn boosted the adoption of a new ideational consensus which was shared at the domestic 
institutional level and led to a re-organization of the transnational policy community where 
the dealer banks were pushed to the margin. With the ideational consensus shared by both 
the US and the EU, there was no need for policy-makers to invoke inter-state power. High 
levels of business unity were insufficient to turn the tide. 
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CHAPTER VI - The design of the IM mandate: The two-
way mandate, mandatory segregation, and the 
prohibition of rehypothecation 
 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter analyzes the design of the IM mandate, focusing on three key requirements: 
that the banks need to collect and post IM, that collateral needs to be segregated from 
proprietary assets, and that it must not be re-invested by the transferee for her own 
purpose. The chapter argues that the banks lost all three battles. 
 
Section 2 discusses the introduction of 2-way IM. The public issue salience of 1-vs 2-way IM 
itself was comparatively low, both in the US, and the EU. The main conundrum was whether 
the banks should not only collect IM, but also post it to their clients. Section 2.1 shows that 
the dealer banks vehemently opposed the idea of having to post themselves to their 
customers. The information they submitted to policy-makers centred on the claim that two-
way IM was highly costly and uneconomical. However, unlike in the ‘mandatory use of IM’ 
case, the banks did not enjoy the full support of the buy-side which was split on the idea. 
Depending on whether buy-side firms believed that the additional cost of receiving 
collateral from the banks (which would of course be priced into the deal) was worth the 
additional protection against counterparty risk or not, they supported or rejected the idea. 
 
Section 2.2 reveals that the question of whether IM should be posted 1- or 2-way initially 
also split the transgovernmental community which disagreed over how the ideational 
consensus and its macroprudential component should be interpreted. The conflict 
originated in the US. It centred on the regulatory treatment of transactions with the 
dealers’ clients, given that trades between the banks themselves were already covered by 
the post-only mandate. Dodd-Frank delegated the question to the regulators. Its resolution 
pitched the CFTC against the PRs, meaning there were frictions at the domestic institutional 
level. While both (sets) of agencies agreed that IM was a must, the way in which to apply it 
set them apart. At the root of the conflict was the decentralized nature of the US regulatory 
landscape. Each side drew on their respective institutional mandate to offer a different 
explanation of how IM was supposed to reduce systemic risk. As a market regulator, the 
CFTC favoured a 2-way arrangement protecting both counterparties, whereas the PRs, as 
prudential regulators, decided to focus primarily on the health of the individual banks, and 
thus one side of the transaction only. Unlike the CFTC, they preferred a 1-way approach, 
arguing that it was unjustifiable to have assets flowing from the regulated banking sector to 
hedge funds, in particular, which were often domiciled in jurisdictions exercising light-touch 
regulation or no regulation at all. At first, the PRs prevailed, with the CFTC officially aligning 
its position, but the conflict kept brewing in the background. 
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In Europe, by contrast, there was comparatively little ideational or institutional friction. 
Both the ESAs and the EU Commission envisioned a 2-way approach, insisting that it was the 
only way in which the risk of the uncleared market could be addressed. 
 
At the transgovernmental level, the conflict was eventually resolved in favour of the EU 
(and the CFTC). What led to the PRs changing their mind was probably a combination of two 
factors. The first one might have been related to learning/socialization effects through their 
membership within the transgovernmental community. The second one might have been 
derived from the EU’s power through market size and power through regulatory capacity. 
The transgovernmental solution also brought the US domestic institutional environment 
and ideational outlook in alignment for a 2-way mandate. Both jurisdictions subsequently 
adopted the 2-way mandate. 
 
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the moderator constellation of the 2-way IM case in the US and 
the EU. A super imposition of two shapes means the moderator changed its effect over the 
course of the policy-making process, with the thicker line reflecting the final effect. 
 
The banks on both sides of the Atlantic did not like the idea of IM, but if there had to be IM, 
their preference was for it to be one-way, meaning they wanted to only collect it from their 
clients, rather than having to post IM to them themselves. They lost in both jurisdictions. 
 
In the US, the needle of the influence barometer swung from ‘congruence’ to ‘loss’ over the 
course of the policy-making process. Figure 12 reflects this in form of the crossed-out light-
shaded double-wave symbol, with the double-wave itself representing congruence. Initially, 
there was conflict about the contours of the ideational consensus. The CFTC and the PRs 
disagreed about whether there should be 1-way or 2-way IM, given regulatory 
fragmentation and differing mandates. At first, the PRs prevailed with their preference for 
1-way IM, which turned the effect of the ideational and domestic institutional moderators 
to positive, as seen from the banks’ perspective. If the PRs had also prevailed at the 
transgovernmental level, this would have led to congruence for the dealers. 
 
However, the resolution of both the brewing conflict between the CFTC and the PRs, as well 
as the disagreement between the PRs and the ESAs in favour of 2-way IM, be it through 
socialization efforts and/or EU market power cum power through regulatory capacity, 
turned the sign of the domestic ideational consensus against the banks. At the domestic 
institutional level, it brought the CFTC and the PRs in alignment in favour of a 2-way 
exchange. The new agreement also meant that the transgovernmental and inter-state 
power moderators were now equally turned against the banks. In combination with low 
business unity, bank influence was constrained under this new equilibrium, and low levels 
of issue salience alone were insufficient to increase it. The overall result was a significant 
loss for the dealers. 
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In the EU, the constellation leading to a loss for the banks originated from the stable 
ideational consensus in favour of 2-way IM, which was not weakened by any challenges at 
the domestic institutional level. As a consequence, both the ideational outlook and the 
domestic institutional environment moderators were turned against the banks. With 
WGMR eventually in favour of a 2-way solution, probably because of EU power as market 
power and regulatory capacity and/or broader socialization efforts by like-minded policy-
makers, the transgovernmental and inter-state power moderators equally operated against 
the dealers. In addition, the banks also suffered from a lack of business unity. Again, in this 
environment, low issue salience alone was insufficient for them to exercise influence. 
 
Figure 12: The two-way IM case in the US 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 13: The two-way IM case in the EU 
 
Source: Author 
 
Section 3 discusses segregation. It begins with a background section providing further 
information on different forms of segregation. Section 3.2 reveals that once again there was 
a lack of business unity. The dealer banks preferred to keep the question of segregation 
outside the perimeter of formal regulation, insisting on total optionality. The preferences of 
the sell-side, however, were scattered, with some groups favouring optionality and others 
opposing any firm segregation requirement. There were also some supporters of relatively 
strict segregation requirements. Business unity was therefore low. 
 
At the legislative level, there was little debate about the contours of segregation, with 
Dodd-Frank granting counterparties the right to request segregation, and EMIR stating only 
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that some form of segregation had to take place. Public issue salience, therefore, was 
comparatively low again, with legislators delegating most of the detailed work on these 
issues to the regulators. Regulators fully embraced the ideational clearing/margining 
consensus, insisting that segregation had to apply and that it had to be informed by stricter 
rules than those governing the cleared marketplace. There were also no challenges from a 
domestic institutionalist point of view, with the CFTC and PRs both preferring tight rules. 
 
However, while the US regulators followed through with the adoption of third-party 
segregation with a custodian at the domestic level, the ESAs were forced to compromise, 
most likely because of domestic institutional constraints, including the lack of a EU-wide 
insolvency regime, as well as an insufficiently high number of custodian banks to cover each 
member state. The ESAs’ rules thus stipulated segregation, but left it to the counterparties 
to decide on the desired strength of the segregation arrangement. This outcome was closer 
to the dealer banks’ preferences than in the US, but it still represented a loss, as segregation 
cannot be negotiated away anymore under the new rules. 
 
WGMR, in principle, equally supported strong segregation, but in light of the EU 
institutional challenges, it appears to have adopted more flexible wording. Given the broad 
consensus in favour of segregation, the relevance of inter-state power relations faded away. 
 
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the constellation of the segregation case in the US and the EU. 
 
The banks requested total optionality in both the US and the EU, but lost in either case, 
even though the EU adopted a somewhat more flexible regime than the US. In the US, 
policy-makers’ ideational outlook called for the strictest form of segregation with a third-
party custodian. This ideational consensus was fully shared at the domestic institutional 
environment and also by WGMR at the transgovernmental level (even though it was stricter 
than the group’s minimum recommendations). This means that the ideational, domestic 
institutional, and transgovernmental moderators all operated against the banks. Again, low 
business unity further constrained the dealers, and low issue salience alone was insufficient 
to elevate their level of influence. Given transatlantic public agreement on the need for 
segregation, inter-state power relations appear not to have been at the forefront of this 
case. 
 
In the EU, the configuration looked very similar, i.e. the ideational outlook, domestic 
institutional environment, and transgovernmental moderators were oriented in favour of a 
strong segregation approach, and thus against the banks. However, the EU stopped short of 
adopting third-party segregation with a custodian, most likely because of domestic 
institutional challenges associated with the lack of a pan-European insolvency framework 
and the insufficient number of banks that could have served as custodians across individual 
member states. As a consequence, it opted for a less strict segregation solution, while still 
remaining within the remits of WGMR (to whose recommendation it had contributed). The 
banks were further constrained by a lack of business unity. As in the US, low levels of issue 
salience alone were insufficient for them to exercise effective, causal influence. 
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Figure 14: The segregation case in the US 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 15: The segregation case in the EU 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
Section 4 turns to rehypothecation. I first introduce the concept in section 4.1. Section 4.2 
reveals that the dealers also opposed a ban on rehypothecation, arguing it would cause a 
huge liquidity drain. As in the previous cases, business unity was low, with several buy-side 
actors engaging in counter-active lobbying. The buy-side’s preferences ranged from a 
prohibition of rehypothecation, to leaving the question to the counterparties, to support for 
the banks’ position. In a similar way to the segregation case, the key factor determining 
buy-side firms’ stance on the issue was their interpretation of the costs versus the benefits 
a rehypothecation ban would incur. 
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Section 4.3 discusses regulators’ decision to ignore the pleas of the banks and to largely 
prohibit rehypothecation. The question was not intensely debated at the parliamentary 
level, meaning public issue salience was comparatively low again. Regulators in both 
jurisdictions fully embraced the ideational clearing/margining consensus, insisting that 
without a rehypothecation ban, the protection derived from segregation would be 
meaningless. Again, there were no challenges from a domestic institutionalist point of view. 
As in the segregation case, the broad-based consensus of the transgovernmental 
community and its embrace of the ideational consensus meant that inter-state power 
relations did not feature prominently. At the domestic level, the cohesiveness of the 
institutional environment in both jurisdictions further constrained bank influence. 
 
Figure 16 illustrates the constellation of the US and the EU case. 
The factor constellation keeping dealer bank influence at bay was the same as in the 
segregation case, and it was equally strong and stable in both jurisdictions. The ideational 
consensus, which pointed against rehypothecation, was shared at the domestic institutional 
and transgovernmental levels, meaning all three moderators operated against the banks’ 
preferences. In addition, low levels of business unity equally mitigated against the banks. 
Again, low issue salience alone was insufficient to create an opening for the banks. The 
inter-state power dimension was probably not of any major relevance to this case, given 
policy-makers’ shared consensus on the required outcome. 
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Figure 16: The rehypothecation cases in the US and the EU 
 
Source: Author 
 
Across all cases, the dealers had to learn the hard way that they had lost their privileged 
role within the transnational policy community, which had morphed into a tight 
transgovernmental community with regulators not wavering in their support for regulation. 
The information the banks provided was noted, but had little impact on policy-makers’ 
choice. Exit threats by the banks were not a dominant feature of either case.  
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2. Two-way IM 
2.1 Dealer banks’ opposition to 2-way IM and the lack of consensus among the 
buy-side  
 
Realizing the extent of regulators’ determination, market actors somewhat stomached the 
idea that the banks had to collect collateral (in the sense of a one-way mandate). The focus 
of the debate now turned to the question of whether the dealers should also be obliged to 
post assets themselves (equivalent to a two-way mandate). The banks absolutely rejected 
the idea as a matter of principle. In fact, they appeared even more opposed to a 2-way 
mandate than to the introduction of IM as a binding regulatory principle. From the dealers’ 
point of view, IM only mattered in a highly unlikely once-in-a-lifetime ‘end-game situation’. 
A two-way mandate, they argued, would unnecessarily double the amounts of collateral 
stored away, which would drain the economy and incentivize the central clearing of 
unsuitable trades. 
 
ISDA considered the bilateral exchange of IM ‘extremely inefficient as it assumes that both 
parties to every contract must be protected against each other’s default simultaneously’.845 
Along similar lines, SIFMA claimed that ‘both parties cannot each simultaneously default 
while owing the other money’.846 More generally, ISDA observed that a 2-way exchange ‘is 
not an effective tool to accomplish the stated goals of the G20 leaders and BCBS/IOSCO’, 
given its ‘excessive cost to market liquidity and stability’.847 SIFMA equally predicted a 
binding 2-way regime would ‘have a potentially significant destabilizing impact on the 
financial system and the real economy’.848 It also warned that IM in general, and 2-way IM 
in particular ‘is not necessary to promote central clearing’.849 To the contrary, it would 
result in ‘uneconomic decision-making’ and might encourage counterparties to shift 
unsuitable trades to CCPs, which would raise, rather than decrease risk. The association also 
claimed that the analogy of 2-way IM applying in the centrally-cleared market was logically 
inconsistent, as the clearing house itself did not post any IM.850 The German Banking 
Industry Committee commented ‘we see no practical need to make collection/posting of IM 
mandatory’, citing ‘serious concerns because of liquidity burdens for counterparties’.851 The 
European Banking Federation advanced the same argument.852 Barclays rejected a 2-way 
regime on the grounds that it would be ‘overly burdensome and fail to strike the correct 
balance between financial stability versus market efficiency and economic expansion’.853 
Goldman Sachs warned that a posting requirement for the dealers would ‘lead[] to 
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additional risks for the posting firm, thereby arguably increasing the overall risk in the 
system’.854 Deutsche Bank advanced a similar argument.855 
 
The buy-side, by contrast, was split, with commenters’ positions ranging from support to 
outright rejection of a 2-way mandate, depending on whether the entity in question 
emphasized the benefits or the costs of receiving collateral from its banks. The benefits 
included perceived risk-reduction, while the costs resulted from the banks pricing the 
expense of posting collateral to their clients into the contracts. Several buy-side 
commenters felt that if IM could not be prevented, it should at least apply two-way, so as 
not to disproportionately disadvantage the banks’ customers.856 These buy-side actors 
argued that from a risk perspective, two-way margin was superior to a one-side application, 
given the mutual protection it allowed for. Second, they emphasized that it would level the 
playing field, particularly for small clients who would otherwise lack the leverage to 
negotiate a 2-way arrangement. Their third and fourth arguments maintained that a two-
way mandate would mirror the way VM was used in the market, and that it would prevent 
the dealers from using bilateral swaps to circumvent the requirement to post margin in the 
centrally cleared marketplace. 
 
First, adopting a risk-based perspective, CalSTRS declared that a one-way regime would 
leave bank clients unprotected from a dealer bank failure, which ‘will adversely affect the 
U.S. financial system’.857 ACLI argued that two-way margin ‘enhances the safety and 
soundness of [the client] […], thereby enhancing the stability of the financial system as a 
whole’. 858  MetLife recalled that the ‘[u]nchecked accumulation of exposures was a 
contributing factor to the financial crisis’.859 ICI pointed out that ‘[t]he collection of two-way 
margin helps to protect the individual counterparties to a swap transaction as well as the 
swaps and other derivatives markets more broadly’. It therefore considered a two-way 
mandate ‘the most effective risk reduction tool to protect against residual counterparty 
credit risk’ and ‘an essential component of […] reducing systemic risk’. 860  Fidelity 
emphasized that a one-way system would enable the dealer to trade derivatives without 
ensuring appropriate collateralization, ‘thereby presenting potentially significantly more risk 
to its counterparties’.861 In a similar way, asset manager Insight Investment shared its 
conviction that a 2-way regime would ‘ensure robust and prudent risk management’ on the 
part of the dealers.862 EFAMA insisted that a 2-way regime ‘avoids shifting the risk to the 
[client] only’.863 Building on these claims, PIMCO indicated that in many cases buy-side 
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entities were ‘more stable and secure’ than the banks, so that it would only be logical if the 
dealers were obliged to post margin as well.864 The American Benefits Council and other 
pension fund associations equally insisted that because of their superior risk management 
practices, ‘[p]ension plans pose significantly less counterparty risk to dealers than dealers 
do to pension plans’. A two-way mandate, they continued, would therefore be the only 
logical solution, unless pension plans were exempt from the rules to begin with.865  
 
A second argument raised by several buy-side actors centred on the claim that a 2-way 
regime would increase their influence in the collateralization negotiations with their banks. 
ACLI, for example, was worried that if the decision were left to the counterparties, only the 
largest clients would be able to secure a two-way arrangement with their banks. It warned 
that ‘[t]his result could require smaller market participants to accept uncollateralized 
exposure to their […] counterparties as a cost of mitigating business risks for which no 
cleared swap is available’.866 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company urged the regulators 
to avoid a scenario where clients would find themselves  ‘in an unbalanced position during 
negotiation of credit support arrangements’.867 To the American Benefits Council as well 
other pension fund associations it was essential that smaller counterparties would be able 
to conduct a ‘reciprocal’ relationship with their banks.868  
 
Third, several buy-side firms justified a 2-way mandate on the grounds that it would mirror 
the way in which VM was traditionally handled. ACLI, for example, argued the design of the 
IM mandate should mirror the ‘customary practice’ of maintaining two-way VM relations.869 
MetLife said ‘[t]he mutual posting requirement preserves the market practice typically 
observed’ with respect to VM.870 For CalSTRS, a one-way exchange would conflict with the 
‘quite common and very well accepted practice in the market that collateral arrangements 
in ISDA Master Agreements or other swap documentation apply bilaterally’.871 
 
Finally, several buy-side entities insisted that a two-way exchange forcing the banks to post, 
rather than just collect, would prevent them from using bilateral swaps to evade the margin 
payments they would be subject to in the centrally-cleared market. MetLife therefore 
recommended regulators avoid any ‘discrepancy’ between the treatment of centrally-
cleared and bilateral derivatives.872 Along similar lines, ICI insisted banks’ instincts in terms 
of the ‘avoidance of posting of initial margin’ had to be addressed by a two-way mandate.873 
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Fidelity warned of ‘a perverse incentive for [dealers] to increase uncleared trading activity’, 
in case the banks were relieved from the posting requirement.874 
 
However, not every buy-side firm subscribed to that logic. Several buy-siders remained 
attached to their outright rejection of IM, as discussed in chapter V-2. The Association of 
British Insurers, for instance, questioned whether a 2-way mandate was ‘appropriate’, given 
that it did not account for the unique characteristics which in the association’s view 
rendered insurance firms and pension funds particularly safe.875 BVI, representing the 
German investment fund and asset management industry, advanced similar arguments, 
topped with the observation that an exchange of collateral had in fact not been requested 
by the G20.876 Hedge fund association AIMA also vehemently opposed a 2-way mandate, 
claiming that receiving collateral from the bank would ‘not outweigh the costs’ of having 
this practice factored into the price of the trade.877 
 
Between these two extremes, there was a group of buy-side actors who adopted a middle-
ground position. AXA, for example, insisted that if IM were to be introduced, it should be 2-
way, but that insurance firms, given their perceived safety, should be compensated in the 
form of reduced capital requirements.878 There were also several associations whose 
members comprised both supporters and skeptics who could not decide on a common 
position. As a consequence, their submissions recommended leaving the decision to the 
counterparties themselves. SIFMA’s AMG, for example, cautioned that the risk of a dealer 
default ‘could cause ripple effects throughout the financial system’, but instead of 
supporting a two-way regime, the association proposed that regulators should allow bank 
clients ‘to elect whether to collect initial margin’.879 MFA’s members were also not united, 
with the association’s comments dancing around the issue. On the one hand, the 
submission acknowledged the need for rules that ‘appropriately reflect and address the 
risks to the financial system’. On the other, it warned that a 2-way mandate ‘could reduce 
liquidity and adversely impact market participants’ ability to properly hedge their 
portfolios’.880 The association of the French-based investment management industry, AFG, 
equally proposed that in light of the costs associated with a 2-way exchange, regulators 
‘should permit counterparties to choose not to exchange IM’.881 
 
 
2.2 A loss for the industry: Policy-makers embracing 2-way IM 
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The conflict regarding the need for 2-way IM was replicated within the regulatory 
community. While the US regulators had concurred on making IM compulsory for all types 
of entities, they fundamentally disagreed on the need for a two-way regime, given their 
differing institutional mandates. Frictions caused by regulatory fragmentation thus marked 
the US domestic institutional environment. The US regulators’ disagreement was eventually 
resolved within WGMR, when it became clear that Europe was moving full speed ahead 
with the two-way mandate. 
 
The conflict between the US regulators emerged because Dodd-Frank stipulated that the 
rules apply to ‘Swap Dealers [SDs] and Major Swap Participants [MSPs] that are banks’, and 
‘Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants that are not banks’,882 i.e. to the largest players 
in the market, but left it to the regulators to decide how the new requirements would 
precisely affect the counterparties of these entities. Indeed, the Act only stipulates that 
 
To offset the greater risk to the swap dealer or major swap participant and the 
financial system arising from the use of swaps that are not cleared, the [margin 
rules] shall 
(i) help ensure the safety and soundness of the swap dealer or major swap 
participant; and 
(ii)  be appropriate for the risk associated with the non-cleared swaps held as a 
swap dealer or major swap participant.883 
 
Both the PRs and the CFTC agreed that the large players should collect IM from their clients. 
However, there was disagreement as to whether the banks should also post to their 
customers in return for collecting collateral from them. The agreement on ‘collect’ meant 
that there was a de facto two-way mandate for the large players which both had to ‘collect’ 
from each other. This limited the discussion to whether the dealers should have to post to 
non-banks. The CFTC supported this requirement, while the PRs rejected it. 
 
Both the CFTC and PRs were determined to limit systemic risk, but their different 
institutional outlooks resulted in them focusing on the particular portion of systemic risk 
most relevant to the exercise of their respective mandates. The PRs traditionally focus on 
the health of the individual institution, although there has been a recent emphasis on the 
‘macroprudential’ dimension, particularly as far as the Fed is concerned. Indeed, the latest 
version of the Fed’s key publication on its ‘Purposes & Functions’ explains that it ‘promotes 
the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions and monitors their impact on 
                                                        
882
 See section 731 of Dodd-Frank. The precise definitions of those terms are complex (see CFTC (No Year.b) 
and Willkie Farr & Gallagher (2012)). For the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to recall that the SD category 
captures all of the large dealer banks. The threshold value for SD-registration is USD 8bn of annual notional 
exposure. The MSP category is based on a series of non-numerical considerations. It was designed to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage in terms of the large banks re-structuring themselves, such that they would not qualify as 
dealers anymore. 
883
 See 7 U.S. Code §6s - Registration and regulation of swap dealers and major swap participants. 
 153 
the financial system as a whole’.884 The FDIC’s mission is also institution-specific in terms of 
‘Insuring deposits’, ‘Examining and supervising financial institutions for safety and 
soundness and consumer protection’, ‘Making large and complex financial institutions 
resolvable’, and ‘Managing receiverships’.885 The same applies to the OCC which is expected 
‘[t]o ensure that national banks and federal savings associations operate in a safe and sound 
manner, […]’.886 
 
With their key focus directed to the safety and soundness of the individual institution, the 
PRs’ first proposal, published before the establishment of WGMR, suggested a one-way IM 
regime.887 The PRs believed their proposal was ‘consistent with the statutory requirement 
that these rules help ensure the safety and soundness of the covered swap entity and be 
appropriate for the risk to the financial system associated with non-cleared swaps […] held 
by covered swap entities’.888  For the PRs, a ‘covered swap entity’ (CSE) denotes a 
prudentially regulated entity engaging in uncleared trades, whereas for the CFTC, it signifies 
a SD or MSP for whom there is no prudential regulator.889 
 
The PRs’ rejection of a two-way mandate may have been informed by their focus on banks’ 
‘safety and soundness’, which they likely saw at risk if collateral were to flow to non-bank 
entities, in particular hedge funds, over which they had no jurisdiction. Indeed, in the US, 
hedge funds have to register with the SEC and CFTC, rather than the PRs, and some of them 
might be domiciled in the Cayman Islands or other lightly regulated, or even unregulated, 
tax havens. Already prior to the crisis, in 2006, Bernanke had voiced ‘concerns about 
counterparty risk management’890 in this particular sector, although at that time, he 
considered it primarily a case for enhanced transparency and market discipline, rather than 
public intervention. After 2008, the Fed and the OCC appeared to believe that 
macroprudential stability was best served by strengthening banking institutions, which, 
from their point of view, might have collided with collateral flowing out of their vaults to 
these entities over which they had little oversight. The FDIC, in turn, had never left any 
doubt that its ‘first duty as receiver, is to protect insured depositors and the insurance 
fund’.891 Having funds flowing out of the banks risked being equally at odds with this 
commitment.  
 
By contrast, the CFTC’s mandate ‘is to foster open, transparent, competitive, and financially 
sound markets. By working to avoid systemic risk, the Commission aims to protect market 
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users and their funds, consumers, and the public  […]’.892 Compared to the PRs, the CFTC 
places relatively greater emphasis on strengthening market-wide stability. This mission 
suggests a stronger preference for a two-way mandate, even more so given that the CFTC’s 
core focus has traditionally been the futures world centred around CCPs, where both of the 
original counterparties to a trade have to post VM and IM. Indeed, as the CFTC declared 
itself, ‘in designing the proposed margin rules for uncleared swaps, the Commission has 
built upon the sound practices for risk management employed by central counterparties for 
decades’.893 The agency was therefore rather unsatisfied with the PRs’ proposal. CFTC 
Commissioner Scott O’Malia publicly stated he was ‘struck by the fact that prudential 
regulators are hiding behind the safety and soundness language in the Act to draft rules that 
prohibit bank swap dealers from posting margin to their counterparties. To be clear, this is a 
one-way posting of margin’.894 He was concerned that the market would interpret this move 
as a sign ‘that regulated banks are too big to fail’, and that a one-way mandate 
‘institutionalizes purchasing and negotiating power on one side of the commercial 
transaction [i.e. on the banks’ side]’.895 
 
As a comment by CFTC chair Timothy Massad (Gensler’s successor) illustrates, the agency 
rejected the sell-side’s logic that it was unnecessary to protect against the highly unlikely 
scenario of both counterparties defaulting, insisting that it was unknown ex ante which one 
of them would fail. Indeed, in his words, ‘[s]ome will characterize this [i.e. a two-way 
mandate] as expensive insurance, as both parties must post initial margin as protection 
against potential future loss, even though in default, only one would actually recover 
against the margin. But we need only remember the costs of the crisis to our economy to 
recognize that this is, on the contrary, quite sensible’.896 The cooperation by the CFTC and 
the PRs appears to have been further complicated by the differing professional background 
of regulatory officials. While the PRs tend to be dominated by (financial) economists, CFTC 
recruits are often lawyers, meaning the authorities’ intellectual approach to regulation 
sometimes differs.  
 
However, in the end, the CFTC’s first proposal equally contained a one-way mandate.897 As 
the smallest regulator of the group, the CFTC appears to have conceded to the PRs, even 
more so given Dodd-Frank’s stipulation that the regulators coordinate their work and strive 
for maximum similarity between their rules. 898  In its first proposal, the CFTC thus 
emphasized that its ‘approach is consistent with what the prudential regulators are 
proposing in their margin rules’.899 At the same time, the agency did not miss the 
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opportunity to subtly clarify its true preference for a two-way mandate. First, the proposal’s 
opening pages emphasized that ‘[w]ell-designed margin systems protect both parties to a 
trade as well as the overall financial system’.900 Second, it explicitly asked interest groups 
whether ‘requiring a CSE to post initial margin to non-SD/MSP counterparties [would] 
reduce systemic risk (e.g., by reducing leverage in the financial system or reducing systemic 
vulnerability to the failure of a covered swap entity)’.901  
 
With the European Commission being a member of WGMR,902 it soon became clear that 
Europe favoured a two-way mandate, and that unlike Dodd-Frank, EMIR would be much 
more detailed, providing a long list of clearly specified ‘financial counterparties’. In a 
discussion paper published prior to the adoption of the final version of EMIR, the ESAs 
emphasized that a 2-way arrangement would result in uncleared derivatives being cheaper 
to trade bilaterally than through CCPs. It cautioned that this ‘could act as a disincentive to 
migrate towards central clearing and therefore could be viewed to be contrary to the 
objectives of the Regulation’. The paper also warned of adverse incentives for banks ‘to 
arbitrage the requirements’.903 
 
Unlike in the US, the EU domestic institutional environment did not show any open cracks. 
Article 11(3) of the final version of EMIR subsequently codified the 2-way approach. The 
definition of ‘financial counterparty’ as detailed in Article 2(8) comprised investment firms, 
credit institutions, insurance/assurance/reinsurance undertakings, UCITS funds, institutions 
for occupational retirement provision, and alternative investment funds. The EU authorities 
appeared to believe that IM could best deliver its full potential if both counterparties had to 
post collateral, in a similar way to CCPs, where the two original parties to a trade equally 
have to post IM to the clearing house 
 
To the PRs, this came as a shock. With the EU initially far behind the US in the development 
of the margin rules, they had begun the international discussions in the firm conviction that 
as first-movers they would be able to provide the blueprint for the international framework, 
in line with Geithner’s expectation of the US as the leading jurisdiction which would ‘bring 
the world with [it].904 In the 2-way IM case, however, the EU brought the PRs with it. 
Indeed, the disagreement was eventually solved in favour of the EU (and the CFTC). There 
seem to have been two vectors of conflict resolution. The first one might have been related 
to the PRs’ membership within the epistemic community formed by WGMR. The PRs appear 
to have begun reconsidering their position as a result of the arguments advanced by the 
supporters of a 2-way approach. Indeed, these arguments seem to have contributed 
towards invalidating the PRs’ concerns about the hedge fund industry, by highlighting that 
the crisis had not in fact originated within this particular sector, but rather inside the US 
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banking sector itself. From this perspective, a 2-way exchange of collateral was considered 
to constrain bank leverage and therefore also to promote the stability of the banks 
themselves. The PRs seem to have eventually subscribed to this logic, following a series of 
exchange and discussion of the issue. This points to the importance of WGMR as a focal 
point displaying the key characteristics of an epistemic community, bound together by 
shared experiences, learning, and socialization. Being part of this community most likely 
helped to overcome differences rooted in diverging institutional legacies. This 
interpretation would also confirm the consensus-fostering and legitimacy-enhancing 
attributes Newman and Posner have associated with ‘[s]oft law proposals [which] by 
providing new policy ideas, force the engagement of competing regulatory factions’.905 
 
On the other hand, the PRs might have also responded to the EU’s resolution to stay its 
course, and its power to do so. With EMIR and the ESAs’ rules going to apply directly at the 
member state level, given the EU’s enhanced institutional consolidation following the crisis, 
the EU enjoyed power as regulatory influence. Moreover, it hosted the world’s largest 
uncleared market located in the City of London, i.e. in addition to power as regulatory 
influence, it also had power through market size. Table 3 below provides some quantitative 
illustration of domestic market size for the IR and FX markets for which the best data is 
available. 
 
Table 3: Breakdown of global market share of IR and FX derivatives 
 
 
In the end, the PRs gave up their resistance to a two-way mandate and WGMR equally 
recommended this solution in both its consultation papers, as well as its final framework. 
Specifically, regulators decided to have counterparties exchange gross IM, i.e. the amounts 
due could not be netted down.906 Back in the US, the PRs justified their U-turn as a 
‘refinement’ of their original approach, developed in light of the ‘2013 international 
framework’.907  Their second proposal argued that ‘[w]hile the Agencies believe that 
imposing requirements with respect to the minimum amount of initial and variation margin 
to be collected is a critical aspect of offsetting the greater risk to the covered swap entity 
and the financial system arising from the covered swap entity’s non-cleared swap exposure, 
the Agencies also believe that requiring a covered swap entity to post margin to other 
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financial entities could forestall a build-up of potentially destabilizing exposures in the 
financial system’.908 Both the PRs’ second proposal and final rule contained the two-way 
mandate.909 The CFTC also officially shifted to a two-way regime.910 In Europe, the ESAs 
never left any doubt they would impose a two-way mandate. The final draft RTS clearly 
stipulated that in order ‘to prevent the build-up of uncollateralised exposures within the 
system’, counterparties ‘will also be required to exchange two-way initial margin to cover 
the potential future exposure resulting from a counterparty default’.911  
 
The outcome in both jurisdictions ran counter the dealers’ preferences, indicating that they 
lost the battle. Over the course of the debate, regulators selectively referenced the 
information they had received from commenters on the issue in order to support their own 
position, but the comment letters themselves do not appear to have changed the tide. 
 
 
3. Segregation 
 
3.1 Background: Different forms of segregation 
 
The idea of segregation is to separate the margin counterparties receive from their trading 
partner from their own assets, so as to ensure the trading partners’ collateral is not lost in 
case they were to default. Segregation is particularly relevant for IM which acts as a 
performance bond, whereas VM represents collateral owed as a result of mark-to-market 
changes. Prior to 2008, segregation was only rarely applied.912 An exception pertained to 
investment funds subject to the SEC’s Investment Company Act of 1940 that prescribes 
strict segregation rules regarding the management of customer funds.913 In Europe, UCITS 
are also subject to certain safekeeping duties.914 The banks, as a general rule, did not 
segregate the collateral they received, since keeping it on their own books allowed them to 
earn additional income, for example through interest rate payments. Sometimes, the clients 
would be compensated for this through specific provisions in the CSA. As a downside, 
however, they were exposed to the risk of losses at times of default. The Lehman debacle 
clearly illustrated this risk, when clients found out their collateral (if they had posted assets 
in the first place) had evaporated, or had become entangled with the banks’ own assets, 
thus requiring a lengthy and expensive ‘unscrambling’ exercise. The result of this exercise 
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was unknown ex ante and often turned out disappointing ex post. After the crisis, 
segregation therefore ranked high on the agenda, particularly once regulators had decided 
on a gross 2-way exchange of IM without any netting. 
 
Segregation can take several forms, with each arrangement representing a different cost-
benefit profile.915 Under omnibus segregation, the receiving counterparty parks all assets it 
receives as IM collectively in one account that does not hold any of its proprietary assets. 
This means that IM is not commingled with its own assets, but is also not stored separately 
for each client, meaning all assets in the account can potentially be drawn upon to respond 
to the financial obligations of a particular client. This approach is cost-efficient, as only one 
account is needed. However, for the posting counterparty, it entails the risk of losses arising 
from the default of other counterparties that its trading partner does business with. 
Individual segregation addresses this limitation of omnibus segregation by specifying a 
separate account for each of the banks’ counterparties. Of course, the more elaborate 
account structure and the additional protection associated with individual segregation 
increase operational cost. A compromise between omnibus and individual segregation is the 
LSOC (legally segregated, operationally commingled) protection scheme in which all pledged 
collateral can be held in one account, but must be clearly attributed to the original pledger 
in the pledgee’s books and records. However, even individual segregation and LSOC do not 
entirely exclude any potential misuse of the funds by the pledgee, or problems of 
recuperating assets in case the receiving counterparty fails. Third-party segregation can 
provide a solution to this problem. This arrangement involves parking the collateral with a 
neutral agent who is distinct from both the posting and receiving counterparty. Within 
third-party segregation, a variety of different arrangements are possible. However, 
regardless of its precise design, this structure has its price, which further increases the cost 
of the deal. Third-party segregation is often provided by special banks known as custodial 
banks that also offer similar services for other kinds of financial transactions. The custodial 
business is very concentrated, given the need of scale to ensure profitability. Among the 
largest custodian banks are State Street, BNY Mellon, JP Morgan, and Northern Trust. Note 
that some of these banks, most importantly JP Morgan, also act as dealer banks themselves. 
While third-party segregation can, in principle, also be pursued through entities other than 
custodian banks, this thesis refers to the two approaches interchangeably. 
 
 
3.2 Dealer banks’ opposition to firm segregation requirements and the lack of 
consensus among the buy-side 
 
Once again, the industry opposed the imposition of any strict segregation requirements, 
arguing that the regulators should not interfere with counterparties’ choices. The only 
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exception was the custodian banks that favoured a regulatory solution through which their 
business model would become part of a compulsory requirement. 
 
ISDA rejected public intervention, clarifying that ‘the margin rules should permit […] flexible 
segregation arrangements, so long as they sufficiently mitigate counterparty risk’. It also 
believed that counterparties were able to judge the suitability of those arrangements 
themselves.916 SIMFA emphasized that regulators should not place unnecessary ‘limitations 
on the scope of permissible segregation arrangements’.917 It also warned against any 
segregation approach that would ‘give rise to punitive costs’.918 Along similar lines, the 
Financial Services Roundtable stated that policy-makers should not restrain counterparties 
in ‘whether and where’ to segregate posted assets.919 Equally advocating optionality, the 
Association of Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) recommended regulators should not 
interfere with segregation beyond ensuring the availability of the ‘relevant operation 
processes and procedures to enable this [i.e. segregation] to take place’, if so desired by the 
counterparties.920 The German Banking Industry Committee and the European Banking 
Federation voiced similar opinions, recommending that clients should be allowed to take 
the decision themselves, ‘depending on their specific needs and risk profile’.921 The French 
Banking Federation, in turn, insisted that the segregation requirements needed to be 
‘feasible’.922 Deutsche Bank alerted the regulators to the perceived risks of pressing 
counterparties into a tight corset of segregation rules, which ‘may lead to segregation 
taking place against the interests of the client (for example where operational costs 
outweigh the benefits’.923 In a joint submission, ISDA and SIFMA equally pointed to the costs 
of mandatory segregation which ‘would be burdensome’.924 The dealers were particularly 
opposed to third-party segregation, given the cost of maintaining third-party accounts and 
their perception that custodian banks lacked the sophistication to handle high volumes of 
segregated assets. Along those lines, ISDA, for instance, warned that ‘because there are 
limited numbers of large custodians, requiring use of non-affiliates may cause issues with 
total custodial capacity’. 925  UBS, in turn, informed policy-makers that third-party 
segregation would disproportionately concentrate risk within a few entities acting as 
custodians.926  
 
The custodian banks themselves did not see any reason why third-party segregation should 
not become the gold standard, and considered themselves perfectly capable of managing 
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increased volumes of assets. The submission by State Street, BNY Mellon, and Northern 
Trust identified third-party segregation as an ideal approach to protecting client assets, 
because it ‘provides high levels of protection for each counterparty to a swap’.927 They also 
claimed that this approach was ‘consistent with existing banking practices’,928 with State 
Street emphasizing in a separate letter that requiring third-party segregation with an 
independent custodian would mean responding to a market-led trend in terms of this 
arrangement being ‘increasingly requested by parties posting collateral, even in the absence 
of a regulatory mandate’.929 Precise data on this trend is difficult to identify. 
 
The buy-side’s preferences were scattered across the entire spectrum of options. A close 
analysis of their written submissions suggests that most associations favoured optionality, 
probably as a result of their members’ inability to reach consensus on a common position. 
Some firms appeared to believe segregation was too expensive to pursue. By contrast, 
others may have thought they brought enough business to the table in order to exercise 
leverage over the banks and make them pay at least part of the additional cost of 
segregation. Others again seemed to believe segregation did not provide any tangible 
benefits in terms of enhanced risk protection and could therefore be left aside. 
 
MFA’s members, for instance, welcomed the additional protection granted by segregation, 
but appeared to lack consensus on which precise arrangement should be required, most 
likely because of the differing cost profiles related to the individual forms of segregation. 
The association therefore called upon the regulators to ‘provide optionality for CSE 
customers’.930 AIMA’s views on the issue appeared to evolve. One submission advocated 
letting counterparties decide ‘where and how assets are held’.931 Another one contained a 
plea ‘to segregate funds and collateral posted as initial margin with an independent third 
party custodian’.932 A third one suggested letting the posting party decide on whether it 
preferred segregation at the level of the trading partner or through a custodian.933 EFAMA’s 
members may have equally shared divergent preferences. The association’s submission 
kept dancing around the issue, without providing any clear recommendation to the 
regulators. The comment letter concluded that ‘EFAMA members believe that whatever the 
solution is, there will always remain a risk’.934 EIOPA’s Occupational Pensions Stakeholder 
Group and Insurance and Reinsurance Stakeholder Group, asset manager Insight 
Investment, and IMA (representing the UK’s Investment Management Industry) also insisted 
on giving carte blanche to banks’ clients.935 
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Other associations narrowed down their members’ preferences more specifically. The 
Federation of Dutch Pension Funds for example, asked regulators to let their members 
choose between segregation at the level of the counterparty or with a third-party 
custodian.936 The Association of British Insurers, in turn, advocated a choice between 
individual and omnibus segregation.937 To some groups, such as ACLI, MetLife, and SIFMA’s 
Asset Management Group, optionality was equally of paramount importance. These groups 
also insisted on regulators explicitly protecting clients’ right to ask for third-party 
segregation. This request was motivated by the desire to ensure that, if a member favoured 
a segregation arrangement, it would not find itself in a situation where its pledged funds 
were ‘used simply as a source of liquidity for the CSEs’.938 
 
A number of groups advocated a more specific regulatory outcome. Indeed, several 
commenters strongly embraced third party segregation. For ICI, for instance, using a 
custodian was key to the ‘Safeguarding of Two-Way Margin Collateral’.939 Pension fund 
manager Cardano, the European Federation for Retirement Provision, the French Asset 
Management Association (AFG), asset manager BlackRock, and insurance firm AXA 
advanced very similar arguments.940 PIMCO equally advocated third-party segregation, 
asking the regulators to develop specific provisions ‘to ensure that a covered swap entity 
does not unduly delay the establishment of tri-party custodial agreements’.941 Insurance 
Europe, too, supported the compulsory use of an independent custodian. However, it was 
concerned about the additional cost this form of protection would incur, and therefore 
requested additional regulatory intervention in order to ‘ensure that these charges are not 
so excessive that the cost of this protection becomes prohibitive’.942 
 
On the other hand, there were also groups which rejected any regulatory intervention on 
the issue. The German Investment Association (BVI), for instance, warned that granting the 
right to have IM segregated could risk operationally overwhelming the receiving 
counterparty. It ‘could create operational shortcomings and could lead to the situation that 
the collecting counterparty is not capable to handle the numerous individual accounts for 
investment funds’.943  
 
3.3 A loss for the industry: Policy-makers embracing (third-party) segregation 
 
Policy-makers were not impressed with the information the dealers submitted in favour of 
letting counterparties decide for themselves on the level of protection they desired. Indeed, 
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they appeared to believe that the crisis had shown the result of leaving the choice to 
counterparties. Given the complexity of the issue, segregation was not much discussed at 
the parliamentary level, particularly in the US. Section 724 of Dodd-Frank stipulated that ‘[a] 
swap dealer or major swap participant shall be required to notify the counterparty of the 
swap dealer or major swap participant at the beginning of a swap transaction that the 
counterparty has the right to require segregation of the funds or other property supplied to 
margin, guarantee, or secure the obligations of the counterparty’. Article 11(3) of EMIR 
went a step further by imposing the principle of segregation in terms of specifying that 
‘counterparties shall have risk-management procedures that require the timely, accurate 
and appropriately segregated exchange of collateral’ (emphasis added). Both jurisdictions, 
however, left the definition of the precise contours of the segregation rules to the 
regulators.  
 
In the US, both the CFTC and the PRs embraced compulsory third-party segregation and 
made it a regulatory requirement. The disagreement about one- vs. two-way margin did not 
extend to this part of the rule-making process, meaning the domestic institutional 
environment was comparatively free of frictions. Regardless of whether margin was to be 
collected only, or collected and posted, regulators agreed that it had to be safeguarded. The 
rules stipulate that the custodian must not be affiliated with any of the counterparties (i.e. a 
dealer such as JP Morgan cannot rely on its own custodian division to hold client assets). In 
addition, the custodian must be part of the same insolvency regime as the CSE, such as to 
guarantee and speed up the release of assets, when deemed necessary.944 There seemed to 
be strong consensus among the US regulators that margin had to be available when 
needed, which they believed could be best ensured if it was stored outside the entity 
potentially facing difficulty. 945  Another reason justifying the viability of third-party 
segregation appears to have been the fact that no custodian bank had ever failed, although 
it was clear that the rise in volume of assets might lead to a concentration of risk. 
 
The US collateral segregation rules for uncleared derivatives were also stricter than those 
for cleared ones, thus accounting for the perceived higher level of risk regulators associated 
with bilateral trades, and providing an incentive for market actors to transition to CCPs. 
Indeed, CCPs’ segregation requirements are limited to LSOC, which represents a less 
burdensome arrangement.946 While some regulators might have preferred a stricter CCP 
segregation requirement, the US bankruptcy law made this difficult to achieve, given a 
provision stipulating the ‘loss-sharing among customers of a [clearing member], meaning all 
client assets have to be pooled, including those held in individual segregated accounts’.947 
 
In the EU, the regulatory decision-making process was more complicated. The ESAs’ rules 
specify that  
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Collateral collected as initial margin shall be segregated in either or both of the 
following ways: 
(a) on the books and records of a third party holder or custodian; 
(b) via other legally binding arrangements; 
so that the initial margin is protected from the default or insolvency of the 
collecting counterparty. 
 
Collateral collected as initial margin shall meet all the following requirements: 
(a) where collateral is a proprietary asset of the collecting counterparty, it shall be 
segregated from the other proprietary assets of the collecting counterparty; 
(b) where collateral is not proprietary asset of the collecting counterparty, it shall 
be segregated from the proprietary assets of the posting counterparty; 
(c) it shall be segregated from the proprietary assets of the third-party holder or 
custodian.948 
 
The ESAs’s rules thus stipulate that segregation needs to take place (meaning 
counterparties cannot negotiate it away), but there is some optionality regarding the 
precise contours of the arrangement. In addition, cash needs to be deposited with an 
independent third party holder or a custodian bank (neither of which must be part of either 
counterparty’s organization), or with a central bank.949 This special provision is related to 
the fact that cash cannot be properly segregated. Indeed, if held on the balance sheet of the 
transferee, it represents a liability, but cannot be easily separated from her own (or other 
counterparties’) assets, which is problematic at times of default.  
 
There is little publicly available material explaining the ESA’s precise decision-making 
rationale. At least some officials might in theory have preferred a stricter segregation 
approach. However, there appear to have been two factors that may have caused the 
authorities to settle for a more flexible solution. The first one relates to the fact that the EU 
counts as one jurisdiction with respect to the margin rules, but not with regard to 
insolvency proceedings which remain anchored at the national level. This means that while 
the EU’s institutional consolidation allows counterparties to engage in uncleared derivative 
trades across member-state borders under one common set of rules, market actors will find 
themselves confronted to distinct national regimes in case of a default. 
 
In 2016, AFME, in a different regulatory context, compiled a list of some of the key ‘areas in 
which European national insolvency laws and practices vary, both substantively and 
procedurally, and in which stakeholders can expect varying results depending on the 
applicable jurisdiction: 
• the opening of insolvency proceedings; 
• applicable insolvency triggers/tests; 
• the interpretation and application of insolvency rules and regulations; 
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• the length of and process for a general stay of creditor rights; 
• management of insolvency proceedings; 
• ranking of creditors; 
• the role and level of participation of creditors in insolvency proceedings; 
• filing and verification of claims; 
• responsibility for proposing and approving reorganisation plans; 
• annulment of transactions entered into prior to insolvency proceedings; 
• liability of directors, shareholders and management; and 
• the availability of post-petition financing (i.e. financing provided to an enterprise 
operating under court-supervised protection after it has already entered into insolvency or 
similar proceedings)’.950 
 
A report by the EU Parliament published several years earlier had derived similar 
conclusions.951 In 2000, the EU passed a regulation on insolvency proceedings, with updates 
added in 2015. More recently, it also adopted a Recommendation, but the currently existing 
pan-European framework is limited to procedural matters, such as assisting firms in 
identifying the regime applying to their particular case.952 As a consequence, at least some 
regulators appear to have been concerned that third-party segregation might, in fact, 
provide little additional protection in a worst-case scenario involving counterparties located 
in different member states. The legal situation in the EU is very complex, and further 
examination is needed in order to derive a full picture of the situation.  
 
One might ask why, in light of this challenge, the regulators did not impose third-party 
segregation for trades conducted by counterparties located in the same member state. This 
leads us to the second potential institutional challenge. Several of the EU’s 28 member 
states, particularly the smaller ones, lacked a sufficiently high number of banks that could 
serve as independent custodians. In light of the insolvency regime challenge, the custodian 
would ideally be domiciled within the same jurisdiction as the two counterparties to the 
trade. While the CFTC and PRs could afford this requirement, given the depth of the US 
financial market and the availability of a federal insolvency regime applying across all 
member states, the ESAs’ hands were tied. It appears likely that the presence of these two 
domestic institutional challenges may have caused the ESAs to adopt a more relaxed 
approach. They mandated segregation, but on the basis of a broad range of acceptable 
arrangements, allowing customers to opt for a higher degree of protection, if they so 
desired. It could also be that for similar reasons, the segregation rules for bilateral deals are 
not significantly stronger than those for cleared trades. Indeed, the segregation rules for 
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CCPs require the client to be given a choice between omnibus and individual segregation, 
rather than imposing third-party segregation.953 
 
WGMR’s discussion on segregation was probably much less heated than the debate on 2-
way IM. Regulators broadly shared the conviction that strong segregation requirements 
were indispensable, but that domestic institutional challenges could not be easily 
overcome. BCBS-IOSCO therefore limited itself to recommending that ‘collected collateral 
must be segregated from the initial margin collector’s proprietary assets’ and that clients 
had to be given the right to ask for individual segregation. In addition, the final framework 
called upon jurisdictions to ensure their specific rules were compatible with their respective 
legal frameworks, in order ‘to ensure that collateral can be sufficiently protected in the 
event of bankruptcy’.954 
 
 
4. Rehypothecation 
 
4.1 Background: The concept of rehypothecation 
 
Prior to the crisis, the rehypothecation of customer assets by dealer banks was widespread, 
to the point of being considered a ‘practice [that] oils the wheels of finance’.955 At the same 
time, the concept was often not well understood, even among frequent users of derivatives, 
some of whom then experienced a rude awakening during the crisis.956 Rehypothecation 
entails the ‘onward pledging’ of collateral by a derivatives counterparty, usually the dealer, 
to a third party vis-à-vis whom it has another financial obligation. In practice, 
rehypothecation often moves beyond the mere re-pledging of assets, resulting in the re-use 
of said assets. Re-use involves the full transfer of ownership rights, as exemplified by a re-
sale of the collateral posted by the client.957 The transferor is usually compensated for 
agreeing to rehypothecation, for example through lower fees. This thesis employs the term 
‘rehypothecation’ to capture all the different facets of collateral re-cycling, thus applying a 
‘loose’ definition.958 
 
ISDA estimates that pre-crisis, the dealer banks used to rehypothecate around 70% of the 
collateral they received.959 Back then, IMF research suggests, the average length of the 
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rehypothecation ‘chain’ was roughly three links, i.e. the collateral provided by a given 
counterparty was re-cycled three times. After 2008, the chain length dropped to around 2.4 
links, one key reason being increased investor awareness.960 
 
The problems that can arise from rehypothecation are particularly intense with regard to 
IM. VM is exchanged frequently in function of mark-to-market changes, and therefore 
requires collateral to be easily available, which tends to discourage rehypothecation. By 
contrast, IM is only posted once at the inception of the transaction to serve as a buffer at 
times of counterparty default. This provides dealers with an incentive to recycle it, even 
more so given the long maturities of many uncleared deals. Once the 2008 crisis erupted, 
many investors learned this the hard way (particularly in the case of Lehman) when they 
realized that an important fraction of their assets was not available anymore.961  
 
4.2 Dealer banks’ opposition to a rehypothecation ban and the lack of 
consensus on the buy-side 
 
Already infuriated about the two-way mandate in form of the exchange of gross IM and the 
segregation requirement, the banks completely rejected any public intervention regarding 
rehypothecation. ING Bank, for example, declared rehypothecation was ‘at the heart of the 
banking business model’962 and an anonymous dealer banker told the press it ‘would be 
ludicrous if we didn't have the ability to rehypothecate’.963 Another bank official furiously 
commented that ‘[w]e might as well just shut down the US financial system and go 
home’.964 DACSI (the Dutch Advisory Committee Securities Industry), the peak business 
association of the Dutch derivatives and securities industry, insisted rehypothecation had to 
remain legal. Any other solution ‘would be an impediment for parties in the chain (forcing 
them to make money “dead”), and would be incompatible with the conventional approach 
of the banking industry’.965 
 
The dealers’ main argument in favour of maintaining rehypothecation related to the 
liquidity drain any form of restriction would incur. ISDA warned that limiting 
rehypothecation would be ‘likely to lead to an extensive liquidity and collateral shock with 
unintended consequences for the global economy. […] The combined effect would be 
analogous to a “quantitative tightening” but one of gargantuan proportions’.966 UBS, the 
European Association of Public Banks, and the French Banking Federation predicted higher 
prices for customers and liquidity shortages.967 Credit Suisse believed the banks had the 
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risks related to rehypothecation fully under control, arguing that restricting 
rehypothecation would ‘arbitrarily restrict liquidity when the risk of rehypothecation can be 
fully addressed’.968 Spanish bank BBVA defended rehypothecation as purely beneficial from 
the clients’ point of view, given that it ‘tries to obtain the best profitability for them’.969 
Summing up the industry’s position, the German Banking Industry Committee maintained 
‘there cannot be any restrictions’.970 
 
The buy-side was less united, given firms’ differing interpretations of the costs and benefits 
a prohibition of rehypothecation would incur. A ban would increase the cost of the deal, 
given enhanced collateral protection, while allowing for asset re-use would lower the cost. 
Several firms favoured an outright prohibition, or at least strict limits to rehypothecation. 
Vanguard, for instance, wrote it ‘strongly prefers the overall prohibition on [sic] the 
rehypothecation of initial margin’ as allowing it would be ‘contrary to the intention of 
margin’.971 The American Benefits Council and other pension fund associations pointed out 
that a prohibition would not only mitigate systemic risk and enhance investor protection, it 
would also assist ‘regulators in overseeing the liquidation of a dealer because collateral can 
be identified faster and with greater certainty in a dealer bankruptcy’.972 The Federation of 
Dutch Pension Funds considered rehypothecation ‘inappropriate’, emphasizing that ‘IM 
functions as a buffer and must be available when a counterparty defaults’.973 ICI also made 
it very clear it favoured a regulatory outcome under which IM ‘may not be rehypothecated, 
repledged, reused or otherwise transferred’.974 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, i.e. in close proximity to the banks, were several buy-side 
entities that emphasized the OTC markets’ dependence on rehypothecation. Submitting 
identical comments, Insurance Europe and the Association of British Insurers indicated that 
restricting rehypothecation ‘could leave the market effectively grid-locked’975 by making 
insurance contracts more expensive and therefore less profitable. AXA and Natixis Asset 
Management insisted that rehypothecation was indispensable for maintaining the market’s 
liquidity.976 Insight Investment warned that restraining rehyothecation would risk rendering 
the OTC market ‘unviable’.977 
 
The majority of commenters, however, positioned themselves between those two 
extremes, recommending leaving the decision to the counterparties themselves. Several 
associations once again had to accommodate a split membership.978 This also applied to 
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some larger funds which were often composed of specialist companies acting 
independently from each other, but remaining affiliated with the main firm. EIOPA’s 
Occupational Pensions Stakeholder Group and Insurance and Reinsurance Stakeholder 
Group urged regulators to be ‘pragmatic’ in delegating the decision to the counterparties.979 
The UK, French, and German investment associations IMA, AFG, and BVI each 
communicated their preference for bilateral solutions negotiated by the trading partners.980 
The European Fund and Asset Management Association as well as individual asset managers 
Amundi and Mirova each highlighted that ‘derivatives are traded between professionals’ 
who were aware of the risks involved in rehypothecation and should therefore not be 
restricted in their decision whether to grant this right or not.981 The members of the large 
hedge funds associations were also not united on this question. Some members of AIMA 
appeared to harbour doubts about the virtues of rehypothecation, given that the 
associaiton recommended rehyothecation should ‘only be permitted where specifically 
authorised by the customer’.982 MFA, in turn, simply advised against ‘restricting the choices 
of the counterparties’. 983 
 
4.3 A loss for the banks: Transatlantic public consensus on banning the 
rehypothecation of IM 
 
From the beginning, regulators shared the conviction that rehypothecation of IM had to be 
prohibited, since the idea of segregation would otherwise risk being led ad absurdum.984 BIS 
economic advisor, Stephen Cecchetti, summarized the transatlantic consensus by observing 
that ‘the result will be financial institutions that are safer, more transparent, more liquid 
and less interconnected than was the case before’.985 
 
The level of public issue salience was similar as in the segregation case, i.e. there was 
comparatively little debate about the question at the legislative level, particularly in the US. 
Regulators in both jurisdictions justified the prohibition of rehypothecation along nearly 
identical lines across all their releases, which reflected a domestic institutional environment 
without cracks. Justifying the prohibition, the CFTC argued the rules had to be ‘designed to 
prevent the same asset from being passed around as margin for multiple positions’,986 
which would risk leading to a situation where payment problems affecting one link of the 
chain might have ‘cascading’ effects,987 both for psychological reasons and due to delays in 
the recovery of posted assets. The PRs also prohibited rehypothecation, saying that ‘[i]f 
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swap entities exchange similar amounts of initial margin and these funds are available for 
general use and rehypothecation by the swap entities, then the net effect is as if little initial 
margin was exchanged’.988  
 
To WGMR, two-way IM equally required a prohibition of rehypothecation: ‘Although a firm 
has received initial margin as collateral, the firm also now bears the risk of additional loss on 
the initial margin that it has provided to the counterparty if the counterparty defaults, 
which may offset some or all of the benefits of initial margin received. The risk would be 
exacerbated if the counterparty re-hypothecates or re-uses the provided margin, which 
could result in third parties having legal or beneficial title over the margin, or a merging or 
pooling of the margin with assets belonging to the others as a result of which the firm’s 
claim to the margin becomes entangled in legal complications, thus delaying or even 
denying the return of re-hypothecated/re-used assets in the event that the counterparty 
defaults’.989  
 
In Europe, the EU Commission observed that ‘rehypothecation works well until a 
bankruptcy occurs’.990 In line with WGMR’s interpretation, the ESAs further elaborated on 
this argument, explaining that rehypothecation ‘would create new risks due to claims of 
third parties over the assets in the event of a default’.991 Because of the legal and 
operational challenges involved in making IM available when needed, they noted that 
keeping the practice of rehypothecation legal ‘would be contradictory to the concept of the 
IM’.992 
 
Both the US and the EU authorities may have also perceived a rehypothecation ban as 
consistent with promoting central clearing. Indeed, post-crisis, US CCPs are prohibited from 
placing a lien on customer collateral, i.e. the CCP cannot use client assets to meet unrelated 
financial obligations of its own.993 However, US CCPs and clearing members can re-invest 
cleared swap customer assets in high-liquidity, low-risk assets, such as US government 
bonds and commercial paper, subject to restrictions.994 In a similar way, EMIR stipulates 
that conditional upon clearing member consent, the CCP can re-invest assets, but ‘only in 
cash or in highly liquid financial instruments with minimal market and credit risk’.995 
 
For the regulators, it followed that the rules for the uncleared market had to be stricter, 
although the final outcome does not take this logic to its extreme which would entail a 
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requirement for the collecting party in the uncleared market to leave the assets completely 
untouched (at the cost of overall liquidity in the system). The rules of the CFTC, the PRs, and 
the ESAs each ban the rehypothecation of assets posted as IM. Reinvestment is possible, 
particularly with respect to cash, but subject to tight restrictions.996 As in the segregation 
case, the special treatment of cash is informed by its problematic role in case the entity 
holding it defaults.997 
 
Overall, both the US and the EU policy outcomes represented another loss for the banks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the banks failed to exercise influence over the adoption of the 
2-way IM mandate, the segregation regime, and the rehypothecation ban, each a 
requirement they vehemently opposed. It also showed that policy-makers did not act on the 
information the banks submitted, and that the industry found itself at the margin of the 
transnational policy community. There were also no attempts by the banks to project 
structural power in terms of threats of exit. Business unity was low across all cases. While 
the dealer banks were united in their opposition to policy-makers’ proposals, the buy-side’s 
preferences on each of the three issues varied greatly, including multiple incidents of 
counter-active lobbying. As a result, interest groups sent a messy signal to the regulators. 
 
Regarding 2-way IM in the US, the needle of the influence barometer at first pointed to 
congruence, given that at the domestic institutional level and with respect to the ideational 
outlook, the PRs initially prevailed in the conflict with the CFTC with their preference for 
one-way IM. However, the banks lost the battle because EU market power cum power 
through regulatory capacity, most likely in combination with socialization efforts projected 
on the PRs by the other members of WGMR, turned the sign of the transgovernmental and 
inter-state power moderators against them. The transgovernmental outcome also provided 
a solution to the domestic dispute about the contours of the ideational consensus in favour 
of a 2-way exchange, meaning that the ideational moderator and the domestic institutional 
environment moderator were now also operating against the banks. The lack of business 
unity further constrained the banks. The dealers benefited from low issue salience, but 
given the overall factor constellation, they were unable to exploit it in their favour in terms 
of preventing the adoption of the 2-way mandate. 
 
In the EU, the banks’ lack of influence was the result of policy-makers’ shared ideational 
consensus in favour of 2-way IM, which was not constrained by any challenges at the 
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domestic institutional level. As a consequence, both moderators were turned against the 
banks from the start. The fact that EU power probably contributed to the adoption of a 2-
way solution within WGMR, maybe in combination with socialization efforts, then also 
turned the transgovernmental and inter-state power moderators against the dealers. Low 
business unity further restricted the banks. In this constellation, low issue salience pointing 
in their favour was insufficient for them to exercise any influence. 
 
Regarding segregation in the US, the early embrace of third-party segregation with a 
custodian by both the CFTC and the PRs turned the ideational outlook and domestic 
institutional environment moderators against the banks. Given that strong segregation was 
also supported by WGMR, the transgovernmental moderator equally operated against 
them. As in the 2-way IM case, the dealers were also constrained by a lack of business unity. 
Low issue salience alone was again insufficient for them to exercise influence. In light of the 
broad transatlantic agreement in favour of segregation, inter-state power relations were 
probably not invoked. 
 
In the EU case, the factor constellation was the same. The ideational consensus pointed 
towards the need for segregation, and WGMR supported this principle. Business unity was 
again low. This means that, as in the US, the moderators indicating the effect of the 
ideational outlook, domestic institutional environment, transnational community, and 
business unity were flashing red. However, the EU’s segregation requirements did not go as 
far as those in the US, most likely because of challenges at the domestic institutional level in 
terms of the lack of a EU-wide insolvency regime and the insufficient number of banks that 
could serve as custodians across all member states. Nonetheless, segregation is required 
and cannot be negotiated away, meaning the outcome still represents a loss for the dealers. 
Inter-state power was probably not at the forefront of this case. The banks benefited from 
low issue salience, but given the overall factor constellation, the positive signal of this 
moderator alone was once again insufficient for them to exercise any causal influence.  
 
The rehypothecation case was another lost battle for the banks where they exercised no 
influence over the outcome. The feedback mechanism limiting dealer bank influence was 
the same as in the segregation case, without any shocks to it in either jurisdiction. The 
ideational consensus stipulated that for the IM mandate to be viable, collateral must not be 
re-used, which clashed with the principle of rehypothecation. The consensus was supported 
at the domestic institutional and transnational levels, with all three moderators having a 
detrimental effect on bank influence. Low business unity added a fourth moderator that 
operated against the banks. Again, low issue salience alone was insufficient for the dealers 
to exercise any influence. 
 
Comparing the pre-crisis deregulation case with the post-crises cases discussed so far allows 
us to identify a commonality across all cases. The banks were able to exercise influence 
when the effect of three moderators was working in their favour: policy-makers’ ideational 
outlook, the state of the transnational policy community, and the domestic institutional 
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environment. However, they lost when these moderators were turned against them. We 
will return to this result in the conclusion of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER VII - The Treatment of Commercial End-
Users  
 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter discusses the treatment of commercial end-user trades under the margin rules. 
The end-user case was the only one in which the banks successfully exercised influence, 
even though only in an indirect way, by forming a coalition with the corporate sector which 
did most of the lobbying on their behalf. The banks (and end-users) were more influential in 
the US where trades with non-financial firms are completely exempt. In the EU, by contrast, 
the bank/end-user coalition failed to secure a full exemption, meaning dealer bank 
influence was less strong. The two cases unfolded primarily at the domestic level, with 
transatlantic power relations not playing a dominant role. 
 
Section 2 covers the US case. Section 2.1 reveals that initially, the end-user question did not 
rank high on the political agenda, with policy-makers and regulators believing that the end-
user business did not represent a major source of systemic risk. Instead, the idea at first was 
to delegate the issue to the regulators, and to allow them to pursue exemptions where they 
saw fit. At this time, public issue salience was low, and there was an implicit consensus that 
the ideational clearing/margining consensus would not apply to non-financial firms.  
 
It was CFTC chair Gary Gensler who radically changed this equilibrium by launching a public 
issue salience-raising campaign and forcefully discussing the risks of leaving the end-user 
business outside the regulatory umbrella. The PRs, by contrast, showed little interest in the 
issue, meaning that at the domestic institutional level, the effects of regulatory 
fragmentation became visible. Section 2.2 discusses the response Gensler’s campaign 
provoked. Section 2.2.1 shows that it alarmed the dealer banks which did not want to lose 
this profitable source of income. Given their tarnished reputation, they could not publicly 
lobby for an end-user carve-out themselves. For this reason, they mobilized the end-user 
community which drew upon a critical resource the banks lacked: their credibility with 
policy-makers. Together, they launched a counter attack, redirecting the focus of public 
issue salience towards the risks of not excluding the end-user business from the new rules. 
Section 2.2.2 suggests that, in addition to their alliance with the end-users, the banks also 
built a second coalition with the New Democrats for whom the end-user carve-out became 
a central part of the political agenda. Section 2.2.3 examines the end-users’ own campaign 
on Capitol Hill in which they vociferously refuted Gensler’s claims. 
 
Section 2.3 covers Congress’ response to the two campaigns. As a consequence of Gensler’s 
campaign and the counter-campaigns organized by the bank/end-user alliance as well as 
the bank/New Democrat alliance, the public issue salience of the end-user question reached 
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increasingly high levels. Indeed, the treatment of non-financial firms was among the most 
debated topics of the derivatives-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank legislation. The 
Democratic Party was split regarding the need to apply the ideational clearing/margining 
consensus to the end-users. As sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 illustrate, several progressive 
Democrats, the Democratic Party leadership, and the Treasury fell in line behind Gensler. 
The House bill, however, did not tighten the language on the end-user treatment, most 
likely because Barney Frank needed the votes of the New Democrats on some of the other 
Dodd-Frank-related policies. The House bill also contained a clearing exemption through 
which Frank hoped he could appease the end-users (which he could not). The Senate bill 
similarly contained the clearing exemption, but it, too, lacked any stricter language 
regarding margin for end-user deals. While most of the Democratic Party’s progressive 
Senators favoured Gensler’s approach, the Democratic chair of the Agriculture Committee, 
Blanche Lincoln, sided with the end-users.  
 
The final version of Dodd-Frank then surprisingly lacked any precise wording on the margin 
treatment of end-user deals. Senators Dodd and Lincoln drafted a letter intended to clarify 
the situation, but which in fact only complicated it further. The proponents of a carve-out 
claimed it confirmed the exemption under Dodd-Frank. The skeptics, however, insisted that, 
while the Act did not impose margin requirements, it did not prohibit the regulators from 
approving a system where the banks themselves could ask for margin (or include its 
equivalent cost in the price of the deal). From their perspective, the Dodd-Lincoln letter was 
fully compatible with this interpretation. 
 
Section 3.4 discusses the policy-process leading to the final adoption of the waiver. Section 
3.4.1 shows that because of the ambiguous legal context, the CFTC believed it lacked the 
authority to impose margin rules on the end-users. However, it still felt reinvigorated 
enough by the situation to ask the banks to calculate hypothetical margin amounts and to 
determine thresholds below which the end-users would be free to not post any collateral. 
The PRs, by contrast, were of the view that Dodd-Frank did not give them the authority to 
implement a complete waiver. Largely unsatisfied that neither of the proposed rules 
granted a full carve-out, the bank/end-user coalition intensified its advocacy campaign on 
Capitol Hill in order to secure a legally codified exemption. The public issue salience of the 
topic, thus, remained at a maximum. The Republican victory in the 2010 House mid-term 
elections subsequently pitched the progressive Democrats against the GOP. Having made 
the repeal of Dodd-Frank their rallying cry, the Republicans made the codification of the 
end-user waiver one of their top priorities. Section 3.4.2 explains that, while the House soon 
adopted the required legislative changes, the Senate Democrats resisted the waiver over 
several years, before finally accepting it as part of the reauthorization of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (TRIA), a piece of legislation considered a ‘must-pass’ bill they felt they could 
not block. 
 
Compared to the US case, the policy process in the EU was much less complex. Section 3.1 
shows that, as in the US, there was a bank/end-user campaign which advocated a full carve-
out on similar grounds. However, the alliance operated much more in the open than its 
 175 
American counterpart, taking advantage of the fact that in the early stages, many EU policy-
makers interpreted the 2008 crisis very much as a ‘US problem’, meaning EU banks’ 
reputation was not as tarnished. 
  
Section 3.2 argues that the level of public issue salience of the end-user question was 
relatively higher from the beginning, given Europe’s tradition of providing special 
treatments for their SMEs under its financial rules, which facilitated the work of the 
bank/end-user coalition. Policy-makers also largely agreed that the coverage of the 
ideational consensus should extend only to the larger end-user firms. Some members of the 
EU Parliament initially advocated the adoption of a complete waiver. The majority of policy-
makers, however, favoured a threshold approach exempting only the smaller entities, and 
this was also the solution eventually implemented through EMIR. The bank/end-user 
coalition was therefore not fully successful, in that the margin rules cover the largest 
corporate firms. 
 
Section 3.3 studies ESMA’s post-EMIR attempts at further tightening the threshold 
approach. ESMA’s activism had two effects. First, it questioned the contours of the 
ideational consensus. Second, it introduced frictions at the domestic institutional level, 
since ESMA’s preferences clashed with those of the Commission which had to approve its 
work. ESMA’s plans failed, to a large extent because of the end-users’ continuing efforts at 
keeping public issue salience high. The ideational consensus and the institutional context 
thus returned to their earlier post-crisis levels.  
 
At the transnational level, WGMR took little interest in the end-user question. The vast 
majority of its members did not believe that the ideational consensus should extend to 
most end-users, given that trades with non-financial firms ‘are viewed as posing little or no 
systemic risk’.998 Its final framework recommended covering only systemically-important 
non-financial firms.999. 
 
Figures 17 and 18 depict the configuration of the end-user case in the US and the EU. The 
banks’ preference in both cases was a full exemption for all end-user trades. In the US, the 
needle of the influence barometer initially pointed towards a loss, but the dealers 
succeeded in pushing it to the (limited indirect) ‘influence’ category. Figure 17 illustrates 
this through the crossed out lightning bolt. 
 
Gensler’s campaign raised the level of public issue salience against an exemption. It also 
conditioned the ideational outlook of the Treasury and parts of the Democratic Party 
against it. In addition, it introduced friction at the domestic institutional level, given that the 
CFTC clarified its intention to bring the end-user business under the regulatory umbrella, 
whereas the PRs showed little interest in the issue. All three moderators were therefore 
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initially turned against the banks, meaning the needle of the influence barometer pointed 
to a loss. 
 
In the end, however, the dealers were able to secure a victory. Because of the bank/end-
user coalition, business unity was high. The coalition’s advocacy successfully countered 
Gensler’s campaign by raising the issue salience of the perceived need for an exemption, 
which eventually superseded the effects of his efforts. The bank/end-user campaign also 
raised the support of the New Democrats and other members of the Democratic Party, 
which put the ideational consensus under pressure. The missing language in Dodd-Frank, 
however, represented a setback for the banks, as it allowed the CFTC to propose rules that 
fell short of granting a full-scale exemption. The bank/end-user coalition responded by 
multiplying its efforts to keep ‘friendly’ issue salience at an all-time high. With the 
Republican victory in the 2010 elections, the coalition’s efforts to turn the signal of the 
ideational consensus to their advantage experienced a significant boost, which eventually 
led to the exemption of end-user trades through the reauthorization of TRIA. This then also 
shifted the domestic institutional environment to the banks’ advantage, as it tied the hands 
of the CFTC. The dealers also benefited from the fact that WGMR showed little interest in 
the issue. The end-user exemption is thus the result of bank influence. However, because 
most of the dealers could not act directly in the open, being forced instead to rely on the 
end-users as their intermediary, their influence was only indirect. 
 
In the EU, the policy process was less complex and more favourable to the banks from the 
beginning. As in the US, the dealers mobilized the end-users, ensuring high business unity. 
However, the hurdles the coalition had to overcome were smaller, given the EU’s historical 
precedent of shielding SMEs from potentially harmful effects associated with bank-related 
financial regulation. The domestic institutional moderator therefore operated in favour of 
the banks. This almost automatically translated into higher issue salience in favour of some 
kind of preferential treatment for end-user deals, and an ideational outlook conducive 
towards some form of carve-out. The banks also benefited from a positive signal of the 
transgovernmental moderator, given that WGMR approved of exempting all but the largest 
corporate entities. The bank/end-users’ campaign focused on sustaining the momentum 
towards an exemption. After the adoption of the clearing threshold through EMIR, the 
campaign maintained the level of issue salience and ensured ESMA’s recommendations on 
further tightening the rules would not fall on fertile ground. However, given that the final 
outcome, at least at this stage, does not include a full carve-out, the banks’ indirect 
influence was only limited. The arrow in figure 18 is therefore thinner than in figure 17. 
Because the end-user question was largely considered a domestic issue, the inter-state 
power dimension was of comparatively little relevance in either case. 
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Figure 17: The end-user case in the US 
 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 18: The end-user case in the EU 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
2. The US case 
2.1 CFTC chair Gary Gensler raising the issue salience of the end- user question 
 
The ‘end-user’ component of the reform efforts initially ranked low on the priority list of 
policy-makers, both the US Congress and the Administration. In fact, back at the time, many 
staffers who had been involved in earlier discussions about derivatives regulation were not 
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even familiar with the term ‘end-user’.1000 With the importance of the end-user business for 
systemic risk being considered minor, the Administration at first intended to delegate the 
topic to the regulators. Its Draft Legislation for Financial Regulatory Reform published in 
September 2009 provided for a ‘permissive’ exemption, granting regulatory authorities the 
discretion to pursue exemptions where they saw fit: 
 
Regulators may, but are not required to, impose margin requirements with 
respect to swaps in which one of the counterparties is— 
“(i) neither a swap dealer, major swap participant, security-based swap dealer 
nor a major security-based swap participant; 
“(ii) using the swap as part of an effective hedge under generally accepted 
accounting principles; and 
(iii) predominantly engaged in activities that are not financial in nature […].1001 
 
Neither Frank’s ‘Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market Act of 2009’ nor Dodd’s ‘Restoring 
Financial Stability Act of 2009’ questioned these exclusions,1002 the main difference being 
that Frank’s version excluded transactions used to hedge ‘commercial risk’ (which allows for 
a wide interpretation of ‘hedging’), whereas Dodd’s approach followed the Administration 
by exempting only ‘effective hedges’ (which limited exemptions to those respecting the 
restrictions of hedge accounting rules). 
 
The PRs did not display great interest in the question either, considering the systemic risk 
associated with the end-user business to be comparatively low. The only proponent of 
strong rules was Gary Gensler. A former partner at Goldman Sachs who had followed the 
well-trodden path from the bank to the US Treasury, where he had helped push through the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Gensler became one of the most dedicated, 
if not the most dedicated reformer,1003 who would later be remembered for his unique 
‘aggressiveness’1004 in seeking change. Changing from Saul to Paul, Gensler used his 
confirmation hearing to do penance for his prior deregulatory efforts by confessing ‘that all 
of us – all of us that were involved at the time, and certainly myself, should have done more 
to protect the American public through aggressive regulation, comprehensive 
regulation’.1005 He ruled out ever returning to Wall Street for future employment, which, in 
his own words, felt ‘very liberating’.1006 In his view, neglecting the regulation of the end- 
user business would provide the banks with a giant loophole and allow Wall Street to 
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maintain an important aspect of the pre-2008 deregulation status quo that had contributed 
to the crisis.1007 
 
Once he realized that his concerns were not fully listened to by the Administration or on 
Capitol Hill, he shifted his strategy from traditional discussions behind closed doors to 
raising the public issue salience of the need to regulate the end-user business. For a 
regulator, this move was nearly unheard of. In the words of Noam Scheiber, ‘[i]n the normal 
order of the bureaucratic universe, this would have been the end of the discussion. The 
obscure regulator, having noted his objections, would have fallen in line behind the 
Treasury secretary. […] But Gensler had little interest in the normal order of things.’1008 
Rather, ‘[i]t was now clear that Gensler was playing a different game: not a backroom 
negotiating game, but an outside political game. He was appealing over the heads of 
bureaucrats and congressmen and making a run at public opinion’.1009 The core of Gensler’s 
strategy involved raising public attention by testifying in front of Congressional committees, 
speaking to industry groups and ensuring he was quoted in the press.1010  
 
Unlike his colleagues from the PRs who saw no need to bring the end-users under the 
regulatory tent, it was unequivocally clear to Gensler that the ideational consensus had to 
apply to the end-user business as well. His position consisted of three major points. The first 
one was the objective of preventing regulatory evasion in terms of the financial industry 
shifting its deals to the end-user community. Gensler urged Congress to ‘ensure that 
customized derivatives are not used solely as a means to avoid the clearing 
requirement’.1011 He therefore considered it necessary to implement encompassing reform, 
‘to cover the entire market and that means corporates, small municipalities and non-profits 
that use these markets to hedge’. 1012 
 
Gensler’s second argument pertained to the macroprudential dimension of the margining 
consensus. He observed that the end-users had a tendency to underestimate the systemic 
risk to which their transactions with the dealer banks contributed. Posting and receiving 
margin would protect them against the elevated systemic risk of customized derivatives, as 
well as against the effects of the potential failure of one of their banks. He warned that 
‘[e]ven though individual transactions with a financial counterparty may seem insignificant, 
in aggregate, they can affect the health of the entire system’.1013 ‘If we can bring more 
transactions in, we further lower the risk of the financial sector’.1014 ‘[W]e have to protect 
the American public’.1015 Gensler emphasized that the failure of a highly interconnected 
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dealer bank could bring down all its end-user customers with it, unless they had taken 
precautionary measures by margining their transactions. He explained: ‘These banks also 
have other lines of business that can generate financial risks, such as lending, underwriting, 
asset management, securities, proprietary trading and deposit-taking. Given the 
interconnectedness of these banks, one bank’s failure can have profound effects on every 
one of its customers or counterparties’.1016  
 
Gensler’s third argument concerned the price of OTC transactions. Describing the OTC 
derivatives market ‘as a dark ocean’,1017 he claimed that the end-users would highly benefit 
from regulation, not only in an abstract sense in terms of being exposed to less systemic risk 
and reduced (social) cost in times of crisis, but also much more directly in a very tangible 
way through reduced trading costs derived from greater price transparency. He argued that 
the end-users were actually already paying for margin as part of the price of the deal. He 
explained that the banks themselves did not keep the risk of an end-user trade unhedged 
on their books, but that they took out hedges themselves, with the cost being passed on to 
the client. However, given the lack of transparency of the OTC marketplace, Gensler 
insisted, the end-users were unaware of the precise composition of the price of the trade. 
Improved transparency through imposed regulation would result in increased competition 
among dealers, and thus better prices for the end-users. In his words, ‘[i]f currently they are 
not posting any margin or taking it out, it is already priced into the contract. It might be 
opaque, but it is priced into the contract’.1018 The reforms would therefore ‘benefit every 
small utility company, every small user of derivatives to have greater transparency. The only 
party that would naturally be opposed is Wall Street because they right now have the 
information advantage [...].’1019 As a model for his reform plans, Gensler referred to the 
futures and securities markets where bid/ask spreads are readily available, which ensures 
that the informational advantage tends to reside with the public in form of the buyer, rather 
than the seller. ‘It is only the Wall Street banks that benefit from such an exemption, not 
the end-users or the public’.1020 
 
2.2 The counter initiative: The banks … 
 
Gensler’s campaign elicited strong resistance on Wall Street. Alarmed by his dedication and 
eagerness to push for deep, encompassing reform, the banks feared losing yet another 
profitable source of income, after they were already at risk of losing the battle on the IM 
front. For this reason, their overall objective became ensuring a Congressional end-user 
carve-out. However, in light of the high public issue salience of derivatives regulation and 
their own reputation as the bête noire of the country, most of the banks avoided raising the 
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idea in public. The few representatives of the financial industry that publicly testified on the 
issue decided to frame their arguments by pointing out the macroeconomic benefits they 
associated with an end-user exemption, without drawing attention to the fact that such an 
outcome would also largely benefit themselves. ISDA’s CEO Robert Pickel, for example, 
stressed that OTC derivatives were quintessential to the thriving of the American economy. 
Encouraging Congress ‘to understand that the benefits of the OTC derivatives business are 
significant for the American economy and American companies’, he emphasized that ‘OTC 
derivatives exist to serve the risk management and investment needs of end-users such as 
the businesses that are the backbone of our economy and the investors that provide funds 
to those businesses. The development of OTC derivatives has followed the development of 
the American economy’.1021 
 
One of the few, if not the only dealer banks to openly testify on the end-user question was 
JP Morgan. In contrast to its competitors, it had weathered the financial crisis relatively 
well, and unlike most of his CEO colleagues, Jamie Dimon continued to enjoy considerable 
bipartisan respect on Capitol Hill.1022 The firm warned of the employment effect that brining 
the end-user business under the legislative umbrella would have. It ‘hurts the company and 
its employees’.1023 Regulating the trades of non-financial firms ‘would limit their ability to 
manage the risks they incur in operating their business and have negative financial 
consequences for them via increased collateral and margin posting. These unintended 
repercussions have the potential to harm an economic recovery’1024. In addition, JP Morgan 
advanced ‘the moving business overseas argument’,1025 which in the past had been so 
successful in fending off regulation.  JP Morgan concluded that there was no need to change 
the status quo: ‘The current method by which end-users negotiate and execute OTC 
derivatives is suitable for them […] and does not harm the financial system’.1026 
 
 
2.2.1 … mobilizing the end-users … 
 
Given their damaged reputation, the banks needed others to advocate the waiver, and to 
advocate it forcefully by using a framing strategy that would point out the dire economic 
consequences a regime without exemptions would cause. The end-users’ were an obvious, 
natural ally, given their credibility with policy-makers. In public, the banks consistently 
denied having formed this alliance, and so did most of the end-users.1027 The larger end-
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users, such as Cargill (which in light of the size of its derivatives portfolio had to register as a 
swap dealer with the CFTC1028) certainly did not need the banks to raise their attention. As 
well, the size of their portfolios combined with their credit rating sometimes enabled them 
to make the banks compete for their business, resulting in lower fees. Based on these 
considerations, it would be an oversimplification to reduce the bank/end-user connection 
to a ‘master-puppet’ relationship. However, the importance of the banks must not be 
underestimated, and there is strong evidence contradicting the denials of their close 
cooperation with the end-users. 
 
The press has quoted several knowledgeable individuals confirming the benefits the banks 
saw in having the end-user community lobby policy-makers on their behalf. In addition, 
some end-user representatives have corroborated the banks’ activism in this regard, and 
several members of the US Congress equally voiced their concerns about the end-users 
having been directed to Capitol Hill to advocate on behalf of Wall Street. The media reports 
include an article describing how JP Morgan lobbyist Kate Childress, a former Democratic 
staff member of the Senate Banking Committee, ‘urged the other big banks to contact the 
chief financial officers of their corporate clients and warn that their derivatives could 
disappear or become prohibitively expensive unless they appealed to Congress’.1029 A 
Congressional staffer provided further evidence, citing a conversation with a corporation in 
which one participant referred to Jamie Dimon as being highly active in ‘imploring all of our 
clients to start calling Congress, get their lobbyists involved’.1030 Another anonymous staffer 
spoke of ‘an orchestrated, well-funded effort by the banks to manipulate our legislation and 
leave no fingerprints’.1031 
 
The press has also cited a banking lobbyist who acknowledged that ‘[e]nd users are very 
important because they have the most credibility’,1032 which highlighted the obvious quality 
the banks were lacking in the eyes of most policy-makers. In addition, a ‘derivatives industry 
lawyer’ was quoted as saying that the end-user activism ‘is going to be pretty critical. […] [I]t 
would be naïve to think companies have not been talking to their bankers about how the 
business is going to be affected going forward’.1033 Another anonymous banker confirms: 
‘We’ve really had to work to alert our clients’, ‘Many customers didn’t understand that they 
were being lumped together with the AIGs and monoline insurers of this world and they’re 
only now seeing the risks’.1034  
 
Most corporations vehemently dismissed the idea of having been mobilized by the banks. 
However, there were also some exceptions. Sean Cota, the president of Cota & Cota, a small 
petroleum product company explained the situation as follows: ‘We had a consensus 
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amongst everybody that this [i.e. the margin requirements] was all a great thing until ISDA, 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, with the big players and the money in 
the over-the-counter market, said ‘You’ve got to figure out who your biggest accounts are 
and start telling them that it’s going to get really expensive to do these hedging programs 
for you folks […]. So you need to make sure that financial reform doesn’t happen’.1035 Jim 
Collura of the New England Fuel Institute, a regional trade and business association 
representing the home heating fuels industry, confirmed the scale and intensity with which 
the banks pursued their efforts. In his words, the end-users were ‘getting hammered 
constantly with ‘You’re going to be put out of business; you’re not going to be able to 
hedge; you’re not going to be competitive anymore’’.1036 
 
Several Congressional policy-makers shared this impression. Collin Peterson (D-M), chair of 
the House Agriculture Committee, reported ‘that some of the big financial players have sent 
a bunch of these end-users around to talk to you [i.e. his colleagues on the House 
Agriculture Committee] about this. […] a lot of this stuff that has been ginned up around 
here has been by those guys that are on the other side of this. When this goes on a 
clearinghouse or exchange or is made transparent, their margins are going to narrow’.1037 
Chris Dodd concurred, confirming his impression that ‘the end users have been basically 
used by the major investment banks’.1038 
 
 
2.2.2 … and the New Democrats 
 
Despite their tarnished reputation, the banks still succeeded in winning support on Capitol 
Hill, particularly among the New Democrats Coalition, a segment of the House Democratic 
Caucus that, inspired by Bill Clinton’s Third Way was ‘committed to pro-economic growth, 
pro-innovation, and fiscally responsible policies’.1039 The New Democrats’ positions on 
various policies were also informed by the fact that many of their districts traditionally 
voted Republican, which often led to tight electoral races.1040 After the crisis, the financial 
industry provided massive financial support to the New Democrat candidates1041 in order to 
put them in a position where they could advance their ‘pro-growth’ and ‘common sense’ 
policies.1042 
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The end-user carve-out became a central part of the New Democrats’ political agenda. 
Steve Bartlett, President and CEO of the Financial Services Roundtable considered them 
‘[his] favorite group in Congress in the sense of doing the right things for the country’.1043 
Reflecting this sentiment, the New Democrats chair, Congressman Ron Kind (D-WI), at one 
point reassured his audience at a meeting with lobbyists of the Chamber of Commerce and 
the big dealer banks that he and his colleagues were ‘working hard with you to get the 
policy [i.e. reform under Dodd-Frank] right’.1044 ISDA’s CEO, Robert Pickel, confirmed the 
importance of the New Democrats’ support on the end-user question, crediting them with 
‘hav[ing] played a central role here both in terms of interacting with the end-users but also 
being able to take that concern to Chairman [Barney] Frank’.1045 
 
 
2.2.3 The end-user campaign 
 
The end-user community raised the issue salience of the need for a carve-out by a multiple 
of what the banks would have been able to achieve by themselves. Two groups were 
particularly influential. Most active was the ‘Coalition for Derivative End Users’, a group 
established by the US Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the National 
Association of Manufacturers which comprised firms and associations from all sectors of the 
economy.1046 It coordinated the bulk of the end-users’ efforts on Capitol Hill, but also 
advocated in its own name, particularly at the later stages of the legislative debate, once 
Dodd-Frank had already been signed into law. Several sources claim the banks contributed 
towards the formation and funding of the group,1047 but the Coalition has denied having 
received any such support.1048 
 
There was also a second group led by the National Gas Supply Association (NGSA) which 
mobilized groups from the agricultural sector, such as the National Corn Growers 
Association.1049 In addition, several firms decided to lobby in a stand-alone capacity in order 
to convey their message in as unfiltered a way as possible. Again, this highlights that, 
despite the importance of the banks, there was no mono-directional trajectory leading to 
the end-users’ mobilization. 
 
The end-users campaigned in favour of both an exemption from central clearing as well as a 
carve-out from the collateralization requirements for uncleared trades (both IM and VM). 
Most of their arguments applied to both dimensions, given the similar role played by margin 
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in either market. The thesis, however, focuses on their arguments regarding the margin 
waiver. 
 
The end-users particularly resisted the second and third of Gensler’s claims, i.e. his 
interpretation that the imposition of margin requirements would make the end-users 
contribute towards financial stability and lower systemic risk, and that it would save them 
money by improving transparency. In their view, Gensler had his arguments upside down. 
By using OTC derivatives, they were not contributing to systemic risk, but rather reducing it. 
Moreover, they claimed that given their financial strength, most of them did not actually 
have to post or pay for any margin. Any mandatory collateralization requirements would 
therefore not provide them with any savings, but would in fact cost them millions, if not 
billions of dollars, with drastic consequences for the already battered economy in terms of 
more job losses, higher costs for consumers, and foregone growth. 
 
Detaching their business practices from those traditionally pursued by the banks, the 
Industrial Energy Consumers of America, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives 
Association, and Deere & Company, in separate statements, emphasized that their firms 
were ‘not a broker or dealer’,1050 that their ‘volumes are too small to manipulate the 
market’,1051 and that they did ‘not use derivatives as speculative investments, nor to bet on 
the ebbs and flows of different sectors of the economy’.1052 Cargill insisted that OTC 
derivatives’ sole and only purpose involved allowing the end-user community ‘to affordably 
and efficiently hedge their flour, heating oil, and chicken risks’.1053 The firm therefore 
advised against regulation for ‘OTC products that have not created systemic risk’,1054 and 
called upon Congress to show ‘some recognition that the bakery hedge, for example, did 
not cause systemic risks for the financial system’.1055 
 
Regarding systemic risk, the end-users argued that not only had they not contributed 
towards its increase prior to the crisis, their prudent use of OTC derivatives for hedging 
purposes had actually reduced it. Chatham Financial forcefully made this point, declaring 
that ‘[t]he business end-users who use derivatives to hedge do not create systemic risk; 
rather they use derivatives to reduce their business risk, which in turn reduces systemic 
risk’.1056 This argument was related to the principle of hedge accounting (already discussed 
in section IV-4.1 above), which the end-users argued provided for balance-sheet 
stability.1057 They also emphasized that given their excellent credit ratings, most firms were 
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in fact not posting any margin, and therefore also not paying for it. For example, Delta 
Airlines declared: ‘We do not have to post initial margin’.1058 Building on these arguments, 
the National Gas Supply Association urged Congress to abstain from reforms whose only 
purpose would consist in forcing end-users to channel ‘capital to Wall Street’.1059 Along 
similar lines, the American Public Gas Association concluded that margin requirements for 
end-users would in fact be equal to ‘punishing the victim’ of the crisis.1060 
 
Regarding Gensler’s third claim, the end-users fundamentally rejected the idea of the banks 
in any way taking advantage of them through the pricing mechanism of OTC derivatives. In 
fact, many corporations considered themselves more than capable enough to request 
quotes, compare prices, and identify the best seller. Cargill, for example, insisted that 
‘financially strong food companies, industrial, commercials, and producers should have the 
flexibility to negotiate credit terms. […] This system works very well’.1061 While the end-user 
community was very concerned about the liquidity drain a compulsory IM requirement 
would imply, it was the repercussions of VM that worried them most, given that VM has to 
be posted regularly in function of the development of market prices. The National 
Association of Corporate Treasurers warned that firms risked insolvency in case they 
weren’t able to raise VM: ‘If a corporate treasury is called to meet margin requirements and 
it doesn’t, then it’s in default. So we would have to hold credit to meet that potential 
margin call’.1062 Deere & Company also feared ‘a liquidity event for firms that aren’t able to 
access the capital markets and raise the margin’.1063 3M concluded that ‘robust margin 
requirements would create substantial incremental liquidity and administrative burdens for 
commercial users, resulting in higher financing and operational costs’.1064 The end-users 
therefore argued that they preferred paying fees, rather than importing this kind of 
volatility through the requirement of having to post VM. 
 
The end-user community expected massive financial losses from a mandatory margin 
mandate, warning of the devastating effects this would have in ‘the midst of a liquidity 
crisis’,1065 ‘[a]t a time when the U.S. economy needs more free-floating capital’. 1066 The 
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National Association of Corporate Treasurers, for instance, observed that in order to verify 
the legitimacy of margin calls, businesses would ‘have to replicate the same systems banks 
use’.1067 The end-users provided staggering cost estimates, reaching from millions to billions 
of USD. At the firm level, Delta Airlines calculated ‘that it would cost us about $300 million 
annually in liquidity’,1068 and MillerCoors judged that the ‘proposal would tie up well over 
$100 million a quarter’.1069 Ford, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association and 
the American Public Gas Association put forward similar numbers. 1070  The Business 
Roundtable commissioned a study which concluded that ‘[a] 3% margin requirements, 
assuming no exemptions, would result in aggregate collateral of $33.1 billion for non-
financial, publicly traded BRT [Business Roundtable] companies. On average, this would be 
equal to $269 million per firm […] Extending the analysis to the S&P 500 companies, this 
note estimates that a 3% margin requirement on OTC derivatives could be expected to 
reduce capital spending by $5 to $6 billion per year’.1071 The Natural Gas Supply Association 
and the National Corn Growers Association identified an even larger funding gap that would 
cause ‘a staggering potential $900 billion economic drain’.1072 The entire economy would 
feel the consequences in terms of higher prices for customers, and corporations shifting 
production, and job losses. In the words of 3M, ‘[t]his could result in slower job creation, 
lower capital expenditures, less R&D and/or higher costs to consumers’, thereby 
‘discouraging hedging, and diverting scarce capital that could otherwise be used in further 
growing American businesses’.1073 
 
Ford, in turn, urged Congress to take into account that its own estimate of ‘a half-a-billion 
dollars of margin could be a very significant new product from the standpoint of our ability 
to stay competitive, not only domestically, but against foreign competition’. 1074  The 
American Public Gas Association, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, 
MillerCoors, and the Independent Petroleum Association of America, among others, made 
similar statements.1075 The Business Roundtable’s study projected ‘a loss of 100,000 to 
120,000 jobs’,1076 and the National Association of Corporate Treasurers predicted a mass 
exit of businesses, threatening Congress that if hedging ‘would no longer be economic, 
unfortunately the U.S.-based manufacturer might have to consider moving its production 
overseas to match its costs with its revenues’.1077 
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2.3 Policy-makers’ response to the two campaigns: Conflict in the Democratic 
Party and on Capitol Hill 
 
2.3.1 Resistance against an end-user margin exemption among the Treasury and 
influential, often progressive Democrats 
 
Many observers were surprised by Gensler’s ability to conjure his political magic. Following 
his campaign, the Treasury and several progressive Democrats began making comments 
reflective of his advocacy, pulling many of the more moderate Democrats with them. Their 
statements appeared largely unimpressed with, if not sceptical of the information the end-
users had advanced. Noam Scheiber argues that Gensler’s strategy had been highly 
effective, mainly because of his unique ability ‘of looking at himself through the eyes of an 
ordinary voter’,1078 which turned out ‘uniquely effective at shaming public officials’.1079 
Scheiber also quotes a bank lobbyist according to whom Gensler’s activism turned the CFTC 
‘into the most powerful agency in the federal government’.1080 
 
While Gensler’s influence was certainly crucial, it is important to pause for a moment and 
acknowledge that beyond his activism, there were also other factors at play that increased 
the salience of the end-user question. For example, estimates suggested that the vague 
wording of Frank’s draft legislation would have risked opening a gigantic loophole, 
potentially covering up to 80% of the OTC derivatives market, given its wide interpretation 
of ‘hedging’.1081 In addition, one of Dodd’s closest advisors, Julie Chon, began to learn about 
the perceived need to rein in derivatives through conversations with the BIS as well as other 
experts who advocated a tough response to the crisis. Inspired by these exchanges, she 
began guiding her boss in that direction.1082 Also, Senator Cantwell, among other left-
leaning Democrats, ‘made derivatives a personal interest’ which she and her colleagues 
were not willing to give up easily.1083 
 
Nonetheless, Gensler’s influence must not be underestimated. Not only did he firmly place 
the issue on the political agenda, but most of the subsequent debate, in one way or 
another, also centred on the arguments he had made on the issue. Regarding regulatory 
arbitrage (Gensler’s first point), Barney Frank soon began reconsidering the discretionary 
language of his bill. The CFTC chair’s campaign had inspired two particularly influential 
articles - one in the Boston Globe, the most important newspaper of Massachusetts (Barney 
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Frank’s home state), and another in Newsweek, a weekly magazine with nationwide 
coverage - both of which caused furor in Washington, D.C.1084 The first article accused 
Frank, who had previously been widely considered a ‘hero to the left’1085 for his past 
accomplishments in terms of progressive policy-making in favour of consumer and gay 
rights, 1086 of having sold the soul of the reform. The article cited an observer as saying ‘he 
[i.e. Frank] has cut out the limbs and we’re left with the torso’.1087 
 
In the second article, Michael Greenberger, a former senior official with the CFTC who had 
become an advocate on behalf of Americans for Financial Reform attacked Frank upfront: ‘I 
don’t think he [i.e. Frank] ever fully understood the legislation’.1088 These articles incensed 
Frank, causing him to shift his position. In a letter to Gensler, he declared it was necessary 
to avoid a situation where ‘clever financial firms will somehow scheme to get themselves 
under an exception to which they are not entitled’.1089 In the upper chamber, Senator Tom 
Harkin (D-Iowa) also promoted comprehensive reform, warning that otherwise ‘[t]hese 
mathematical geniuses who create these things can find a way to turn anything into a 
customized swap. […] You’d get a loophole big enough to drive a truck through. It could be 
worth trillions and trillions of swaps’.1090 The Treasury, in turn, also started pushing for 
‘protections against evasion’,1091 indicating that it would ‘oppose all attempts to create 
loopholes or carve-outs that undermine the basic goals of transparency and comprehensive 
oversight’.1092 
 
Regarding the need for corporations to margin trades in order to contribute towards 
financial stability (Gensler’s second point), Treasury Secretary Geithner declared that ‘those 
products come with a lot of risk […] And, therefore, it is important that there be […] a 
comprehensive framework of oversight and authority over those instruments, as well’.1093 
Congressman Bill Foster (D-Illinois) equally argued ‘you need to have that sort of margin 
requirement for both the customized and the non-customized things if you intend to use 
margining as the way of preventing future AIGs’.1094 Chris Dodd, in turn, insisted that, 
‘[t]here are trillions of dollars in play that would raise risks again’.1095 He went on to explain 
that ‘[t]he problem of under-collateralization is especially apparent in bank transactions 
with non-financial firms and regulators should address this problem through the new 
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margin requirements for uncleared derivatives […]’.1096 Senators Diane Feinstein (D-CA), 
Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Byron Dorgan (D-N.D), and their Republican counterpart from 
Maine, Olympia Snowe (one of the few Republican supporters of a comprehensive 
approach), shared Dodd’s perspective, arguing that ‘an exemption would be a mistake. […] 
The collapse or default of any major swaps dealing Wall Street bank would create a systemic 
failure […]’.1097  
 
Finally, regarding the costs borne by the end-user community (Gensler’s third argument), 
the Treasury expected ‘greater price competition among dealers and improved prices for 
end users of derivatives’.1098 Geithner warned of giving in to the rhetoric employed by the 
end-users: ‘Opponents have tried to convince the American people that these reforms will 
hurt Main Street […]. Those arguments won’t work because they aren’t true’.1099 In the 
Senate, Jon Tester equally rejected the claim that the end-users would actually ‘have to put 
money up front’.1100 Along similar lines, Feinstein and her colleagues stated that ‘[t]here is 
no free lunch. “End-users” currently pay significant fees to swap dealing Wall Street banks, 
but not margin payments. These fees serve as the major profit center in the derivative 
business’. Embracing Gensler’s position and opposing the estimates submitted by the end-
users, they identified major cost savings for the end-user community ‘because trades, fees 
and derivative products would be transparent, [and] competition would likely reduce the 
costs to end users’.1101 
 
In the House, Collin Peterson equally voiced his scepticism, emphasizing that a mandatory 
requirement ‘is actually going to cost the big guys money and actually save the little guys 
money. […] we are going to get an outcome that is going to benefit these little guys’. Most 
significantly, he also strongly dismissed the ‘exit’ argument the end-users had made. In his 
own words, ‘[…] this old saw that everybody is going to go to Europe if we get too tough, 
well, what we heard over there was the reason they didn’t regulate is they were told that if 
they got too tough, everybody is going to go to the U.S., and it was the same people that 
were telling both sides. So I mean this has been going on, and it is part of why we got into 
this trouble in the first place’.1102 
 
2.3.2 The push for an exemption by the New Democrats as well as some leading 
Democratic Senators, and the missing language in Dodd-Frank 
 
The Democratic Party, however, was not fully united by the idea of imposing mandatory 
margin requirements on end-user trades. In contrast to their progressive colleagues, the 
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New Democrats became strong supporters of the end-users’ cause. Underscoring the 
importance of derivatives to the end-user community, they insisted that ‘[w]hether they are 
being used by a rural electric cooperative looking to hedge against spikes in energy inputs, 
an airline protecting itself from rising fuel costs, or a community bank guarding against 
interest rate fluctuations for loans, derivatives play an important role in reducing risk in our 
commercial sector, and keeping prices stable and low for consumers’.1103 At the individual 
level, congressmen Gregory Meeks (D-Florida) and Michael McMahon (D-NY) made strong 
statements in favour of an exemption: Meeks pushed his party ‘to be reasonable and 
responsible’ by exempting the ‘end-users who pose no systemic risk and who do the right 
thing by hedging business risks they don’t control’. Otherwise, ‘this may lead to smaller 
firms doing more riskier things’. 1104  McMahon, in turn, reminded his party of the 
responsibility to ‘be sure that any new regulation is smart and rational regulation. We need 
to target any new rules to directly address the potential for systemic risk without needless 
imposing of regulations that could have unintended effects. Because derivatives are 
financial instruments that help all of us, they help keep our energy costs low and stable. 
They help insurance companies keep premiums low. They help companies complete 
construction projects on time and under budget. And despite the negative press and lack of 
understanding of the derivatives market, for the most part, the derivatives market works. 
We cannot throw the baby out with the bath water. We must work to protect the end-
users, good American businesses that are just trying to manage their cash flows and hedge 
against uncertain risks beyond their control in a cost-effective manner’.1105 The New 
Democrats also intervened with the Administration in order to try and make them shift their 
position. Summarizing a meeting of several New Democrats with Geithner, Congressman 
James Himes (D-CT) confirmed: ‘We got into the weeds on the derivatives bill’.1106 
 
At the time, the New Democrats themselves did not occupy any influential positions that 
would have allowed them to directly influence legislation, but the size of their group 
accounting for 68 of the 256 Democratic seats in the House meant that the party’s 
leadership could not ignore them, even more so considering that the Democrats overall 
majority consisted of no more than 38 seats, and that the Republicans almost unanimously 
opposed the Dodd-Frank reform efforts. 1107 While Barney Frank had intended to ‘sharpen’ 
his bill following Gensler’s campaign,1108 the ultimate House bill pointed in the opposite 
direction. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 introduced a 
clearing exemption for end-user transactions, while keeping the language regarding the 
‘permissive’ exemption intact.1109 Frank initially seemed to believe he could navigate a 
course allowing him to simultaneously placate the end-users by relieving them from the 
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clearing requirement, while also responding to Gensler’s campaign by introducing firm 
requirements for trades remaining in the bilateral, and thus riskier, marketplace. However, 
in the end, the discretionary margin language survived, probably as the result of a horse 
trade through which Frank secured the New Democrats’ approval of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency.1110 This new agency represented one of the other highly contested 
provisions of Dodd-Frank. Over time, it had become a cause close to the heart of the 
Democratic leadership.1111 According to this interpretation, the desire to conserve the 
establishment of the new agency in the bill might have trumped concerns over 
strengthening the language of the end-user margin requirements. 
 
In the Senate, Dodd’s staff initially considered the House bill too weak.1112 However, the 
final version of the Senate bill, S.3217 – Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, 
hardly differed. It equally contained the clearing exemption and retained the discretionary 
language regarding margining.1113 The main reason for leaving it untouched appears to have 
been resistance against burdensome end-user rules by the chair of the Senate Agriculture 
committee, Blanche Lincoln (D-AK). ‘[V]ery sympathetic’ to the end users’ cause, Lincoln had 
taken on board their arguments early in the process, citing her awareness of ‘the 
importance of cash flow and working capital to businesses’ and the need for the new rules 
to ‘be surgical’. 1114 Up for re-election during the critical stage of debate on Dodd-Frank, she 
faced strong competition, first for her nomination as the Democratic candidate, and then 
from her Republican challenger,1115 which strengthened her resolution to be tough on the 
banks, but reject any policies that could potentially be interpreted as detrimental to 
employment, investment, and growth in her home state.1116 
 
In addition to these immediate re-election concerns, Lincoln also appeared eager to work 
with her Republican colleagues to continue the bipartisan spirit that traditionally 
distinguishes the Agriculture Committee from most other committees, given its overall 
preoccupation with defending public support for farmers against various attempts by other 
committees to appropriate those funds differently. For this reason, she seemed more 
willing to listen to the concerns the Republicans harboured against burdensome rules, at 
the cost of alienating herself from the rest of Democratic Party’s leadership.1117 The 
Treasury tried to intervene, but ultimately could not convince her to change her 
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position.1118 Lincoln wrote a letter to her colleagues Feinstein, Cantwell, Dorgan, and Snowe 
who had resisted an end user exemption, arguing that ‘[c]ommercial entities, as opposed to 
financial firms, have strong arguments regarding regulatory costs and their impact on 
keeping jobs in the United States’. Her letter also emphasized the need to ‘ensur[e] that 
tough regulations on Wall Street don’t cost us jobs on Main Street.1119 Opposition to 
bringing the end users under the legislative umbrella was also voiced by Senator Debbie 
Stabenow (D-Michigan) who called upon her colleagues not to unnecessarily burden the 
end-users, as ‘the ability to provide financial certainty to companies’ balance sheets is 
absolutely critical for them and for us in terms of jobs and so on’.1120  
 
Most of the Republicans in both chambers firmly embraced the end-users’ point of view and 
showed themselves utterly convinced by the information they had received. The GOP’s 
opposition added to the high degree of public issue salience surrounding the end-user 
question. For Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the end user argument that ‘this might 
affect job production, that we are going to have margin instead of jobs, […] makes it a very 
acute political problem’.1121 His colleagues Saxby Chambliss (R-Georgia) Jim Bunning (R-Ky), 
and David Vitter (R-La), joined by their Democratic colleague from Colorado, Michael 
Bennet approvingly cited the cost estimate submitted by the Natural Gas Supply Association 
and the National Corn Growers Association, claiming that the reform ‘would force 
companies to set aside $900 billion in capital that would otherwise be used to build 
factories, hire workers, and fund research and development.1122 In the House, Congressmen 
Frank D. Lucas (R-Oklahoma) and Bill Cassidy (R-Louisiana) warned of ‘overreach’ 1123 and 
‘pass[ing] on higher costs to consumers from entities which are really not out there to 
disrupt the market […]’.1124 Their statements were representative of the Republican position 
on the issue. 
 
The final version of the Dodd-Frank Act, as reported by the joint (House and Senate) 
Conference Committee on 29 June 2010 and signed into law by President Barack Obama on 
21 July 2010 then came as a surprise. As expected, it contained the clearing exemption, but 
any mention of margin requirements for end-users had disappeared, i.e. the 
collateralization of end-user trades was neither imposed nor excluded. As to the reasons for 
this omission, there are several competing hypotheses. The press has cited an anonymous 
Congressional staffer who simply considered it the result of ‘an oversight’ related to the fact 
that the conference committee deliberated the final version of the bill until long after 
midnight. 1125  Alternatively, other observers have argued the margin exemption was 
considered redundant. According to this second interpretation, the regulators were 
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supposed to know of the implied existence of an end-user waiver in the Act and to act 
accordingly, even more so given the clearing exemption. For example, a letter drafted by 
Dodd and Lincoln shortly after the adoption of the Act (later known as the Dodd-Lincoln 
letter) explicitly confirmed that ‘a number of provisions were deleted by the Conference 
Committee to avoid redundancy and to streamline the regulatory framework’.1126 A third 
hypothesis implies the opposite. It postulates that in line with Gensler’s campaign, one or 
several critics of a carve-out intentionally dropped the language in order to ensure the end-
users were covered by the margin rules. The Wall Street Journal, for example, reports that it 
was Frank who deleted the respective passages, with his ‘gambit’ initially going 
unnoticed.1127 
 
A consistently shared interpretation suggests the work on Title VII began past 12.30am, with 
a constant stream of pages and proposed changes coming in, to the extent that few 
individuals, if any, might be in a position to accurately reconstruct the entire timeline of 
events. Around 6am, the missing language began to raise broader attention, but there was 
no time to immediately discuss the issue on site. The G20 summit in Toronto during which 
the Administration intended to demonstrate strong US leadership was imminent, and any 
delay in enacting Dodd-Frank might have been interpreted as a sign of US weakness. A few 
days after the conference, Senator Chambliss offered an amendment to get the exemption 
back into the text, but with the exception of the Republicans and Senator Lincoln, all 
Democrats voted against it, and the Democratic House leadership subsequently refused to 
re-open the debate on the issue.1128 Dodd, in turn, suggested rectifying the situation 
through future legislation, if need were to arise.1129 
 
Against this background, the Dodd-Lincoln letter ‘seeks to provide some additional 
background on legislative intent’.1130 The proponents of an end-user exemption would go 
on to cite it as evidence supporting their cause, which eventually contributed to the myth of 
Dodd-Frank actually containing a margin waiver for non-financial firms. For example, in 
2011, Senators Debbie Stabenow and Tim Johnson (D-SD) together with Congressman Frank 
Lucas sent a letter to the Treasury and the regulators in which they expressed ‘support for 
the comments expressed in the […] letter from former Senators Christopher Dodd and 
Blanche Lincoln’, calling on regulators to ‘exempt end-users from margin requirements’.1131 
 
However, there is reason to believe that the Dodd-Lincoln letter was in fact worded much 
more ambiguously than its proponents implied. On the one hand, it clearly stated that ‘[t]he 
legislation does not authorize the regulators to impose margin on end-users’  and that ‘[j]ust 
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as Congress has heard the end-user community, regulators must carefully take into 
consideration the impact of regulation and capital and margin on these entities’. However, 
on the other, it also emphasized that ‘[i]n cases where a Swap Dealer enters into an 
uncleared swap with an end-user, margin on the dealer side of the transaction should 
reflect the counterparty risk of the transaction’.1132 As a result, the letter did actually not 
prohibit the regulators from approving a system in which the dealers, without being 
formally required to do so, would either explicitly request, or implicitly include margin 
requirements for end-user trades, i.e. it did not speak against a continuation of the status 
quo. 
 
Barney Frank indirectly backed this interpretation by saying that ‘[w]e do differentiate 
between end users and others. The marginal [sic] requirements are not on end users. They 
are only on the financial [sic] and major swap participants. And they are permissive. They 
are not mandatory, and they are going to be done, I think, with an appropriate touch’.1133 
Collin Peterson made a similar comment, following the same line of reasoning: ‘Nowhere in 
this section do we give regulators any authority to impose capital and margin requirements 
on end users’. ‘What is going on here is that the Wall Street firms want to get out of the 
margin requirements, and they are playing on the fears of the end-users in order to obtain 
an exemption for themselves’.1134 
 
 
2.4 The end-user exemption 2.0: Getting the carve-out formalized and winning 
the end-user debate 
 
2.4.1 Public issue salience reaching new heights 
 
With both the CFTC and the PRs proposing rules that lacked a definite end-user exemption, 
it was clear that the debate would continue. The CFTC suggested that banks and end-users 
‘would be free to set initial margin and variation margin requirements in their discretion 
and any thresholds agreed upon by the parties would be permitted’.1135 It also asked banks 
to calculate hypothetical margin amounts for OTC trades with their end-user clients.1136 In a 
similar way, the PRs’ first proposal stated that as long as end-users’ exposure remained 
beneath the threshold decided by their banks, no margin would need to be posted. The PRs 
justified this approach as being ‘consistent with current market practices with respect to 
nonfinancial end users, in which derivatives dealers view the question of whether and to 
what extent to require margin from their counterparties as a credit decision’.1137 The CFTC 
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felt it did not have the authority to explicitly impose margin requirements on the end-users, 
but tried using its manoeuvring room as much as possible. In contrast, the Fed believed it 
lacked the authority to not introduce any requirement, and therefore proposed as little as 
possible. The second proposals of the agencies did not differ substantially from the first 
ones.1138 
 
The end-users adamantly rejected this approach, interpreting the lack of an exemption as 
synonymous with the imposition of margin requirements, which they claimed was in 
conflict with the Dodd-Lincoln letter and the overall spirit of Dodd-Frank. For example, 
Boeing, Caterpillar, Daimler, John Deere, Ford, American Honda, Hyndai, Nissan, Toyata, 
and Volvo in a joint submission referred to the letter as explaining that Dodd-Frank ‘did not 
extend that authority to imposing margin requirements on commercial endusers. The 
Congressional intent is clear on this point’.1139 The Coalition for Derivatives End Users 
equally claimed that the letter ‘states unequivocally that [regulators do] not have the 
authority to create this type of regime’.1140 ISDA joined the choir, arguing that ‘Senators 
Lincoln and Dodd specifically addressed Congressional intent regarding the treatment of 
end-users […]’.1141 The National Grain and Feed Association’s submission summed up the 
end-users’ demand that the regulators ‘state clearly and definitely that all non-financial 
end-users are exempt’.1142 
 
The end-users appeared to fear that once the dust of the debate on Dodd-Frank would 
settle, the regulators, in particular Gary Gensler at the CFTC, would sharpen the rules by 
imposing mandatory margin requirements, essentially turning the ‘hypothetical’ margin 
calculations into ‘real’ ones. Indeed, as noted by an observer, the CFTC rules ‘raised a ruckus 
among derivatives end users, which see the language as a back-door attempt to impose 
margin requirements on them […]’.1143 CFTC commissioner Scott O’Malia (who after the end 
of his tenure at the agency would continue his career as CEO of ISDA) in turn poured oil on 
the fire by insisting that the PRs’ rules ‘will require that end-users pay initial and variation 
margin to banks’.1144 The end-users worried that one-day, the PRs could invoke their 
supervisory authority to oblige the banks to tighten their margining practices vis-à-vis their 
end-user clients, a situation that the National Association of Corporate Treasurers 
characterized as ‘having the sword of Damocles hanging over you’.1145 JP Morgan confirmed 
the end-users’ fears by claiming that ‘the draft rules raise the specter of margin 
requirements applying to the hedging activities of thousands of Main Street companies’.1146 
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The end-users’ ultimate objective therefore consisted of securing an explicit prohibition of 
margin requirements for their businesses through a legally codified carve-out. Their activism 
propelled the issue salience of the margining exemption to new heights. Representatives 
from the Coalition for Derivatives End Users, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, 
American Public Power Association, the National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, 
and the National Association of Corporate Treasurers, among others, continued to forcefully 
plead their cause on Capitol Hill, using the same arguments they had advanced prior to the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.1147 NGOs and individual scholars whose voices, compared to the 
end-users, had so far been more in the background of the public debate, now also began 
making more forceful arguments. In particular, they criticized the end-users’ estimates of 
the macroeconomic costs of mandatory margin requirements as dramatically exaggerated 
and based on the inaccurate assumption that the non-margining of OTC deals did not incur 
any extra cost.1148  Some of these critics also argued that in order to protect their 
businesses, the end-users should take out ‘classical’ loans, rather than functionally 
equivalent derivatives that were up to 10 times as lucrative for the banks.1149 However, the 
end-user community swiftly and effectively countered these claims, relying on the same 
canon of arguments they had been making since the beginning of the debate.1150 
 
Called to testify to Congress, Gensler used slightly more conciliatory language than earlier in 
the process,1151 but defended the manoeuvring room Dodd-Frank had provided the CFTC. 
He argued that the agency had ‘the authority not to impose’ end-user margin requirements, 
while the PRs de facto had the possibility to do so under supervisory guidance. Under the 
proposed rules, he explained, ‘[d]ealers would have the same authorities they would have 
today to do that [i.e. request margin] by individual negotiation, depending upon end users’ 
balance sheet […]’. 1152  In line with the end-users’ position, the House Agriculture 
Committee’s new Republican chair, Frank Lucas, interpreted Genslers’ approach in the 
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sense that ‘yes, you [i.e. Gensler] believe the Commission could in the future under the rule’ 
proceed to imposing end-user margining rules.1153 
 
The PRs, which in the early stages of the legislative process had kept a rather low profile on 
the end-user question, decided to employ appeasing language, with Fed Chair Ben Bernanke 
explaining ‘that nonfinancial end users benefit and that the economy benefits from the use 
of derivatives’.1154 Along similar lines, Tarullo emphasized the ‘relatively low systemic risk 
posed by most end users’.1155 Tarullo also confirmed that the lack of an explicit exemption 
in Dodd-Frank had obliged the PRs to introduce margin rules for corporate firms in some 
form, and that they had done so in the least intrusive way through the ‘thresholds’ 
approach. Dodd-Frank ‘applies broadly and there is obviously no exception provided for any 
class of counterparties’, he explained.1156 The Fed itself felt ‘very comfortable with [its] 
proposal’,1157 arguing that no legislative change was needed. Tarullo, however, confirmed 
the end-users’ fears by informing Congress that the Fed ‘ha[d] a general safety and 
soundness authority, and when we see things that are being done in an unsafe or unsound 
fashion, we can seek a change in that’, although he was quick to add that with respect to 
the end-user question, he did not see any need to proceed in that direction.1158 
 
2.4.2 Getting the end-user exemption codified 
 
While the regulators themselves felt satisfied with their approach, the Republicans began 
pushing for legislation accommodating the end-users’ wish to prohibit margin 
requirements. At this point, the public issue salience surrounding the end-user question 
reached new heights. The end-users kept hammering Congress, and the topic became one 
of the flagship initiatives, if not the point of the spear of Republican activism directed at 
repealing Dodd-Frank.1159 While the GOP had been in a minority position before 2010 and 
thus unable to block Dodd-Frank, it regained the majority in the House in the 2010 mid-
term elections, missing the Senate majority by only a few seats. Exemplary of its criticism 
were the statements by Frank Lucas who insisted that the proposed margin rules were 
‘clearly inconsistent with Congressional intent’,1160 by Scott Garrett who worried that they 
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were ‘harming the functioning of a mature market’,1161 and by Jeb Hensarling who claimed 
that ‘[t]hanks to the “end user” margin requirements imposed by Dodd-Frank, Main Street 
businesses and farmers across America face higher costs in managing their risk and 
producing their products, costs which are passed through to their customers and felt 
directly by every American at the kitchen table’.1162 
 
In line with their overall rejection of Dodd-Frank which they felt originated from ‘a false 
premise that somehow deregulation or lack of regulation led us into the crisis’,1163 the 
Republicans believed the text should not be considered as ‘chiseled in stone; nobody 
brought it down to us from Mount Sinai’.1164 They therefore began pursuing what Frank 
characterized as ‘a death through a thousand cuts’ approach.1165 Indeed, the House 
Republicans launched a barrage of bills (more than two dozen in 2011 alone) all of which 
aimed at revoking key provisions of the Act.1166 The Business Risk Mitigation and Price 
Stabilization of 2011 (H.R. 2682), which passed the House on 26 March 2012, after having 
been first introduced on 28 July 2011, explicitly exempted end-users from margin 
requirements.1167 It passed the House again as H.R. 634 in 2013, both times with the 
support of the New Democrats, as well as other House Democrats who may have felt they 
could no longer defy the end-users’ pressure any more. 
 
In the Senate, Republican sentiment was similar. Saxby Chambliss, for example, rejected 
Dodd-Frank as ‘overly burdensome’ and ‘a law that potentially regulates American 
businesses as if they were all large risky financial institutions’.1168 Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) 
felt the need to ‘ensure that the proposed regulations will not hinder the country’s 
desperate need for economic growth and job creation’.1169 The Senate Democrats, however, 
kept the door shut for several years, resisting any debate on a potential softening of the 
rules. Particularly vocal was Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass., first elected in 2012) who fought 
tooth and nail against any attempt at weakening Dodd-Frank whose passage she considered 
a modern-day example of ‘David can beat Goliath’.1170 The Administration equally refused 
to support any bill that would provide an explicit end-user exception, with Geithner 
declaring that ‘[w]e can’t allow loopholes, gaps, and weaknesses to take hold and 
undermine the fundamental strength of our reforms’.1171 
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Yet after several years, with the memories of the crisis beginning to fade away, the 
consensus among the Senate Democrats against breaking up Dodd-Frank weakened, and 
the Republican attempts to exempt the end-users attracted more and more Democratic 
support.1172  However, final legislation providing full end-user relief from the margin 
requirements did not pass the Senate before being attached to a ‘must pass’ bill, i.e. a bill of 
such high relevance to the Democrats that it could not be held back over political struggles. 
The bill in question was the Renewal of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (known as TRIA) 
signed into law by President Obama on 12 January 2015.1173 TRIA, originally enacted 
following 9/11 to provide federal support to insurance firms selling terrorism protection, 
had expired at the end of 2014, meaning large parts of the economy including the 
construction and transportation sectors faced the cancellation of their insurance plans at 
the beginning of 2015.1174 The Republicans had shown only lukewarm support, if not 
outright resistance, towards extending this kind of federal intervention,1175 but to many 
Democrats it turned out an important provision. Chuck Schumer, the Democratic senior 
Senator from New York, who was among the strongest supporters of the bill, eventually 
struck a deal with Representative Jeb Hensarling, and the Democrats secured the 
reauthorization in exchange for agreeing to the end-user exemption.1176 Warren offered an 
amendment to strip the end-user provision from the renewal of TRIA, but failed to mobilize 
the necessary votes.1177 With the passage of the reauthorization of TRIA, the commercial 
end-users became explicitly and unequivocally exempt from the rules. 
 
 
3. The EU case 
 
3.1 The bank/end-users alliance 
 
Compared to the US case, the banks in Europe exercised considerably less restraint in 
voicing their open support for an end-user exemption, even during public testimonies. In a 
2010 hearing, for example, a Deutsche Bank official said: ‘OTC Derivatives provide 
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corporations with efficient risk transfer mechanisms to protect their downside, and give 
them a sound financial footing from which to invest and grow. […] Non-financial 
corporations do not generally post collateral at all on their OTC trades today and any 
requirement to force them to clear their trades, or exchange collateral on a bilateral basis, 
would be a major issue for them. It would also provide an incentive to not hedge their risks, 
leaving them more vulnerable to market volatility and potentially increasing risk in the real 
economy’.1178 At the early stages of the policy-making process, the crisis was still widely 
interpreted as a problem caused by American, rather than EU banks. European banks were 
therefore subject to less intense levels of public scrutiny, at least initially, which afforded 
them with more manoeuvring room during the consultation process. Some of the end-users 
may have believed the intensity of bank lobbying could in fact risk undermining corporate 
firms’ credibility with policy-makers.   
 
Despite the progress the American end-users had achieved, commenters in Europe rarely 
publicly referenced the US solution as a model for the EU, since both financial and non-
financial businesses felt that EU policy-makers would not appreciate an invitation to draw 
inspiration from the very country whose failure to properly monitor its financial system had 
precipitated the crisis. The uncertainty surrounding the missing language in Dodd-Frank 
further decreased the attractiveness of such an approach. Nevertheless, at the conceptual 
level, the bank/end-user-coalition advanced nearly identical arguments, i.e. that end-user 
deals had not caused the crisis because they did not contribute to systemic risk, and that 
any collateralization requirements would represent an immense liquidity drain hurting the 
broader European economy.  
 
Regarding the first claim, German energy giant RWE insisted that the ‘activities of energy 
trading firms in the financial markets have neither in the past created any systemic risk nor 
is there any reason to believe that they will in future’.1179 The European Federation of 
Energy Traders in turn blamed the crisis on ‘bubbles in the real estate and financial markets 
as well as highly complex securities’, all of which it considered far removed from end-users’ 
day-to-day business.1180 Siemens explained the source of all problems ‘originates from the 
financial sector’. 1181  Along similar lines, the Federation of German Industries (Bund 
Deutscher Industrie) wrote that ‘[i]ndustrial companies do not use derivatives for 
speculative reasons, but for reasons of risk reduction in combination with an existing or 
planned underlying operative transaction’.1182 The submissions of many other end-user 
firms contained a similar message.1183 ‘It follows therefore’, the European Association of 
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Corporate Treasurers concluded, ‘that the non-financial sector should so far as possible not 
be exposed to the adverse consequences summarised above from an initiative that is 
appropriate for the financial sector only’.1184 
 
The banks sustained this perspective. Société Générale declared that end-user margin ‘will 
not make the financial system stronger and/or safer’1185 and HSBC considered it ‘unlikely’ 
that corporate end-users would ever ‘cause systemic risk’.1186 Deutsche Bank argued that 
regulatory intervention ‘makes sense for systemically risky financial institutions’ only.1187 
Similarly, ISDA co-authored a letter with the Association of Financial Markets in Europe 
(AFME) and the British Bankers Association in which it maintained that ‘increased margin 
and operational requirements would be too burdensome and the reduction in systemic risk 
is insufficient to justify the imposition of these costs on the economy as a whole’.1188 
 
Sanofi pointed to the negative repercussions a mandatory margin regime would have for 
the credit rating of end-user firms, given that some rating agencies would likely count 
collateral towards gross debt, rather than cash reserves.1189 The Association of European 
Airlines branded mandatory ‘collateralization […] a risk accelerator. Harmless and limited 
counterparty risk is replaced by dangerous and unlimited liquidity risk’.1190 Siemens alerted 
EU policy-makers to the risk that ‘[t]he demand for additional cash to meet a margin call 
could be a crucial event triggering collapse of the company’.1191 Lufthansa claimed that on 
these grounds ‘[i]t is good that one third of overall credit exposures remain uncollateralized. 
It should be even more’.1192 BASF predicted the required operational updates necessary to 
manage margin requirements ‘would cause unreasonably high costs’.1193 Warning that firms 
would be left with the choice between a rock and a hard place, Rolls Royce argued firms 
would either discontinue their hedging strategies or spend precious resources on the 
collateralization of their trades. Either option would ‘impair economic growth’ and ‘hamper 
investment in R&D’.1194 Energy provider E.ON put it in very simple terms: ‘More cash has to 
be allocated for [margin] at the expense of investments in the real energy business’.1195 EDF 
Energy added that ‘[t]hese costs will ultimately be passed on to other firms and 
consumers’.1196. German market leaders E.ON, Siemens, and MAN submitted estimates of 
the aggregate cost of mandatory margin requirements for their firms of EUR 10bn, 4bn, and 
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2bn respectively.1197 Along similar lines, the European Association of Corporate Treasurers 
reported warnings of some firms that the ‘cash needs could reach 100% and more of their 
market capitalization’.1198 
 
The banks again reinforced these claims. The German Banking Association, for instance, 
communicated to policy-makers the ‘growing concerns amongst German treasurers in the 
non-financial sector’ about mandatory collateralization requirements which ‘would impair 
their ability to hedge their risk position effectively and at existing cost levels’.1199 Similarly, 
ISDA and the European Banking Federation in separate submissions warned of ‘the liquidity 
squeeze’ and ‘working capital issues’ end-users would face.1200 Santander pointed to the 
‘detrimental effect on their daily cashflow’.1201 Banks from various member states including 
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, and Intesa San Paolo also observed that end-users 
lacked the infrastructure necessary to manage margin requirements.1202 The European 
Banking Federation concluded that ‘[t]aking away the possibility from clients to hedge their 
risk in a cost efficient way could stifle innovation and economic growth’.1203 
 
3.2 Policy-makers’ consensus on a ‘clearing threshold’ 
 
Compared to the US, the end-user question ranked high on the EU institutions’ agenda early 
on, resulting in elevated public issue salience which the end-users further increased and 
sustained. There was no individual policy-maker equivalent to Gary Gensler to catapult the 
need for regulation into prominence. The ESAs, however, in particular ESMA, appear to 
have harboured strong concerns about a broad-based carve-out. After the adoption of 
EMIR, ESMA openly discussed these concerns, but pre-EMIR, and compared to the CFTC, it 
did not play as prominent a role in the public discussion. For most of the time, the political 
debate also lacked the ‘all-or-nothing’ dimension that had marked the discussions in the US. 
Rather, it was characterized by the EU’s tradition of insisting on shielding commercial 
businesses, in particular SMEs, from the potentially harmful effects increased capital 
requirements could have on their access to credit. This tradition can be traced back to the 
design of Basel II in the early 2000s, when Europe, in particular Germany, had pushed 
through carve-outs for banks providing capital to the Mittelstand.1204 From an early 
moment, this tradition set the end-user case on a path towards some form of an exemption. 
 
Early on, EU policy-makers discussed the burdensome effect of mandatory clearing/margin 
requirements for the end-user community. Governor of the Banque de France, Christian 
                                                        
1197
 Grant/Tait (2010) 
1198
 European Association of Corporate Treasurers (2010:3), see also Bayer (2009:5). 
1199
 German Banking Industry Committee (2009:17) 
1200
 ISDA and Financial Services Industry (2012:4), European Banking Federation (2009:7). 
1201
 Santander (2009:2), see also JP Morgan Chase (2010:2). 
1202
 Barclays (2009:7), BNP Paribas (2010:5), Société Générale (2009:6), Intesa San Paolo (2009:7) 
1203
 European Banking Federation (2009:13), see also European Association of Public Banks (2009:10). 
1204
 See Pagliari/Young (2014:590f.). This legacy has also permeated the discussions on Basel III (see for 
example EU Commission (2016b)). 
 205 
Noyer, for example, explicitly recognized that ‘this [new rule] would trigger additional 
liquidity needs that they cannot afford’, and that the end-users might be affected by a ‘lack 
of operational capabilities’. However, he also observed that non-financial institutions were 
not all alike, with larger firms usually more involved in the financial markets than smaller 
ones. He therefore considered a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach as ‘certainly not appropriate for 
all corporations active in OTC markets’.1205 The UK authorities employed nearly identical 
language. The FSA and HM Treasury, for example, openly acknowledged that margin 
requirements ‘would increase costs and introduce an unpredictable liquidity burden’ and 
that some corporations might lack the necessary ‘levels of financial and operational 
resource to dedicate to this function’.1206 However, rather than advocating a full carve-out, 
they equally concluded that the requirements should be ‘proportionate’.1207 The German 
and Italian authorities also supported this nuanced approach.1208 Policy-makers, thus, 
shared the belief that the ideational clearing/margining consensus should extend to parts of 
the end-user community. 
 
On the basis of this agreement, the EU Commission decided on pursuing a threshold 
approach, not in the sense of a ‘permissive’ threshold up to the discretion of the banks or 
the regulators, as had initially been considered by the US Congress, but rather by formally 
imposing a mandatory ‘clearing threshold’ beyond which counterparties would have to 
either centrally clear trades if they were part of the list of transactions to be cleared, or post 
collateral, if they were not.1209 The threshold was to be designed such as to cover only large 
players ‘that are particularly active in the OTC derivatives market and if this is not a direct 
consequence of their commercial activity’.1210 This means transactions undertaken purely 
for hedging purposes were to be excluded from any clearing/margining requirement. 
 
There were two key reasons as to why the EU Commission did not give the end-users 
complete ‘carte blanche’ for all their trades. As in the US, the first one was to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage. The deputy director general of the EU Commission’s internal market 
and services unit, David Wright, spoke about the need to find ‘a balance’: ‘We can’t design a 
system where the cost is so high that it takes out derivatives that can be used to hedge. On 
the other hand, if we have a system with loopholes, the system could be gamed’.1211 For the 
EU Commission, the clearing threshold allowed for such a balanced approach. In its view, it 
represented ‘a sensible system that reflects the economic and financial hedging needs of 
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corporate end-users’, while at the same time providing for ‘a reduction of risk in the 
financial system that does not tolerate regulatory arbitrage’.1212  
 
Second, the EU Commission believed the riskiness of a trade was a function of its size, 
rather than the type of entity undertaking it. Against the claims the end-users had voiced, it 
was convinced that certain end-users traded positions large enough for them to contribute 
to systemic risk. The Commission appeared particularly worried about the trades 
undertaken by the large commodity firms which it believed were often not purely hedge-
motivated. Indeed, it insisted that large corporations can ‘be a risk to their counterparties 
and possibly to the system as whole should they default’.1213 The Commission was confident 
that the costs of the threshold approach were reasonable. From its perspective, the 
macroeconomic effects of the crisis in terms of foregone growth had clearly demonstrated 
that corporations had a keen interest in enhancing the stability of the derivatives market. As 
the Commission put it, ‘[a]ddressing the root causes for the financial crisis in order to 
provide a more stable financial foundation for the real economy is therefore a vital interest 
for us all, non-financial institutions included’.1214  
 
In contrast to the US, where many supporters of comprehensive margin reform insisted the 
new rules would decrease the cost of derivatives for end-users, the EU Commission believed 
the price for end-user trades prior to the crisis had actually been too low and needed to be 
adjusted upwards. Patrick Pearson, head of the Commission’s financial infrastructure unit, 
observed that ‘[a] number of derivatives exposures were underpriced in the past, and 
corporates benefited from underpriced risk through lower fees passed on by the 
dealers’.1215 The press also cited an anonymous source from the Commission which further 
specified this argument by explaining that ‘[c]orporates actually enjoyed underpriced risk in 
the past, but once the new legislation kicks in it will mean they will have to pay the proper 
price, which is higher than what they’re used to. They might not like that, but you can’t 
have taxpayers subsidise their derivatives business’.1216 The Commission decided that the 
size of the threshold should be determined by ESMA on the basis of a thorough information 
gathering exercise.1217 The EU Council was in broad agreement with the Commission, 
arguing that ‘consideration should be given to the purpose for which [a] non-financial 
counterparty uses OTC derivatives’.1218 
 
The banks and end-users found their strongest allies in the European Parliament where 
several MEPs from the UK and Germany would have preferred a much more aggressive 
approach than the one the Commission charted. The Economic and Monetary Affairs 
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Committee (ECON) seemed concerned about delegating the design of the threshold to 
ESMA, for fear the result would disproportionately restrain the end-user community.1219 
Swinburne introduced an amendment that would have restricted ESMA’s manoeuvring 
room by stipulating that the clearing threshold should apply only in case end-users’ non-
hedge-related positions surpassed the clearing threshold for more than 90 consecutive 
days.1220 Bowles proposed another amendment, stipulating that the threshold to be defined 
by ESMA would only apply ‘at the time the position is taken’, meaning that non-hedge 
related trades causing a firm to cross the threshold at a later point of their lifecycle would 
be de facto exempt.1221 In yet another amendment, she suggested that a non-financial 
entity would be exempt, in case it could demonstrate ‘that it is not projected to exceed the 
threshold on a regular basis’.1222 MEP Markus Ferber (elected from Germany) went even 
further by introducing an amendment that would have limited the applicability of the 
clearing threshold to financial entities. This would have provided non-financial firms with a 
blanket exemption, as they enjoyed in the US.1223 
 
The EU Parliament as a whole stressed the need for the new rules to reflect ‘the specificities 
of small and medium enterprises’,1224 but without supporting any of these far-reaching 
amendments discussed in the ECON committee. Particularly vocal about the need to cover 
all end-user deals were the Greens who in their own words ‘want the clearing obligation to 
cover non-financials as every derivative done by a non-financial usually has a financial 
counterparty. Exempting such derivatives for the non-financials therefore also exempts 
them from clearing by financials, thus weakening the impact of EMIR’.1225 There were two 
factors which made a larger group of MEPs reaching beyond the Greens reject the idea of a 
carve-out. A key moment occurred in 2009, when the media reported that Porsche had 
earned six times more on the stock market than through its traditional core business of 
selling cars.1226 While this was a special case related to the firm’s attempt to take over its 
much larger competitor Volkswagen (which eventually failed, resulting in the reverse 
move), it confirmed the skeptics’ position that certain end-users seemed to behave like 
hedge funds. 
 
The final outcome in the Parliament was a classic compromise, according to which the 
rolling average of end-users’ portfolios of non-hedge-related trades would have to cross the 
threshold for 50 business days in order for the clearing threshold to apply.1227 The inter-
institutional ‘trilogue’ between Parliament, Council, and Commission then led to a reduction 
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of this number to 30 business days,1228 a result likely due to pressure by the Commission for 
a more conservative approach. The bank/end-user alliance was thus successful in 
maintaining the momentum in favour of the threshold approach, but it failed to achieve a 
full carve-out for all end-user deals. 
 
In September 2012, ESMA published the numerical values of the threshold, which were EUR 
1bn for credit and equity derivatives respectively, and EUR 3bn each for interest rate, FX, 
commodity, and all other derivatives.1229 ESMA specified that a non-financial entity whose 
aggregate portion of trades not concluded for hedging purposes crossed one of these 
thresholds had to margin/clear its entire portfolio, i.e. not just the excess ratio or the asset 
class in question.1230 Such an entity would be referred to as a NFC+, as compared to a NFC- 
designating a corporate firm below the threshold. ESMA also provided information on what 
characteristics trades needed to reflect in order to be classified as ‘objectively’ risk-
reducing, including those of the ‘hedging’ definition as understood by IFRS, or, alternatively 
those of ‘proxy hedging’ or ‘portfolio hedging’ in order to take account of cases where 
direct hedging was not possible.1231 
 
3.3 Further accommodations for the end-users post-EMIR 
 
With EMIR stipulating a review of the entire Regulation by August 2015, in particular the 
systemic effect of NFCs’ use of derivatives and the impact of the new rules on their 
business,1232 the debate barely ever stopped, even though this deadline preceded the actual 
implementation of the requirements themselves. As in the US, public issue salience thus 
remained high. 
 
ESMA’s report recommended extending the coverage of the ideational clearing/margining 
consensus to a larger fraction of the end-user community. Specifically, it encouraged the EU 
Commission to reinforce the threshold approach by tightening the ‘hedging’ concept. The 
recommendation was informed by three observations ESMA had made. First, an empirical 
analysis led it conclude that the aggregate portfolio of trades undertaken by large NFCs- 
combining both hedge-related and unrelated trades was in fact often larger than that of 
NFCs+. ESMA interpreted this result as indicative of many NFCs- being de facto NFCs+, 
without having made the required notification.1233 Second, ESMA was worried that the 
broad definition of ‘hedging’ had resulted in the ‘inconsistent application’ of this concept 
across firms.1234 Third, it noted that a large fraction of NFCs- had reported all their trades as 
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hedge-related, which it interpreted as evidence suggesting that many NFCs- were actually 
overwhelmed by the task of accurately categorizing their trades. 1235  Overall, ESMA 
questioned the suitability of the ‘hedging’ concept for determining the size of the various 
thresholds, arguing ‘that the share of hedging versus non-hedging of positions may not be 
the most relevant criteria to assess the systemic relevance of NFCs’.1236 It recommended 
that the EU Commission keep the asset-class based thresholds, but reformulate the 
calculation instructions, such as to require NFCs to add together all their trades per asset 
class regardless of their relevance for ‘hedging’ purposes. ESMA concluded that such a 
reformed approach would be suitable for ‘capturing the most systemically important NFCs’ 
and removing all ambiguities related to the nature of ‘hedging’, while at the same time 
relieving the smaller NFCs from the ‘hedge’ classification effort.1237  
 
The report led to consternation among the end-user community. The European Association 
of Corporate Treasurers went on to invalidate ESMA’s report point by point. First, it argued 
that the systemic importance of NFCs was minor compared to financial institutions, given 
that NFCs were diversified across various sectors, which meant that both business and 
bankruptcy risks were less correlated across firms. Second, it insisted that portfolio size was 
a poor indicator of systemic importance, ‘as often large companies have sizeable portfolios 
due to the scale of their business activities, not due to speculative actions’.1238 Third, the 
Association considered it ‘perfectly logical’1239 that many NFCs- had classified the totality of 
their trades as hedge-oriented, given that in its view, corporate firms used derivatives 
primarily for commercial risk-mitigation, rather than speculation. Fourth, regarding the 
classification problems ESMA had identified, it blamed EMIR’s difficult reporting regime, 
rather than a lack of corporate capacity.1240 As a result, it rejected any changes to the 
threshold methodology. A group of German and other European end-user associations 
submitted a nearly identical letter to the EU Commission in which they qualified ESMA’s 
position as ‘plainly wrong’, insisting that ‘the retention of the hedging exemption is of 
utmost importance’.1241 Their submission equally identified the reporting regime as the 
main problem, explaining that in many cases trade repositories had not accurately 
registered or saved the information provided by end-user firms.1242 The associations 
concluded that except for trade reporting ‘only smaller changes to EMIR are necessary’, 
such as the automatic attribution of the ‘NFC- label’ to small end-users with insignificant 
uncleared portfolios.1243 
                                                        
1235
 ESMA (2015:23f.) 
1236
 ESMA (2015:14) 
1237
 ESMA (2015:32) 
1238
 European Association of Corporate Treasurers (2015:3) 
1239
 European Association of Corporate Treasurers (2015:4) 
1240
 European Association of Corporate Treasurers (2015:2) 
1241
 BDI et al. (2015:5,4). The associations were Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Bundesverband 
Großhandel, Außenhandel, Dienstleistungen (BGA), Deutsches Aktieninstitut, Deutscher Industrie- und 
Handelskammertag (DIHK), European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) and Verband Deutscher Treasurer 
(VDT). 
1242
 BDI et al. (2015:8) 
1243
 BDI et al. (2015:7) 
 210 
 
The end-users attributed ESMA’s intransigence in part to the unbalanced composition of its 
Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group, a consultative body that had been formed in 
2013. Indeed, after two unsuccessful applications for membership, the European 
Association of Corporate Treasurers submitted a formal complaint to the European 
Ombudsman, challenging ESMA’s position that ‘even if non-financial companies also have a 
legitimate interest in the work of ESMA there is however no explicit legal obligation to 
include such stakeholders. To be selected, interested parties do not only have to apply but 
they should also be considered better placed than other candidates’.1244 The complaint was 
later withdrawn and a representative of the association was appointed as a member of the 
group.1245  
 
The EU Commission was much more sympathetic towards the end-users’ concerns and 
suggested adjusting the ideational consensus in order for it to better suit the needs of 
smaller firms. Acknowledging the challenges with regard to trade reporting, the Commission 
recommended ‘streamlining’ the respective requirements for end-users. 1246  Most 
importantly, it contradicted ESMA’s view by characterizing ‘hedging’ as ‘a relevant factor 
when considering the systemic relevance of NFCs because hedging entities are generally not 
highly leveraged and hold underlying offsetting positions to their OTC derivatives 
contracts’.1247 Its proposal for an amendment of EMIR published in May 2017, suggested 
lowering, rather than increasing the end-users’ burden, for example by providing for a 
simplified reporting regime for NFCs. Regarding the clearing thresholds, the Commission 
proposed keeping the original approach of exempting only hedge-related transactions. 
However, NFCs would no longer have to study the size of their non-hedging oriented 
uncleared derivatives portfolio on a continuous basis, but only for a period of three months 
(March, April, and May) per year. Moreover, a threshold breach would no longer oblige 
them to clear/margin all trades, but only those of the asset class for which the breach had 
occurred and which fell under the clearing/margining requirement.1248 
 
Overall, without the constant hammering by the bank/end-user coalition, it would have 
been much easier for ESMA to have its reservations heard, both early in the process and 
after the adoption of EMIR. 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the end-user case was the only one in which the banks 
exercised influence. However, compared to the pre-crisis deregulation case, they did so only 
indirectly, and their influence in securing a (partial) carve-out was larger in the US than the 
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EU. Bank influence was indirect, rather than direct, given that the dealers had to lobby 
through the end-users as their coalition partner. In light of their damaged reputation after 
the crisis, the dealers lacked the strength and credibility to directly engage policy-makers 
themselves. 
 
Interestingly, in the US, the banks exercised indirect influence in spite of the high levels of 
‘hostile’ issue salience initially pointing against them. In the pre-crisis period, high issue 
salience had always come with the risk of regulatory intrusion, but this time, the banks 
turned the situation to their advantage. Indeed, in the US, the banks succeeded in turning 
the tide from what appeared to be a loss to a victory, even if only in form of indirect 
influence. The moderator constellation was initially configured against the banks. Gensler’s 
campaign had turned both the public issue salience and the contours of the ideational 
consensus as perceived by the Congressional Democrats and the Treasury against an 
exemption. His advocacy for an encompassing set of rules also introduced friction at the 
domestic institutional level, given that, unlike the CFTC, the PRs showed little interest in the 
end-user question.  
 
The factor constellation enabling the banks to exercise indirect influence was premised on 
the high degree of business unity the banks were able to achieve by mobilizing the end-
users. The bank/end-user coalition, in turn, succeeded in changing the signal of the public 
issue salience moderator to the dealers’ advantage. The coalition also secured the support 
of the New Democrats and other members of the Democratic Party, as a result of which the 
sign of the ideational outlook on Capitol Hill equally began to turn. The missing end-user 
exemption in Dodd-Frank dealt the banks with a temporal setback, as it reinvigorated the 
CFTC. The bank/end-user coalition, however, responded by turning up the volume of their 
campaign exponentially. In conjunction with the Republican victory in the 2010 elections, 
the campaign eventually succeeded in completely shifting the signal of the ideational 
outlook to the banks’ advantage. The exemption was eventually implemented through the 
renewal of TRIA. With an unambiguous carve-out now formally adopted, this also turned 
the sign of the domestic institutional moderator, as it tied the hands of the CFTC. The banks 
also benefited from the fact that at the transnational level, the end-user debate did not 
attract much attention, with WGMR directing comparatively little attention to the issue and 
approving of a broad-based exemption. As a primarily domestic topic, the end-user question 
did not raise any inter-state power-related concerns. In sum, the final exemption was the 
product of bank influence, but since the dealers themselves had to leave most of the talking 
to the end-users, their influence was indirect, rather than direct. 
 
In Europe, the banks did not find themselves in as much an uphill battle as in the US. There 
were two starting points for the feedback mechanism leading to (limited) indirect bank 
influence. As in the US, the dealers mobilized the end-users, thus ensuring high business 
unity. At the domestic institutional level, the historical legacy of granting special treatment 
to SMEs under bank capital rules provided further momentum to the coalition’s campaign, 
as it raised the issue salience of the question and oriented the ideational outlook towards 
some form of exemption. As in the US, the banks also benefited from WGMR’s benign 
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interpretation of a broad exemption. The bank/end-user alliance secured this equilibrium, 
and defended it against ESMA’s attempts to stack the domestic institutional environment 
against the banks and change the contours of the ideational outlook by bringing a larger 
proportion of the end-user community under the regulatory umbrella. Inter-state power 
again was not at the forefront. However, given the lack of a complete end-user carve-out, 
the banks’ indirect influence in the EU was less complete than in the US. 
 
Again, as in the pre-crisis deregulation case, (indirect) dealer bank influence emerged under 
a factor constellation that included positive effects emanating from the three moderators 
associated with policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the transnational policy 
community, and the domestic institutional environment. Chapter IX will further expand on 
this finding. 
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CHAPTER VIII - The Treatment of FX swaps and FX 
forwards 
 
1. Overview of the chapter 
 
This chapter discusses the treatment of FX swaps and FX forwards. While the US and the EU 
both implemented an exemption from IM, but not from VM, the dynamics of the policy 
process on either side of the Atlantic were very different. 
 
Before we begin with the detailed case analysis, section 2 provides some background 
information on the FX market. Section 3 covers the US case. Section 3.1 illustrates the 
efforts of the US Treasury to carve out FX swaps and FX forwards from Dodd-Frank on the 
grounds that it considered this segment of the OTC derivatives market to be ‘different’ from 
the other types of bespoke trades. Its campaign attracted Congress’ attention, which 
increased the public issue salience of the question, even though it did not reach the same 
level as the end-user question. The progressive Democrats and their Party leadership, 
together with the CFTC which hoped to secure jurisdiction over those products, objected to 
the Treasury’s suggestion, insisting that the consensus be left intact, and that an exemption 
would only represent another loophole in favour of the banks. The Treasury, however, 
prevailed. While Dodd-Frank did not directly provide for an exemption of FX swaps and FX 
forwards from the definition of ‘swap’, it allowed the Treasury to prepare a determination 
justifying that these products should in fact be exempt, which would also relieve them from 
the margin requirements associated with it. The Treasury complied and exempted them 
under the Determination, at a time when public attention had already turned to other 
questions. 
 
Section 3.2 reveals the high level of business unity among the banks and the buy-side in 
favour of an exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards from both IM and VM. The information 
the banks submitted stated that these products were ‘safe’, given stable payment 
obligations known ex ante, short maturities corresponding with deep market liquidity, and 
high degrees of market transparency. The only remaining risk, commenters claimed, was 
settlement risk, which in their view was already sufficiently mitigated by the CLS Bank, a 
specialized financial institution providing settlement services for FX transactions (see 
section 2). The critics of an exemption, including exchange houses, NGOs, the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, as well as individual observers, 
submitted evidence trying to invalidate each of these claims. 
 
Section 3.3 argues that while the exemption from IM reflects the preferences of the banks, 
it was probably a case of congruence, rather than influence. The banks most likely saw their 
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preferred option adopted for another reason: a (historically informed) turf war at the 
domestic institutional level, with the Treasury aiming to ensure that the CFTC would not 
obtain jurisdiction over the FX market. The intended beneficiary was the Fed which has an 
important stake in the market, first, because of the relevance of these products for its 
monetary policy, and second, because of the leading role it plays in the governance of 
international payments systems. The domestic decision in the US was taken before the 
establishment of WGMR. 
 
Section 3.4 provides further evidence indicating that the Treasury did indeed sacrifice, 
rather than simply dismiss the ideational margining consensus in favour of the banks. In 
fact, the Fed actually appeared highly concerned about the risks in the FX market. However, 
as the domestic exemption had rendered the adoption of a formal IM mandate impossible, 
the Treasury needed to prevent WGMR from recommending such a requirement. From a 
competition point of view, stronger requirements abroad would have likely benefited the 
US, but they would have probably also further increased systemic risk in the domestic 
banking system, which the Fed appeared keen to avoid. In order to introduce some level of 
oversight, while keeping the exemption formally intact, the Fed operated through BCBS-
CPSS’s Working Group on Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk which recommended the use of 
VM for FX trades. With the support of the US, WGMR imported this guideline and made it a 
recommendation under its own framework. Against the preferences of the banks, and even 
though issue salience was low, the Fed subsequently imposed the use of VM through 
supervisory guidance. 
 
The US portion of the chapter concludes with some reflections on why the Treasury might 
have opted for this complicated strategy, rather than asking Congress directly to grant the 
Fed exclusive jurisdiction in the first place. One likely reason is the high degree of public 
issue salience the Fed’s perceived mismanagement of the crisis had created on Capitol Hill. 
The banks’ preferences do not appear prominently in this overall equation, suggesting that 
with regard to IM, they probably did not exercise causal influence. Supervisory guidance on 
the use of VM also did not overlap with their preferences. 
 
Section 4 discusses the EU case. In section 4.1, we will see that there was business unity 
regarding the need for an exemption from IM. The use of VM was not extensively discussed 
in market actors’ written submissions. Business consensus on the need for a carve-out was 
not unanimous, but it would be too much to speak of business conflict. Section 4.2 reveals 
that the public issue salience of the question was high in the EU, just as it had been in the 
US. With the exception of some MEPs, the majority of policy-makers refused a blanket 
carve-out for FX. The EU’s decision to adopt a VM requirement for these products was 
therefore accompanied by comparatively little debate. The transnational discussion on IM 
was controversial, given the EU’s insistence on IM, and WGMR was split. In the end, 
however, the US prevailed, and the EU pursued an exemption from IM. Section 4.3 focuses 
on Europe’s decision to forego the IM requirement. It discusses several hypotheses why the 
EU might have taken this decision, suggesting that it was probably US structural power that 
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made the EU drop its IM plans and sacrifice the ideational consensus pro IM, given its banks’ 
dependence on the USD.  
 
Figures 19 to 22 provide graphical illustrations of the IM and VM cases for FX swaps and FX 
forwards in the US and the EU. The two purple waves indicate congruence. The crossed-out 
lightning bolts shows that the banks initially faced the possibility of a loss regarding IM in 
either jurisdiction, but that the needle on the influence barometer eventually shifted away 
from this category. 
 
The banks on both sides of the Atlantic opposed any form of mandatory IM or VM 
requirement. In the IM for FX swaps and FX forwards case in the US, the banks most likely 
benefited from congruence, after the needle of the influence barometer had initially 
hovered over the ‘loss’ category. Indeed, at first, the dealers found themselves confronted 
with a factor constellation in which high issue salience and the CFTC’s as well as the 
Democrats’ ideational outlook on the issue were turned against an exemption. The Treasury 
probably equally subscribed to this consensus, although we can only indirectly infer this 
from the VM case.  
 
The domestic institutional moderator at this stage equally operated against the banks, since 
the CFTC attempted to achieve jurisdiction over the market, with the firm intention of 
imposing strict margin requirements on those trades. What changed the tide was the turf 
war between the CFTC and the Fed/Treasury. In order to prevent the CFTC from gaining 
jurisdiction, the Treasury most likely sacrificed the ideational consensus and pushed the US 
Congress to exempt FX swaps and FX forwards from the definition of ‘swap’ under Dodd-
Frank. The subsequent adoption of the exemption from IM through the Treasury 
Determination turned the domestic institutional environment moderator to the banks’ 
advantage. As well, when the Treasury adopted the Determination, public attention had 
already turned to other questions, meaning issue salience was comparatively low again. The 
banks themselves benefited from business unity in favour of the Determination, but their 
own lobbying appears to have had little direct causal influence over the decision. Given that 
the Determination was adopted before WGMR was officially established, the transnational 
moderator most likely did not play a major role. Finally, with the EU far behind in the policy 
process, inter-state power-related questions were not at the forefront of this case.  
 
In the EU, the banks probably also benefited from congruence, with the needle at first 
equally hovering over the ‘loss’ category. Indeed, as in the US, the factor constellation 
initially appeared set against the banks, with the same moderators flashing red. The 
ideational outlook called for FX swaps and FX forwards to be covered by IM. There were no 
stumbling blocs at the domestic institutional level challenging this assessment. In addition, 
the public issue salience of the question was high. The EU’s strong preference for an IM 
mandate put WGMR under stress, given US opposition to an IM requirement. What turned 
the tide in favour of an exemption, and thus congruence for the banks, was most likely 
structural power exercised by the US through Europe’s dependence on the USD. WGMR 
subsequently recommended an exemption from IM. The EU followed this recommendation, 
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in spite of the prevalence of high issue salience against an exemption. As in the US, the fact 
that the banks preferred the exemption and could point to business unity in their favour 
was most likely insufficient for the dealers to exercise any causal influence over the 
decision.  
 
While the banks probably benefited from congruence regarding IM, they registered another 
loss with respect to VM. In the US, the ideational post-crisis consensus implied that FX 
swaps and FX forwards needed to be collateralized, if not with IM, then at least with VM. 
The consensus was equally embraced by BCBS-CPSS and WGMR at the transgovernmental 
level. At the domestic institutional level, Dodd-Frank and the Treasury Determination had 
removed any stumbling blocs by ensuring the CFTC would not gain jurisdiction over this 
segment of the FX market. The ideational, transgovernmental, and domestic institutional 
environment moderators were thus all turned against the banks. The dealers benefited 
from business unity and low issue salience, but these two factors were insufficient for them 
to exercise any influence. As a result, the banks had to accept yet another loss. Inter-state 
power most likely had receded to the background again. 
 
In the EU, the factor constellation keeping bank influence at bay was the same as in the US, 
the only exception being high issue salience which further constrained it. 
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Figure 19: The IM exemption for FX swaps and FX forwards in the US 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 20: The IM exemption for FX swaps and FX forwards in the EU 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 21: Supervisory guidance on VM for FX swaps and FX forwards in the US 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 22: The mandatory use of VM for FX swaps and FX forwards in the EU 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
2. Background: Different types of bilateral FX trades and the role 
of the CLS Bank as the first line of defence against settlement risk  
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FX spot trades involve the purchase of a currency against the sale of another for immediate 
delivery ‘on the spot’. The maturity of spot trades is short, usually less than two days.1249 
Spot trades are generally not considered to be derivatives. Once the maturity of a spot 
trade extends beyond two days, it becomes a derivative and is called an FX forward. This 
product allows the investor to buy or sell foreign currency at a pre-specified price on a 
future date.1250 An FX swap, in turn, involves two parties simultaneously borrowing and 
lending currency from/to each other. Repayment is locked in at the FX forward rate valid at 
the time the deal is struck. The FX swap can therefore be considered a combination of spot 
and forward.1251 The purpose of a currency swap is to exchange principal and interest for 
two different currencies, with maturity usually not being reached for several years.1252 An 
FX option grants the right (without imposing any obligation) to convert currency A into 
currency B at a pre-specified date at a pre-determined rate.1253 Non-deliverable forwards 
(NDFs), in turn, allow for the trading of movements in less easily available currencies issued, 
for example, by countries having put in place capital controls. They are cash-settled in USD, 
with the exchange of cash flow being calculated as the difference between the exchange 
rate of the day when the deal is concluded and the day it reaches maturity.1254 
 
Most of the public regulatory debate focused on the treatment of FX swaps and FX 
forwards. Two characteristics distinguish these product types from other FX contracts, their 
short maturities and physical settlement. As figure 23 illustrates, most FX swaps and FX 
forwards reach maturity within a year or less, and the bulk of FX swaps (panel A) actually 
mature within 7 days or less. By contrast, many other uncleared trades have maturities 
stretching several years, if not decades. 
 
Figure 23: Maturities of FX swaps and FX forwards 
                                                        
1249
 For USD-CAD trades settlement is one Toronto business day (see for example Canadian Foreign Exchange 
Committee (2010:3)). 
1250
 See for example Tormey (1997:2316). 
1251
 BIS (2008) 
1252
 Baba et al. (2008:82) 
1253
 James et al. (2015:4) 
1254
 Abdel-Qader (2017) 
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Source: BIS Triennial Survey of foreign exchange and OTC derivatives trading (Table D11.4: Foreign exchange 
turnover by instrument, counterparty and maturity) 
 
Physical settlement means that the underlying currency is exchanged. One of the main risks 
of physically-settled FX derivatives is therefore settlement risk, which is the risk of a 
counterparty handing over the agreed amount of currency, without receiving in exchange 
the contractually stipulated amount of currency from its trading partner. The reasons can 
vary, from struggles with technical problems to financial distress/insolvency.1255 The period 
of exposure stretches from the moment the payment instruction cannot be revoked 
anymore until the moment the funds have been received. On average, it lasts beyond 24 
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hours.1256 Revoking the payment instruction might be necessary in case it turns out 
erroneous, or if the issuing counterparty learns that its trade partner has become insolvent. 
This part of the risk management process is further complicated by time zone differences 
and legal problems concerning the question under which precise conditions cancellations 
are possible.1257 
 
One of the most prominent cases of financial disaster in this segment of the derivatives 
market is the collapse of Germany’s Bankhaus Herstatt in June 1974. Indeed, Herstatt filed 
for bankruptcy after having received millions of Deutsch Mark from US banks, but before 
making the promised USD payments in return. The related risk of losing principal is 
therefore often called ‘Herstatt’ risk. 1258  The decades following this debacle were 
punctuated by several other insolvencies including the failures of Drexel Burnham Lambert 
in the US in 1990 and Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in the UK one year 
later.1259 As a response, the CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) Bank was established. Since 
its inception in 1999, it has acted as a major pillar of the international payments systems. 
The CLS Bank provides the ‘link’ between the two legs of an FX transaction that is missing in 
case banks rely on traditional correspondent banking. It operates a ‘payment-versus-
payment’ (PVP) system ensuring that one payment does not occur without the other.1260 
Otherwise, payments are refunded to the party that made the pay-in.1261 Each settlement 
member (together more than 60 financial institutions worldwide1262) holds an account with 
one subaccount per currency through which payments are made.1263 CLS simultaneously 
settles the two legs of a trade by adjusting the respective subaccounts of the two 
counterparties, provided sufficient funds available. In order to protect its clients against 
Herstatt risk, CLS pursues various risk management controls before proceeding to 
settlement.1264 In addition, it applies multilateral netting techniques, thereby freeing up 
significant amounts of liquidity, up to 96% according to its website.1265 CLS also maintains 
loss-sharing arrangements with its members and contingency plans for liquidity provision 
with large banks, in case one or several counterparties break their limits of negative 
balances.1266 While some of CLS’s operational procedures make it appear similar to a CCP, it 
is important to understand that it is in fact not a central counterparty. It settles the 
payment instructions associated with trades, but without providing for counterparty 
                                                        
1256
 Kos/Levich (2016:6f.) quoting BIS data published in 2008. 
1257
 Lindley (2008:55) 
1258
 Levich (2012:10f.) 
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 CPSS (1996:6f.) 
1260
 Lindley (2008:57) 
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 Kos/Levich (2016:14) 
1262
 See the CLS Bank website https://www.cls-group.com/products/settlement/clssettlement/membership/, 
accessed 14 May 2018. 
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 Miller (2002:17ff.) 
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 Galati (2002:63), CPSS (2008:79f.) 
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 See the CLS Bank website at https://www.cls-group.com/products/settlement/, accessed 15 May 2018. 
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 The value of the missing payments might increase in case of negative intra-day exchange rate 
developments, which could result in a situation where CLS owes money to one or several of its members, but 
either lacks the funds or does not have access to them in the correct currency (see Galati (2002:63)). 
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substitution, i.e. it does not become counterparty to these trades.1267 Headquartered in 
New York City, CLS settles a daily volume of USD 5tn of payment instructions across 18 
currencies, with a focus on spots, forwards, and swaps.1268 
 
 
3. The US case 
 
3.1 The US Treasury’s push for an exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards  
 
From a very early stage, the US Treasury urged Congress to provide an exemption for 
physically settled FX swaps and FX forwards from the definition of ‘swap’, which would have 
otherwise become part of the CFTC’s jurisdiction. The Treasury’s publicly voiced arguments 
for the exemption at this stage of the process remained somewhat cryptic, much to the 
dissatisfaction of the Congressional leadership. Geithner emphasized that ‘[t]he FX markets 
are different. They are not really derivative in a sense and they don’t present the same sort 
of risk’. To support this claim, he pointed to the CLS Bank and its ‘elaborate framework’ to 
address settlement risk. Concluding that ‘[t]hese markets actually work quite well’,1269 he 
opposed any form of regulation going beyond business conduct and reporting standards.1270 
 
Compared to the end-user debate, the FX question attracted less attention among policy-
makers. First, the end-users pushed for encompassing relief covering all asset classes, 
meaning they did not single out FX derivatives. Second, given their tarnished reputation, the 
banks did not dare address the topic in public. Geithner’s initiative, however, led to a 
significant increase in public issue salience on Capitol Hill. 
 
Several influential Democrats of the US Congress vehemently rejected an exemption. Their 
arguments resembled those made during the end-user debate. First, they insisted that there 
should not be any gaping loopholes in the reform. Dave Smith, chief economist of the House 
Financial Services Committee, summarized the House Democrats’ view by saying ‘[w]e want 
to promote as much transparency as possible’.1271 The Senate Democrats argued along 
similar lines. Blanche Lincoln explained that ‘we have seen sharp operators in derivative 
markets use just this kind of loophole to get around Federal regulation’.1272 An outraged 
Maria Cantwell commented as follows: ‘I can’t believe the first decision the administration 
would make to carry out Dodd-Frank would be an anti-transparency decision. The idea that 
                                                        
1267
 See CPSS (2008:78, footnote 66 and footnote 31 on p.24) 
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 See the CLS Bank website at https://www.cls-group.com/products/settlement/, accessed 15 May 2018. 
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 All quotes by Geithner taken from Reuters (2009b), see also Geithner quoted in US Senate Agriculture 
Committee (2009c:7). 
1270
 Clark (2011) 
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 Smith quoted in Nasiripour/Grim (2010). 
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 Lincoln quoted in US Senate Agriculture Committee (2009c:7). 
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the foreign-exchange markets are not at risk is preposterous – we now know that they 
required multitrillion-dollar bailouts. Anytime you have a lack of transparency, there is 
potential for abuse’.1273 She concluded that ‘current law with its loopholes would actually 
be better than these loopholes, which are just going to continue to promulgate the 
problem’.1274 Gary Gensler who tried to claim these products for the CFTC’s jurisdiction also 
voiced concerns about regulatory evasion. In his words, FX trades ‘could be broken down 
into their component parts and then restructured to resemble a series of foreign exchange 
forwards or a foreign exchange swap to come within the scope of these foreign exchange 
exclusions and thereby avoid regulation’.1275 
 
Second, the Democrats insisted that an exemption would represent a Wall Street subsidy to 
the banks whose reckless behaviour had caused the crisis in the first place. The Senate 
Banking Committee’s chief economist, Rob Johnson, for example, characterized the 
proposed exemption as a ‘form of Wall Street protectionism’ and therefore inadequate to 
‘address the fault lines that OTC derivatives represent’.1276 Using similar arguments, Bernie 
Sanders (I-VT) branded a potential carve-out ‘an absolute disaster’. 1277  Against this 
background, Barney Frank promised to leave no room for an exemption.1278 In the Senate, 
Chris Dodd considered closing the loophole a ‘legitimate issue’.1279 
 
The Treasury, however, prevailed. While the Act did not provide for a blanket exemption, it 
specified the following:  
 
Foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards shall be considered swaps 
[…] unless the Secretary [of the Treasury] makes a written determination […] that 
either foreign exchange swaps or foreign exchange forwards or both – 
(I) should be not be regulated as swaps under this Act; and  
(II) are not structured to evade the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act […] 1280 
 
The arrangement was considered a face-saving solution, particularly for the group of 
Democrats who had strongly opposed an exemption.1281 Note that any potential carve-out 
did not extend to business conduct and reporting standards.  
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3.2 Lobbying under the banner of business unity: The banks and the buy-side 
pushing for an exemption 
 
Interest groups’ responses to the Treasury’s public consultation on the determination 
revealed that the market widely supported an exemption, with the banks and the buy-side 
acting in unison and sending compatible signals. The only dissenting voices came from the 
exchanges that spoke through a joint submission of the World Federation of Exchanges and 
International Options Market Association. NGOs and the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee also drafted skeptical submissions.  
 
Building on ISDA’s claim that ‘the FX market has withstood many market disruptions’ over 
the last decades and had also weathered the 2008 crisis extremely well,1282 the proponents 
of an exemption advised that FX swaps and FX forwards were safe products and that 
regulatory intrusion would risk disrupting a well-functioning market. Regarding product 
safety, they pointed to three key characteristics, which, from their point of view, 
differentiated those products from most other kinds of OTC derivatives: Stable payment 
obligations the size of which is known ex ante, short maturities which provide for deep 
market liquidity, and transparency, given widespread execution through electronic trading 
platforms. To the American Bankers Association (ABA), the Institute of International Finance 
(IIF), 1283  and the Financial Services Roundtable, ‘[t]hese unique features result in a 
substantively different, and substantially reduced, risk profile compared to other swaps and 
derivatives’.1284 ICI argued that these are ‘all features that mitigate risk and help ensure 
stability’.1285 ISDA concurred, stating that ‘[t]he FX market is transparent and efficient’.1286 
Several other market actors advanced similar arguments.1287 
 
Settlement risk was the only type of risk market participants considered relevant. Indeed, 
according to a joint submission by SIFMA, AFME (Association of Financial Markets in 
Europe), and ASIFMA (Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association), it ‘dwarfs 
all other risks in the FX market’.1288 The Foreign Exchange Committee whose members 
included ISDA alongside a number of individual large banks, believed it was ‘the 
predominant risk.’1289 Most private sector respondents believed this form of risk was 
already well addressed, if not entirely eradicated through counterparties’ use of the CLS 
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Bank. SIFMA, AFME, and ASIFMA, for instance, maintained that ‘CLS Bank’s settlement 
system today eliminates virtually all settlement risk to CLS Bank participants’.1290 
 
The supporters of an exemption also directed attention to the fact that the banks as the 
most active market participants were already sufficiently regulated themselves, with ISDA 
highlighting the importance of ‘consolidated supervision by the relevant banking 
regulator’.1291 The proponents of a carve-out therefore saw no reason for the Treasury not 
to pursue the exemption. BlackRock highlighted that ‘the FX market has already attained, 
under its current regulatory structure, the goals Dodd-Frank seeks to achieve for other OTC 
derivative markets’. 1292  Along similar lines, the ABA, IIF, and the Financial Services 
Roundtable commented that ‘the presence of statutory carve-out language in Dodd-Frank is 
a recognition that the FX Swaps and FX Forwards markets already reflect Dodd-Frank’s 
primary goals for reform: greater transparency, effective risk management, and financial 
stability’.1293 
 
In contrast, the critics of an exemption emphasized that from their view, FX swaps and FX 
forwards were by far not as safe as the banks and some of their clients tried to make 
everybody believe, and that an exemption would only provide yet another loophole for Wall 
Street. The skeptics contended that the FX market had in fact experienced high levels of 
volatility during the crisis. Table 4 derived from sources cited in their submissions provides 
an overview of volatility in the FX market from the fall of 2007 to the autumn of 2008.1294 It 
documents a drastic increase in the number of transactions (left column), which was driven 
by counterparties’ desire to quickly pass on risk. In addition, it indicates the presence of 
large average bid-offer spreads (middle column), as well as their increased volatility (right 
column).1295 
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Table 4: Increased volatility of the FX markets at the height of the crisis 
 
Source: Melvin/Taylor (2009:29) 
 
Better Markets explained that the effects of the crisis in this market had only been 
alleviated following the Fed’s arrangement of currency swap lines with foreign central banks 
of an unprecedented size.1296 These central bank currency swaps functioned in the same 
way as currency swaps traded by private actors. Specifically, they allowed the Fed’s central 
bank counterparties to inject liquidity into their domestic economies, which eventually 
calmed the markets.1297 Figure 24 illustrates this relationship, plotting the Fed’s central 
bank swaps and the 3-month non-US/US LIBOR spread as an indicator of market 
stability.1298 
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Figure 24: The market-stabilizing effect of the Fed's central bank swap lines 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (2010) 
 
Americans for Financial Reform (AfR) argued that this kind of intervention would have been 
unnecessary, ‘[h]ad the FX markets been better regulated’.1299 It also cited a publication by 
the BIS according to which the use of CLS was not nearly not as universal as market actors 
had claimed, with ‘$1.2 trillion of FX obligations […] still subject to settlement risk as a result 
of the use of traditional correspondent banking arrangements [...]’.1300 In the same vein, 
Better Markets wrote that less than half of all transactions were channelled through 
electronic platforms, which made it conclude that the industry’s claims about full market 
transparency were ‘unfounded’. 1301  The World Federation of Exchanges and the 
International Options Market Association went on to explain that not only was settlement 
risk not fully addressed, given that not every trade was channelled through the CLS Bank, 
but that the Bank itself did not mitigate counterparty credit risk.1302 Better Markets added 
that neither did stable payment obligations, nor short maturities, nor the mere availability 
of CSAs.1303 
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The critics of an exemption also believed that providing regulatory relief for FX swaps and 
FX forwards would open a giant loophole for the industry. The Senate Homeland Security 
Committee, for instance, observed that the industry itself had already provided sufficient 
evidence for the accuracy of this view in light of its past actions. Specifically, the committee 
pointed to the actions of Goldman Sachs which in the early 2000s had assisted the Greek 
government in disguising the level of its debt through the perceived misuse of sophisticated 
FX derivatives. The committee explained that the discovery of this (entirely legal) 
manoeuvre had contributed to the start of the sovereign debt crisis. The fact that a number 
of other entities ranging from the government of Italy to energy giant Enron had previously 
applied similar strategies only reinforced its conviction that ‘foreign exchange swaps and 
foreign exchange forwards should not be exempted from regulation’.1304 For the critics, any 
carve-out would act as the ‘starting gun for the financial wizards on Wall Street to let their 
creative juices flow and figure out how many products they can cram through the 
loophole’.1305  
 
 
3.3 The seemingly perfect reflection of the banks’ arguments in the Treasury 
Determination: A case of congruence for the banks 
 
The Treasury Determination provided the exemption for FX swaps and FX forwards1306 that 
Geithner had sought from the beginning.1307 The document was published shortly after the 
presidential elections of 2011, at a moment when the level of issue salience was low 
enough for the solution to attract comparatively little public attention.1308 Referring again to 
the ‘qualitatively different’1309 nature of these products, the Determination repeated the 
industry’s arguments. Indeed, in order to explain away the need for regulation, it listed the 
same product characteristics market actors had discussed as risk-reducing and concluded 
that these ‘distinctive structural characteristics […] merit different regulatory treatment’.1310 
For example, the Determination pointed out that market ‘participants know their own and 
their counterparties’ payment obligations and the full extent of their exposures at 
settlement through the life of the contract’.1311 In addition, it highlighted the ‘much shorter 
maturities’, which, in its view, resulted in ‘significantly lower levels of counterparty credit 
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risk’.1312 Finally, the Determination cited statistics suggesting that 41% of FX swaps and 72% 
of FX forwards were already channelled through electronic trading platforms, which made it 
conclude that stricter regulation ‘would be unlikely to improve price transparency 
significantly’.1313 In line with the industry, the Treasury observed that this unique set of 
product characteristics ‘contributes to a risk profile that is largely concentrated on 
settlement risk’.1314 Equally in line with the majority of commenters, the Determination 
insisted that this source of risk was already ‘largely addresse[d]’, given the ‘extensive’ use of 
PVP arrangements and CLS’s settlement of 68% of the market.1315 
 
Regarding the concern about regulatory evasion, the Treasury reassured the skeptics that 
the carve-out from the definition of ‘swap’ did not provide any relief from Dodd-Frank’s 
trade reporting and business conduct standards.1316 In addition, it emphasized that any 
attempt to use the exemption as a loophole would not only be ‘illegal’,1317 but also further 
complicated given ‘operational challenges and transaction costs’.1318 
 
Finally, the Determination dismissed reservations against an exemption by reinforcing the 
industry’s observation that the banks as the most active FX market actors ‘are subject to 
prudential supervision, including comprehensive risk-management oversight’. 1319  The 
Treasury did not expand on the role of the Fed’s currency swaps or the general performance 
of the FX market during the crisis, the only exception being a brief reference to the market 
as ‘one of the few parts of the financial market that remained liquid throughout the 
financial crisis’.1320 
 
At first sight, the Treasury’s justification of the exemption appears as a glorious victory for 
market actors, above all ISDA and the large banks. Some observers have indeed taken that 
line. One media article, for example, cited statistical data from the OCC according to which 
the dealers had derived more than a third of their revenues for Q1-3 of 2010 from the FX 
segment. The article implicitly suggests that the exemption had to be interpreted as the 
result of successful bank lobbying and that the Treasury simply intended to protect the 
banks’ profitability.1321 The ‘profitability’ argument implies that the Treasury’s ‘no harm’ 
argument, discussed earlier in this chapter, mainly involved doing ‘no harm’ to the banks’ 
balance sheets.  
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However, there is reason to believe that this was probably not the Treasury’s primary 
motivation. Indeed, if it had been the Treasury’s driving concern, we would need to ask why 
it pushed for encompassing regulation across all other asset classes in the first place. 
Derivatives in general (i.e. not only FX swaps and FX forwards) used to be among the most 
lucrative parts of dealers’ business. The ‘profitability’ argument also does not explain why 
the Treasury did not ask for an outright exemption of all FX derivatives, rather than insisting 
on a special treatment for these two product types. While we cannot exclude that the 
Treasury at some point might have requested a broader carve-out behind closed doors, we 
know that its main focus rested on these particular product types. 
 
The most likely alternative explanation for the exemption seems to be the Treasury’s 
intention to keep these products outside the CFTC’s jurisdiction to which they would have 
otherwise automatically been subject. Why would the Treasury disapprove of the CFTC 
having jurisdiction over FX swaps and FX forwards, while it supported having the bulk of the 
other derivative products regulated by the very same agency? Why were these product 
types considered ‘different’? A derivatives lawyer of Jones Day has been quoted in the press 
as saying that ‘[w]hat it comes down to is an issue of regulatory turf. […] It might not be an 
issue that forex is a fundamentally different product to other OTC contracts, but a political 
move rather than anything else’.1322 
 
Against this background, we might need to interpret the Determination as a tactical solution 
intended to limit the CFTC’s reach. Indeed, the ‘political move’ of outmanoeuvring the 
agency might have been informed by at least two reasons related to turf, both of which 
concerned the Fed’s special role in this segment of the FX market. The first one related to its 
conduct of monetary policy, the second one to its dominant role in the governance of 
international payments systems.1323 
 
The first reason concerns the relevance of FX swaps and FX forwards to the Fed’s monetary 
policy, in particular the foreign currency segment of its Open Market Operations. The Fed’s 
use of FX swaps and FX forwards is part of its cable transfers, which ‘encompasses 
purchases and sales through standalone spot or forward transactions and through foreign 
exchange swap transactions’.1324 Back in 1961, the Fed’s general counsel, Howard Hackley, 
wrote a memo which ‘argued that various sections of the [Federal Reserve] Act - when 
considered together – authorized the Federal Reserve System to hold foreign exchange, to 
intervene in both the spot and forward markets, and to engage in swap transactions with 
foreign central banks and with the US Treasury’.1325 The ‘Hackley Memo’ is still relevant 
today, with eminent economist Allan Meltzer arguing that it ‘remains as the legal basis of 
the Federal Reserve’s holding of foreign exchange by purchase or ‘warehousing’, i.e. a loan 
to the Treasury secured by foreign currency’.1326 While warehousing has gone slightly out of 
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fashion, given the political concerns such a loan might fuel with regard to the Fed’s 
independence,1327 this chapter has already discussed the Fed’s swap lines with other central 
banks as a fundamentally important stabilizing element at the height of the crisis. Indeed, 
the Fed acted as the de facto international lender-of-last-resort to the central banks of 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, England, the EU, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and Switzerland.1328 In his memoir, Ben Bernanke describes 
the swap lines as ‘crucial in containing global contagion’.1329 Preventing the CFTC from 
interfering with these vital aspects of the Fed’s Open Market Operations could thus have 
been one of the reasons for the exemption. 
 
The second reason might relate to the Treasury’s intention of shielding the governance of 
the international payments systems, a central pillar of which is the CLS Bank, from the 
influence of the CFTC. Already in the 1970s, when the US Congress amended the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 to create the CFTC (i.e. at a time when the CLS Bank did 
not yet exist), the Treasury drafted an amendment, known as the Treasury Amendment, 
which clarified that the new agency should limit its oversight to FX futures traded on 
organized exchanges. In a letter to the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, the 
Treasury further detailed its motivation. While the letter was clearly informed by the rising 
deregulation consensus, it equally reflected the desire to prevent the CFTC from interfering 
with the work of the Fed (and the OCC):  
 
Virtually all futures trading in foreign currencies in the United States is carried out 
through an informal network of banks and dealers. This dealer market, which 
consists primarily of the large banks, has proved highly efficient in serving the needs 
of international business in hedging the risks that stem from foreign exchange rate 
movements. The participants in this market are sophisticated and informed 
institutions, unlike the participants on organized exchanges, which, in some cases, 
include individuals and small traders who may need to be protected by some form of 
governmental regulation. Where the need for regulation of transactions on other 
than organized exchanges does exist, this should be done through strengthening 
existing regulatory responsibilities now lodged in the Comptroller of the Currency and 
the Federal Reserve. These agencies are currently taking action to achieve closer 
supervision of the trading risks involved in these activities. The Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission would clearly not have the expertise to regulate a complex 
banking function and would confuse an already highly regulated business sector.1330 
 
The US Congress approved the Amendment in 1974.1331 After more than two decades of 
legal battle over the precise interpretation of the text during which the CFTC tried to extend 
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its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court upheld the core of the Treasury Amendment in 1997.1332 
Justice Antonin Scalia made the following comment corroborating the view that one of the 
Treasury’s main intentions was to prevent the CFTC from expanding its jurisdiction:  
 
[I]f Treasury were that confident [that the CFTC would not interfere with the 
efficiency of the interbank market], they would never have introduced the Treasury 
Amendment[.] If they were content to rely upon the good offices of the … 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, they wouldn’t have introduced the 
amendment at all. They would have just said we’ll cut our deal with the Commission. 
We know they’re reasonable people.1333 
 
The importance of the Fed’s leadership to the governance of the international payments 
systems can also be derived from various reports published by a number of groups 
composed of central bank representatives acting under the umbrella of the BIS. For 
example, the 1990 report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes highlighted that 
‘[i]nterbank payment and settlement arrangements provide the basic mechanism for the 
exchange of monetary value among financial institutions and, as such, are fundamental 
components of each country’s banking and monetary system’.1334 In a similar way, a 1996 
report by CPSS (the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures) argues that 
‘[s]ecure and well-functioning payments systems are necessary for the attainment of central 
banks' monetary, macroprudential, supervisory and other policy objectives. […] It is 
therefore appropriate that central banks should be concerned that the settlement 
arrangements in the foreign exchange markets should be structured so as to minimise 
systemic risk (the risk that the failure of one market participant to meet its required FX 
settlement or other obligations when due may cause significant liquidity or credit problems 
for other participants, and so may threaten the stability of the financial markets)’.1335 
 
In light of this assessment, it is probably not surprising that the CLS Bank is regulated by a 
group of central banks through the ‘CLS Oversight Committee [which is] organized and 
administered by the Federal Reserve’. 1336  The CLS Bank maintains accounts at the 
participating central banks in which it receives settlement members’ payments and through 
which it adjusts their respective sub-accounts. While central banks do not issue money for 
this purpose, CPSS notes that ‘all payments to and from CLS are made through the issuing 
central bank, so central bank money retains a necessary role, pivotal but not central, in the 
settlement of foreign exchange transactions in CLS’.1337 The exemption of FX swaps and FX 
forwards which together represent the bulk of trades settled by CLS might therefore also be 
understood as a move to protect the privileged relationship between the Fed (as well as 
other central banks) and the CLS Bank. 
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If the CFTC had gained jurisdiction over FX swaps and FX forwards, it would most likely have 
imposed a clearing mandate. This means a CFTC-regulated CCP would have had to 
cooperate with the CLS Bank, an outcome the Fed might have intended to avoid. Indeed, 
the central clearing of FX trades had already been explored 30 years earlier, but central 
banks had dismissed the idea because of turf. In its 1989 report, the Group of Experts on 
Payment Systems (representing the central banks of the G10 countries) identified as 
particularly problematic ‘the overlapping jurisdiction of domestic supervisory authorities. 
[…] [C]learing houses are likely to have characteristics that are similar to clearing 
corporations for organised securities and futures exchanges. Thus, in countries where the 
authority to supervise banking, securities and futures activities is divided between two, or 
more, official bodies, jurisdictional questions may arise’.1338 
 
After the crisis, central banks once again considered the idea of central clearing for FX 
trades. However, the Committee on the Global Financial System and the Markets 
Committee1339 housed at the BIS ultimately rejected it, referencing the risk that ‘any 
migration to a CCP model for a significant part of the FX market will have implications for 
the CLS business model’.1340 Shielding FX swaps and FX forwards from the CFTC might have 
also been an additional reason (beyond the deregulation consensus and concerns pertaining 
to competitiveness) why Greenspan, Summers, and Rubin shut down Brooksley Born’s 
attempts of regulating OTC derivatives in the late 1990s. 
 
 
3.4 Discarding IM, but imposing VM through supervisory guidance  
 
An additional reason casting doubt on the ‘profitability’ argument is the New York Fed’s 
decision, taken in cooperation with other central banks, to pursue supervisory guidance 
over banks’ adequate use of VM in their FX derivatives business. While the Determination 
attempted to downplay the risks of the market, Geithner was in fact acutely aware of them. 
Under his leadership as chair of the New York Fed, CPSS had discussed the results of a 
survey on financial institutions’ management of FX settlement obligations that had 
identified major weaknesses.1341  For example, while it found that 55% of the total 
transaction volume was channelled through CLS, it concluded that the fraction of trades still 
depending on ‘traditional correspondent banking remain[s] significant’.1342 In addition, it 
reported that the total settlement exposure of some institutions surpassed their capital by a 
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factor of 3-6.1343 Most worryingly, the survey revealed that the risks of FX trades were often 
not well understood by market actors. No more than a third of the institutions questioned 
were equipped with appropriate control mechanisms to check their exposures, and this 
fraction often did not include the institutions managing the largest exposures in function of 
capital.1344 
 
This might have presented the Fed with a dilemma. There was a perceived need for 
improved collateralization, but the Treasury Determination had made it impossible to 
impose formal requirements. Against this background, the preferred strategy was to 
enhance the use of VM through supervisory guidance by the New York Fed under its safety 
and soundness mandate, a solution which did not require new legislation and was 
compatible with existing one. The overall approach of the US thus involved pursuing an 
exemption from IM, but introducing VM through supervisory guidance. Most of this 
reasoning took place away from the public spotlight, meaning it did not attract or raise 
public issue salience. 
 
At the transnational level, this approach required several steps to be taken. First, WGMR 
had to be pushed to adopt a similar exemption for FX swaps and FX forwards from IM. From 
a purely competition-oriented perspective, the US might have probably benefited if banks in 
foreign jurisdictions had been required to post IM for FX swaps and FX forwards, while its 
own banks were exempt and thus in a position to lower cost and attract new business. 
However, this move would have likely further increased systemic risk in the American 
banking system. Most importantly, it would have openly contradicted the US’s overall desire 
to achieve a regulatory race to the top, which might have negatively affected its credibility. 
Further research would be required to uncover the precise decision-making rationale in this 
context. 
 
WGMR contemplated an exemption in its early discussions. Its first consultation paper cited 
‘the particular market and structural features of those instruments’, 1345  i.e. the 
characteristics the Treasury Determination had considered risk-reducing. However, there 
were tensions among the group, reflected by a passage in the consultation paper according 
to which it was ‘unclear whether these characteristics fully offset the need for margin 
requirements’.1346 The European members, in particular, rejected an exemption from IM 
(see section 4 of this chapter).1347 In the end, however, the US prevailed and WGMR 
adopted the desired exemption.1348 
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Second, the use of VM had to be promoted. The Fed decided to take advantage of BCBS-
CPSS’s Working Group on Foreign Exchange Settlement Risk which was chaired by its 
representative Jean-Marie Davis of the New York Fed. Davis identified the ‘sharpen[ing] of 
the discussion of replacement cost risk and holding of variation margin’ as one of the 
group’s key tasks.1349 In February 2013, the group published a package of seven guidelines, 
recommending a series of measures for banks to tackle FX risk, in line with the concerns 
discussed by the CPSS survey. The third guideline recommended the use of VM: 1350  
 
A bank should use legally enforceable collateral arrangements and should have an 
explicit policy on margin, eligible collateral and haircuts to reduce replacement cost 
risk. A bank should exchange (ie both receive and deliver) the full amount of 
variation margin necessary to fully collateralise the mark-to-market exposure on 
physically settled FX swaps and forwards with counterparties that are financial 
institutions and systemically important non-financial entities. […]1351 
 
Davis strongly affirmed the importance of the use of VM for banks’ FX risk management: 
‘This is an important piece of supervisory guidance and I expect there to be a lot of 
important development in the industry in response to it’. Emphasizing that ‘the industry will 
have some work to do in making sure they have all the CSAs they need’, she announced that 
‘[w]e will monitor the progress of implementation of the guidance and we want to see an 
improvement in the industry’s ability to identify, measure and monitor the duration of the 
risks, and then take steps to eliminate or mitigate the risk’.1352 
 
WGMR subsequently imported this guideline on the use of VM into its own framework. This 
manoeuvre worked rather smoothly, given the strong support for regulation of the FX 
swaps and FX forwards business by many of the group’s European members. The WGMR 
framework recommended that ‘[i]n developing variation margin standards for physically 
settled FX forwards and swaps, national supervisors should consider the recommendations 
in the BCBS supervisory guidance’.1353  The US Fed did so through the adoption of 
corresponding supervisory guidance.1354  
 
One might ask why the Treasury did not simply ask Congress to grant the Fed jurisdiction 
over FX derivatives in the first place, rather than strategizing the rather cumbersome 
manoeuvre of pushing for a domestic and then global exemption first, only for guidance to 
be subsequently issued both at the international level and domestic level. Publicly available 
material on this question is scarce, but it appears that public issue salience might have 
rendered it unwise for the Treasury to make this move. Indeed, the Fed faced strong 
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domestic criticism for having failed to prevent the crisis, and its perceived mismanagement 
of the crisis itself only reinforced Congress’ anger. For example, Congress’ antagonism had 
already torpedoed the Treasury’s original plan to turn the Fed into a systemic risk regulator 
for the entire US financial system,1355 with the job going to FSOC instead. 
 
House Agriculture committee chair Collin Peterson spoke for many of his colleagues who 
believed the Fed had been asleep at the wheel, when he approvingly cited a press article in 
which the Fed was criticized as having been ‘supposed to supervise the lending of many of 
the banks now in trouble, and yet seemingly they did nothing.’ Referring to the systemic risk 
regulator debate, Peterson went on to quote from the article which asked ‘why, when they 
didn’t do the job they were supposed to be doing, one would give them even more 
responsibility’.1356 In the Senate, Chris Dodd pointed out that ‘[f]rom its failure to protect 
consumers, to regulate mortgage lending, to effectively oversee bank holding companies, 
the instances in which the Fed has failed to execute its existing authority are numerous.1357 
Citing an American scholar and former Fed official, he concluded that ‘[g]iving the Fed more 
responsibility at this point […] is like a parent giving his son a bigger faster car after he 
crashed the family station wagon’.1358 
 
Jim Bunning criticized the secrecy surrounding the Fed’s emergency lending decisions, 
arguing that ‘the American people have a right to know where that money is going’.1359 
Regarding the lack of funds flowing to domestic businesses, he attacked the Fed for having 
‘put the printing presses into over-drive to […] hand out cheap money to [its] masters on 
Wall Street, which they used to rake in record profits while ordinary Americans and small 
businesses cannot even get loans for their everyday needs’. In a public hearing, he told 
Bernanke he considered this failure sufficient ‘to send you [i.e. Bernanke] back to 
Princeton’.1360 At one point, the Fed’s chair nomination for a second term seemed at serious 
risk in the Senate.1361 
 
The Fed’s swap lines, in particular, were widely considered a back-door bailout of foreign 
banks, to the detriment of the American taxpayer. Bernie Sanders, for example, furiously 
expressed his disapproval of this policy, saying that ‘[i]t is incomprehensible to me that 
while creditworthy small businesses in Vermont and throughout the country could not 
receive affordable loans, the Federal Reserve was providing tens of billions of dollars in 
credit to a bank [i.e. Arab Banking Corp] that is substantially owned by the Central Bank of 
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Libya’.1362 Congress’ anger went so far as to result in an audit of the Fed’s emergency 
lending system and the statutory limitation of its emergency lending powers during future 
crises.1363 In addition, several bills calling for a full audit of the Fed’s entire range of 
activities, including its monetary policy, were introduced, although ultimately none of it was 
ever enacted.1364 
 
Under these circumstances, asking for the exclusive jurisdiction over FX derivatives could 
have turned out problematic for the Fed, as it might have reinvigorated Congress’ appetite 
for limiting the central bank’s powers even further. Against this background, the Treasury’s 
request for an exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards provided an elegant alternative, as it 
directed Congressional attention away from the Fed. The final solution kept the Fed’s 
influence over these two important product categories intact, shielding its conduct of 
monetary policy and the governance of payments systems from any outside interference. 
Dealer bank influence does not appear to have played a significant role in this case. 
 
 
4. The EU case 
 
4.1 The banks’ push against regulation support by the buy-side  
 
In Europe, interest groups from both the sell-and buy-side unanimously opposed IM for FX 
swaps and FX forwards. VM was also widely rejected, although there were one or two 
cracks in the consensus. NGOs rarely participated in the public debate, and, as in the US, the 
end-users had already asked for an encompassing exemption for all product categories.1365 
 
The banks’ submitted information centred on two arguments in support of regulatory relief. 
First, as in the US, they believed that these products were ‘different’ compared to other 
types of OTC derivatives. The London Foreign Exchange Joint Standing Committee, housed 
at the Bank of England and composed of the largest market participants, pointed to 
numerous safety-enhancing features of the market including ‘[t]he deep and liquid nature 
of the market and high level of transparency, together with the risk mitigating structures 
already in place and a well established code of conduct between participants’.1366 It also 
observed that many counterparties ‘are themselves regulated entities’.1367 GFMA (the 
Global Financial Markets Association representing AFME, SIFMA, and ASIFMA) applauded 
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the work of the CLS Bank, arguing that ‘prudent supervision, practice guidelines and capital 
implications’ were already in place to address all pertinent forms of risks.1368 Bank of 
America-Merrill Lynch mentioned the widespread reliance of market actors on electronic 
trading and collateralization through the use of CSAs.1369 From ISDA’s point of view, the 
overall safety of the market allowed for only one logical conclusion, i.e. ‘that such trades 
should attract lower regulatory capital and margin requirements, if any at all, than other 
uncleared trades to reflect this lower level of risk’.1370 UBS simply explained to policy-
makers that ‘common sense must be applied’ in the rule drafting.1371 
 
Second, the dealers highlighted the competitive repercussions for EU firms, in case Europe 
were to divert from the course of the US. Warning of ‘unnecessary differences’, ISDA 
maintained ‘that a level international playing field is required to promote competition and 
prevent the distortions in trade which result from differing regulatory regimes’.1372 GFMA 
wrote ‘it is essential that the smooth functioning of the FX market not be disrupted’.1373 The 
recommendation of the German Banking Industry Committee read that the ESAs should 
‘align the European framework more closely with that of other regulatory frameworks, in 
particular the USA […] and thus help to avoid the significant competitive advantages’ any 
other decision would imply.1374 Along similar lines, the French Banking Federation insisted 
that ‘[i]nternational consistency is needed to avoid what could be a major disruption of 
competition for banks submitted to EMIR and their clients’.1375 Exit threats were not a 
dominant part of the banks’ publicly available communications. 
 
The buy-side advanced very similar arguments. Commenters questioned the virtues of 
public intervention, given ‘that many of the benefits the regulation seeks to address have 
been sufficiently mitigated by market practice without the cost implications’, 1376  in 
particular the mitigation of settlement risk through the CLS Bank, short maturities and 
stable payment obligations.1377 Numerous buy-side actors also pointed to the need for 
regulatory consistency with the US Treasury Determination.1378 SIFMA’s Asset Management 
Group, for instance, asked for complete relief from both IM and VM, claiming that any other 
regulatory approach, in particular the imposition of VM by the ESAs, would result in 
‘conflicting requirements’ with the US margin rules, which ‘could lead to regulatory 
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arbitrage’. 1379  EIOPA’s Occupational Pensions Stakeholder Group and Insurance and 
Reinsurance Stakeholder Group explicitly backed the sell-side’s position, arguing that ‘the 
banks recommend that physically-settled FX forwards and swaps should be exempted from 
any regime which requires the exchange, collection or posting, of initial margin between 
transacting parties on a mandatory basis’.1380 
 
Regarding the use of VM, ISDA was crystal clear in its rejection of any formal requirement, 
arguing that supervisory guidance as applied in the US was less strict than formal rules: 
‘[C]ompliance with supervisory guidance is not identical to compliance with margin rules; 
supervisory guidance does not have the same level of detail, it may apply only to banks, and 
may be interpreted in different ways for different countries. As a result, there is a significant 
difference for ISDA members between implementing margin rules and implementing 
supervisory guidance’.1381 Deutsche Bank pointed to ‘[t]he potential competitive distortion’ 
mandatory EU rules would introduce,1382 given that entities exclusively regulated by the 
CFTC were not subject to the New York Fed’s supervisory guidance, while the ESAs’ rules 
would apply across all types of firms. 
 
On the buy-side, VM requirements found support among the members of EIOPA’s Pensions 
Stakeholder Group and Insurance and Reinsurance Stakeholder Group which suggested that 
a ‘[v]ariation margin requirement for these products should be required as a result of 
supervisory guidance or national regulation’.1383  The vast majority of buy-side firms, 
however, rejected VM. Asset manager Adrian Lee & Partners, for example, requested the 
ESAs to show ‘consistency’ with Dodd-Frank and the Treasury Determination. It warned of 
the competitive implications of the mandatory prescription of VM, which ‘would only result 
in putting EU financial institutions at a competitive disadvantage’.1384 Millennium Global 
equally argued that a VM mandate ‘is at odds with international standards. […] This would 
put EU banks at a competitive disadvantage’.1385  
 
 
4.2 EU policy-makers imposing VM and harbouring strong reservations against 
an exemption from IM 
 
As already mentioned in the analysis of the US case, EU policy-makers harboured important 
reservations against carving out these products, and, initially, they did not see any reason 
for deviating from the overall ideational consensus. For the EU Commission, there were 
three main concerns. First was the risk of regulatory arbitrage, with Michel Barnier drawing 
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attention to ‘the possibility of transactions being re-categorised in order to benefit from 
such an exemption’.1386 Along similar lines, another EU Commission official emphasized that 
‘[i]t makes little sense to go down an asset-specific, single path. We must target all 
derivatives’. 1387  Second, the Commission pointed out that counterparty credit and 
settlement risk were still relevant.1388 In the words of Patrick Pearson, head of the 
Commission’s financial infrastructure unit, ‘[m]ost risk in FX is settlement risk. Is it really 
true that CLS took care of that?1389 Indeed, Germany’s KfW-Bank, a government-owned 
development bank, had made a Euro 300mn payment outside of CLS to Lehman Brothers on 
the very day of the bank’s bankruptcy, without obtaining a single dollar of the amount it 
should have received in return for its payment.1390 Third, Pearson referred to statistics 
showing a dramatic increase of FX volatility during the crisis, which made him question the 
impression created by some interest groups that the FX segment had weathered the crisis 
well.1391  
 
The EU Parliament largely supported the Commission’s views. A few MEPs led by the UK 
representatives Sharon Bowles and Kay Swinburne pushed for an exemption. Both policy-
makers contended that the CLS system was sufficient to address the main risks of the 
market.1392 Swinburne whose ‘personal preference would be to take FX out of the clearing 
obligation altogether’ hoped that the Treasury Determination would make her position 
‘gain more traction’.1393 Her ideal approach would have been ‘to address this directly in the 
regulation’1394. Bowles equally maintained that ‘[i]nternational consensus with the US is 
quite important, which is why you shouldn’t be rigid where you don’t need to be rigid. You 
don’t want to find your EU legislation has left you high and dry’. Unlike Swinburne, she 
preferred a more nuanced approach, in case the US would reconsider its position: ‘[W]e 
didn’t want to explicitly say ‘exempt FX’ in case the US changes its mind; we’d then be stuck 
with it in our primary legislation’, she explained.1395 
 
Bowles and Swinburne, however, faced strong opposition from their continental European 
colleagues who advocated a more independent European approach. German MEP Markus 
Ferber, for instance, questioned that FX was ‘different’, noting that ‘there was no-one able 
to explain to me why there should be a totally different approach for FX markets in 
comparison to other markets. Of course I've learnt what the US did […] - they will not 
include FX swaps in the Dodd-Frank regime. But that is the US approach. For the moment I 
don't see any need to have another approach for FX at the European level. The Parliament's 
                                                        
1386
 Barnier (2013) 
1387
 Mattias Levin of the EU Commission quoted in Grant (2009). 
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1391
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 See Khalique (2011c, 2011e, 2011f) 
1393
 Swinburne quoted in Khalique (2011c,2011d). 
1394
 Swinburne quoted in Khalique (2011d). 
1395
 All quotes by Bowles as cited in Khalique (2011f). 
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position is very clear: FX is included in the rules’. ‘If you add all the financial centres in the 
EU together, we have the largest financial market. I don't follow that we have to adopt only 
Dodd-Frank and then everything is clear. No, Europe is different’.1396 The Green Party in the 
Parliament equally insisted that ‘[t]he US Treasury is not a European legislator and the 
European Parliament should assess the issue independently’.1397 Given this high level of 
resistance, pushing through an exemption turned out impossible. Swinburne conceded that 
‘[w]ithin Parliament, we have never discussed an outright exemption for FX’. ‘A few of us 
suggested it but had absolutely no traction among the majority of the Parliament 
members’.1398  
 
The ESAs probably shared most, if not all the concerns voiced by the Commission and the 
Parliament. As a result, WGMR’s discussions of the FX question became contentious, with 
the transgovernmental community showing signs of cracks. An anonymous member of the 
group told the press that ‘there has been disagreement and we don’t currently have 
consensus’.1399 While VM for FX products was largely uncontested, the debate on the need 
for IM took place over an extended period of time, with both sides digging in their heels. In 
the end, however, the US prevailed, and, as already mentioned in the previous section, 
WGMR exempted FX swaps and FX forwards from IM. 
 
The ESAs followed the same path as the US, sacrificing the ideational consensus. Support for 
the idea that the ESAs probably ‘sacrificed’ the consensus, rather than simply amending on 
the basis of an ideational re-orientation, is provided by their comments on the issue. 
Indeed, in the first draft proposal, they clearly stated that ‘[t]here appears to be a risk 
involved in these transactions.’1400 The second consultation equally noted that ‘the physical 
settlement characteristics do not minimise the counterparty risk against unforeseen events 
such as counterparty default.  […] An initial margin requirement for non-centrally cleared 
physically settled foreign exchange swaps and forwards is expected to minimise the risk 
associated with counterparty default’.1401  
 
Regarding VM, the ESAs’ (final) draft RTS stipulate that despite the exemption from IM, ‘the 
counterparties are still expected to post and collect the variation margin associated with 
these contracts’.1402 ISDA tried to intervene with the EU Commission to have it veto the 
ESAs’ plan of adopting a VM requirement, but to no avail.1403 While market actors praised 
the decision on IM, they interpreted the VM requirement as ‘a shock to the system’.1404  
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4.3 The EU decision against IM: A case of congruence for the banks 
 
Given that the EU institutions appeared to care deeply about the perceived risks of FX 
trades, with some MEPs, such as Ferber, even willing to flex the EU’s ‘market power’ 
muscles, one might wonder why Europe gave in to the US’ pressure for an exemption from 
IM for FX swaps and FX forwards, after having stood its ground regarding the universal two-
way exchange of IM. This leads us to the question of why FX, again, was considered 
‘different’, and why the EU sacrificed the ideational consensus on the issue. 
 
We can think of several hypotheses. At first glance, one might attribute Europe’s decision to 
successful bank lobbying, particularly given the fact that, unlike in the 2-way IM debate, 
there was unanimous consensus among market actors in favour of an IM exemption. We 
cannot entirely discard this option. However, given that the EU representatives in WGMR 
kept resisting an exemption as long as possible, and that the Parliament equally rejected a 
carve-out, this interpretation appears unlikely. 
 
A second interpretation might focus on the role of the CFTC. In the 2-way IM case, the CFTC 
supported the European position for a collect and post mandate. This undermined the PRs’ 
call for a collect-only regime and resulted in the US lacking a consistent approach, which the 
EU could exploit by pushing for a universal 2-way exchange alongside the CFTC. In the FX 
case, however, the agency’s hands were tied because of the Treasury Determination, 
meaning the European regulators lacked a crucial ally. 
 
We can also think of a third potential interpretation. When drafting the RTS, the ESAs made 
a comment emphasizing the need for globally harmonized rules: ‘[T]o maintain 
international consistency, entities subject to the RTS may agree not to collect initial 
margin’.1405 The emphasis on ‘international consistency’ in the regulation of the highly 
integrated global FX market might be considered an indicator of a ‘functionalist’ logic being 
at play.1406 However, margin for FX swaps and FX forwards appears to be much more than 
just a technical issue which, if left unresolved, would cause elevated transaction costs, 
inefficiencies, and externalities, thus requiring international coordination. An example of 
such an issue and its (to this date rather unsuccessful) resolution would be the adoption of a 
common system of legal entity identifiers (LEIs) and unique trade identifiers (UTIs) required 
for the efficient operation of post-crisis derivatives trade reporting.1407  In this case, 
coordination was necessary to develop a common language for all counterparties. Policy-
makers were also unlikely to be constrained by the design of the rules themselves. Some of 
them harboured confidentiality concerns regarding the requirement to share relevant 
data,1408 but this responsibility evenly applied to all members of the system. 
 
                                                        
1405
 ESAs (2014:7; 2015:8; 2016a:13) 
1406
 For a full development of the theoretical arguments undergirding an important strand of functionalism, 
see for example Keohane (1984) and Martin/Simmons (1998). 
1407
 See Knaack (2018). 
1408
 See FSB (2018). 
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Margin for FX swaps and FX forwards, however, appears to be different. The consistent 
application of IM, or the granting of an exception would certainly reduce transaction costs, 
inefficiencies, and externalities. However, the outcome could have lasting uneven effects 
(either enabling or constraining) in terms of the particular risks and costs associated with 
the chosen approach, both at the level of the individual entity and the respective 
jurisdiction in which it operates. Indeed, the effects would probably reach beyond those 
associated with classical functionalist solutions, such as the agreement on a particular width 
of railroad tracks, where most of the cost is concentrated at the early stages of the 
implementation phase for those jurisdictions having to adjust their systems to the 
commonly agreed solution. More generally, focusing on the desire of achieving 
‘international consistency’ does little to help us in understanding who has to concede to 
whose definition of ‘consistency’. If the EU had prevailed with its original preference in 
favour of an IM requirement, European policy-makers could have probably made the exact 
same ‘consistency’ argument in justifying the adoption of a comprehensive IM mandate. 
 
This leads us to a fourth possible interpretation: competitiveness concerns. The ESAs note 
that imposing IM ‘would give the EU a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis other players’, 
given the ‘additional costs for the industry, which may in turn downsize the market’.1409 In 
the UK, the FSA equally highlighted that charting a regulatory course out of sync with the US 
would disadvantage the City whose competitiveness as a premier financial centre would 
suffer. As a consequence, the FSA insisted on the need ‘to avoid potentially creating the 
arbitrage issues that might arise from the discrepancies between two such large 
markets’.1410 There is thus some important support for this hypothesis. 
 
However, we might ask how this fourth interpretation fits together with the imposition of 
the VM mandate. As we saw, US supervisory guidance on the use of VM is limited to entities 
under oversight by the Fed, whereas firms falling under the CFTC’s jurisdiction are not 
directly affected. Indeed, the EU was the only major jurisdiction to adopt a formal VM 
requirement. Because the ESAs issued joint rules for all types of financial entities, their VM 
requirements also covered a much broader range of firms than those subject to the Fed’s 
supervisory guidance. If competitiveness had been the EU’s sole decision-making criterion, 
we might have expected it to forego the VM requirement altogether, or to significantly 
curtail its scope. 
 
An explanation allowing us to retain competitiveness as a central decision-making criterion, 
but to embed it within a richer theoretical context is the idea that the EU sacrificed the 
consensus because of its fundamental dependence on the USD, and that the US prevailed at 
the international level, given its structural power informed by precisely this dependence. On 
the one hand, Europe enjoyed power as regulatory capacity, given the elevation of the ESAs 
to regulatory agencies and the EU-wide scope of EMIR. Moreover, it also had power as 
market size by hosting the largest market for FX transactions in the City of London. London 
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 Alexander Justham of the FSA quoted in Khalique (2011g), more generally Marsh (2009). 
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owes much of its pre-eminent status to the City’s geographical time zone location allowing 
for local trading sessions to overlap with those in Asia (London morning) and New York 
(London afternoon). As already mentioned in the two-way IM chapter, the EU in 2010 
accounted for 50% of the global FX market, with the UK covering 37%, while the US was 
trailing behind with a share of no more than 18%. In 2013, the respective figures were 53% 
(EU), 41% (UK), and 19% (US).1411 While these data cover the FX market in its entirety, the 
breakdown for the FX swap market yields similar results. In 2010, for example, the average 
daily volume of FX swaps traded in the US was USD 220bn, which is less than a third of the 
775bn traded in the UK over the same period. For 2013, the figures were USD 237bn (US) 
and USD 1127bn (UK) respectively.1412 
 
However, while the US did not host the leading marketplace, it supplied the most traded 
good - the USD - and thus the currency European banks fundamentally depended on. 
Indeed, for historical reasons, the USD is (still) the world’s ‘top currency’ which Strange 
‘defined as the currency of the state that has world economic leadership, the currency of 
the predominant state in the international economy’.1413 She argues that the dollar has 
acquired this dominant role as a result of the decades during which the US occupied the 
leading position in the areas of global production, knowledge, security, and finance.1414 
 
Table 5 reflects the dominance of the USD with regard to the currency distribution in the 
OTC FX market. 
 
Table 5: Currency breakdown of the OTC FX market 
 
Source: Author based on BIS (2016, table 2). The table denotes percentage shares of overage daily turnover. 
The total of all currencies is 200%, rather than 100%, given that the recorded transactions involve two 
currencies. Only the top 7 currencies are listed, i.e. the mark of 200% is not reached. 
 
                                                        
1411
 Author’s calculation by other based on BIS derivatives statistics (table D11.2 -Turnover of OTC foreign 
exchange instruments, by country). 
1412
 The data is taken from the FX volume surveys conducted by the Bank of England’s Foreign Exchange Joint 
Standing Committee and the New York Fed’s Foreign Exchange Committee.  
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 Strange (1971:221) 
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Strange (1987:565). Since her first publications on the topic, many scholars have made similar arguments 
building upon her insights (see for example Cohen (1998,2013) and the collection of essays in Germain 
(2016b)). 
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Moreover, as shown by figure 25, the USD is also the currency that dominates international 
cross-border lending. A comparison of panel A and panel B reveals that most of the lending 
is accounted for by banks. 
 
 
Figure 25: Currency denomination of cross-border lending 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author based on BIS Locational Banking Statistics (Table A1-S: Summary of locational statistics, by 
currency, instrument and residence and sector of counterparty; USD tn) 
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Other BIS data indicates that prior to the crisis, European banks had accumulated large USD-
denominated exposures. For example, the USD-share of UK banks’ foreign operations at the 
end of 2007 accounted for 42%. The equivalent ratio for Spain was 36%, 33% for Germany, 
31% each for the Netherlands and France, 23% for Belgium, and 10% for Italy.1415 The 
reasons for European banks’ appetite for USD-denominated exposures ranged from the 
growing importance of structured finance and securitization perceived as yielding attractive 
rates, the rise of ‘universal banking’ and the related growth of proprietary trading, as well as 
the expansion of the hedge fund industry to which the banks provided loans through their 
brokerage arms.1416 A second incentive for accumulating USD was related to the dollar’s 
status as the world’s ‘vehicle currency’. Unlike non-Eurozone European countries that can 
use the Euro, most countries have to go via the USD in order to exchange their currencies, 
which represented an attractive business opportunity for Europe’s banks.1417 To these more 
specific considerations one might add a broader third factor: the general attractiveness of 
the US financial markets, unrivalled in their depth and liquidity. Finally, a fourth factor might 
involve (continental) Europe’s traditional reliance on banks rather than securities markets 
for financial intermediation, a dependence the Commission has recently begun to address 
by taking first steps towards the development of a capital markets union.1418 
 
The high level of USD-denominated exposures made Europe’s banks vulnerable, because 
most of them lacked the necessary funds to finance them internally. The banks therefore 
had to rely on external dollar liquidity. Besides US money market funds and (emerging 
market economies’) central banks, the FX swaps market represented the most important 
funding source.1419 European banks’ vulnerability was elevated not only because of the level 
of their USD exposure, but also because of its maturity structure.1420 Indeed, as is the case 
for most banks, the maturity of their loans was longer than that of their deposits, while the 
maturity of their foreign currency funding was shorter than that of their domestic currency 
funding.1421 The situation for Europe’s banks was further compounded by the fact that 
because of the USD’s central role, their US counterparts had only modestly expanded their 
own foreign claims, i.e. their demand for European currencies was much smaller than vice 
versa, and their need to hedge international investments was comparatively much less 
severe.1422 As a consequence, rolling over debt was a constant urgent need for European 
banks. Estimates suggest that in mid-2007 Europe’s banks required a minimum of USD 1-
1.2tn.1423 
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With the intensification of the crisis in 2008, securing access to USD became more and more 
difficult, and after the traditional sources of USD liquidity had dried up following the failure 
of Lehman, it became nearly impossible. Indeed, US money market funds began to retreat, 
given their domestic losses, and (emerging market) central banks pulled back some (or all) 
of their USD deposits in order to channel them towards their own banking systems. At the 
same time, the FX swap market risked freezing. US banks that could have provided USD 
preferred not to, be it in order to hoard them for precautionary reasons, to signal strength 
to their competitors, and/or to deleverage their own balance sheets. 1424  Investors 
scrambling to buy dollars as a ‘safe haven’ asset created additional demand for the 
currency.1425 Those banks with offices in the US that could tap the Federal Reserve System 
transferred USD funds to Europe, but in general these amounts proved insufficient.1426 The 
ECB did not have enough USD in its vaults either, meaning that Europe was unable to 
liberate itself from the USD shortage. 
 
Rather, it was the US Fed which, acting as the international lender-of-last-resort, provided 
the required liquidity through its swap lines with other central banks.1427 The ECB was the 
main recipient drawing on USD 8tn in aggregate, followed by the Bank of England with USD 
900bn, and the Swiss National Bank with USD 456bn.1428 Through the swap lines, the ECB 
was able to infuse USD liquidity into the European banking system, thereby easing the 
tension in the market. Ben Bernanke writes in his memoir that ECB President Jean-Claude 
Trichet tried ‘to foster the impression that the swap lines were part of a solution to a U.S. 
problem, rather than an instance of the Fed helping out Europe’. However, he argues that 
Europe’s fundamental dependence on this kind of support was evident.1429 
 
The success of the Fed’s swap lines and the resilience of the USD during the crisis (as 
opposed to its demise which some observers had initially expected) further reinforced the 
dollar’s centrality.1430 The sudden failure of the Euro on its path towards rivalling the 
greenback, caused by the sovereign debt crisis and the serious limitations of the EU’s crisis 
management, indirectly strengthened the USD even further.1431 The yuan, long considered a 
potential long-term rival of the dollar turned out to be exactly that: a potential, long-term 
rival. At the height of the crisis, several influential Chinese policy-makers voiced concerns 
about their country being embedded in a monetary system premised on the USD, but the 
enormous amount of USD-denominated currency reserves tied their hands with respect to 
any drastic short-term change.1432 Indeed, China’s decision against any precipitous move 
                                                        
1424
 Mancini-Griffoli/Ranaldo (2011:22ff.), Committee on the Global Financial System and Markets Committee 
(2010:6ff.), Allen/Moessner (2010:6f.), McGuire/von Peter (2009:16ff.), Borio et al. (2017:47) 
1425
 Helleiner (2014c:8) 
1426
 McGuire/von Peter (2009:17) 
1427
 McDowell (2012) 
1428
 All data is taken from Weder di Mauro/Zettelmeyer (2017:8). 
1429
 Bernanke (2015:184) 
1430
 Helleiner (2016b, 2014c:ch.3) 
1431
 See Cohen (2015) and Germain/Schwartz (2014). 
1432
 See for example Kirshner (2014). 
 250 
towards full currency convertibility, caused to a great extent precisely by the size of its 
reserves,1433 prevented it from dumping large amounts of USD within a short period of time. 
As a result, the yuan did not have any negative short-term effects on the dollar’s centrality 
either.1434 
 
Overall, the USD had therefore lost little, if anything, of its pre-crisis attractiveness. As a 
consequence, and with the exception of structured finance and securitization whose 
importance decreased following the US housing crash, the factors causing European banks’ 
appetite for USD-denominated exposures had remained unchanged. In fact, they might 
have even grown in importance, given the US’s stronger relative economic performance. 
With the adoption of stricter rules for US money market funds by the SEC following the 
crisis,1435 European banks dependence on the FX swap market might have actually become 
even more severe. Against this background, a unilateral imposition of IM on FX swaps and 
FX forwards by the EU would have had severe repercussions for the competitiveness of its 
banks, as it would have increased their cost of accessing USD even further, and this at a 
time, when they were already struggling with the effects of the sovereign debt crisis.  
 
This explanation would confirm Kirshner’s interpretation of Hirschman’s approach according 
to which ‘the US gains because participation in a dollar-based international monetary order 
[…] shapes the perceived self-interests of states […]’.1436 It also appears compatible with the 
frameworks developed by Strange and Cohen. While the analysis suggests that the 
American representatives in WGMR certainly had to do more than simply attend and ‘be 
there’ in order to make the EU drop its preference for an IM mandate, Europe’s reliance on 
the USD allowed them to exercise ‘the power to decide how things shall be done’, in 
Strange’s terminology,1437 and to ‘favorably modify[] the interaction situation’, in Cohen’s 
parlance.1438 
 
While policy-makers never explicitly mentioned the relevance of structural power in public, 
the explanation aligns with some comments by the EU Commission’s Patrick Pearson on its 
effects. For example, at one point he observed that ‘you would probably have to wear a 
pretty big pair of boots to come up with a different decision [than the US]’.1439 Along similar 
lines, an unnamed source from the EU Commission commented in the media that ‘[i]f we 
are very strict on those instruments, we would simply hurt ourselves’.1440 
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While we require further empirical evidence to understand the precise impact of and 
interplay between ‘power’ in its different facets in this case, the analysis appears sufficient 
to provide an answer to the overall research question of the thesis, in the sense that it 
appears unlikely that dealer bank influence acted as the primary causal driver of public 
decision-making in either jurisdiction. The exemption from IM, while congruent with their 
preferences for keeping the market deregulated, appears to have been taken for different 
reasons in the US and the EU, but none of them seems to be have been directly related to 
bank lobbying. The dealers also could not prevent the adoption of VM for FX swaps and FX 
forwards, be it in form supervisory guidance, as in the US, or through the imposition of 
formal rules, as in Europe.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards from IM in the US 
and the EU was in keeping with the banks’ preferences, but that in both cases it was most 
likely a case of congruence, rather than causal influence. Regarding VM, the dealers lost on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  
 
In the US, the factor constellation regarding IM initially appeared stacked against the banks. 
High levels of issue salience, the Democrats’ (plus maybe the Treasury’s) ideational outlook, 
and the CFTC’s attempts to disturb the domestic institutional environment resulted in an 
initial configuration in which each of the three moderators at first disadvantaged the banks. 
What turned the tide in favour of congruence was most likely the turf war between the 
CFTC and the Fed/Treasury which caused the Treasury to sacrifice the ideational consensus, 
leading to the exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards through the Treasury Determination 
on the basis of Dodd-Frank granting this opportunity. This turned the sign of the domestic 
institutional moderator to the banks’ favour, as it cemented the CFTC’s lack of jurisdiction. 
After the passage of Dodd-Frank, public attention had moved on to other questions, 
meaning low levels of issue salience now equally worked in favour of the banks’ 
preferences. High business unity added to the stability of this equilibrium. The banks 
themselves, however, seem to have exercised little causal influence over the decision. The 
transgovernmental and inter-state power moderators at this stage were most likely 
uninvolved. 
 
In the EU, the same moderators were initially turned against the banks, with the overall 
factor constellation equally placing them in the direction of a loss. In light of the ideational 
outlook calling for IM, and this consensus being accompanied by persistently high levels of 
issue salience, as well as a frictionless domestic institutional environment, a loss for the 
banks appeared likely. Indeed, at first the EU insisted on WGMR embracing a 
recommendation in favour of the use of IM. What turned the tide in favour of congruence 
was most likely US structural power in terms of European banks’ dependence on the USD. It 
ensured that WGMR eventually decided against the imposition of IM, which then turned the 
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domestic institutional environment moderator around, leading to the adoption of an 
exemption by the ESAs, in spite of high issue salience and an opposing ideational outlook. 
As in the US, the banks benefited from business unity, but their preferences do not appear 
to have been the causal driver of the policy process.  
 
Regarding VM, the banks lost because of the individual and joint effects of the ideational 
outlook, the domestic institutional environment, and the transgovernmental community 
operating against their preferences. At this point, inter-state power had most likely receded 
into the background again. The only difference between the two jurisdictions appeared to 
be the level of issue salience which was high in the EU, but low in the US. Under either 
constellation, high business unity (in conjunction with low salience in the US) was 
insufficient for the banks to exercise influence and prevent the adoption of the VM 
mandate in the form of supervisory guidance in the US, and as part of the ESAs’ draft 
regulatory standards in Europe. 
 
As opposed to the cases of influence or loss discussed in the previous chapters, in the IM 
cases, the individual and joint effect of the three moderators associated with policy-makers’ 
ideational outlook, the state of the transnational community, and the domestic institutional 
environment pointing in the same direction was absent, most likely because these were 
examples of congruence. However, we once again identified the effect in the VM cases, 
where it appears to have contributed to keeping bank influence at bay. The following 
chapter will further address this finding. 
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CHAPTER IX - Conclusion 
1. Discussion of the results, the argument, and theoretical 
contributions to the literature 
 
Has there been any change to the influence of dealer bank preferences over policy 
outcomes in the regulation of OTC derivatives in the US and EU since the global financial 
crisis of 2008? If so why? If not, why not? Focusing on OTC derivatives deregulation prior to 
2008 and the introduction of mandatory margin requirements for non-centrally cleared 
derivatives after the crisis, I have argued that dealer bank influence has significantly 
decreased since 2008, having shifted from pre-crisis dominance to a mix of (limited) indirect 
influence, congruence, and losses thereafter.  
 
Table 6 summarizes the results of the empirical analysis. The table follows the same 
notation as used for the individual case-related illustrations in the empirical chapters. Green 
shading indicates a moderator had a positive effect on the level of influence, as seen from 
the banks’ perspective with regard to their preferences (second column from the left). Red 
stands for a negative effect. A frame in the opposite colour (red for green, green for red) 
indicates the moderator had its sign turned. Note that the discussion of the results does not 
always follow the chronological chapter order. 
 
Table 6: Overview of results 
Source: Author 
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As we can infer from the outer right column, there was not a single post-crisis case over 
which the banks succeeded in exercising direct influence post-2008. The only case in which 
they projected some influence concerned the treatment of commercial end-users. 
However, given the dealers’ tarnished reputation following the crisis, they were largely 
forced to act through the end-users as their coalition partner, meaning their influence was 
only indirect. Moreover, it was limited in the EU, where policy-makers did not adopt a full 
exemption. The banks probably also benefited from congruence regarding the exemption 
from FX swaps and FX derivatives from IM, but they most likely did not have any direct 
causal influence over these outcomes. 
 
Most strikingly, however, the banks had to accept several major defeats in cases over which 
they lost and failed to exercise influence. The mandatory use of IM, the fact that it has to be 
exchanged 2-way, the requirement to segregate it (with a third-party custodian in the US), 
the prohibition to rehypothecate it, and the VM requirement for FX swaps and FX forwards 
are each in direct contradiction to their preferences. The empirical analysis suggests that 
the banks did not ‘overstate’ their ‘true’ preferences, meaning we can classify these cases 
as ‘losses’ with some degree of confidence. 
 
The table also reveals that the needle indicating the level of bank influence sometimes 
fluctuated over the course of the policy-making process, before settling at its final level. We 
find this outcome only for some of the post-crisis cases, including the 2-way IM case in the 
US, the end-user case in the US, as well as the IM for FX swaps and FX forwards cases in 
both the US and the EU. 
 
Focusing on the final level of influence for the post-crisis cases, with each jurisdiction 
counting as one case, the overall results yield the following score: 2 cases of (limited) 
indirect influence, 2 cases of congruence, and 10 cases of loss. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the pre-crisis period, where the banks exercised constant dominant influence in both the 
US and the EU, with no regulatory decision being taken against their preferences.  
 
The broader case study evidence also suggests that post-crisis, policy-makers attributed 
much less importance to the information the banks submitted in order to justify their 
preferences. As well, the dealers lost their ability to exercise structural/structuring power 
which they had used to prevent or correct deviations from the deregulation paradigm prior 
to 2008. Relatedly, the banks lost their central position within the transnational policy 
community. In fact, in the margin case, the transnational policy community dissolved, with 
the transgovernmental community emerging in sharp relief. 
 
How can we explain this change? 
 
I suggest conceiving of ‘dealer bank influence’ as a moderated condition whose expression 
in terms of causal ‘influence’, ‘congruence’ and ‘loss’ can be explained by six conditions, the 
level of business unity, the level of public issue salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook, 
the state of the transnational policy community, the nature of inter-state power relations, 
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and the domestic institutional environment. In particular, I argue that we should study this 
system as a dynamic and interactive one in which it is not always just the effect of the 
individual moderator that determines the particular level of influence, but also their 
interaction amongst each other. Such an integrative approach appears particularly relevant 
for developing an understanding of cases in which the needle moves along the ‘influence 
barometer’ before settling in its final category at the end of the policy process. In other 
words, when examining the table, we should not focus only on the individual effect of each 
moderator across all cases, but also on their interplay in each individual case. 
 
Prior to 2008, the banks benefited from a unique constellation in terms of a positive effect 
emanating from each of the moderators. There was high business unity, public issue 
salience of derivatives regulation was usually low, policy-makers’ ideational outlook was 
informed by the ‘efficient market’ hypothesis, the banks occupied a privileged position in 
the transnational policy community, inter-state power relations never played out in a way 
that could have been detrimental to deregulation, and at the domestic institutional level 
the dealers equally found an environment conducive towards deregulation.  
 
Most importantly, many factors also positively reinforced each other. The absence of 
business conflict promoted the banks’ position within the transnational policy community, 
whose members subscribed to the efficient market hypothesis, which consolidated support 
for deregulation at the domestic institutional level, which again fed back into the ideational 
deregulation consensus. The dominance of this consensus also ensured that inter-state 
power plays never had a market-constraining effect. Predominantly low levels of public 
issue salience added further stability to this configuration. In other words, it was not only 
the individual effect of the moderators that strengthened bank influence prior to the crisis, 
but also their joint and interactive effect. The banks’ influence was also supported by their 
ability to provide information highly valued by policy-makers, and to (threaten to) exercise 
structural/structuring power, if deemed necessary to keep this equilibrium in place. The 
stability of this configuration might also be the reason why neither occasional spikes in issue 
salience, nor occasional attempts by the CFTC to rein in the market could shake it and push 
the banks’ level of influence into a weaker category. 
 
The crisis, however, caused an exogenous shock to this configuration, resulting in a 
fundamental reconfiguration. Each of the moderators at times had a detrimental effect on 
the banks’ respective level of influence. Depending on the specific moderator constellation, 
this resulted in (limited) indirect influence, congruence, or loss. There was not a single case 
in which the banks reached their peak-level of pre-crisis dominance.  
 
The policy-making process on the margin rule began with the mandatory use of IM, a case 
which turned out a lost battle for the banks in both jurisdictions. The high issue salience of 
derivatives regulation, caused by the negative repercussions of the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression, led to the adoption of a new ideational outlook in form of the 
‘clearing/margining’ consensus. This consensus which clashed with banks’ preferences, was 
shared by policy-makers both at the domestic institutional and the transgovernmental level, 
 257 
meaning inter-state power relations were not at the forefront (nor was any of the margin 
cases openly used as a side show to solve some other inter-state problem). With the 
exception of ‘business unity’, which was high, thus exercising a positive effect, as well as 
‘inter-state power’, which was neutral, all moderators were flashing red. It was not just the 
individual effect of these factors, but also their joint interaction, that produced a fatal 
constellation in which high business unity against IM alone did not allow the banks to 
exercise any influence.  
 
In the 2-way IM case in the US, the banks at the beginning appeared to be set for 
‘congruence’, but the needle of influence eventually settled in the ‘loss’ category. Initially, 
there was friction at the domestic institutional level, informed by the differing mandates of 
the CFTC (which preferred a 2-way mandate) and the PRs (which favoured a 1-way 
approach). With the PRs prevailing at first, this moderator thus exercised a positive effect 
on the level of bank influence. The same applies to the ideational moderator, given that the 
PRs also prevailed from an ideational point of view. Public issue salience was low, adding 
yet another positive effect. In the early stages, the only factor operating to the banks’ 
detriment was the lack of business unity, given the high degree of preference divergence on 
the buy-side. What changed the tide and pushed the level of influence from ‘congruence’ to 
‘loss’ was probably a mix of EU market power cum power through regulatory capacity, in 
combination with socialization efforts of the PRs within WGMR, which turned the signs of 
the transgovernmental level- and inter-state power-related moderators negative. With the 
EU and US members of WGMR ultimately in agreement about the need for 2-way IM, this 
also changed the effect of the domestic institutional level moderator from positive to 
negative. As a consequence, in the end, the only positive effect on influence emanated from 
public issue salience, which remained low. However, on this basis alone, the banks were 
unable to exercise effective influence. 
 
There were also other cases which reflected a dynamic interaction of the moderators. In the 
IM for FX swaps and FX forwards case, the banks were initially set for a loss on both sides of 
the Atlantic. In the US, the level of issue salience was initially high and the CFTC claimed 
jurisdiction over this segment of the FX market. The ideational outlook probably also called 
for covering these products with IM. As a result, all three moderators were operating 
against the banks. What turned the level of influence from ‘loss’ to ‘congruence’ was 
probably the turf war between the CFTC and the Fed/Treasury at the domestic institutional 
level, which made the Treasury adopt an exemption. The exemption of these products from 
the definition of ‘swap’ under Dodd-Frank ensured the CFTC would not gain jurisdiction, 
which turned the effect of the domestic institutional moderator from negative to positive. 
Once the Treasury adopted the Determination, the public issue salience of the question had 
already returned to lower levels again, as a result of which the signal of this moderator 
equally changed from negative to positive. The effects of the transgovernmental policy 
community and inter-state power moderators were probably neutral, given that the US 
took this decision before the official establishment of WGMR, and at a stage when the EU 
was far away from any final decision-making. The fact that business unity was high and in 
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favour of the exemption, and that the banks welcomed a carve-out was probably unrelated 
to the outcome.  
 
In the EU, the initial factor constellation was the same. The level of public issue salience was 
high, the ideational outlook called for the use of IM, and the domestic institutional 
environment was comparatively free of any frictions. This meant that all three moderators 
operated against the banks. What turned the tide and shifted the level of influence from 
‘loss’ to ‘congruence’ was probably US structural power exercised through European banks’ 
dependence on the USD, which caused the EU to give in to the US. The effect of the inter-
state power moderator was therefore positive. This set in motion a cascading development. 
Structural power led to the adoption of an exemption by WGMR, thus ensuring an equally 
positive signal from the transgovernmental policy community moderator. This, in turn, 
changed the signal of the domestic institutional environment moderator, with the ESAs 
equally embracing an exemption, in spite of high issue salience and policy-makers’ opposing 
ideational outlook. As in the US, the banks’ preference for an exemption and the display of 
business unity on the question were probably unrelated to the decision. 
 
We find a similar dynamic pattern in the end-user case, particularly in the US, where the 
dealers succeeded in preventing a loss in favour of achieving ‘(indirect) influence’. Gary 
Gensler’s campaign initially stacked the field against the banks, conditioning public issue 
salience, policy-makers’ ideational outlook and the domestic institutional environment 
against them. What turned the tide and pushed the needle on the influence barometer 
from ‘loss’ to ‘(indirect) influence’ was the high level of business unity between the banks 
and the end-users. The bank/end-user coalition launched a major campaign with the aim of 
creating ‘friendly’ issue salience, which, over time, changed the overall sign of the issue 
salience moderator to the banks’ advantage. The campaign also raised the support of the 
New Democrats and other members of the Democratic Party, as a result of which the effect 
of the ideational outlook began to change to the banks’ advantage. The missing language on 
the treatment of end-user deals in Dodd-Frank caused a temporary setback for the banks, 
since it boosted Gensler’s determination to not let go of the mandatory collateralization of 
end-user trades. As a response, the end-users reinvigorated their efforts, ringing the 
salience bell at full alarm regarding the need for a carve-out. With the advent of the 
Republican majority whose members supported the end-users’ preferences, the ideational 
outlook on Capitol Hill further evolved in the banks’ favour. The exemption was therefore 
only a question of time. It was eventually adopted as an unrelated provision to the renewal 
of TRIA. With a legal exemption in place, this also turned the domestic institutional 
moderator to the banks’ advantage, as it tied the hands of the CFTC. In addition, the banks 
benefited from the fact that WGMR did not show much interest in the question, supporting 
a broad exemption. As a consequence, the transgovernmental community moderator 
equally flashed green. The end-user question being primarily a domestic issue, inter-state 
power relations were not invoked, corresponding with a neutral effect of this moderator. 
 
In all the other cases, the process was more straightforward, meaning the banks’ level of 
influence did not fluctuate during the process. In the end-user case in the EU, the bank 
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exercised (limited) indirect influence. They benefited from the fact that at the domestic 
institutional level, historical precedent of promoting SMEs had made policy-makers much 
more receptive towards some form of a carve-out. This, in turn, meant that the ideational 
outlook and salience moderators were also operating to the advantage of the banks. As in 
the US, the level of business unity was high. The dealers also formed a bank/end-user 
coalition whose campaign ensured that ESMA would not disrupt this equilibrium. As in the 
US, the fact that WGMR approved of a broad exemption and that the end-user question 
was considered a domestic concern provided further support to the stability of the factor 
constellation. 
 
The banks lost all the other cases, with the needle never leaving the ‘no influence’ segment 
of the spectrum. In the 2-way IM case in the EU, as well as the segregation and 
rehypothecation cases in both jurisdictions, the ideational outlook called for a strong 
regulatory response, with this assessment being shared both by the transgovernmental 
community and at the domestic institutional level. As a result, all three moderators 
operated against the banks, forming a stable feedback mechanism. The dealers also 
suffered from the fact that business unity was low across all cases. With low levels of issue 
salience being the only moderator working in their favour, they turned out unable to 
exercise any influence. 
 
The VM for FX case evolved in a similar way. On both sides of the Atlantic, the same three 
moderators operated against the banks’ preference for regulatory relief. In the EU, this was 
complemented with high levels of ‘hostile’ issue salience. With business unity as the sole 
moderator operating to their advantage, the banks experienced a major loss. In the US, high 
levels of business unity were complemented with comparatively low levels of issue salience, 
but the positive effect of these two moderators alone was insufficient for the banks to 
prevent a loss. In both cases, the relevance of the inter-state power moderator had ceded 
into the background again. 
 
The results of this study do not allow us to answer the eternal question of what ‘causes’ 
influence, or, more precisely, what moderators or constellation(s) of moderators determine 
in which category of influence the banks will find themselves at the end of the policy 
process. The model is not predictive,1441 meaning that we cannot specify ex ante, which 
variable(s) will initiate a movement of the needle on the influence barometer, and in which 
direction. 
 
However, what we can derive from the analysis is that a sole focus on the final, individual 
effect of each moderator would limit our understanding of dealer bank influence. Each of 
the theoretical explanations of the individual effect of the moderators contributes 
important insight, but on their own, each of them is insufficient for us to comprehend the 
overall level of dealer bank influence. Rather, banks’ level of influence appears to be the 
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 The model shares this characteristic with other theoretical approaches of the IPE literature, such as the 
historical institutionalist framework discussed in chapter II-2.3.6. 
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result of the individual effects of the moderators plus particular combinations of 
moderators and their interaction effects. In other words, the sum is more than the parts. 
 
The table also allows us to make further observations that other scholars might find 
interesting. First, there appears to be no single ‘super’ moderator whose expression allows 
us to predict which level of dealer bank influence will prevail. This means that dealer bank 
influence cannot be reduced to a single cause. However, with the relatively limited number 
of six conditions and various combinations thereof, we were able to explain all outcomes, 
even though we cannot guarantee that we have not missed a critical condition. 
 
Second, in each case over which the banks enjoyed influence, all moderators had a positive 
effect (or a neutral one in the case of inter-state power). We did not study enough cases to 
infer that all these moderators always need to be flashing green (or exercise a neutral 
effect) in their final constellation in order for influence to occur. However, it appears that 
configurations associated with ‘influence’ or ‘loss’ become more stable, the higher the 
number of moderators operating in sync. 
 
Third, a comparison of the ‘influence’ and ‘loss’ cases suggests that three moderators and 
their interactions are of particular relevance: policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of 
the transnational policy community, and the domestic institutional environment, which 
together appear to have formed a ‘core’ across all these cases. Every time the banks were 
influential, the ‘core’ and its individual components exercised a positive effect, whereas 
every time they lost, the ‘core’ had a negative effect. It is perhaps not surprising that the 
only cases to which this observation does not apply are the congruence cases, where the 
core was split, leading to an outcome that pleased the banks, but over which they had 
exercised little causal influence. 
 
Pre-crisis, banks’ use of information and structural/structuring power may have contributed 
to maintaining the positive effect of the ‘core’ and its component variables, whereas post-
crisis, the dealers lacked the means to disrupt it. However, it appears, difficult to establish 
initial causation for each case. Nonetheless, the presence of the ‘core’ and the interaction 
among its component variables is an interesting observation, worthy of further 
investigation.  
 
Fourth, the specific configuration of the ‘core’ factors does not render the other moderators 
irrelevant. In the post-crisis period, inter-state power appears to have been particularly 
relevant for cases marked by transatlantic preference divergence of policy-makers as a 
result of challenges at the domestic institutional level. From a ‘bank influence’ perspective, 
there is no clear tendency in which direction the ‘inter-state power’ moderator operates. In 
the 2-way IM case in the US, it pushed the needle from the ‘congruence’ to the ‘loss’ 
category, whereas it shifted it from ‘loss’ to ‘congruence’ in both IM for FX swaps and FX 
forwards cases. Whenever the US and the EU were already in agreement about the desired 
policy outcome, this moderator was not of any explicit relevance to banks’ influence. 
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Business unity was less meaningful to the pre-crisis cases, in that the dealers were the only 
private sector actors raising their voice. In the post-crisis period, however, business unity 
between the banks and non-financial firms was crucial. Indeed, in the end-user case, it was 
the key ingredient causing the needle to shift from ‘loss’ to ‘influence’, particularly in the 
US. However, banks’ success on this front in terms of exercising (limited) indirect influence 
over the outcome also meant that they subsequently lacked their most valuable coalition 
partner, given policy-makers’ embrace of (partial) regulatory relief for end-user trades. 
 
The evidence also indicates that banks’ attempts to use high levels of business unity with 
the buy-side in order to block reform never resulted in influence. We don’t have a case 
where they agreed on a ‘constructive’, alternative reform proposal, given the preference 
divergence on the buy-side and the banks’ constant obstruction against reform. It would be 
worthwhile studying the factor constellation and corresponding level of influence that 
would have emerged from the banks forming a strong coalition with the buy-side and 
submitting such proposals. 
 
Finally, public issue salience was a particularly interesting moderator. As theoretically 
expected, the dealer banks were influential in the pre-crisis period, when issue salience was 
low, while they lacked influence post-crisis, when public attention reached high and ‘hostile’ 
levels. The banks’ attempts at manufacturing ‘friendly’ issue salience in the end-user case 
were crowned with success, paving the way for a full exemption in the US, and ensuring the 
policy-process stayed ‘on track’ in the EU. Importantly, however, the banks never succeeded 
in exercising influence, even when public issue salience was low. This, again, highlights the 
need to study the joint and interactive effect of the moderators. With the exception of the 
IM for FX swaps and FX forwards case in the US, where the carve-out stretched two steps 
across the adoption of Dodd-Frank and the Treasury Determination, low levels of issue 
salience in the post-crisis period always coincided with the presence of the ‘core’ variables 
flashing red. This would suggest that as long as policy-makers share a common ideational 
consensus on a given policy, with this agreement being sustained at the transgovernmental 
and domestic institutional levels, the banks have a hard time disrupting the equilibrium in 
the event they oppose it, even under conditions of low issue salience.  
 
What are the implications for research on private financial interest group influence over the 
design of post-crisis rules? 
 
Studying dealer bank influence over policy outcomes in financial regulation as a moderated 
condition appears promising. I have identified a range of six variables that individually and 
in their various combinations promote our understanding of the change of dealer bank 
influence from pre-crisis derivatives deregulation to the development of some important 
elements of the margin rule as a crucial post-crisis case of re-regulation. Specifically, I have 
proposed that we should not study only the ‘individual’ effect of the moderators, but also 
examine their joint, dynamic, and interactive effect. These (dynamic) interactions have so 
far received little attention in the literature, but the results suggest that such an integrative 
approach might be promising for future research. In particular, we should direct more 
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attention to the ‘tipping points’ at which moderators turn their sign, thereby often initiating 
a cascade of effects over the course of which other moderators change their signal. When 
do these tipping points occur? How many moderators need to change before the banks 
enter into a new category of influence? 
 
Out of the six variables I have suggested to study, three appear to be of particular relevance 
for banks’ degree of influence: policy-makers’ ideational outlook, the state of the 
transnational policy community, and the domestic institutional environment. Dealer bank 
influence appears more likely if these three moderators are in alignment, with the banks’ 
preferences, but also amongst each other. 
 
This thesis has taken only an initial step towards understanding and conceptualizing dealer 
bank influence as a moderated condition. More conceptual work would be necessary in 
order to put this approach on a more solid analytical footing. For example, how would one 
respond to studies not confirming the theoretically expected individual effect of a particular 
moderator? While the framework developed in this thesis provides an explanation as to 
why such inconclusive results based on individual effects may be possible, it would be 
important to critically examine the relevance of such findings for the broader validity of the 
approach. 
 
Conceptually, we might also have to apply more nuance to specifying the role of the 
different methods of preference articulation the banks have at their disposal. In the 
empirical cases, the banks moved from a situation where their information was highly 
sought after and where they could freely project structural/structuring power, to almost the 
opposite scenario. This left us with little granularity to further develop the model in this 
direction. 
 
Another observation we made was that the border between ‘methods of articulation’ and 
‘moderators’ sometimes blurs. For example, the revolving door can be considered a vector 
of preference articulation, but, prior to the crisis, it also sustained the vitality of the 
transnational policy community. Relatedly, the banks’ post-crisis mobilization of the end-
users for the creation of ‘friendly’ issue salience could also be considered an indirect form of 
‘preference articulation’. While these issues did not constrain us in answering the overall 
research question undergirding this thesis, a more refined version of the framework would 
have to address these issues. 
 
The sceptical reader might suggest that the generalizability of the results could be 
contingent on the cases to which the framework was applied. Indeed, we witnessed a 
reversal from complete deregulation to strong, even if not full re-regulation. While such 
radical changes have also occurred in other areas of post-crisis reform (two important 
examples being the regulation of hedge funds and credit rating agencies1442), the more 
common ‘routine’ case involves a smaller shift along the regulatory spectrum in favour of 
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 Pagliari (2013b) 
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‘more’ or ‘less’ intervention. Applying the framework to a number of such ‘routine’ cases 
would therefore be important. Bank capital regulation might offer such an opportunity. 
 
At the conceptual level, it might also be worthwhile examining the utility of modifying the 
basic design of the framework in order to apply it to questions other than interest group 
influence over policy outcomes. For example, we might be interested in developing a better 
understanding of the ways in which policy-makers’ embraced the ideational post-crisis 
consensus. In this case, policy-makers’ ideational outlook would become the dependent 
variable. Alternatively, we might focus on the post-crisis development of US-EU inter-state 
power relations. In either case, the other variables - including dealer bank influence, or 
private sector influence more generally - would have to be re-arranged in function of the 
precise research question. If considered useful, this level of flexibility would add to the 
model’s intellectual purchase and theoretical versatility. 
 
At the empirical level, the next steps would involve testing how the framework, including 
the results pertaining to the ‘core’, travel to the other parts of the margin rule which we did 
not study. In particular, it would be interesting to see if the dealer banks were able to 
recoup some of their lost influence during the negotiation of the precise calculation 
requirements (see also the discussion in chapter II-5). In addition, we could apply the model 
to the later stages of the policy cycle, when market actors began implementing the new 
requirements, or when policy-makers started evaluating the reform’s overall performance. 
 
Another promising research strategy would consist in adding more cases at the 
jurisdictional level. This thesis has focused on the largest markets for uncleared derivatives, 
i.e. the EU and the US. However, the commitment to develop post-crisis derivatives rules 
was made at the level of the G20, and thus by many more jurisdictions. Since the 2008-
crisis, the Asian derivatives markets, in particular, have started gaining in importance.1443 
Examining the implementation of the G20 agreements in Asia could yield valuable lessons 
for IPE scholarship. Japan hosts the largest and most developed market in the area. At the 
same time, Singapore and Hong Kong are aiming to increase the respective shares of their 
own markets.1444 A comparative analysis of the reform process in Asia and the US/the EU 
could also help us derive relevant conclusions.  
 
Moving beyond the framework as such, the results suggest that scholars interested in bank 
influence over post-crisis financial regulation should spend more time analyzing the 
relevance of the ‘core’ variables. While this would of course not mean dismissing the other 
factors, scholars might find it useful to pursue a mixed approach combining insights 
specifically from constructivism, transnational approaches, and domestic institutional 
analyses. The variables related with these literatures sometimes tend to be considered only 
as a ‘second thought’ by the interest group literature which often tends to place particular 
emphasis on ‘instrumental’ and ‘structural’ power variables, or to consider policy-makers 
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‘as mere vectors of competing interests’.1445 Balancing both aspects might further enrich 
our understanding of the notoriously difficult-to-capture notion of ‘interest group 
influence’.  
 
More generally, the results indicate that an uncritical focus on the idea of ‘regulatory 
capture’ is misleading. In the margin case, business unity alone was never sufficient for 
influence to prevail, even if it occurred in conjunction with low issue salience. The results of 
this thesis contribute to a growing literature calling for a more nuanced approach to the 
study of interest group influence. For example, at the most basic level, Carpenter and Moss 
highlight the empirical challenges of ‘proving’ capture, given the difficulties in precisely 
defining the ‘public interest’ a particular policy should serve. In their words, ‘policy analysts 
are often quick to see capture whenever an interest group appears to benefit from 
regulation, or even when there is merely motive for capture’.1446 Carpenter also warns of 
uncritically subscribing to the idea that public policies favouring a particular industry 
necessarily collide with the public interest as perceived by policy-makers themselves.1447 
The pre-crisis case, when most policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic genuinely 
believed in the virtues of full-scale deregulation as beneficial for the wider economy 
illustrates this point.  
 
Approaching the ‘regulatory capture’ concept from a different angle, Stellinga and Mügge, 
observe that a closer look at ‘the controversies and debates that occur[] in the policy 
process’ often reveals that ‘[p]olicy problems may show a much greater resistance to 
effective solutions than we often assume’,1448 which can constrain the adoption of ‘optimal’ 
policies, creating the impression that private interest groups drove the decision-making 
process. The exemption of FX swaps and FX forwards from IM might have been such an 
example. 
 
Finally, Young argues that ‘if we really want to acquire a substantive understanding of 
private sector influence in global financial governance, it is not sufficient to only examine 
instances when private sector groups appear to get what they want’.1449 His empirical 
research shows that financial groups’ success in influencing policy outcomes during the 
development of Basel II was often paired with considerable losses. The results of the margin 
case point in a similar direction. More generally, the evidence indicates that the level of 
dealer bank influence is conditional on an array of six conditions, as well as their interaction, 
of which three appear particularly important. Even in the pre-crisis period, when dealer 
bank influence was dominant, deregulation was not simply the result of the banks asking for 
                                                        
1445
 Stellinga/Mügge (2017:416). Their conceptualization focuses on regulators, while I widen it to include 
policy-makers more generally. 
1446
 Carpenter/Moss (2014:20, emphasis in the original). The ‘common interest’ and its relation to ‘capture’ are 
also at the centre of an analysis by Mattli/Woods (2009). 
1447
 Carpenter (2014) 
1448
 Stellinga/Mügge (2017:415) 
1449
 Young (2012:683) 
 265 
it and policy-makers acting upon that request, but of a much more complex inter-play of a 
number of different factors. 
 
One particular risk of elevating the relevance of these factors during the research process is 
that it could lead us from one extreme, where we see ‘capture’ everywhere, to another one 
where we fail to identify ‘influence’ anywhere. One strategy to avoid this trap could be 
paying particular attention to the dynamic nature of the interactions of the moderators. In 
the end-user case, for instance, this analytical perspective helped us identify the role of 
banks’ (indirect) influence over the eventual carve-out, particularly in the US, thus 
preventing us from classifying this example as an outcome unrelated to dealer bank 
lobbying. 
 
What are the implications of this study for the wider literature on post-crisis financial 
derivatives regulation? 
 
Most importantly, the margin case suggests that an exclusive focus on dealer banks and 
their preferences is limiting, if we aim to develop a better understanding of particular 
outcomes of post-crisis financial derivatives regulation. This thesis has suggested that the 
level of dealer bank influence is conditional upon an array of six conditions and their inter-
play. Post-2008, the expression of these conditions and their interaction changed. Scholars 
interested in post-crisis derivatives regulation should focus not exclusively on interest group 
approaches, but widen the analytical lens so as to elevate the relevance of these other 
conditions. As Helleiner has noted, understanding the complexity of post-crisis financial 
reforms requires ‘a more contingent, conjunctural, and nuanced understanding of the 
politics of global regulation’.1450. Indeed, it is the particular inter-play of all these variables 
that allows us to comprehend why post-crisis derivatives regulation (at least with respect to 
the margin case) was in fact possible, against the predictions of some structuralist observers 
as well as other skeptics. 
 
 
2. Empirical contributions  
 
Beyond the theoretical contributions discussed in the last section, the dissertation also 
makes several empirical contributions.  
 
First, it contributes to the IPE literature on derivatives. Despite a number of recent 
publications exploring selected aspects of post-crisis derivatives regulation,1451 this area still 
represents relatively uncharted territory for IPE scholarship. The thesis provides the first 
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detailed analysis of some key elements of the reform leading to the introduction of 
mandatory margin requirements for uncleared derivatives. The study is also among the first 
that does not only focus on the content of new rules, but also traces the policy process of 
their adoption. In adopting this perspective, it responds to calls by other scholars to provide 
‘more detailed analyses of the content of [post-crisis] regulatory initiatives’1452 and develop 
‘[a] better grasp of how rules are made’.1453  
 
Second, the thesis contributes to the literature on interest group influence over post-crisis 
financial regulation. The empirical results shed light on the role of private financial interest 
groups over post-crisis reform, an ambition encouraged by a number of scholars inviting us 
to study the evolution ‘of private actors, particularly financial firms, as key players in the 
policymaking process’,1454 the process of ‘how these groups adapt to and contribute to the 
process of financial regulatory change’,1455 and to examine whether ‘financial industry 
influence [is] less consistent than in the past’.1456  
 
The evidence suggests that the dealer banks lost their privileged role in the policymaking 
process leading to the adoption of the margin reform. While they had exercised 
commanding influence over the pre-crisis deregulation of derivatives, the global financial 
crisis and the reconfiguration of the factors which I suggest moderate bank influence led to 
an evaporation of large parts of this influence. Rather than shaping the policy-making 
process and contributing to the design of the specific requirements, the dealers mostly 
attempted to obstruct any change of the status quo, usually to no avail. While they had not 
lost a single of the pre-crisis battles, they were forced to swallow several major defeats 
post-2008, and where they did exercise influence after the crisis, they did so indirectly and 
sometimes with only limited success. Other policy outcomes that align with their 
preferences were probably the result of congruence, rather than causal influence. 
 
Post-2008, the significantly reduced level of ISDA’s influence appears particularly striking. 
Indeed, with respect to the margin rule, the association clearly lost its pre-crisis position as 
the ‘most powerful and effective lobbying force in the recent history of financial 
markets’.1457 Indeed, ISDA’s tremendous pre-crisis success may have boosted its confidence 
to an extent that it believed it could weather the 2008 crisis and simply block change, as it 
had so frequently succeeded in the past. This would also explain the often rather 
confrontational, ‘all-or-nothing’ advocacy style it decided to adopt. One should also keep in 
mind that ISDA is not, and has never been, a Self-Regulatory Organization, such as FINRA 
(the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority) which develops and enforces rules for 
brokerage firms and exchanges. Given its pre-crisis success in ensuring the deregulation of 
financial markets, as well its confidence in maintaining the status quo in the immediate 
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aftermath of the crisis, ISDA probably did not see the need for a wider discussion about 
owning that space, and once the political climate had turned against the banks, the window 
of opportunity for policy-makers to support such a move had closed. 
 
In addition, ISDA frequently struggled to unite the banks’ preferences with those of the buy-
side, except for when it came to obstructing change. The quest for business unity was 
certainly not facilitated by the fragmentation of preferences on the buy-side, as well its 
peak business associations. However, there also appears to have been a perception that 
ISDA probably did not do enough to reach out to buy-side actors to identify areas in which a 
pro-active collaborative advocacy approach could have been possible. 
 
Regarding the location of the empirical results on the spectrum of change in private 
financial interest group influence after 2008, the case study evidence suggests a position 
towards the end that identifies reduced financial sector dominance. We should not choose 
the far end of the spectrum, given the dealers’ success at exercising (limited) indirect 
influence over the end-user case. The end-user case also corroborates a number of post-
crisis empirical studies suggesting that financial group influence is often indirect, exercised 
through the advocacy of a coalition partner.1458  
 
Unlike broader analysis of post-crisis banking and derivatives regulation more generally 
suggests, the dealers in this particular case did not ‘passively accept’1459 the new margin 
rules. To the contrary, they actively fought tooth and nail against every proposal that would 
have resulted in a reversal of the pre-crisis status quo of deregulation. Yet in most cases, 
they were unsuccessful, and where they saw their preferences adopted by policy-makers, 
they were probably lucky in terms of benefiting from congruence, the only (partial) 
exception being the end-user case. One reason, (though, as we saw, far from the only one) 
was the growing trend towards intra-financial sector conflict that Pagliari has already 
identified with respect to other aspects of post-crisis derivatives regulation. 1460  The 
empirical evidence also confirms Porter’s observation about banks having been 
unsuccessful in their attempts ‘to restore the levels of power […] that private sector actors 
enjoyed before the crisis’.1461 Overall, the margin reform which has brought an end to self-
regulation has, to this date, led to anything but ‘stasis’,1462 or a return to ‘business as 
usual’.1463 Taken together, the results provide a clear answer to the question of how the 
‘public-private relationship’ has evolved after the crisis.1464 The balance has shifted towards 
the public side, after it had long resided on the private one.1465 
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The analysis of the margin rule also allows us to make some broader observations which 
contribute to the literature on post-crisis financial regulation more generally. First, unlike 
some skeptics had initially expected, challenges at the domestic institutional level, such as 
regulatory fragmentation in the US, did not derail the (trans)national decision-making 
process, nor did they lead to significant fragmentation.1466 One of the key reasons for this 
outcome appears to have been the strength of the ideational consensus, in combination 
with the role of WGMR to serve as a focal point for policy-makers to coordinate their 
reforms.  
 
Newman and Posner have conducted a comparative analysis studying the degree of 
alignment of US and EU post-crisis banking and derivatives regulation, particularly central 
clearing. They find that, while in banking ‘politicized bilateralism characterized by mutual 
threats of retaliatory action has been the exception’, it has been much more frequent with 
regards to CCPs, the result being ‘outcomes based on relative power as opposed to 
technocratic rationales’.1467 The key difference they identify between these two cases is the 
presence or absence of an established international forum enabling policy-makers to 
develop international soft law, understood ‘as a set of written, advisory prescriptions’1468 
that carry legitimacy at the national level and are adopted, ideally, before the launch of the 
domestic policy-making process.1469 Over the course of their analysis, they reveal that while 
the BCBS served as the focal point for post-crisis banking regulation, central clearing lacked 
such a forum. As a consequence, policy-makers drafted their own clearing rules 
independently from each other at the domestic level, which often led to fragmentation and 
conflict about the cross-border applicability of these requirements. 
 
For example, one of the most contested aspects of the clearing rules, which resulted in a 
long-lasting public blame game and significantly delayed transatlantic equivalence 
determinations, concerned the minimum length of the ‘liquidation period’ IM collected by 
CCPs should cover. The CFTC insisted on one day, whereas the EU preferred two days. The 
dispute persisted for several years, before being eventually resolved in 2016 in favour of the 
US.1470 After large parts of the CCP rules were already in place in both jurisdictions, CPSS-
IOSCO in 2012 published some ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’.1471 However, 
in spite of the length of the document extending across a total of 188 pages, the principles 
were ‘principles’, rather than ‘advisory prescriptions’, to use Newman and Posner’s 
terminology. Moreover, they were frequently not specific enough, and they came too late in 
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order to shape the domestic policy process. Also, the group did not enjoy the same extent 
of immediate legitimacy in domestic policy-making, as is the case for BCBS.1472 
 
In derivatives trade reporting (not at the focus of Newman and Posner’s analysis), policy-
makers operated in ‘a web without a center’, with the FSB equally acting too late and not 
decisively enough.1473 The result has been chaos, even though this transparency-enhancing 
reform ‘is arguably the least controversial’.1474 
 
The margin rule has been spared this fate. Newman and Posner briefly hypothesize this 
thought, but without further developing the idea.1475 As we saw, BCBS-IOSCO’s WGMR was 
established by the US because of uncertainty whether the EU would follow up on its G20 
commitment, at a time when the extent of the problems in the realms of clearing and trade 
reporting could not yet have been gauged. The timing was not ideal, since Dodd-Frank was 
already adopted, and the CFTC and the PRs had already published a first round of draft 
rules. While an earlier establishment would have facilitated the decision-making process, it 
was not yet too late for the adoption of a harmonized global approach, since the EU was not 
yet advanced in its decision-making process, and the US regulators could re-set their rule-
making through a second draft proposal.  
 
Fragmentation, particularly with respect to 1-vs. 2-way IM, could thus be prevented. As 
well, where disagreements persisted, as in the IM for FX swaps and FX forwards case, a 
transgovernmental solution could be found (exception from IM, but introduction of VM 
requirements) before fragmentation and retaliation were to poison the political climate, as 
they did in the clearing case. With the exception of the (EU) segregation case, and the highly 
politicized end-user case where the current exemption in the EU is not as all-encompassing 
as in the US, fragmentation along domestic lines has been mostly averted. 
 
While we have to limit the applicability of this statement to the cases we examined, the fact 
that the equivalence determinations pertaining to the collateralization of cross-border 
trades revealed comparatively little contestation, provides further indirect evidence 
pointing to the relevance of WGMR in preventing fragmentation.1476  
 
However, while the relevance of WGMR, in conjunction with the strong ideational 
consensus, was of unquestionable importance for achieving harmonization, power 
considerations were not completely absent. The power-related arguments of the analysis 
are comparatively less strong, given data constraints and the general difficulties of 
identifying power in its application. Keeping these challenges in mind, the EU’s power 
through regulatory capacity and power through market power probably represented the 
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‘second leg’ which, in combination with socialization effects, ensured the stability of the 
PRs’ embrace of the 2-way mandate. The US regulators, in particular the PRs, had initially 
expected that as first movers, they would provide the blueprint for the global margin rules, 
with one of the purposes of WGMR being to ensure that the other jurisdictions would 
follow the American lead. However, the 2-way IM case reveals that the EU has in fact 
become an independent voice in global financial governance. Shortly after the crisis, Posner 
predicted ‘a greater willingness on the part of national politicians and EU representatives to 
use strengthened bargaining positions to export EU models to the international level’.1477 
The empirical evidence provides support in favour of this conjecture.  
 
At the same time, the IM for FX swaps and FX forwards case points to the (current) limits of 
the EU’s inter-state power. While Europe enjoyed both power through regulatory capacity 
and power as market power, it was not in control of the supply of the key traded good, i.e. 
the USD. Even more so, not only was the EU not in control of its supply, it was in fact highly 
dependent on it for its own domestic banking sector. This might have allowed the US to 
project structural power through the relevance of the USD as the international key 
currency, and thus to extract a concession from the EU in terms of the exemption of these 
products from IM. We also saw that in light of the immediate lack of credible contenders, 
the USD’s centrality is likely to continue.1478 
 
This thesis asked: has there been any change to the influence of dealer bank preferences 
over policy outcomes in the regulation of OTC derivatives in the US and the EU since the 
global financial crisis of 2008. If so, why? If not, why not? The analysis up to this point has 
focused on change to the influence of dealer banks. As a final step, we might ask to what 
extent the margin reform per se signifies change to the governance of post-crisis derivatives 
markets more generally. The following section will discuss this broader question in order to 
conclude the study. 
 
 
3. The margin reform and broader change to the governance of 
post-crisis financial derivatives markets  
 
The empirical evidence underscores the structural overhaul the uncleared market has 
undergone. Much more than just ‘symbolic’ and ‘marginal’, as some observers have 
commented with respect to post-crisis financial regulation more generally,1479 the reform 
has imposed significant costs on market participants and represents a ‘seismic shift’1480 in 
terms of how the market is governed. The mandatory use of IM, in combination with the 
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requirement to segregate and to not rehypothecate it, represents a sea change, even 
though some exemptions and limitations apply. This defies the notion that ‘the Dodd-Frank 
Act falls short of radically reshaping the structure or operation of derivatives markets’.1481 It 
also runs counter to some structuralist observers who had maintained that OTC derivatives 
reform was ‘a near impossibility’ because of the uncleared market being ‘too elusive to be 
easily regulated’.1482 In 2017, CFTC chair Massad explicitly confirmed the significance of 
margin rule by saying that ‘I believe one of our most important accomplishments is that we 
have built a broader consensus that these reforms make sense.’1483 
 
As well, analysts consider the increased use of CCPs, which represents a central pillar of the 
post-crisis ideational consensus, as ‘probably the main accomplishment of the post-2008 
reform’.1484 Indeed, more than 60% of the OTC market is now centrally cleared. This is a 
significant achievement, even though, given limits to standardization and exceptions for 
certain FX derivatives as well as (some) end-user trades, only two product types - interest 
rate derivatives and, to a smaller extent, credit derivatives - account for this ratio (see table 
1). A survey conducted by BCBS/CPSS/FSB/IOSCO in 2018 revealed that the margin rule is 
among the top three criteria incentivizing dealers to use CCPs, besides perceptions of 
counterparty credit risk and the clearing mandate itself.1485 
 
The significance of the extent of this change must not be underestimated. However, once 
we broaden the angle of our analysis, it becomes clear that a large proportion of this 
success builds on policy-makers’ ability to draw on margining and central clearing as already 
existing market practices. Conceptually, these practices had been firmly established within 
the market for decades, even though in terms of volume, they used to be less widely 
applied.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, we might argue that it was precisely the previous existence 
of the clearing model which contributed to the success of the margin reform. Indeed, the 
literature argues that ideas evolve in an incremental fashion.1486 As Baker observes, ‘new or 
changing ideas and policy programmes do not appear on a blank canvas but rather interact 
with existing institutional context’.1487 Clearing and margining were not ‘revolutionary’1488 
new concepts. Rather, they preceded the financial crisis and were already well anchored 
within the market of exchange-traded derivatives. The post-crisis clearing/margining 
consensus also evolved along the three lines Hall has identified as prerequisites for the 
successful implementation of new political ideas: their economic, political, and 
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administrative viability.1489 As we saw, the clearing/margining idea appealed to regulators 
on economic theoretical grounds. Policy-makers embraced it as it allowed them to 
demonstrate strength and leadership in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (even though 
the US Republicans never fully subscribed to the idea). The administrative viability in terms 
of the availability and willingness of CCPs to take over the uncleared business as well as 
regulators’ experience in supervising these entities provided further momentum to the 
idea.  
 
Policy-makers, however, did not use this momentum to consider more far-reaching changes 
to the governance of the markets. The justification was often that policy-makers first 
needed to consolidate the vast array of the new reforms the G20 had adopted, before 
further change could be contemplated. However, this often meant that the momentum the 
crisis had provided was not fully exploited. 
 
Placed into a larger context, the degree of change the margin reform has provoked 
therefore remains limited. Most importantly, beyond the immediate confines of the (un-
)cleared market, the reform has not been part of, nor has it led to, the definition of more 
ambitious ‘policy goals’,1490 or ways to promote the ‘global public interest’ in more than a 
predominantly ‘(macro-)prudential’ sense.1491 Ten years after the crisis, we can conclude 
with some confidence that we have not entered the ‘new era of economic engagement’ 
Obama had optimistically announced in 2009.1492 
 
Indeed, the margin reform is reflective of policy-makers’ more limited perspective, 
informed by the belief that financial risk need only be ‘better’ managed, rather than 
fundamentally addressed through broader structural reform. It is true that financial risk, 
particularly systemic risk, cannot easily be dissolved or ‘regulate[d] away’,1493 and that a 
financial system that curtails risk too significantly risks itself becoming highly 
counterproductive on many levels. However, given the destruction caused by the 2008 
crisis, and the multitude of factors that contributed to it (see figure 5 in chapter I-2.3), a 
broader discussion about finding the right balance to address and manage financial risk 
would have required a more far-reaching approach. Most importantly, it would have 
required renegotiating the ‘social purpose’ of the financial system itself.1494 Ideally, this 
conversation would involve ‘an ongoing interactive process’ towards the development of ‘a 
systemic vision, which specifies the purpose, function and contribution of the financial 
system, in wider economic and social terms, derived from combinations of empirical and 
normative reasoning, that is communicated publicly and explicitly to build an inter-
subjective consensus concerning appropriate economic goals, principles, values and 
                                                        
1489
 These are the terms used by Hall (1989:369ff.). 
1490
 Moschella/Tsingou (2013b:197) 
1491
 Helleiner (2014b:76, 86ff.) 
1492
 Obama (2009:2, see also 5) 
1493
 Tsingou (2010:28) 
1494
 Baker (2018) 
 273 
activities’.1495 The debate about the macroprudential dimension of the margin rules barely 
scratches the surface of such a conversation.1496 
 
Returning to the more immediate consequences of the margin reform, CCPs have taken on 
the new business and are now successfully operating in the market on both sides of the 
Atlantic. However, it is important to highlight that central clearing in its current post-crisis 
form does not contain risk to the extent many policy-makers had initially hoped for, when 
they embraced the ideational consensus.1497  
 
There is range of challenges associated with the current situation which this thesis can only 
briefly touch on. First, in order to optimize netting benefits, there should be only one CCP in 
place to cover the global market in its entirety, or at least one CCP per asset class.1498 Policy-
makers, however, quickly abandoned this idea, mainly for political reasons.1499 Second, this 
also means that the problem of interconnectedness, which had contributed to the crisis, has 
not been resolved. Indeed, firms have to use several CCPs in order to clear their 
portfolios.1500 Third, contrary to the initial expectations of some observers, CCPs have not 
been turned into not-for-profit, user-owned entities,1501 or even public utilities,  but remain 
private, profit-oriented businesses.1502 Fourth, at the same time, the recent growth of the 
cleared market has turned a number of CCPs into systemically important entities which are 
considered ‘the ultimate case of “too big to fail”, or, alternatively, ‘too big to fail on 
steroids’. 1503 Fifth, there are increasingly doubts about how well these entities are risk-
managed. For example, there have been growing concerns ‘about the limitations of [their] 
risk models as a centerpiece of [their] risk management strategies’.1504  
 
Sixth, the preceding challenges further raise the importance of identifying viable strategies 
to stress-test CCPs, and to resolve them if they should fail. The latest stress tests in the US 
(2017) and EU (2018) identified some weaknesses, but the results were broadly 
optimistic.1505 However, despite ongoing modifications of the underlying methodologies of 
these tests, analysts have identified several important limitations.1506 More generally, 
discussions about how to resolve a failing CCP have been keeping policy-makers on their 
toes for several years. Yet, in spite of intensive debate, analysts conclude that the current 
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‘toolkit is insufficient to avoid the costs of resolution being borne by taxpayers’.1507 Seventh, 
the Brexit vote has re-opened heated discussions about regulatory jurisdiction. The key 
question is which (group) of regulators should oversee the UK CCPs, particularly 
LCH.Clearnet which clears a large proportion of continental European client trades. These 
debates are not limited to the UK and the EU, but also include the US CFTC which fears that 
the current equivalence determination that took years to negotiate might be at risk 
again.1508  The ideational consensus undergirding the margin reform in terms of the 
incentivization of central clearing has, therefore, not led to a vastly ‘safer’ market, even 
though the reasons for this failure are not directly connected to the reform itself. 
 
It is also worth returning to the role of the large banks. We saw that the dealers had to 
accept major defeats during the policy-making process on the regulation of bespoke trades. 
However, at the same time, they continue to act as the dominant players in both derivative 
markets, as dealers in the uncleared one, and clearing members in the cleared one. In the 
uncleared market, the top 4 banks are still the same as in 2008, only in different order of 
size. As well, in both markets, there is a concentration towards the top players, meaning the 
banks’ centrality has persisted, if not even increased. Currently, this concentration is still 
less pronounced in the cleared market, but the trend towards growing concentration can be 
equally identified.1509 Figures 26 and 27 provide quantitative illustrations.  
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Figure 26: The leading US dealer banks in 2017 
 
Source: Author based on OCC (2018:37 of the pdf, table 1. Notional amount of derivative contracts, top 
commercial banks and trust companies in derivatives, as defined by the OCC (December 2017, USD mn)). 
 
Figure 27: The leading US clearing members 
 
Source: Author based on Skarecky (2017). The figure depicts the top 10 US futures commission merchants in 
function of client funds related to swaps (September 2017, US bn) 
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Finally, recent trends point to a possible return of the pre-crisis factor constellation, 
particularly in the US, as a result of which the level of bank influence might be on the rise 
again. 
 
Indeed, the Republican victory in the 2016 US elections has catapulted the skeptics of the 
margin reform into the driver’s seat. The PRs have so far remained relatively quiet on the 
topic, although Randal Quarles, Tarullo’s successor as the Fed’s new vice chair for financial 
supervision, has clarified that ‘everything is up for a fresh look’.1510 The CFTC, by contrast, 
has publicly announced plans for reforming the reform.  
 
CFTC chair Giancarlo, who was confirmed as Massad’s successor in August 2017, recently 
co-authored a White Paper identifying the perceived flaws of the reform. Most importantly, 
he insists that the two components of the ideational consensus that undergird the margin 
reform – accounting for the systemic risk emanating from uncleared trades and promoting 
the transition of uncleared trades to CCPs - cannot be reconciled in one reform. ‘[T]hese 
two standards for uncleared margin are not compatible from a policy perspective. Margin 
requirements on uncleared derivatives can either be set to reflect counterparty risk, thus 
avoiding regulatory arbitrage, or they can be set higher, to discourage uncleared trades and 
promote clearing’.1511 While the precise meaning of the statement itself is not fully clarified 
in the White Paper, the remainder of Giancarlo’s comments suggests that he believes the 
uncritical implementation of the ideational consensus has made the regime too costly and 
burdensome for some market actors. 
 
Specifically, he argues that the CFTC fundamentally misinterpreted the Dodd-Lincoln letter 
by insufficiently accounting for its clarification that under Dodd-Frank, the margin rules 
‘must set the appropriate standards relative to the risks associated with trading …’.1512 The 
White Paper does not challenge the central pillars of the margin reform pertaining to the 
use of IM, the segregation mandate, and the prohibition of rehypothecation. However, 
Giancarlo offers a roadmap for adjusting the contours of the reform. The respective section 
of the document, which fully resonates with many of the preferences the dealer banks had 
voiced during the earlier stages of the reform process, is titled ‘Uncleared Margin 
Requirements Should Not be Prescriptive’.1513 This commitment, if further acted upon, 
might inaugurate the beginning of the return of the banks as policy-makers’ trusted 
interlocutors and providers of information. The Financial Times reports that Giancarlo ‘won 
a standing ovation from the derivatives industry when he gave his first speech as chair’.1514 
 
The adjustments he envisions include an exemption for ‘smaller financial end-users’ 
including pension funds and insurance firms ‘for the same reasons that commercial end 
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users are exempt’.1515 The White Paper contains no details about the precise threshold that 
would inform the definition of ‘smaller’. Second, he proposes to raise the USD 50mn IM 
payment threshold and the USD 8bn ‘material swap exposure’ threshold below which no IM 
needs to be posted, because they disproportionately affect ‘larger entities that have small 
swap books relative to the size of their businesses’.1516 Third, he intends to introduce VM 
thresholds for end users, given that ‘there are many other regulations, like capital and 
liquidity ratios, to ensure the safety of swap dealers’.1517 
 
Giancarlo acknowledges that ‘[i]t will be challenging for the CFTC to implement these 
recommendations on its own. While they are all consistent with the requirements of Dodd-
Frank, they are not consistent with the rules of other domestic regulators or international 
standards or guidance’.1518 The US Treasury recommends that regulators ‘cooperate with 
non-U.S. jurisdictions that have implemented the BCBS-IOSCO framework’, 1519 but it is 
unclear to what extent the CFTC would be willing to embrace this approach. For CFTC 
Commissioner Brian Quintez, ‘different jurisdictions must have the flexibility to adopt the 
approaches that fit best within their existing regulatory frameworks and market 
structures’.1520 He insists that this would not ignite ‘regulatory arbitrage’ or a ‘regulatory 
“race to the bottom”’, an insinuation he ‘completely reject[s] [as] disingenuous’. To the 
contrary, from his point of view, ‘[m]arket participants seek neither the least nor the most 
regulated marketplaces, but rather marketplaces that have the best balance of sensible, 
objective, and reliable regulation.1521  
 
The EU Commission could not disagree more. Commissioner for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, Valdis Dombrovskis, has emphasized that ‘[i]nternational finance needs 
international regulatory cooperation. Without it, we run the risk of regulatory arbitrage and 
renewed instability’. ‘Lax regulation in one country can create conditions for inadequate 
regulation and contagion throughout the world’. He has made it clear that ‘[w]e are 
sensitive to talk of unpicking financial legislation which applies carefully negotiated 
international standards and rules’.1522  
 
It appears uncertain to what extent any changes to the post-crisis margin rules would be 
adopted at the transnational level through WGMR. The group was not dissolved after the 
publication of its final framework, but it has so far remained largely quiet on the current 
deregulation debate in the US. 
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While the EU has also chipped away at the rules, its current reforms of the reform have 
been much less far-reaching than those envisaged by the CFTC. In May 2018, the ESAs 
published a proposal that would exempt simple, transparent and standardised (STS) 
securitisations from the requirements to exchange IM and post VM.1523 As well, there are 
plans to relax the VM requirement for FX swaps and FX forwards which would apply to a 
significantly smaller range of entities. Indeed, in May 2018, a report by the EU Parliament 
proposed that ‘[i]n order to avoid international regulatory divergence and bearing in mind 
the particular nature of the trade in such derivatives, the mandatory exchange of variation 
margins on physically settled foreign exchange forwards and physically settled foreign 
exchange swap derivatives should only apply to transactions between the most systemic 
counterparties, namely credit institutions and investment firms’.1524 At the time of writing, 
the precise contours of the final solution remain to be determined. It is also not entirely 
clear whether policy-makers’ primary objective is to simply bring the EU requirement more 
in line with the US, where supervisory guidance applies only to banks under the Fed’s 
jurisdiction,  and/or whether it is a response to industry pressure. Regarding the end-user 
business, the report suggests the adoption of two separate clearing thresholds for financial 
and non-financial firms, ‘[s]ince financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties 
present different risks’.1525 
 
Compared to the US, the EU has so far largely maintained its resolution against 
deregulation. However, it is open whether it would persist past Brexit, when the City of 
London would no longer be part of the EU market. The major uncertainties surrounding 
Brexit as well as its precise implications for the City mean that currently we cannot fully 
discuss this aspect. The FCA’s recent comments on the issue have been less pronounced. 
For instance, chair Charles Randell has warned of the ‘damaging cycle’ deregulation might 
initiate.1526 By contrast, the UK government has already voiced its preference for large-scale 
deregulation in order to boost the competitiveness of its financial system post-Brexit.1527 
Against this background, it cannot be excluded that the UK would join the US at the 
ideational level.  
 
It remains to be seen how the EU would respond to such a move. On the one hand, 
competitive deregulation dynamics could equally set in on the continent. On the other 
hand, the EU could strengthen its resolve, trying to sail against the wind blowing from the 
US. An exit from Brexit, which is occasionally discussed, could reinforce this trend, as it 
would leave the EU’s inter-state power informed by market size intact. However, if the UK 
were to leave the EU market as planned, Europe would likely lose this power, unless a 
special arrangement for the EU-UK financial markets was adopted. Absent such an 
agreement, Brexit would make standing against the tide more difficult for the EU, unless it 
were to result in a mass exodus from the City to the continent. In this case, the EU could 
                                                        
1523
 ESAs (2018) 
1524
 EU Parliament (2018:10) 
1525
 EU Parliament (2018:8) 
1526
 Randell quoted in Jones (2018b). 
1527
 See for example Gordon et al. (2017). 
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respond more forcefully to US deregulatory plans, since its overall market share would 
probably decrease less significantly. However, if the US were to deregulate alone, bypassing 
the transnational level, the EU could find itself exposed to market forces that might turn out 
difficult to resist. Indeed, the dynamics in the US might encourage EU banks to once again 
(threaten to) exercise structural power in order to try to extract regulatory concessions, 
even though many firms are still struggling with the wider effects of the triple crisis 
(financial, debt, and economic). On the other hand, a ‘hard’ Brexit could also lead to serious 
market disruptions that could prevent the deregulation trend from taking hold, although 
they would probably result in corresponding shocks to market size. 
 
If the deregulation trend were to gain further strength, domestic institutional variables 
would most likely not stand in its way. As we saw in the pre-crisis chapter, from a domestic 
institutional point of view, deregulation is often much easier to achieve than regulation. 
 
In addition, the level of public issue salience pertaining to the need to regulate the 
derivatives markets has significantly decreased since 2008, and, without a new, large-scale 
scandal or crisis, is likely to remain low. The challenges associated with central clearing keep 
attracting attention, at least among the more informed policy-makers. However, the 
regulation of the uncleared market appears to no longer be a major concern for the average 
policy-maker, and even less so for the average voter, of which there is now also a new 
generation which was less immediately exposed to the effects of the 2008 crisis. Against 
this background, Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson in a recent op-ed published by The New 
York Times warn that ‘[f]or those working to keep our financial system resilient, the enemy 
is forgetting’.1528 
 
This leaves us with the business unity moderator. While the rise of the buy-side as a chorus 
of new voices should not be underestimated, the empirical evidence of the post-crisis cases 
highlights that market actors faced few challenges in achieving consensus on the perceived 
need for keeping regulatory requirements relaxed. This consensus would probably translate 
to renewed deregulation. 
 
Overall, if these trends were to persist, they could lead to a re-emergence of strong bank 
influence over a new round of deregulation. They could also result in the more fragmented 
and decentralized framework that observers had initially expected after the crisis,1529 and 
which has already become a reality with respect to several aspects of the cleared market 
and trade reporting.1530 
 
In conclusion, the margin reform per se represents a ‘seismic shift’1531 in the ways in which 
the uncleared market is governed. This ‘shift’ is the result of a reform over which the large 
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dealer banks, as the central actors of the uncleared market, exercised limited influence. The 
post-crisis situation therefore stands in sharp contrast to the pre-crisis period which was 
characterized by deregulation and a factor constellation which afforded the banks 
commanding influence. However, if studied in a larger context, it becomes clear that the 
margin reform has not led to, nor has it been accompanied by more far-reaching change to 
the governance of the derivatives market, and that the regulatory pendulum might soon 
begin swinging back. 
 
While we are not witnessing a ‘status quo crisis’,1532  we have also not entered ‘a 
‘constitutive’ phase in the development of a new international financial system’,1533 and a 
return to a ‘status quo crisis’ cannot be excluded. 
  
                                                        
1532
 Helleiner (2014c) 
1533
 Helleiner (2010a:634) 
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Appendix A - Timeline of major events 
 
1974 
 
   Congress adopts Treasury Amendment 
   Establishment of the CFTC 
 
1985 
 
 Formation of the International Swaps Dealers Association 
 
1986 
 
 Adoption of the Financial Services Act in the UK 
 
1987 
 
 Publication of the first version of ISDA’s Master Agreement 
 
1989 
 
 CFTC publishes ‘Swap Policy Statement’ 
 
1991 
 
 Gibson Greetings derivatives scandal 
 
1992 
 
 IOSCO fails to adopt an international accord on capital requirements 
for securities firms 
 
1993 
 
 CFTC issues ‘Exemption for certain Contracts Involving Energy 
Products’ 
 
 Metallgesellschaft derivatives scandal 
 
 G30 publishes ‘Derivatives: Practices and Principles’ 
 
1994 
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 Procter & Gamble and Orange County derivatives scandals 
 
 Establishment of the Derivatives Policy Group 
 
1995 
 
 Derivatives Policy Group publishes ‘Framework for Voluntary 
Oversight’ 
 
1998 
 
 Failure of Long Term Capital Management 
 
 CFTC issues ‘Concept release concerning Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Market’ 
 
1999 
 
 Counterparty Risk Management Group publishes ‘Improving 
Counterparty Risk Management Practices’ 
 
2000 
 
 US Congress adopts the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
 
 UK adopts the Financial Services and Market Act 
 
2002 
 
 EU adopts the Financial Conglomerates Directive 
 
2004 
 
 SEC adopts Consolidated Supervised Entities programme 
 
2008 
 
15 September Failure of Lehman Brothers 
 
16 September Bailout of AIG 
 
14-15 November G20 Summit in Washington, D.C. 
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2009 
 
3 July EU Commission publishes first consultation on ‘Possible initiatives to 
enhance the resilience of OTC derivatives markets’ 
 
22 September US administration publishes ‘Draft Legislation for Financial Regulatory 
Reform’ 
 
24-25 September G20 Summit in Pittsburgh 
 
13 October Barney Frank introduces ‘Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market Act of 
2009 (H.R. 3795)’ 
 
10 November, 10th Chris Dodd introduces ‘Restoring Financial Stability Act of 2009’ 
(discussion draft) 
 
11 December  House of Representative passes‘The Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2009’ (H.R. 4173)’ 
 
2010 
 
15 April Chris Dodd introduces ‘S.3217 - Restoring American Financial Stability 
Act of 2010’ 
 
14 June EU Commissions publishes second consultation on ‘Derivatives and 
Market Infrastructures’ 
 
21 July President Obama signs the ‘Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173)’ into law 
 
19 October US Treasury publishes notice and request for comment on the 
‘Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Forwards’ 
 
2011 
 
1 January EU’s ESAs become formally operational 
 
17 March Joint BCBS-CPSS ‘Working Group on Foreign Exchange Settlement 
Risk’ established 
 
11 April Prudential Regulators publish first proposal on ‘Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities’ 
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12 April CFTC publishes first proposal on ‘Margin Requirements for Uncleared 
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants’ 
 
29 April US Treasury publishes ‘Notice of Proposed Determination on Foreign 
Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act’ 
 
8 September CFTC publishes ‘Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation 
Schedule: Trading Documentation and Margining Requirements Under 
Section 4s of the CEA’ 
 
October WGMR established 
 
3-4 November G20 Summit in Cannes 
 
2012 
 
6 March ESAs publish ‘Joint Discussion Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical 
Standards on risk mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives not 
cleared by a CCP under the Regulation on OTC derivatives, CCPs and 
Trade Repositories (JC/DP/2012/1)’ 
 
4 July EU Commission adopts ‘Regulation No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories (European Market 
Infrastructures Regulation- EMIR)’ 
 
31 July ESRB publishes its report ‘Macro-Prudential Stance on the Use of OTC 
Derivatives by Non-Financial Corporations’ 
 
July WGMR publishes first consultation paper on ‘Margin requirements for 
non-centrally-cleared derivatives’ 
 
27 September ESMA publishes numerical values of the clearing threshold 
 
18 October SEC publishes proposed rule ‘Capital, Margin, and Segregation 
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers’ 
 
16 November US Treasury publishes ‘Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and 
Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the Commodity Exchange Act’ 
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19 December EU Commission adopts ‘Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
149/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard 
to regulatory technical standards on indirect clearing arrangements, 
the clearing obligation, the public register, access to a trading venue, 
non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques for OTC 
derivatives contracts not cleared by a CCP’ 
 
2013 
 
February WGMR publishes second consultation paper on ‘Margin requirements 
for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ 
 
15 February BCBS-CPSS publishes ‘Supervisory guidance for managing risks 
associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions’ 
 
September WGMR publishes final policy framework for ‘Margin requirements for 
non-centrally cleared derivatives’ 
 
23 December US Fed implements ‘Supervisory guidance for managing risks 
associated with the settlement of foreign exchange transactions’ 
 
2014 
 
14 April ESAs publish first ‘Consultation Paper Draft regulatory technical 
standards on risk-mitigation techniques for OTC-derivative contracts 
not cleared by a CCP under Article 11(15) of Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012’ 
 
3 September Prudential Regulators publish second consultation paper on ‘Margin 
and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities’ 
 
23 September CFTC publishes second consultation paper on ‘Margin Requirements 
for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants’ 
 
2015 
 
12 January President Obama signs the TRIA Reauthorization Bill (H.R. 26) into Law 
 
March  WGMR decides on extended implementation deadlines of Margin 
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives 
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10 June ESAs publish ‘Second Consultation Paper Draft Regulatory Technical 
Standards on risk-mitigation techniques for OTC-derivative contracts 
not cleared by a CCP under Article 11(15) of Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012’ 
 
13 August ESMA publishes ‘EMIR Review Report no.1 - Review on the use of OTC 
derivatives by non-financial counterparties’ 
 
21, 22 October Prudential Regulators publish final rules on ‘Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities’ 
 
18 December CFTC publishes final rule on ‘Margin Requirements for Uncleared 
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants’ 
 
2016 
 
8 March ESAs publish ‘Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on risk-
mitigation techniques for OTC-derivative contracts not cleared by a 
CCP under Article 11(15) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012’ 
 
25 April EU Commission adopts a uniform definition of ‘spot contracts’ 
through the COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2017/565 of 
25 April 2016 supplementing Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements 
and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for 
the purposes of that Directive 
 
9 June EU Commission informs ESAs of delayed implementation of draft 
margin RTS 
 
16 August ISDA publishes VM Protocol for the US 
 
17 November ISDA publishes EMIR-compliant version of the VM Protocol 
 
23 November EU Commission published ‘Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council under Article 85(1) of 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and 
trade repositories’ 
 
1 September Launch of IM and VM phase-in in the US 
 
4 October EU Commission adopts final margin RTS through ‘COMMISSION 
DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) 2016/2251 of 4 October 2016 
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supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories with regard to regulatory 
technical standards for risk-mitigation techniques for OTC derivative 
contracts not cleared by a central counterparty’ 
 
2017 
 
1 February  Launch of IM phase-in the EU 
 
1 March Second final deadline for non-phase 1 US and all EU entities to 
become VM rule-compliant 
 
4 May EU Commission publishes ‘Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension of 
the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-
mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a 
central counterparty, the registration and supervision of trade 
repositories and the requirements for trade repositories’ 
 
1 September Ultimate deadline for US and EU entities to become VM rule-
compliant 
 
18 December ESAs publish ‘Draft regulatory technical standards on amending 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2251 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with 
regard to regulatory technical standards on risk-mitigation techniques 
for OTC derivative contracts not cleared by a CCP under Article 11(15) 
of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 with regard to physically settled 
foreign exchange forwards’ 
 
 
 
 
 
